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This thesis explores the strategic dynamics of Jihad across the first 70 years of Islam, 
surveying how the military instrument dynamically served policy in a means-end 
relationship; and was the product of both the systemic strategic environment, and the 
bargaining dynamics of domestic politics. Two distinct concepts of Jihad are 
distinguished; the first is the theological and perpetual contest or absolute Jihad, that 
seeks to impose the jurisdiction of God’s sovereignty without challenge; and 
secondly, Jihad in reality, that is, war in reality subject to the vicissitudes of the 
strategic setting and environment. 
 
Mapping the evolution of Jihad reveals that the initial warfighting practices of the 
Prophet Muhammad served revolutionary policies that would be transformed by the 
policies of successive Caliphates (al-Khulafa al-Rashidun) yet remain the idiom of 
military action in Islam. Specifically, Jihad served the functions of homeland security, 
defensive expansionism, and most prominently, an emancipatory interventionist 
Da’wa Policy. In its final evolution, during the first caliphate of the Umayyad 
Dynasty, Jihad served an imperial agenda designed to regain strategic and regional 
hegemony. The strategic dynamics of Jihad across the first seventy-years of Islam 
was infused by the cult of the offensive as early Muslim political leadership competed 
with regional actors for superior offense-dominance and the strategic initiative, under 
conditions of anarchy and self-help. 
 
The research concludes that the proposition of ‘Jihad as a continuation of politik by 
other means’ accurately reflects the politico-strategic behaviour of Muslim political 
administrations during the first century of Islam. Absolute Jihad consistently provided 
the permissive essence for policies of limited warfare that sought to implement Jihad 
as the idiom of military action, although objectives were set according to the geo-
political and strategic realities of the operational and strategic environment and setting 






I would like to thank the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, for a 
decade of education in War Studies. In particular, I would like to express my 
appreciation and thanks to my supervisor Professor Michael Rainsborough whose 
mentorship has been invaluable; Dr. Barrie Paskins (retired) for encouraging my 
academic path, and Professor Philip Sabin who believed in my potential. 
Additionally, I would like to thank Professors Guglielmo Verdirame and Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn, Dr. John Stone, and Dr. James Worrall, for their insightful comments 
and criticisms, without which this work would never have been. 
 
Finally, a special thanks to my wife, son, and daughter, whose enduring patience, love 
and support, has sustained me during my research. 
 



















Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 2	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ 3	  
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................ 12	  
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 14	  
CHAPTER ONE ..................................................................................................................... 15	  
1.0. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 16	  
1.1. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................................................................ 17	  
1.2. INTRODUCTORY DEFINITIONS ......................................................................................... 18	  
1.3. A CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE ............................................. 21	  
1.3.1. HISTORICAL REVISIONISM & HISTORIOGRAPHY IN ENGLISH ........................................ 21	  
1.3.2. TRADITIONAL ARABIC HISTORIOGRAPHY ...................................................................... 23	  
1.3.2a. Biographical Literature in English (Seera) ................................................................... 24	  
1.3.2b. Military History in English (Maghazi) ......................................................................... 25	  
1.3.3. THE FORMATION OF THE EARLY ISLAMIC POLITY (AL-KHILAFAH) ................................. 26	  
1.3.3a. The Ridda Literature ..................................................................................................... 27	  
1.3.3b. The Futuh Literature ..................................................................................................... 27	  
1.3.3c. The Fitna Literature ...................................................................................................... 28	  
1.3.3d. Umayyad Historiography ............................................................................................. 29	  
1.3.4. THE RELIGIOUS GENRE ................................................................................................... 32	  
1.3.4a. The Legal Approach ..................................................................................................... 32	  
1.3.4b. International Law and Relations (Siyar) ....................................................................... 34	  
1.3.4c. Just War Theory – The Ethical Approach .................................................................... 35	  
1.3.4d. The Qur’an & Hadith – The Hermeneutical Approach ................................................ 36	  
1.4. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 37	  
1.5. RESEARCH PARAMETERS ................................................................................................ 38	  
1.5.1. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES ................................................................. 40	  
1.6. THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS TO BE INVESTIGATED ................ 42	  
1.6.1. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................ 42	  
1.6.2. Sub-Investigative Questions ........................................................................................... 43	  
1.7. VERIFICATION .................................................................................................................. 44	  
1.8. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................... 47	  
1.9. ON ARABIC CONVENTIONS AND TRANSLATIONS ........................................................... 49	  
 5 
CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................... 50	  
2.0. STRATEGIC THEORETICS ................................................................................................. 50	  
2.1. ON WAR ............................................................................................................................ 51	  
2.2. THE TRINITARIAN SYSTEM .............................................................................................. 51	  
2.2.1. PROPOSITION 1 – RATIONAL CALCULATION (POLICY) ................................................... 51	  
2.2.2. SUB-PROPOSITION A – VERTICAL DESIGN (STRATEGY) ................................................ 54	  
2.2.3. SUB-PROPOSITION B - HORIZONTAL DESIGN (STRATEGIC) ........................................... 56	  
2.3. THE STRATEGIC SETTING ................................................................................................ 57	  
2.3.1. PROPOSITION 2 – RATIONAL ACTORS SEEK TO CONTROL BLIND FORCES ..................... 57	  
2.3.2. SUB-PROPOSITION C - INTERACTION ANALYSIS (LOCAL POLITICS) .............................. 58	  
2.3.2a. The Strategic Actor ....................................................................................................... 59	  
2.3.2b. The Strategic Interest .................................................................................................... 60	  
2.4. THE VARIABLES OF CHAOS ............................................................................................. 61	  
2.4.1. PROPOSITION 3 – THE NON-LINEAR FORCES OF CHAOS, ESCALATION, AND FRICTION . 61	  
2.4.2. The Strategic Environment ............................................................................................. 63	  
2.5. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 65	  
2.6. CLAUSEWITZ AND THE ‘CASE STUDY APPROACH’ ........................................................ 67	  
2.6.1. THE CURIOUS CASE OF NAPOLEON ................................................................................ 69	  
2.7. STRATEGIC THEORY ........................................................................................................ 70	  
2.7.1. PROPOSITION 4 – PRAGMATIC JUDGEMENT NOT TRUTH ................................................ 70	  
2.7.2. Advantages of Strategic Theory ..................................................................................... 72	  
2.7.3. The Theoretical Flexibility of Strategic Theory ............................................................. 72	  
2.7.4. The Parsimonious Nature of Strategic Theory ............................................................... 73	  
2.7.5. Moral Equivocation ........................................................................................................ 74	  
2.8. STRATEGIC THEORETICS AS A DISCIPLINARY MATRIX ................................................ 76	  
2.8.1. THE STRATEGIC PARADIGM ............................................................................................ 77	  
2.9. STRATEGIC DIAGNOSTICS ............................................................................................... 79	  
2.9.1. DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE ............................................................................................... 80	  
2.9.2. Offense-Defense Theory (ODT) and Strategic Dynamics ............................................. 81	  
2.9.3. Diagnostic Stages of Assessment ................................................................................... 83	  
2.9.4. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 86	  
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................ 88	  
3.0. THE ARCHETYPAL JIHAD (610 – 632) ............................................................................. 88	  
3.1. NOMENCLATURE .............................................................................................................. 89	  
3.1.1. THE PRE-ISLAMIC JIHAD ................................................................................................. 90	  
 6 
3.2. THE STRATEGIC SETTING PRIOR TO ISLAM .................................................................. 91	  
3.2.1. THE CONCEPT OF JAHILIYA ............................................................................................. 91	  
3.2.2. Warfighting of the Arabs ................................................................................................ 93	  
3.3. THE BASELINE ZERO (JIHAD V.0) ................................................................................... 94	  
3.4. PHASE ONE MECCA – THE STRATEGIC SETTING ............................................................... 95	  
(610-622) .................................................................................................................................. 95	  
3.4.3. The Mission of Islam – The Overarching Political Objective ........................................ 97	  
3.4.4. The Clash of Value Systems and Strategic Preferences ................................................. 97	  
3.4.5. The Escalation of Blind Forces ...................................................................................... 98	  
3.4.6. The Re-Calculation of Policy ......................................................................................... 99	  
3.5. PHASE TWO (622-630) .................................................................................................... 101	  
3.5.1. MEDINA - THE RATIONAL PURSUIT OF AIMS ............................................................... 102	  
3.5.2. The New Strategic Environment .................................................................................. 103	  
3.5.3. Guerrilla Warfare .......................................................................................................... 104	  
3.5.4. The Results of Guerrilla Jihad ...................................................................................... 105	  
3.5.5a. Milestone # 1: The Battle of Badr (624) ..................................................................... 106	  
3.5.5b. Milestone # 2: The Battle of Uhud (625) ................................................................... 107	  
3.5.5c. Milestone # 3: The Battle of al-Khandaq (627) .......................................................... 108	  
3.5.5d. Milestone # 4: The Treaty of Hudaybiya (628) .......................................................... 110	  
3.5.6a. Analysis of Phase Two - The Horizontal Reconfiguration of Jihad ........................... 112	  
3.5.6b. Jihad in Reality ........................................................................................................... 113	  
3.6. PHASE THREE (630-632) ................................................................................................ 115	  
3.6.1. POLITICAL VICTORY ..................................................................................................... 116	  
3.6.2. Analysis of Phase Three – Trinitarian Success ............................................................ 117	  
3.6.3. Offense-Defense Analysis of Phase Three ................................................................... 119	  
3.6.3a. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 10. Offense Grows Even Stronger - Hypothesis J ............................. 120	  
3.6.3b. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 6. Faits Accomplis are More Common and Dangerous -Hypothesis F
 ................................................................................................................................................ 121	  
3.6.3c. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 7. States / [Actors] Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G ........................... 122	  
3.6.3d. ODT - D/Dx Conclusions ........................................................................................... 123	  
3.7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 124	  
CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................ 126	  
4.0. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STRATEGIC SETTING ............................................ 126	  
4.1. THE RASHIDUN CALIPHATES (632-661) ........................................................................ 127	  
4.2. THE CALIPHATE OF ABU BAKR (632-634) .................................................................... 127	  
 7 
4.2.1. POLITICAL SUCCESSION ................................................................................................ 128	  
4.2.2. Crisis Management ....................................................................................................... 129	  
4.2.3. Strategic Threat # 1: Political Insurrection ................................................................... 130	  
4.2.4. Strategic Threat # 2: False Prophets ............................................................................. 131	  
4.2.5. Strategic Threat # 3: Zakat Collection .......................................................................... 131	  
4.2.6. Rational Calculation ..................................................................................................... 132	  
4.3.	   PHASE ONE: THE RIDDA WARS (632-633) ................................................................ 134	  
4.3.1. MILITARY GENIUS ........................................................................................................ 134	  
4.3.2. Isolate and Destroy ....................................................................................................... 135	  
4.3.3. The Pacification of Arabia ............................................................................................ 136	  
4.4. ANALYSIS OF PHASE ONE – EXPRESSING THE STRATEGIC PARADIGM ..................... 137	  
4.5. DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION OF PHASE ONE .................................................................. 139	  
1.5.1.	   ODT - D/DX ♯ 4. MOVING FIRST IS MORE REWARDING - (HYPOTHESIS D) ............ 141	  
+ ODT - D/DX ♯ 5. WINDOWS ARE LARGER - (HYPOTHESIS E) ............................................. 141	  
4.6. CONCLUSION OF PHASE ONE – THE ART OF COMMITMENT ...................................... 143	  
4.7. PHASE TWO: BORDER CONTROL (633-634) ................................................................. 144	  
4.5.1. THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC SETTING ........................................................................... 145	  
4.5.2. The Extended Security Strategy ................................................................................... 146	  
4.5.3. Contain and Consolidate - Iraq ..................................................................................... 147	  
4.5.4. Contain and Consolidate - Syria ................................................................................... 147	  
4.5.5. The Legacy of Abu Bakr .............................................................................................. 148	  
4.5.6. Analysis of Phase Two – De-Escalation to Limited War ............................................. 149	  
4.6. DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION OF PHASE TWO ................................................................. 150	  
4.6.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 2. Defensive Expansion - Hypothesis B .............................................. 150	  
4.6.1. ODT - D/DX ♯ 8. SECRECY IS MORE COMMON AND DANGEROUS - HYPOTHESIS H ... 151	  
4.7. TRINITARIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIPHATE OF ABU BAKR ......................... 154	  
CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................................. 158	  
5.0. THE RISE OF THE DAR AL-ISLAM .................................................................................. 158	  
5.1. PRELIMINARIES .............................................................................................................. 159	  
5.2. DYNAMIC EXPANSIONISM .............................................................................................. 161	  
5.3. THE CALIPHATE OF ‘UMAR IBN AL-KHATTAB (634-644) ............................................ 163	  
5.4. STAGE ONE POST-RIDDA (634-640) .............................................................................. 163	  
5.4.1. POST-RIDDA POLITICAL DAMAGE CONTROL ................................................................ 164	  
5.4.2. Administrative and Military Reform ............................................................................ 165	  
 8 
5.4.3. Sheathing the Sword of God ......................................................................................... 166	  
5.4.4. Popular Government ..................................................................................................... 167	  
5.4.5. ON THE RHETORIC OF RIGHTEOUSNESS ....................................................................... 168	  
5.5. DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION OF THE DA’WA POLICY .................................................... 170	  
5.5.1. ODT - D/DX ♯ 1. OPPORTUNISTIC EXPANSION – (HYPOTHESIS A) ............................. 170	  
5.5.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 3. Defensive Resistance  - [Hypothesis C] .......................................... 176	  
5.5.3. Defensive Resistance by the Population ....................................................................... 177	  
5.6. STAGE TWO - POLITICAL STABILITY (640 - 644) ......................................................... 182	  
5.6.1. THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY ........................................................................................ 183	  
5.6.2. Origins .......................................................................................................................... 183	  
5.6.3. Systemic Projection of Military Force ......................................................................... 185	  
5.6.4. The Hunt for Yazdegerd ............................................................................................... 186	  
5.6.5. Islamic Mission (da’wa) ............................................................................................... 187	  
5.6.6. Security Protocol .......................................................................................................... 188	  
5.7. THE TRINITARIAN IMPERATIVE FOR RESETTLEMENT ................................................ 191	  
5.7.1. CONTROLLING BLIND FORCES AND THE PLAY OF CHANCE AND PROBABILITY .......... 191	  
5.7.2. The Resettlement Policy as Military Enrichment Programme ..................................... 193	  
5.8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 194	  
CHAPTER SIX ..................................................................................................................... 195	  
6.0. THE VICISSITUDES OF JIHAD (644 - 661) ...................................................................... 195	  
6.1. PRELIMINARIES .............................................................................................................. 195	  
6.2. THE CALIPHATE OF ‘UTHMAN IBN ‘AFFAN (644 – 656) ............................................... 196	  
6.3. PERIOD ONE - A CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY THE SAME MEANS .......................... 197	  
6.3.1. THE SYSTEMIC STRATEGIC SETTING ............................................................................ 198	  
6.3.2. Counter-insurgency Operations .................................................................................... 199	  
6.3.3. Border Control and Defense-Dominance ..................................................................... 201	  
6.3.4. Continued Expansions .................................................................................................. 202	  
6.3.5. The Regional Strategic Environment ........................................................................... 204	  
6.3.6. Naval Power ................................................................................................................. 205	  
6.4. DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION ............................................................................................ 206	  
6.4.1A. ODT - D/DX ♯ 3. DEFENSIVE RESISTANCE  - [HYPOTHESIS C] .................................. 207	  
6.4.1B. ODT - D/DX ♯ 1. OPPORTUNISTIC EXPANSION – [HYPOTHESIS A] ........................... 209	  
6.4.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 9. Intense Arms Racing [Military Power] – [Hypothesis I] ................ 210	  
6.4.3. Growing Military Power ............................................................................................... 211	  
 9 
6.4.4. Diagnostic Evaluation .................................................................................................. 214	  
6.5. PERIOD TWO - THE NEW CRISIS ENVIRONMENT ........................................................ 216	  
6.5.1. THE SHADOW OF ‘UMAR .............................................................................................. 216	  
6.5.2. The ‘Umar Doctrine ..................................................................................................... 217	  
6.5.3. From Meritocracy to Nepotism .................................................................................... 218	  
6.5.4. Insurrections ................................................................................................................. 220	  
6.5.5. Diminishing Returns of Jihad ....................................................................................... 221	  
6.5.6. The Political Restraints of Jihad ................................................................................... 222	  
6.6. TRINITARIAN ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................... 224	  
6.7. THE END OF THE RASHIDUN (656 - 661) ....................................................................... 227	  
6.7.1. PRELIMINARIES ............................................................................................................. 227	  
6.7.2. The Fitna ...................................................................................................................... 228	  
6.8. ON THE CALIPHATE OF ‘ALI IBN ABU TALIB (656 – 661) ........................................... 229	  
6.8.1. THE STRATEGIC SETTING ............................................................................................. 230	  
6.8.2. Political legitimacy ....................................................................................................... 231	  
6.8.3. Trinitarian overview of the Civil War .......................................................................... 231	  
6.8.4. The Domestic Dynamics of Jihad ................................................................................. 234	  
6.8.5. Systemic Recession ...................................................................................................... 236	  
6.9. CONCLUSIONS OF CALIPHATE OF ‘ALI ......................................................................... 237	  
CHAPTER SEVEN .............................................................................................................. 239	  
7.0. THE RISE OF THE JIHAD STATE (661 - 680) .................................................................. 239	  
7.1. THE CALIPHATE OF MU‘AWIYA IBN ABU SUFYAN ...................................................... 239	  
7.2. THE TWO FACES OF MU‘AWIYA ................................................................................... 240	  
7.2.1. Manifest Destiny .......................................................................................................... 242	  
7.3. THE GRAND STRATEGY OF DA’WA 2.0. ........................................................................ 244	  
7.3.1. POLITICAL STABILITY MEASURES ................................................................................ 245	  
7.3.2. POST-FITNA DAMAGE CONTROL .................................................................................. 246	  
7.3.3. Administrative Reforms ............................................................................................... 247	  
7.3.4. The Reinstatement of the Shura Council ...................................................................... 248	  
7.3.5. The Return of the ‘Umar Doctrine ............................................................................... 249	  
7.3.6. Military Reforms .......................................................................................................... 250	  
7.3.7. IMPERIAL BY DIVINE RIGHT ......................................................................................... 251	  
7.3.8. HOLY WAR .................................................................................................................... 252	  
7.4. THE PRAGMATIC IMPERIAL HOLY WAR ...................................................................... 255	  
7.5. RETURN OF THE SECURITY PROTOCOL ........................................................................ 257	  
7.5.1. STRATEGIC MISDIRECTION AND DISRUPTION .............................................................. 257	  
 10 
7.5.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 8. Secrecy is More Common and Dangerous - Hypothesis H ............. 259	  
7.6. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY ................................................................................................. 261	  
7.6.1. ODT - D/DX ♯ 6.  FAITS ACCOMPLIS ARE MORE COMMON AND DANGEROUS -
HYPOTHESIS F ......................................................................................................................... 262	  
7.6.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 7.  States Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G ............................................ 263	  
7.7. THE NEW OFFENSIVE OF THE DAR AL-ISLAM ............................................................... 267	  
7.7.1. THE PURGE .................................................................................................................... 268	  
7.7.2. Ermattungsstrategie ..................................................................................................... 270	  
7.7.3. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 4. Moving First is More Rewarding - Hypothesis D ........................... 272	  
7.7.4. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 5. Windows are Larger - Hypothesis E ............................................... 272	  
7.8. THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF DEFENSE DOMINANCE .............................................. 274	  
7.9. TRINITARIAN CONCLUSIONS OF THE CALIPHATE OF MU‘AWIYA .............................. 276	  
CHAPTER EIGHT .............................................................................................................. 278	  
8.0. INVESTIGATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 278	  
8.1. SUB-INVESTIGATIVE RESEARCH QUESTIONS A. – D. ................................................... 278	  
8.1.1. SUB-INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS A. & B. ..................................................................... 279	  
8.1.2. Sub-Investigative Questions c. ..................................................................................... 283	  
8.1.3. Sub-Investigative Questions d. ..................................................................................... 289	  
8.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 - 4 .......................................................................................... 293	  
8.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 2 ................................................................................................ 293	  
8.2.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 3 ................................................................................................ 293	  
8.2.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 4 ................................................................................................ 298	  
8.3. RESEARCH QUESTION 1 ................................................................................................. 302	  
8.4. FINAL REMARKS ............................................................................................................. 305	  
8.5. AREAS OF CONTINUING RESEARCH .............................................................................. 306	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 309	  
A. ............................................................................................................................................ 309	  
B. ............................................................................................................................................ 311	  
C. ............................................................................................................................................ 313	  
D. ............................................................................................................................................ 315	  
E. ............................................................................................................................................. 316	  
F. ............................................................................................................................................. 317	  
G. ............................................................................................................................................ 318	  
 11 
H. ............................................................................................................................................ 319	  
I. .............................................................................................................................................. 322	  
J. .............................................................................................................................................. 324	  
K. ............................................................................................................................................ 325	  
L. ............................................................................................................................................. 327	  
M. ............................................................................................................................................ 329	  
N. ............................................................................................................................................ 331	  
O. ............................................................................................................................................ 332	  
P. ............................................................................................................................................. 332	  
Q. ............................................................................................................................................ 333	  
R. ............................................................................................................................................ 334	  
S. ............................................................................................................................................. 335	  
T. ............................................................................................................................................. 338	  
V. ............................................................................................................................................ 339	  
W. ........................................................................................................................................... 340	  
Y. ............................................................................................................................................ 341	  



















Absolute Jihad Theological battle between ‘Truth’ and ‘Falsity’; the 
absolute Sovereignty of God versus the laws of 
mankind over others.  
Ahl al-Dhimma   Non-Muslim citizens of the dar al-Islam 
Al-sahaba Companions of the Prophet 
Al-shura   Consultative political decision-making 
Al-wala wa al-bara   Loyalty and disavowal  
Amir al-Mu’meneen  Commander of the Believers 
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Ayyam al-‘Arab  Glorified traditions of Arab warfare  
Bay‘a  Oaths of allegiance 
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Dar al-harb    Hostile territories 
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This is study examines the strategic dynamics of Jihad as a continuation of politik by 
other means from 610 to 680 C.E. The strategic dynamics of Jihad refers to the broad 
identification of critical stages and events that formed a consistent process in the 
evolution of Jihad that is congruent with strategic theoretics or the generally 
acknowledged ‘strategic approach’. Modern strategic studies broadly speaking, is a 
relatively young field that can expand and develop critical, responsible, and purposive 
conclusions, but has yet to be applied to the Islamic discourse in any meaningful 
manner. The research presented in this study is a working example of the scope and 
breadth that strategic theoretics can achieve when creatively applied. 
 
In this study, strategic theoretics are used to explore the relationship between ends 
and means; providing an analysis or framework to translate how the expected utility 
of armed force was used to serve political objectives through the medium of policy 
and decision-making processes during the first century of Islam. The research 
establishes the instrumentalisation of warfighting in Islam as a function of politik that 
is both external policy and internal politics; and how ideas of Jihad became 
institutionalised and consequently affected strategic thought. 
 
A method of diagnostic assessment is employed to test the tenability of offensive 
realist assumptions through the prime predictions of variables expected to induce war 
based upon shifts in the offense-defense balance between strategic actors, known as 
Offense-Defense Theory.1 The method of investigation and research design has been 
encouraged by the continuing strategic lacunae and failure to address major 
theoretical issues concerning the original concept of Jihad that is an essential element 
constituting the conceptual core of early Islamic history. The overall approach 
distinguishes the originality of the research methodology and intention as the first 
strategically committed investigation of Jihad.  
 
                                                
1 Following the American-English convention of the theory the spelling of defense shall remain as used 
by its practitioners, and all references to the theory and its applications shall retain the spelling defense 
to maintain congruity with theory. In instances unrelated to offense-defense theory, the conventional 
British spelling defence shall be used. 
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1.1. The Problem Statement 
 
Since September 11th 2001, Islam and warfare has stimulated an increasingly large 
academic and non-academic interest. ‘Jihad’ has become a well-established word not 
only in common parlance, but also in the vernacular of academia. Current studies in 
social sciences, such as war studies, political science, and public policy refer to - and 
deal with - the topic in various interdisciplinary guises and yet, over the past decade 
these studies have failed to trigger any substantial analytical interest in the strategic 
dynamics of the original politico-military policies and doctrine of the early Muslims.  
 
Instead, Jihad has remained so ambiguous that some academic scholars have 
commented: ‘between Western and Islamic culture there is possibly no other single 
issue at the same time as divisive or as poorly understood as that of jihad.’2 Reuven 
Firestone claims ‘Islam is perhaps the most misunderstood religion to the West, and 
many stereotypes still hinder clarity about its tenets and practices. Western prejudice 
toward Islam is as old as Islam itself.’3 Fred Donner describes this problem of 
deficiency in scholarship as less an issue of prejudice but rather as ‘a practical one’ 
due to the lack of ‘preliminary work on a vast subject.’4 As a result, academics and 
lay readers, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, are liable to ignore or misunderstand 
the earliest forms of politico-strategic thought concerning Jihad, focusing instead 
upon purely religious and legal interpretations and explanations that rarely reach 
beyond the surface of the strategic dynamics involved. 
 
Accordingly, this study will induce a level of strategic appreciation through recognition 
of politico-strategic patterns and military phenomena which Muslim and non-Muslim 
actors share, domestically and internationally. A key aim of this study is to demonstrate 
alignment with existing strategic theoretics in order to elucidate how the dynamics at 
play or common misperceptions pertaining to Jihad are in fact strategically 
comprehensible by applying strategic theoretics over traditional legal-based and 
historical analysis.  
 
                                                
2 Johnson (1997), p.19 
3 Firestone (1999), p.13 
4 Donner (1991), p.57 
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1.2. Introductory Definitions 
This thesis explores the relationship between Jihad and politics, and how the strategic 
dynamics of Jihad as a matter of policy are affected by this interplay. It may be useful to 
state from the start that politics is far broader than the concerns of rational calculation 
(policy) and is the totality of Clausewitz’s trinity reflecting the strategic interactions 
between its parts and the interplay of policy – which is meant by politik. Broadly 
understood, politik, or simply ‘politics’ (meaning both the political and policy): 
 
… is a struggle for power between opposing forces - political 
events and outcomes are rarely if ever the product of any single 
actor’s conscious intentions. Politics, […,] is a chaotic process 
involving competing personalities (…), chance and friction, and 
popular emotion.5 
 
The basic distinction between the term politics and policy (= politik) in this study, is 
that policy refers to the rational calculation of policy by which military force may be 
instrumentally used to serve a political end; and politics which is broadly employed to 
refer to domestic strategic interaction between opposing forces bargaining for power 
and influence. Both terms are contained within the term politik, and are features of the 
Clausewitzian trinity. 
 
More specifically however, this study highlights those elements of bargaining that are 
quintessential to politico-strategic interactions. This mode of political interaction is 
especially valued in game theory but also for qualitative investigations of conflict 
dynamics between adversaries. Thomas Schelling is perhaps the most well-known 
author of this form of politico-strategic analysis and explains that ‘War is always a 
bargaining process, one in which threats and proposals, counterproposals and 
counterthreats, offers and assurances, concessions and demonstrations, take the form 
of actions rather than words.’6 Naturally, those unfamiliar with the nature of war and 
the anarchical society, might object to such a statement, just as Thomas Schelling 
notes 
                                                
5 Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14 
6 Schelling (2008), p.142 
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To think of war as a bargaining process is uncongenial to some of 
us. Bargaining with violence smacks of extortion, vicious politics, 
callous diplomacy, and everything indecent, illegal, or uncivilized. 
It is bad enough to kill and to maim, but to do it for gain and not for 
some transcendent purpose seems even worse.7 
 
It is this very distinction between the mundane and the transcendent vying for 
controlling influence over policy that shall be a constant theme of investigation in this 
study. Religion, and the role of belief is distinguished in this study between a ‘meta-
narrative’ and the value-systems of strategic actors. In regards to the former, Amr Sabet 
makes an important distinction with regards to conceptually gauging how the term 
‘politics’ is used, explaining; ‘Tenuous differences between terms such as Islamic 
politics and politics of Islam frequently lead to conceptual confusion.’8 Part of the 
confusion is a lack of understanding the subtlety and distinction between both phrases 
‘Islamic politics’ and ‘politics of Islam’. Sabet argues that the former, by necessity if 
not by definition, incorporates the latter,9 but the opposite is not true. The politics of 
Islam varies across time and space, and is the result of socio-political changes, 
whereas ‘Islamic politics’ are rooted in the fundamental tenets and ideas of the 
religion, hence the meta-narrative of Islam. Thus, the ‘politics of Islam’ are in the 
context of this study, no different to the ‘politics’ of domestic strategic interaction 
between opposing forces bargaining and competing for power and influence. 
 
The research aims to formulate and explore the interplay of politik during formative 
Islam via strategic dynamics, that is, the motion of forces that stimulated growth, 
development, and institutional evolution within the concept and practice of Jihad as 
an instrument of politik. By ‘formative period’ we refer to the pre-legal period, circa 
610-75010 – or the time before legal codification and construction of Islamic legal 
regulations on the conduct of war. In specifically targeting the first 70 years of this 
period, the research advances strategic explanations and interpretations of events as 
they dynamically unfolded. 
                                                
7 Schelling (2008), p.215 
8 Sabet (2008), p.1 
9 ibid. 
10 On chronology and the development of chronological schemes in the Islamic historiographical 
tradition see Donner (1998), pp.230-248 
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Hitherto, we have made reference to strategic theoretics as an umbrella term to 
denote the cross application of a few methods usually encompassed under the rubric 
of the ‘strategic approach’. Strategic theoretics specifically refers to the use of cross-
investigative strategic approaches, such as strategic theory, realism, and a 
Clausewitzian framework of concepts.  
 
Strategic theory specifically, is rooted in earlier works principally in the fields of 
game theory, rational choice theory, security dilemma analysis and strategic 
deterrence by authors such as Kenneth Waltz, Morton Kaplan, John Herz, Robert 
Jervis, and Thomas Schelling.11 The parsimonious approach of strategic theory seeks 
to reduce complexity by condensing all possible options to the perceived optimal 
response based upon expected utility or value-maximisation. Strategic theory offers 
plausible explanations for outcomes or preferences and strategies. In essence, 
strategic theory links strategic assumptions to logically valid conclusions. Despite the 
analytical strengths of strategic theory to offer a framework of analysis, it is: ‘Too 
formalised to be an art: Too loose to be scientific.’12 This is because the practice of 
applying strategic theory is based more upon explaining claims than establishing 
facts, resultantly, it is more appropriate that such claims are expressed in forms of 
inferential logical propositions such as a strategic dynamics, or as strategic paradigms. 
 
Paradigms guide avenues of enquiry and dictate a way of thinking.13 A strategic 
paradigm is an exploratory framework as opposed to being dogmatic, and qualitative 
rather than quantitative.14 The core characteristic of an exploratory paradigm consists 
in a successful synthesis (achievement) of theory and explanation, which results in the 
continuation of the paradigm with the next generation of practitioners.15 Dogmatic 
paradigms hold to rigid patterns and hypotheses, often institutionally imposed, of 
theory and explanation that formally promote or defend long-standing assumptions and 
answers to problems. In literature, which is to be explored next, these dogmatic 
paradigms often become genres of research and collected writings. 
 
                                                
11 Lake & Powell (1999), pp.4-5 
12 Smith (1991), p.11 
13 Kuhn (2012), p.29 
14 A deeper discussion of paradigm theory follows this chapter, see 2.8. 
15 Kuhn (2012), p.19 
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1.3. A Critical Overview of the Existing Literature 
This literature review provides general background about the subject area and the 
problems, issues and research questions to be investigated. Because there exists a 
notable lack of familiarity in this subject area particularly for non-Arabic readers and 
research specialists, the literature review precedes the research design framework in 
order to demonstrate the gaps in the literature and to provide an overview of the 
terrain of study. It is not without importance to note that the dominant language of 
the discourse on Jihad is in Arabic and not in English. This is particularly significant 
because any academic treatment of the subject requires familiarity with the Arabic 
language and access to primary Arabic sources. This problem is distinctly identified 
in the first genre of exploration, historiography. 
1.3.1. Historical Revisionism & Historiography in English 
James Turner Johnson states that contemporary scholarship on the ‘Islamic normative 
tradition on war is considerably less well developed’ in relation to the ‘Western 
tradition’, and that ‘there exist no general histories treating the understanding of 
normative tradition on religion, statecraft, and war in Islamic societies or in Islamic 
religious thought.’ Johnson cites this problem as a consequence of a ‘lack of 
researchers with the necessary training and language skills.’16 Indeed, a researcher 
without any training in the Arabic language is often limited to available secondary 
translations and interpretations.  
 
Proficiency with the Arabic language does not suffice for a clear understanding of the 
subject alone. For example, Jihad polemics are a common feature of writers whose 
concerns are largely with historical revisionism and negationism of the traditional 
Islamic sources - the Qur’an, the hadith literature, and later the historical biographies 
of the Prophet and his companions (known as seera and tabaqat respectively).17 
Attempts at critical reconstruction of early Islamic historiography, afford better 
contributions18 to the exploration of the strategic environment in which Jihad evolved.  
                                                
16 Johnson (1997), pp. 22-23 
17 See Lewis (1988) and Watt (1998) 
18 See Robinson (2003) 
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Humphrey’s edition of Islamic history19 set out to propose a framework for inquiry, 
which was premised upon a similarly recognised need that non-Arabic reading 
researchers have inadequate resource materials in most cases to effectively study 
many subject areas of Islam. Since this study is concerned with strategic dynamics 
and not critical history per se, the deficiencies in the area of the existing 
historiographal literature have a marginal impact for this study. 
 
Whilst the contributions to the field by of Fred M. Donner 20  are largely 
historiographal, they provide some of the most significant insights to the existing 
literature for the purposes of this study. Donner makes the theoretical and historical 
discourse of the formative stages of Islamic history subject to politico-strategic 
analysis and investigation in a manner distinct from other works on the subject. For 
example, in The Early Islamic Conquests21 Donner’s alternative interpretation of the 
Islamic conquests and establishment of a definitive record of them as the sources 
allow, is the result of his innovative methodology that does not require the usual 
textual skepticism prevalent in historical revisionism. Donner’s Muhammad’s 
Political Consolidation in Arabia up to the Conquest of Mecca22 which details a 
concise and engaging ‘reassessment’ of the Prophet’s politico-strategic calculus in his 
political consolidation of Arabia also provides one of the few, more rigorous attempts 
by modern scholarship to examine Jihad based upon the warfighting practice of the 
Prophet. 
 
With respect to bibliographical surveys, there are two studies worthy of mention 
available in English:23 the first is a work compiled by Muhammad Naeeem – Muslim 
Military History: A preliminary Bibliography 24  - a bibliographical study of all 
academic military research contributions, the compilation comprises of 525 entries, 
145 books in English and 183 articles mainly in English, the rest in European 
languages such as French, German and Spanish; 68 books and 3 articles in Arabic; 
105 books and 16 articles in Urdu; and 3 books in Persian and Pushto.  
                                                
19 See Humphrey (1991) 
20 See Donner (1979, 1981, 1998, 2008, & 2010) 
21 Ibid., (1981) 
22 Ibid., (1979) 
23 For Arabic sources, see ‘Awad (1981-1982), an Arabic bibliographical study of Arab military 
sources, which includes over 850 English language sources on the subject area.  
24 Naeem (1985) 
 23 
The second work of mention is the historiographical and bibliographical sourcebook 
compiled by John W. Jandora25 Militarism in Arab Society; although limited by its 
focus upon Arab military history alone, the method of survey and its theoretical 
framework is of great importance alone. The usefulness of this work cannot be 
understated for researchers in English given that the research is limited to sources 
available in European languages, mainly those in English. 
 
Notable preliminary attempts at examining the subject of warfare in Islam with 
military science has been provided by in articles by Jandora in ‘Developments in 
Islamic Warfare: The early Conquests’; 26  Paul Heck in ‘Jihad Revisited’; 27and 
Margret Pettygrove ‘Conceptions of War in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice’;28 
although these articles do not address the specific concerns of the subject area of 
Jihad, as this study investigates it. Worthy of mention are Michael Bonner’s29 attempt 
to chart the evolution of Jihad through Muslim history (an honest but non-strategic 
approach to Jihad); and David Cook’s30 Understanding Jihad, which, although he 
does not approach the subject from a politico-strategic agenda, the research is, 
systematically organised in episodic and thematic chapters, raising important 
questions for congruity and religious consideration. 
1.3.2. Traditional Arabic Historiography 
The traditional Arabic texts are the key sources upon which any historical reference 
whether biographical (seera) or military history (maghazi), 31 to the early formative 
stages of Islam, is dependent. The most senior of these are the biographies of Ibn-
Ishaq (d. 761-770) and Ibn Hisham (d. 833), and the military biography of al-Waqidi 
(d. 822-3). Other notable works in this genre are al-Waqidi’s Kitab Futuhat al-Sham 
(The Liberation of the Levant); and al-Baladhuri’s (d. 892) Kitab al-Futuh al-Buldan 
(The Liberation of the [non-Muslim] Lands); Ibn Kathir’s (d. 1373) Ghazawat al-
Rasul (The Military Campaigns of the Messenger); and undoubtedly the most 
comprehensive of all the collected histories is Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari’s (d. 
                                                
25 Jandora (1997) 
26 Ibid., (1986) 
27 Heck (2004) 
28 Pettygrove (2007) 
29 Bonner (2006) 
30 Cook (2005) 
31 By maghazi what is meant is ‘The memorable deeds of… those who engage in warring, or warring 
and plundering, expeditions’ - see Lane (1968), p. 2257  
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923), magnus opus - Kitab Tarikh al-Rasul wa al-Muluk (The Complete History of 
The Messenger and Kings). These texts in particular were compiled during an era of 
sparse strategic analysis; hence, whilst the historical importance of these works 
cannot be denied, this must be balanced by an appreciation that very little else exists 
to compete with them.  
 
Indeed, these writings all share a common approach, namely, the historical retelling of 
the military engagements of the Prophet and the Rashidun; to commemorate great 
victories; and inspire courage and martial virtues for succeeding generations. Their 
aims are historical and devotional, and not to develop an ontological understanding or 
general theory of war. The use of such texts has traditionally been restricted to 
providing historical and legislative precedent for how war should be conducted as a 
matter of ideal practice.32 The aforementioned texts have all been translated into 
English and are widely accessed for research. However, despite large bodies of 
classical sources being translated since 2001, their employment within these fields 
have contributed little overall to an understanding of Jihad. The English literature on 
seera and maghazi has continued to rely on the foundational Arabic texts, 
consequently remaining historically descriptive with little or no politico-strategic 
analysis in relation to Jihad as a military instrument. Nonetheless, in order to better 
detail the fields of research and their limitations, historiographical sources may be 
further sub-divided and explored as genres concerning: the Seera, the Maghazi, and 
the Khilafah. 
1.3.2a. Biographical Literature in English (Seera) 
This specific genre considers those studies concerned with the biography of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s life. The most popular of these are often translated biographies 
from the traditional texts. Karen Armstrong and Tariq Ramadan33 have both written 
mainstream examples of popular biography whose wider readership often reflects the 
general intention of such authors and their audiences - to concern themselves less with 
socio-political puzzles and more with the spreading of spiritual enlightenment. 
                                                
32 See al-Tabari’s Kitab al-Jihad – tr. Iqbal (2007); and Ibn Rushd’s chapter concerning Jihad from 
Bidayat Al-Mujtahid (tr. Peters, 1977, and Nyazee, 2002) 
33 Armstrong (2001), Ramadan (2008) 
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Broadly speaking, writers of this distinction unanimously hold negative assumptions 
regarding the utility and efficacy of violence and seem to project this bias upon their 
works without any form of reasoned explanation. William Montgomery Watt, an 
older source, is more rigorous in his approach to the genre. Watt’s socio-political 
approach and research has afforded many subsequent authors with a basis for 
academic research related to the seera, in particular Muhammad at Mecca and 
Muhammad at Medina,34 which are perhaps the best academic overviews of the Seera 
in the English language to date. 
1.3.2b. Military History in English (Maghazi) 
Greater ambition is usually found in this area of academic study, with some authors 
attempting to introduce deeper levels of analysis to uncover an operational or tactical 
methodology of Jihad from the biography of the Prophet. Russ Rodgers 35  for 
example, considers a strategic-asymmetric framework of a ‘Muslim way of warfare’ 
from the early Islamic sources approaching the Prophet’s use of force as correlative to 
a guerrilla campaign against the Arab tribes. Interestingly, though not intended as a 
strategic analysis, is the subject area of early Muslim warfighting examined in Malik 
al-Mubarak’s PhD thesis36, which required attention to strategic matters, and as such, 
contains some very valuable contextual analysis. 
 
Similarly, Muhammad Hamidullah’s The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad 37 
and Bashier’s War and Peace in the Life of the Prophet Muhammad38 both present 
more serious attempts by contemporary Muslim authors to contextualise and approach 
the Prophetic biography from a politico-strategic perspective, whilst also attempting 
to understand the warfighting of the seera through the means of historical narrative 
and analysis, with some attempts at strategic interpretation. Generally, these authors 
primarily redux the traditional narratives found in the traditional texts, but with more 
substantive ideas of military practice. 
 
                                                
34 Watt (1953) & (1956) respectively; see also (1964), (1974), and (1998) 
35 Rodgers (2008) 
36 al-Mubarak (1997) 
37 Hamidullah (2003) 
38 Bashier (2006) 
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Unfortunately, many of these works, such as S.K. Malik’s The Quranic Concept of 
War,39 despite the occasional references to strategists such as Clausewitz and Liddell-
Hart, ultimately fails to deliver an examination of Jihad similar to the writings of 
Hamidullah and Bashier, because they are marred by customary apologetics garbed in 
devotional bias. Indeed, this is a recurrent issue in otherwise promising subject areas 
of research, such as Iqbal’s The Prophet's Diplomacy,40 and Muhammad Siddique 
Qureshi’s Foreign Policy of […] Muhammad,41 both of which fail to deliver anything 
according to what their titles seems to promise. 
 
The most informative analysis of this genre and early Muslim warfighting is a more 
recent work by Russ Rodgers42 entitled The Generalship of Muhammad. Despite 
Rodgers concern (primarily at the operational level of analysis), there are few 
alternatives in the existing literature to match his military treatment of the maghazi 
genre, especially as it concerns Jihad as a military instrument. Another stand out 
contribution in this genre that provides politico-military analysis working through the 
lens of military history is Gabriel’s Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General.43 
Gabriel’s occasional reference to politico-strategic considerations (specifically, the 
highlighting of a means-end approach adopted by the Prophet) in his work does offer 
insight into what is otherwise a distinctly historical revisionist biography. 
Nonetheless, Gabriel is one of a few authors who have engaged with strategic 
thought, specifically Clausewitizian thought, applying it to the warfighting practice of 
the Prophet and the first Muslims. The other branch of research, which specifically 
concerns the subject matter of this study, are those works which consider Jihad 
alongside the development of the Islamic polity. 
1.3.3. The Formation of the early Islamic Polity (al-Khilafah) 
This genre is effectively concerned with the Rashidun period (632-661) and the 
Umayyad Caliphate (661-750). The Rashidun and Umayyad periods are the most 
important demonstrations of Muslim political behaviour both systemically and 
domestically in the face of pre-paradigm legal influence, where the power and weight 
                                                
39 Malik (1986) 
40 Iqbal (1975) 
41 Qureshi (2011) 
42 Rodgers (2012) 
43 Gabriel (2007) 
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of legal opinion was inferior to politico-strategic decision-making and military power. 
Historical detail on systemic military events are scarce however, with descriptions of 
events usually a matter of bare record. Although such information facilitates a sketch 
of the strategic setting, there is little information that actually details the politico-
strategic decision-making and methods behind the application of force. Strategic 
interpretation is therefore academic, but not fanciful. The literature has three sub-
divisions: the Ridda, the Futuh, and the Fitna. 
1.3.3a. The Ridda Literature 
The Ridda literature concerns the events of succession following the death of the 
Prophet and the apostasy wars that ensued thereafter as new central authority was 
challenged. The traditional texts generally extend their coverage of events to include 
the Ridda campaigns and those circumstances surrounding them. The Annals of al-
Tabari, al-Baladhuri, and the many works by Ibn Kathir, are the most well-known. 
Although there exists coverage of the events of the Ridda in English, these are usually 
tied to the broader events of the Futuh and are not specific to the political 
circumstances of succession. Madelung’s44 study of the political succession to the 
Prophet is one of the most well-known studies of the early Caliphate, though 
primarily a Shi‘ite inclined historical narrative, it is nonetheless comprehensive for its 
intended purposes of detailing the early Muslim political community and the causes 
of division.  
1.3.3b. The Futuh Literature 
The futuhat literature represents the post-maghazi era most vividly, detailing the 
historical events of Islamic expansion during the Rashidun era. Futuh literally 
meaning ‘to open’ (futuhat pl. ‘openings’), and refers to the opening of non-Muslim 
territories to Islam, or more precisely, to the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a. Muslim 
historians wrote abundantly on this period, writing within the period itself and for an 
increasingly popular audience. Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam’s (d. 871) Futuh al-Misr (The 
Liberation of Egypt), Abu Isma‘il al-Azdi’s (d. 810) Futuh al-Sham (The Liberation 
of the Levant), al-Baladhuri’s Futuh al-Buldan and al-Tabari’s Kitab al-Rasul wa al-
Muluk constitute the most famous works of this genre.45 
                                                
44 Madelung (1997) 
45 Donner (1998), p.175 
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Developments in style and historical record keeping broadened the scope of these 
works,46 and affording this genre greater precision of events than the maghazi 
literature given that they were events written and compiled during their author’s 
lifetimes.47 In the English language, historiographical research represents the most 
compelling sources for analysis, alongside translated works of the Arabic classics. 
 
In particular, Hugh Kennedy has written a few works in this genre 48  though 
Kennedy’s most appropriate contributions to this study are firstly, The Prophet and 
the Age of the Caliphate49 – a synthesis of the original Arabic sources with some 
modern studies, by which the author seeks as he writes in the preface, to strike a 
balance between the presentation of factual material and speculative interpretation. 
Secondly, The Great Arab Conquests, which is concerned with Islamic expansion 
between 632-750.50 Kennedy insightfully notes how the classical accounts of the 
Futuh, have been edited and revised over the centuries and what has remained in the 
recounting of the Futuh is actually a matter of memory and the creation of 
memories. 51  This awareness is especially pertinent given the second genre of 
literature connected to the post-maghazi era, the Fitna sources. 
1.3.3c. The Fitna Literature 
The theme of Fitna, or the sedition leading to the First Civil War of Islam (656 -661), 
took place as a consequence of the end of the Caliphate of ‘Uthman. Vast amounts of 
literature have covered the events of the Fitna, since the second century of Islam and 
continue today with particular reference to Shi‘ite literature.52 The subject area itself 
is however, inextricably connected to the events of the succession (and therefore the 
Ridda) and the Futuh, and thus is generally covered by the same source materials and 
literature. 
                                                
46 Khalidi (1994), pp.62-5 
47 Robinson (2003), p.50 
48 Kennedy (1981) & (2001) 
49 Ibid., (1986) 
50 Ibid., (2007) 
51 Ibid., p.2; also Hawting (2002), pp.15-6 
52 Donner (1998), p.187 
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1.3.3d. Umayyad Historiography 
The final area of literature in this field concerns the longest serving Caliphate that was 
administered by the Umayyad Dynasty. Broadly speaking, Hugh Kennedy writes: 
‘Clearly so swift and massive a change needs historical investigation, yet the 
approachable literature on the subject is very restricted. This is partly because of the 
territorial boundaries of the historical profession.’53 Although it stands as a reasonable 
expectation that an important era, given the vast expansions and military conflicts that 
took place, would be well researched and published;54 the reality is that there are few 
detailed accounts of the Umayyad historical period, and even fewer accounts that deal 
directly with foreign policy. 
 
Khalid Blankinship’s The End of the Jihad State55 is the most salient and appropriate 
account of Umayyad foreign policy, and consequently of their military affairs 
currently available. Although not written as a work of politics or war studies, given 
the dearth of resources available it is difficult not to write to some degree dependently 
upon Blankinship’s work. Blankinship devotes an appendix to the critical problem of 
sources, methodology, and limitation of scholarship on the period.56 Gerald Hawting’s 
The Ummayad Caliphate: The First Dynasty of Islam is another one of the few 
sources available, as he explains in his preface, ‘there is little that can be 
recommended confidently as an introduction to the importance, main events and 
personalities, and problems of the Umayyad period.’57 Where Blankinship provides 
the best treatment of Umayyad foreign policy, Hawting’s contribution is far more 
concerned with domestic developments and the political evolution of the Umayyad 
dynasty. Complementing the works of both Hawting and Blankinship58 are; Julius 
Wellhausen’s The Arab Kingdom and its Fall,59 M.A. Shaban’s Islamic History,60 
Patricia Crone’s Slaves on Horses.61 
                                                
53 Kennedy (2007), p.3 
54 Mulalic (2012), p.109 
55 Blankinship (1994) 
56 Ibid., pp.247-272 
57 Hawting (2002), p.xxi; Robinson (2003), p.52 
58 Hawting (2002), pp.xxi-xxii; Blankinship (1994), pp.270-2 
59 Wellhausen (1927) 
60 Shaban (1971) & (1976) 
61 Crone (1980) 
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Additionally, concerning domestic politics, ‘Abd al-Ameer ‘Abd Dixon’s The 
Umayyad Caliphate 65-86/684-705 (A Political Study)62 is a comprehensive summary 
of the major Arabic sources with objective analysis regarding Umayyad domestic 
political aims and practices.63 The Arabic literature on the Umayyad period is 
relatively larger with sizeable entries of written historical material, but unfortunately 
the majority of those encountered are not suited to the research agenda of this study.64  
 
Predominately, incompatibility is a consequence of substance where the Arabic 
literature has maintained the traditional approach rooted in an oral culture.65 The early 
Islamic historical literature did not attempt significant analysis preferring instead to 
record and transmit reports and events for posterity,66 emphasising rigour with respect 
to the accuracy of reports to examination of its content.67 
 
Secondarily, the earliest sources on the Umayyads were written during the ‘Abbasid 
period, where anti-Umayyad historians were the majority of writers.68 As sworn 
enemies of the Umayyad House, ‘Abd Dixon writes ‘it is extremely difficult to do 
justice to the Umayyad cause: it gets scarce sympathy from an historical tradition 
which was the product of the period following their fall from power.’69 Following the 
Umayyad political collapse, and the slaughter of the Umayyad House70 by the 
‘Abbasid revolution, a new era of scholastic celebration began whereby the new 
political elite patronised scholarship and the development of learning institutions.71 
The ‘Abbasid revolution ushered in the ‘Golden Age’ of Islamic civilization,72 
cultural-religious sciences, and a ‘lively flourishing of Muslim historiography.’73  
 
 
                                                
62 ‘Abd Dixon (1971) 
63 See also Robinson (2005) 
64 See Kennedy (2007), pp.3-5, 12-23 for a more comprehensive set of historical problems that the 
Arabic and traditional sources present. 
65 Blankinship (1991), p.448; Robinson (2003), p.26; Donner (1998), pp.203-9 
66 Martensson (2005), p.287; Mulalic (2012), p.133 
67 Khalidi (1994), p.67; Robinson (2003), pp.53-4 
68 ‘Abd Dixon (1971), p.1, Donner (1998), pp.187-192; Hawting (2002), pp.11-12 
69 ‘Abd Dixon (1971), p.1; Hawting (2002), p.2; Luttwak (2011), p.211 
70 ul-Hasan (2005), p.109; Robinson (2003), p.41 
71 Robinson (2003), pp.26, 118-122 
72 Bewley (2002), p.iii; Robinson (2005), p.33 
73 Mulalic (2012), p.117 
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Unsurprisingly, ‘Abbasid patronage almost certainly ensured that the Umayyad 
legacy would be one of revulsion and selected memory. 74 Consequently, anti-
Umayyad literature was rife: ‘Literary works came to be produced devoted to 
cataloguing the crimes of the Umayyads, singing the praises of their opponents, and 
explaining why God allowed the community to fall under the sway of these godless 
tyrants.’75 This literature continued into the fifteenth century, and coupled with the 
Fitna genre, virtually guaranteed that historical analysis or revision was almost 
always a matter of religio-ethical judgments and not politico-strategic conclusions. 
The result is a corpus of religiously sensitive ‘political’ versions of history. In a 
candid lamentation of the earliest historical records that researchers have to work 
with, with particular reference to Muslim-Byzantine warfighting during the Umayyad 
Caliphate, Bashear writes: 
 
Anyone who is familiar with the traditional accounts of the early 
Muslim conquests in Syria knows the extent of the discrepancies 
caused basically by the fact that such accounts were actually the 
product of continuous attempts at reconstruction, often motivated 
by the later need to produce a scheme of sacred history, mixed with 
sectarian and local tendencies and hindered by the lack of precise, 
first hand and written documentation. Such is the case concerning 
the issues of dates, locations, how the conquest of Damascus, 
Jerusalem, Caesarea, Hims occurred: in fact almost every event of 
the first century.76 
 
Finally, much of the historical literature collected in the Arabic works was used as 
moral or pious legitimation for the respective caliph at the time, or the opposite.77 The 
ahistorical nature of much of Islamic historiography concerning the political 
administrations of the Caliphates renders much of the information and records ill-
                                                
74 A notable example is al-Tabari’s selective omission of the ‘Abbassid massacre of the Umayyad 
House as a final act of revolution before declaring their new Caliphate, see ul-Hasan (2005), pp.109-
10; and Donner (1998), pp.138-141, 194-5. Hawting (2002) makes the salient comment that the 
hostility of the Muslim tradition as a whole to the Umayyads is ‘reflected in both what the tradition 
reports and the way in which it reports it.’ – p.11; also Humphreys (2006), pp.3-6 
75 Hawting (2002), pp.11-2, 16-7 
76 Bashear (1991), p.199 
77 Donner (1998), pp.190-3 
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suited for the strategic approach broadly speaking, with only passing use for 
understanding the differences between strategic actors in the broader context of 
political decision-making and military action.78 
1.3.4. The Religious Genre 
Having surveyed the historiographical literature, the second major genre or paradigm 
of writings is distinctly religious. Broadly understood, this field represents the 
religious approaches to Jihad structured by Muslim legal specialisation, ethico-
religious beliefs, and hermeneutical investigation. Undoubtedly, it is the richest 
category in not only contribution but also accessibility. 
1.3.4a. The Legal Approach 
The legal approach and sources are known in Arabic as Fiqh, which Muhammad 
Kamali explains, ‘consists largely of juristic interpretation whereas ‘Shari‘ah’ bears a 
closer affinity with divine revelation.’ 79  The majority of academic writings 
consistently orientate their approach to Jihad by reference to the legal rulings of Fiqh. 
Authors such as Al-Dawoody80 whose work is based upon his PhD thesis entitled 
‘War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations’ tend to follow this trend and 
serve as model examples of this persuasion in research. Al-Sumaih’s PhD thesis The 
Sunni Concept of Jihad in classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought81 is similar 
form of work but focuses upon the seera as a foundation for the fiqh. The 
overwhelming majority of works in this area are concerned with legal theory or 
legislation offering little original analysis of Jihad as a subject matter in its own 
right.82 
 
Two exceptions to this trend are Khaled Abou El Fadl and Sherman Jackson. Abou El 
Fadl’s83 article ‘The Rules of Killing at War: an inquiry into classical sources’ and his 
pioneering book Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law; focuses his analyses with a 
direct examination of early sources and thought regarding the utility and efficacy of 
                                                
78 Kennedy (2007), pp.20-2 
79 Kamali (1997), p.107, fn.1 
80 Al-Dawoody (2009) & (2011) 
81 al-Sumaih (1998) 
82 See Khadduri (1966) & (1969), Hamidullah (2003), Aboul-Enein, et al (2004); Ali & Rehman 
(2005); and Thomas (1997) – as typical examples. 
83 Abou El Fadl (1999) & (2001) 
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violence. Sherman Jackson’s84 ‘Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition’ 
and ‘Jihad and the Modern World’; examines the normative state of war and anarchy 
of the pre-modern world, leads through to the experience of early Islam and later 
developments, which would concern jus ad bellum and international relations. 
 
The literature on Jihad by Islamic scholarship writing in Arabic is as impoverished as 
that in English. There are a handful of authors who have attempted to engage with the 
traditional discourse in a more contemporary manner. Muhammad Abu Zahrah 
(d.1974) is among the few and earliest modern Muslim authors who advocated a new 
approach to Jihad and international relations, predicated upon principles of justice, 
cooperation and human dignity. His writings85 have left an impression on mainstream 
modernist Muslim thought on the subject. Comparably, is Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s more 
recent contribution to the subject area; a two-volume work entitled Fiqh al-Jihad: 
Dirasah Muqaranah li-Ahkamih wa Falsafatih fi Daw’al-Qur’an wa al-Sunnah 
(Understanding Jihad: A Comparative Study of its Rules and Philosophy in the Light 
of the Qur’an and Sunnah).86 In this work al-Qaradawi considers Jihad as a legal 
condition, resonating with writers on war such as Quincy Wright.87 Thus, although 
there are occasional hints of politico-strategic analysis scattered throughout both 
volumes, nothing original is presented by al-Qaradawi that merits additional mention. 
 
Similarly, the works of Muhammad Saeed Ramadan al-Buti (d. 2013)88 provide 
another attempt by a prominent member of contemporary Islamic scholarship on Jihad 
to locate early Islamic violence within the legal discourse, using historical and 
biographical narrative respectively. Another leading authority on Islamic 
Jurisprudence, Wahbah al-Zuhayli, whose PhD thesis was published under the title 
Athar al-Harb fi al-Islam: Dirasah Muqaranah (The Effects of War in Islam: A 
Comparative Study)89 is similarly lacking content in relation to politico-strategic or 
military analysis. Al-Zuhayli readily acknowledges that the classical view of Jihad 
was expansionist, but advocates that in the modern era it can only be defensive, a 
                                                
84 Jackson (2001) & (2002) 
85 Abu Zahra (1961) & (1964) 
86 al-Qaradawi (2009) 
87 Wright (1965) 
88 al-Buti (1997) & (2000) 
89 al-Zuhayli (1963) 
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common tendency exhibited by contemporary scholars writing in Arabic, for the 
broader Islamic scholastic community.90 
 
The outstanding work in the Arabic language has been written by Muhammad Khayr 
Haykal’s al-Jihad wa al-Qital fi Siyasati al-Shari’a, (Jihad and Warfighting according 
to Shari’a Policy)91 – an extensive three-volume work. Haykal comprehensively 
covers the subject of Jihad from the perspective of the legal tradition and is perhaps 
the definitive work on the subject area to date in the Arabic language. Whilst the 
treatment of Jihad as concept is thorough with regard to traditional and legal analysis, 
the overall approach of the work remains politically descriptive and idealistic. 
Strategic considerations at the systemic level of analysis are either rare or shallow 
where mentioned. On the subject areas of internally directed Jihad, operational and 
tactical considerations are given a comprehensive treatment according to legal 
opinions and juristic analysis and are extremely informative in this regard. However, 
strategic explanations for early Muslim politico-strategic behaviour are almost always 
lacking. 
1.3.4b. International Law and Relations (Siyar) 
This body of work represents those themes classified under what would be considered 
today as a ‘Systemic’ approach to politics and war at the level of the international, 
where state structures are the most important units of analysis. Technically, this is an 
extension of traditional Islamic fiqh. Originally, as separate body of law, the ‘siyar’ 
was predominately concerned with systemic interaction,92 and the conduct of an 
Islamic polity in the anarchical society. Majid Khadduri’s translation of al-Shaybani’s 
Siyar entitled The Islamic Law of Nations93 is perhaps the most famous work in this 
area in (both the original version in Arabic) and English.94 It is particularly valuable 
with respect to early juristic opinions on such issues as the conduct of war and 
normative interactions with non-Muslim territories. 
 
                                                
90 See al-Atiki (2005), Bayyah (2009), and al-Qadri (2010) 
91 Haykal (1999) 
92 Hamidullah (1977), p.9  
93 Khadduri (1966) 
94 Other works include Kassim (1994), Elbakry (1987), AbuSulayman (1993), Sabet (2008), and Masri 
(1998) 
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Principally, al-Shaybani’s Siyar considers the normal state of affairs between Muslim 
territories and the world at large, as a hostile tension of a ‘state of war’. Khadduri also 
emphasizes that the early Muslim jurists did not consider the non-Muslim nations as a 
zero-sum enemy to be decisively beaten by military means. Furthermore, the 
enactments of military engagements were not deemed authorised on account of being 
non-Muslims (kuffar). Al-Shaybani’s elaboration of questions and answers related to 
the subject demonstrates a framework of juristic concern along the theoretical lines of 
contemporary realist theories of systemic behaviour. 
 
Unfortunately, little explanation is ever given as to why particular rules are the case, 
and the overall analysis of legislation is so deeply rooted within the legal discourse 
that political explanations are rarely given any consideration. More broadly speaking, 
particularly in such an area, one might expect some politico-strategic analysis within 
the context of early Muslim inter-state behaviour, but the siyar literature does not 
incline toward this. The genre as a whole offers disappointingly little for the analysis 
of the formative period of Islam, that is, the pre-legal development of Jihad. 
1.3.4c. Just War Theory – The Ethical Approach 
The ethical approach is rooted in similar, though distinct, literature to the legal 
approach. The distinction resides in the more pluralistic path taken by scholarship in 
this area, that has sought to discuss Jihad in relation to notions of justum bellum95 
where the focus of such works are concerned with the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the Western Judeo-Christian and Eastern Islamic traditions on the subject of 
sanctioned warfighting, causes and conduct. This approach is not shared amongst 
Islamic scholarship written in Arabic but is common in the English language, with 
John Kelsay and James T. Johnson as established forerunners of this approach.96 
Unfortunately, there are a number of studies97 that only serve to reinforce the notion 
that little strategic value can be accrued from such research, which is predominantly 
historical in nature. 
                                                
95 Khadduri, being a popular source for researchers working through English based sources, arguably 
has popularised the claim that Jihad is the ‘just war’ version of Judaeo-Christian tradition, see (1984), 
p.165 
96 See Kelsay & Johnson, (eds.), (1990) and (1991), and Kelsay (2007). Also, Abdel Haleem et al 
(eds.), (1998); and Zawati, (2001).  
97 See Mahallati (2006), Firestone (1999), Armstrong (2001), Watt (1974), and Hillenbrand (2006) 
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1.3.4d. The Qur’an & Hadith – The Hermeneutical Approach  
The final approach of the traditional literature concerns those studies, which are 
hermeneutic in focus. These studies situate the foundations, conceptual origins, and 
explanations of Jihad, primarily within the Qur’an and hadith literature. Traditionally 
the preserve of Arabic reading researchers, the vast corpus of Qur’anic exegeses is 
also becoming increasingly accessible and available online and through printed 
media. In particular, the New Edition of the Encyclopedia of the Qur’an,98 The 
Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, and The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
the Islamic World99 - all provide a number of focused studies on the vocabulary of 
violence in the Qur’an. Consequently, many researchers, as well as journalists and lay 
writers, have taken to re-examining the Qur’an and hadith literature in light of Jihad. 
 
For example, Tim Schwartz-Barcott’s War, Terror & Peace in the Qur’an and in 
Islam: Insights for Military & Government Leaders100 is an attempt to deduce a 
distinctly ‘Muslim’ approach to warfighting derived from historical narrative and 
Qur’anic hermeneutical analysis. However, as with most works which attempt to do 
the same, the historical narrative and secondary sources become much more relevant 
and informative for the study of Jihad than hermeneutical analysis.101 
 
The problem of this approach for the purposes of this study is not academic but rather 
with respect to their inherent assumptions about the role and importance of the Qur’an 
to the subject of Jihad. Whilst undoubtedly the Qur’an and the Hadith literature are 
important, they are not necessarily the foundation for interpretation and analysis when 
it comes to the subject of Jihad proper. Unlike Biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, the 
earliest Islamic methods of interpretation, was not dependent upon the Qur’an and the 
Hadith literature as it was to the maghazi literature. Rather, it was the legal literature 
in general that placed a greater premium upon the Qur’an and the Hadith literature as 
sources of explanation for Jihad than its actual practitioners. 
 
                                                
98 McAuliffe (2005) 
99 Esposito (1995) & (2009) respectively. 
100 Schwartz-Barcott (2004) 
101 See Bassiouni (2008) and Firestone (1997) 
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The literature-promoting Jihad as a form of providentialism appears very early in the 
Muslim world, many of which were authored by those who undertook its practice. 
Perhaps the best known (and also the earliest) is written by Abdallah ibn al-Mubarak, 
Kitab al-Jihad (d. 797) that heavily influenced the writing of Kitab al-Siyar of Abu 
Ishaq al-Farazi (d. 802), an early author of siyar. 102 These books extol the virtues of 
Jihad and those who partake of it, referencing Qur’anic verses and hadith throughout. 
These works are quintessential expressions of early conceptions of Jihad with the 
emphasis solely directed toward encouraging the individual warrior to take up arms.  
 
1.4. Conclusions 
The literature review has demonstrated that academic attention to Jihad in the context 
of strategic analysis and interpretation is virtually non-existent. With no real literature 
available to inform academic strategic research there has been a continued and 
repetitive iteration of pervasive assumptions, or fixations with specific genres of 
writings on Islam. The Arabic literature has been dominated by the religious genre 
and legal approach, whilst the range of literature available in English is generally 
focused on historiographical or textual criticism. Where present in principle, current 
studies focusing on warfare and international law and relations, are more generally 
linked with the traditional siyar literature. 
 
Relative to the existing literature, the research orientation of this study is clearly 
distinguished from the traditional discourse of Jihad. In particular, the literature 
review has alluded to the gap specifically concerning the pre-legal period. In the pre-
Islamic era, information concerning battles and Arab warfighting practices were 
enshrined in poetry, but it was not until the second century of Islam that the oral 
tradition of the Arabs found its way into ink. Roughly corresponding to this period 
was the burgeoning Islamic legal schools and over the following century, the 
legislation of Jihad as a matter of doctrine alongside the formal institution of Islamic 
legal structures. Thus, between the advent of Islam in 610, and the early stage of the 
Umayyad Dynasty circa 661-680, there exists no research that has examined the 
development of Jihad during this formative period. 
                                                
102 Bonner (1992) 
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More specifically, this study seeks to address the gap by proposing an investigation 
into the evolution of the strategic dynamics of Jihad, illustrating the relationship of 
violence to politics, and how policy affected the manner in which warfighting was 
instrumentally applied during the first 70 years of Islam. As a prelude to elucidating 
the research questions, basic assumptions, and the limitations for this study, an 
overview of the parameters, scope, and limitations of the research method and the 
limitations of strategic theory is discussed next. 
 
1.5. Research Parameters 
The literature review has already described the problems associated with the language 
barrier that many researchers face. Additionally, the review has highlighted the 
weaknesses of the Arabic literature alone. Given these parameters, ranges of bi-
lingual sources (English and Arabic) are assessed in tandem to cover a broad variety 
of perspectives and alternative approaches to the historical information available. 
Whenever possible, existing English translations have been be adopted for use and 
reference as a means to make the research presented more accessible. However, in 
instances where no English translations were available, I have endeavoured to provide 
my own translations. The literature employed extends from the earliest Arabic sources 
available to the present-day, including the scholarship of both Muslim and non-
Muslim authors. Comprehensive studies or histories in English have been explicitly 
preferred over original works by authors in matters pertaining to historical survey. 
This is because the episodic approach to history used in this research is concerned 
with the broadly identified variables that afford or relate to the analysis or 
interpretation of evolving strategic dynamics in relation to the research agenda.  
 
The literature review has revealed a second parameter, namely the siyar as the only 
established body writing that considered Jihad in the form of systemic interactions. 
The siyar is however, exclusively legal in nature and not strategic, written in Arabic 
bar a few translations, and developed near two centuries after the advent of Islam. 
There has never been an attempt to explain systematically or examine the nature of 
early violence in Islam as it relates to politik, in the Islamic literature or later non-
Islamic writings on Jihad. This deficiency has resulted in a gap that necessarily limits 
modern research due to the lack of materials with which to discuss issues pertaining 
 39 
to Jihad and early political institutions. Instead, legal interpretation has come to 
dominate the discourse on Jihad, designating the language of law, ethics, and theology 
over that of politics and strategy. 
 
This means that the role of Islamic legal literature and juristic opinion has little to no 
relation to Jihad, policy, and doctrine during the period under investigation, because it is 
pre-legal, that is, before the establishment of the traditional legal institutions of Islam. 
All forms of Islamic legal doctrine written on the conduct of war were written well after 
the events examined. In large part, the later legal literature is an attempt to understand 
the very same questions this research has set out to do, albeit for different purposes and 
to a different end. Therefore, Islamic legal literature has negligible interest except in 
instances of revisionist explanations for events that lack any other form of historical or 
recorded documentation.  
 
A third parameter concerns the body of Islamic historiography which was less 
concerned with military affairs such as tactics and logistics as they were with 
biographical details and issues that extolled the genealogies of battlefield participants 
and their war-time exploits. Hence, this investigation cannot be premised upon an 
examination of Islamic legislation or a historical study of the Muslim conduct of war 
since neither of these fields is suited to the concerns of strategy per se. Accordingly, 
this study does not examine the conduct of Muslim warfare, warfighting, or 
operational dynamics directly, that is, operational and tactical levels of analysis and 
the reasons for military success or failure; including the historical aspects of 
warfighting such as formations, numerical values attached to warring parties, theatre 
tactics, and the like, which are similarly excluded as extemporaneous to the remit of 
the investigation. 
 
More broadly speaking, a fourth parameter to the research design concerns the various 
legal rulings that Muslim jurists developed over the centuries regarding warfare which 
were often moral judgments based upon religious ideals. As a strategically committed 
approach to the subject matter, ethico-religious and hermeneutical approaches are 
generally negligible to the scope of interest for this study. Since these subjects do not 
relate to strategic analysis they are not relevant or necessary for the strategic 
exploration of Jihad as it relates to the evolution of strategic dynamics except as they 
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might relate to the intentions and motivations of the strategic actors involved. This 
qualification is however limited, since the intentions and motivations of strategic 
actors are only one facet of the strategic approach. 
1.5.1. Limitations of Analytical Procedures 
Existing weaknesses present in the literature are a significant limitation. 
Consequently, the research method demands a very specific analytical approach 
where a priori reasoning is engaged to establish coherent and rational explanations 
for events in instances where strategic interpretations can be made but not proven. It 
suggests an artificial coherence of theory and facts, unsubstantiated by any coherent 
body of traditional Islamic texts. This is the consequence of scarce strategic thought 
having been applied, or more specifically, un-developed by traditional Muslim 
thinkers and historians, and a combination of academic indifference or neglect by 
writers on Jihad since. 
 
Therefore, the methodological approach of strategic theoretics offers a useful, though 
limited means to interpret and verify (according to its own standards) a strategic 
reconstruction of events in the past. Verification is provided through a simple self-
referential application of consistent strategic understanding with the theoretical 
approach explicated in Chapter Two. The outcome of the research will be based upon 
a logically congruent demonstration of strategic logic, by which we shall arrive at our 
conclusions. More precisely, the research outcome seeks to demonstrate a set of 
strategically coherent and logically deduced inferences from the examination of the 
relationship between applications of force in the name of Jihad and the politico-military 
circumstances that the use of force served for the ends of policy. 
 
Secondly, the evolution of Jihad is limited only so far as it is relevant to the 
demonstration of the strategic dynamics involved, and not as a matter of detailed 
chronological development. An historical case-study approach is employed 
restrictively as a means of episodic analysis, surveying events and the resulting 
influences upon the strategic relationship between politik and military means to map 
the practice of Jihad against the backdrop of different historical incidents. 
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Because this study is not an historical analysis per se but rather a study of strategic 
theory and dynamics, questions of historical authenticity of texts and sources are 
limited by their practical value. Debates in the fields of textual analysis, Oriental and 
Near-Eastern studies, Islamic studies, and so on, are also not useful for the 
investigation and controversial or widely disputed historical events have been 
excluded from the research. Accordingly, we have kept to those commonly accepted 
historical works that have been used to relay accepted history.  
 
Finally, the research questions have been developed in accordance with the strengths 
and limitations of the research methodology, which is strategically committed. Thus, 
whilst strategic analysis certainly incorporates additional areas of analysis such as 
socio-economic factors for example, this study is restricted to the specific concerns of 
strategic theory and the utility of force in relation to politik. The primary reason for 
this restriction is order to maintain analytical consistency. 
 
Thomas Schelling notes the importance of aspiring towards analytical consistency for 
the development of strategic theory when he writes: ‘The advantage of cultivating the 
area of “strategy” for theoretical development is not that, all possible approaches, it is 
the one that evidently stays closest to the truth, but that the assumption of rational 
behavior is a productive one.’103 Since qualitative research is rooted in human 
behaviour and decision-making, this method fits well with the strategic approach, 
which ‘is based on a set of assumptions and principles that govern the way a political 
actor will, or should, use the military instrument.’ 104  Hence, episodic surveys 
highlighting key politico-strategic decisions and events can demonstrate strategic 
continuity without doing history itself or the need to further hypothesise based upon 
alternative dimensions of analysis. The limitation of analysis to a strictly strategic lens 
is a greater strength than weakness concerning analytical procedures, and shall be 
further elaborated upon in the following section concerning verification. 
 
 
                                                
103 Schelling (1980), p.4 
104 Harris (2006), p.541  
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1.6. The Research Objectives: Basic assumptions to be investigated 
The research questions are explored in the context and operational limitations of the 
literature and are pre-legal, which means no formal legislation for the conduct of war, 
strategy, or policy existed for the strategic actors involved. The foundational 
assumptions of strategic behaviour and decision-making of the actors involved is that 
firstly, they were situated and operating under conditions of anarchy and self-help, 
acting in accordance with rational calculations of means or expected utility. Secondly, 
without a set precedent for action, strategic behaviour was driven by objectives that 
were ideologically crafted by a grand meta-narrative used to communicate theological 
imperatives; or by policies set by Prophet. Clarifying the strategic dynamics of Jihad 
begins with these assumptions that suggest politics and violence are causally 
interlinked as an instrument of bargaining. These assumptions can and will be verified 
by applying the research methodology to highlight where this causal relationship 
clearly existed as a matter of historical record in various established practices in 
Muslim history. 
 
The method of designing the research questions began as the product of highlighting 
the lacunae of strategic analysis found in the literature review. In particular, the period 
between 610-680, in which strategic consideration is virtually absent. A rigid 
application of strategic theoretics to the existing literature revealed the necessary 
research questions that would elucidate the relationship between Jihad and the 
strategic actors, their interests, and the environment. A diligent reading of the 
literature also suggested that no single administration of government during the 70-
year time period could comprehensively explain the strategic congruence of Jihad as a 
continuation of politik, without reference to that which preceded it or would come 
after. Taken as a whole however, the net result of the evolving strategic dynamics 
examined against the prime predictions of offense-defence theory could reveal the 
consistent and deliberate subordination of Jihad to the politik of formative Islam. 
1.6.1. The Research Questions 
The central research questions are designed to fundamentally explore three problems: 
the bargaining dynamics between politics and policy; the politico-strategic 
mechanisms that instrumentalise and drive military force; and lastly, the degree to 
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which behaviour may be understood as a creation rooted in a set of strategic settings 
generated by the pressures and nature of the strategic environment. The strategic 
theoretic so far, culminating in the paradigm presented, offers investigative 
propositions to substantiate these broadly proposed questions: 
 
1. The prime agenda is to ascertain whether Jihad is a continuation of politik by 
other means; that is to ask the question therefore, what is the link between 
politik (policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad? 
2. Logically proceeding from the aforementioned, can a consistent link be 
demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving strategic 
dynamics affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy? 
3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-political 
circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a set of 
strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview 
or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures 
and nature of the anarchic environment? 
4. Can the strategic dynamics of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests of 
Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation 
for the origin and evolution of warfighting? 
1.6.2. Sub-Investigative Questions 
The primary research questions may be divided into a sub-set of investigative avenues 
that more accurately explicates the research direction by establishing the basic 
assumptions of Jihad from its earliest manifestations, and cross-referencing the 
manner in which it was applied as a matter of policy and influenced by wider politics.  
 
a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect 
to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance 
strategic interpretation? 
b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam? To what extent does 
providentialism influence the application of Jihad as the means that justifies 
the ends? 
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c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive 
policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what 
circumstances did these polices come to bear and how did they evolve?  
d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the 
early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates 
strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy? 
 
The sub-set of investigative questions demonstrates if there exists enough congruity to 
suppose that Jihad was a continuation of politk by other means, that is, a consistently 
established instrument of rational calculation. However, research question 4, and sub-
investigative questions (b, c, & d) in particular, requires an additional analytical 
procedure, which seeks to validate strategic interpretation with systemic actions 
operating in a different strategic environment. To accomplish this task, a diagnostic 
method is adopted. The diagnostic method of verification examines historically 
accepted episodes of military practice with hypothetical problem sets of action, to 
strategically interpolate the decision-making process that created strategic behaviour. 
The congruity between interpretations of events to predictions of hypotheses generates 
a diagnostic evaluation that serves explain strategic interactions consistent with a 
proposed strategic paradigm. 
 
1.7. Verification 
Clearly the details of real-time decision-making by actors in the past are a matter of 
historical interpretation. The motivations for many acts in history can only be 
plausible and rarely substantiated as completely true. On the other hand, if this 
ambiguity is taken to be paramount, no analysis can ever be afforded any academic 
value. For this reason, it is reasonable to consider all analysis of historical events, 
which cannot be verified according to a methodological theory as conjectural. The 
strategic approach is rooted in a paradigm that is rigidly self-verified, that is, based 
upon its own logical predictions and not explanatory by endogenous factors. In other 
words, a given problem is resolved through the identification of events conforming to 
the expectations of strategic logic, paradoxical as they may be. Using a strategic 
paradigm maintains a consistent set of expectations that can distinguish a given set of 
events as a strategic condition based upon interaction.  
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Additionally, the qualitative nature of the strategic approach restricts the degree of 
falsification permitted since events cannot be quantifiably tested or demonstrated. 
Given these limitations, the strategic approach must be augmented by a method by 
which to test the interpretations of the strategic paradigm. In this study, Offense-
Defense Theory (ODT) is employed to breach the problems of verification. Offense-
Defense Theory is a sub-branch of the neo-realist school which posits that the calculi 
of the advantage dynamic in the context of security threats is the most important 
concern between adversaries as a prelude to violent engagement. 
 
Offense-Defense Theory employed as a diagnostic tool demonstrates that ‘shifts in the 
offense-defense balance- real or perceived- have a large effect on the risk of war’; that 
is, limited wars as generators of risk are subject to a strategic calculus between 
offense-defense dynamics to the degree that ‘actual offense-defense balance has 
marked effects; [but] the effects of the perceived offense-defense balance are even 
larger.’ 105  Hence, using offense-defense theory as a diagnostic approach treats 
empirical historical events as differential signs and symptoms that can be subject to 
qualitative evaluation when clustered to identify a course of action based upon events 
as they present themselves.  
 
Whilst this method is limited such that variables are examined only in the context of 
realist assumptions, it is necessary in order for two primary reasons. Firstly, as 
previously stipulated subjecting the analysis to multiple alternative explanations 
cannot realistically be resolved in this study alone. Furthermore, many explanations 
require a degree of expertise and knowledge beyond the author’s capacity. Hence, 
those fields of economics, anthropology and archaeology may well contribute or offer 
additional explanation, but would require separate studies to this one. 
 
The second reason to restrict the analysis to strategic theoretics tested against ODT 
predictions is to remain consistent to the research framework that is strategically 
committed in interpretation. By committed, what is meant is that the outlook of the 
study is exclusively concerned with strategic analysis rooted in a Clausewitzian 
                                                
105 Van Evera (2004), p.228 
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Trinitarian interpretation. This is to analyse a case in purely strategic terms, just as a 
medical diagnostic is undertaken strictly in accordance with medical need and not 
endogenous considerations, which do not directly pertain to the case evaluation. 
According to Lyndsey Harris, few authors engage with strategic explanations 
exclusively, because authors invariably seek ‘to assign a particular slant or 
interpretation of strategic interaction according to their own discipline.’ 106 
Consequently, liberal or social constructivist theories are distractions to answers that 
can be abductively derived from pure strategic logic and predicted expectations of 
offense-defense theory. 
 
In a sense, the nature of this study is especially abstracted in relation to analysis that 
other fields of social sciences provide. But strategic theory is itself an exercise in 
abduction by its very nature, which leads to the final limitation of the research 
methodology, which is the abductive reasoning of the research methodology. 
Strategic theory is pragmatically applied as abductive reasoning, being neither 
inductive nor deductive, and congruent with Occam’s razor. Abduction is a logical 
process of observed inference that applies the lex parsimoniae (law of parsimony), as 
a problem-solving method that seeks to derive a theory to account for observed 
phenomena. 
 
By reducing a multiplicity of plausible explanations to those with the least amount of 
assumptions, the result should be a ‘simpler’ process for analysis and explanation. In 
the context of this study, the abductive process is to reduce the complexity of the 
historical events and their backgrounds, as case studies for example, which are 
recounted as descriptions of historical events highlighted by the strategic interactions 
that occurred, before being examined against hypotheses of offense-defense theory. 
The foundational assumptions contained in the strategic paradigm and realist 
assumptions of offense-defense theory are pragmatic premises that guide abductive 
reasoning as opposed to deductive reasoning. 
 
 
                                                
106 Harris (2006), p.542 
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This approach does create a problem of verification within the research methodology 
whereby the logical fallacy of converse error by affirming the consequent is an 
inherent result of inductive qualitative reasoning and analysis alongside the rigid 
application of strategic theoretics to the exclusion of alternative explanations. 
Acknowledgment of this shortcoming reaffirms the positive results that abductive 
reasoning affords theoretical explanation and predictions since the hypotheses of 
offense-defence theory serve as hypothetico-deductive problem sets that affirm the 
abductive process that precedes testing. A hypothetico-deductive methodology is an 
algorithmic process of the scientific method.107 The differential diagnostic procedure 
employed as part of the investigation serves to counter balance the problems of 
converse error by substantiating the process that results in positive examination.  
 
Hence, a differential diagnostic provides three immediate forms of analysis; firstly, a 
diagnosis considers strategic interactions of the events in a case to reveal the strategic 
condition; secondly, the condition is then subjected to differentials, that is, plausible 
strategic explanations, which either elucidate the strategic condition or at the very 
least eliminate what the strategic interactions do not or cannot explain. Lastly, the 
process of diagnostic evaluation results in the clustering or lack of, differentials that 
has the net value of demonstrating a sound diagnostic opinion with respect to the case 
examined. A deeper explanation of this procedure is undertaken in the following 
chapter. 
1.8. The Structure of the Study 
Each chapter begins with a preliminary section introducing the strategic actor. The 
analysis proceeds by chronological development of the most salient events that reveal 
those elements of the strategic paradigm simultaneously emphasising the evolving 
strategic dynamics of the period. The analysis then proceeds to test the strategic 
theoretics established by this process against the most prominently featured 
predictions of the offense-defence balance. Whilst each period contains a cluster of 
predictions, analysis will focus upon those predictions that directly relate to the 
evolution of the strategic dynamics of Jihad. Each chapter concludes with an 
overview of the findings in the context of a trinitarian assessment of events. 
 
                                                
107 Sober (2008), pp.24-34 
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Chapter Two details the strategic theoretics of this study, covering the preliminary 
groundwork beginning with strategic terminology, theory, and a strategic framework 
of analysis. This chapter also outlines the thematic concepts and elements of strategy 
that, alongside the method of strategic diagnostics, is the link between hypothetical 
postulates and strategic theory. A triangulation of strategic methods results in a 
proposed strategic theoretic or paradigm to engage the research throughout this study 
in order generate discursive strategic analysis. 
 
Chapter Three proposes a ‘baseline zero’ which is an overall strategic assessment of 
how and why force was applied by the Prophet Muhammad as part of his mission to 
spread Islam. This chapter is also concerned with the original understanding of Jihad - 
the meaning of the word in its ideation, concept and thematic use. From this chapter, a 
series of key concepts and themes will be identified and used as a baseline to outline 
and share across subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter Four examines the aftermath of the Prophet’s death and the institution of the 
Caliphate under the leadership of Abu Bakr between 632-634. This chapter presents a 
broad strategic overview of the geopolitical and geostrategic events that confronted the 
nascent Muslim community and how, given the strategic setting and environment, 
Jihad was employed to serve the interests of policy and the politics of the Muslim 
community. Specifically, this chapter examines the Ridda Wars, and the preliminary 
incursions into Byzantine and Sassanid territories alongside strategic diagnostics to 
assess the offensive elements of Jihad employed both externally and within Arabia. 
 
Chapter Five continues with the legacy of Abu Bakr and the developments that took 
place in both policy, politics, and the strategic dynamics of Jihad under the new 
administration of the second Caliph ‘Umar. This chapter explores the new strategic 
setting and environment, correlating domestic political events with systemic policies 
as a basis to explore politico-strategic alignment against military actions during the 
period of 634-644 - the famous period of ‘conquests’ in Islam, known as the Futuh.  
 
Chapter Six explores the continuing practice of Jihad against the backdrop of the third 
Caliph ‘Uthman during the period of 644-656. Having already identified and tracked 
the politico-strategic developments that served the design and influence of both foreign 
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and domestic policy, in this chapter we subject the forgoing analysis to hypo-deductive 
sets of offensive strategic behaviour to identify causal strategic behaviour both 
externally but also internally in relation to political uprisings (bughat). The chapter 
concludes with a brief overview of the Caliphate of ‘Ali 656-661, identifying the 
strategic setting and environment, in the midst of Civil War known as the Fitna and 
how the dynamics of Jihad fared under such conditions. 
 
Chapter Seven explores how, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the systemic strategic 
environment began to rebalance itself in the absence of Jihad. The end of the Rashidun 
Caliphates witnessed the rise of the first King of Islam, Mu‘awiya who’s near two-
decades of rule (661-680) redefined the causal assumptions of Jihad in relation to 
policy in the face of a new imperial agenda. In this chapter in particular, grand 
strategic outcomes are considered as designed functions of policy crafted by the 
political elite to instrumentalise Jihad as a means to serve political ambitions.  
 
Chapter Eight illustrates the conclusions gathered from the preceding chapters 
mapping common denominators and causal assumptions to the examined phenomena 
and the historical legacy of the formative period of Islam. Our conclusions shall 
identify preferences for strategic options, simultaneously pinpointing the extent to 
which religious justification for action was imposed upon the operational politico-
strategic decision-making procedures, and general strategic choices for the application 
of violence as a tool of political bargaining.  
 
1.9. On Arabic Conventions and Translations 
Throughout this study historical dates are given according to the Common Era 
calendar. As for translational conventions, Arabic words have been loosely 
transliterated and italicised with the exception of the words Qur’an, Jihad, Shari‘a, 
and Arabic personal names. The ta marbuta which is present at the end of feminine 
words in Arabic and is usually transliterated with either a ‘t’ or a ‘h’ at the end has 
been dropped in most instances where pronunciation may be confused. For simplicity, 
the use of macrons for any Arabic word has not been included, except where quoted 




2.0. Strategic Theoretics 
 
This chapter elucidates the strategic theoretics 1  that form the main analytical 
framework, which is best understood as a matrix of propositions derived from the 
general ‘strategic approach’ originating from a Clausewitzian paradigm. The 
employment of strategic theoretics is, as all methodological approaches are, a 
process of privileging particular forms of explanation over others.2 The essence of 
the research framework is to apply strategic theoretics in order identify, chart, and 
logically explain the politico-strategic events between 610-680 as they involve Jihad. 
Strategic theory is ideally suited to ‘trace the line of thinking of a particular political 
entity in order to comprehend how it proposes to achieve its objectives;’ as M.L.R. 
Smith explains, in particular ‘to look at the ideological assumptions and values that 
underlie that entity’s thinking and how this informs the way it formulates its 
strategy.’3 Strategic theory applied to the research questions delineated in the previous 
chapter reveals the core problems to be explored. Firstly, the bargaining dynamic 
between politics and policy; secondly, the politico-strategic mechanisms that 
instrumentalise and drive military force; and finally, the degree to which political 
behaviour may be understood as a set of bargaining options generated by the 
pressures and nature of the strategic environment. 
 
This research methodology - the theoretical framework as a whole - is heavily 
indebted and influenced by one individual in particular, Carl Philipp von Clausewitz 
(d. 1831) the intellectual and philosophical godfather of Euro-American strategic 
thought. A brief foray into some fundamental concepts raised by Clausewitz is 
therefore necessary in order to explicate the foundations of the strategic theoretic 
presented in this chapter. 
                                                
1 Strategic theoretics have been italicised until now so as to distinguish the word as an umbrella term 
for the research approach. Since this chapter elucidates the research approach fully, the italics shall be 
removed henceforth. 
2 Lake & Powell (1999), p.16 
3 Smith (1997), p.4 
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2.1. On War 
Clausewitz begins his opus On War (Vom Kriege) with a definition of war, which 
contains a subject and a predicate: ‘War is an act of force intended to compel the 
enemy to fulfil our will’ (the subject being war, and the predicate an act of force). The 
resolve to compel is driven by the motives for war, Clausewitz explains, the more 
powerful and inspiring these motives are the closer war will escalate to the abstract 
ideal and the more important it will be to crush the enemy; meaning ‘the more closely 
will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military 
and less political will war appear to be.’4 The basic point is that the tension between 
war’s essence and its attributes is constant and must always be managed. In the 
following sections we shall clarify and explain the major propositions of Clausewitz’s 
theory but also the language used, and their implications for this study. 
 
2.2. The Trinitarian System 
2.2.1. Proposition 1 – Rational Calculation (Policy) 
P1: In order to maintain the primacy of those political interests for which war is 
fought, control of the instrument must ultimately reside with the political and not the 
military authorities. 
 
Basic Theory: Any war effort is never restricted to the military instrument alone. A 
clash of wills and a trial of strength include politico-economic, diplomatic, and legal 
pressure, directed at the enemy. Such means seek to destabilise the opponent and 
increase or induce those elements, which will unbalance his rational pursuits through 
war. The political motives for war when unchecked are threatened by the variables of 
hostile intentions and feelings that will escalate the military influence over the 
political ability to control the direction of the will of war to its natural extreme. On the 
other hand, the inverse relationship holds true, such that the military element’s natural 
tendency toward violent escalation is reduced when political control is exerted over 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, thus facilitating political control and a 
means-ends outcome. 
 
                                                
4 OW, pp.87-88 
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Explanation: Clausewitz refines his philosophical inquiry into war by focusing upon 
its reality than its ideal. The initial definition Clausewitz derived is from the example 
of a duel; essentially a contest between two opposing wills battle for dominance. The 
key concepts of this contest are violence, objective and end.5 The reciprocal logic 
posits that if disarmament or destruction of the enemy is not aimed for, it is only to 
invite the enemy to do the same to us. The strategic objective thus becomes a race 
between two adversaries to disarm each other.6 Clausewitz sought to refine his initial 
definition by rooting war in reality via a framework of analysis he calls the 
paradoxical trinity, a means of triangulation between the subject-predicate. 
Clausewitz delineates that this trinity is constituted by: 
 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded 
as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability 
within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element 
of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject 
to reason alone.7  
 
From Clausewitz’s initial subject-predicate starting point; triangulation between the 
paradoxical trinity delivered Clausewitz to his final statement regarding the nature of 
war: ‘Policy [politik], then will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their 
violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them’;8 and ‘As a 
result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be 
more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem 
increasingly political in character.’9 The term used by Clausewitz is politik, that more 
accurately includes both the meaning of policy and politics, and contains a far broader 
implication of socio-political influence upon the application of the military 
instrument. Thus, adding to our previous introductory definition of politics, politics is 
about the power to influence either directly or indirectly. Politics is about power and 
those avenues by which an actor seeks to attain their objectives. 
                                                
5 Aron (1986), p.62  
6 OW, pp.77, 90-123 
7 Ibid., p.89 
8 Ibid., p.87 
9 Ibid., p.88 [italics in the original] 
 53 
The creation of advantage through bargaining dynamics in relation to counter-
political agendas is the means of policy. Policy may or may not incorporate the use of 
force or specifically the military instrument. Political interests served below the level 
of policy, that is, unofficially or informally; contain a breadth of interactions that can 
include bargaining between institutional structures, businesses, domestic households, 
or social relations. The quintessential link between policy and politics therefore, is the 
idea of bargaining to an end. This bargaining dynamic is what makes interactions 
political, and sometimes involves the threat or use of force, other times through 
mutual consent and agreement. 
 
Hence, according to Clausewitzian logic, the strategic employment of violence is 
never waged in isolation from political influences, constraints, and moral ideals;10 
rather ‘the primacy of politics meant that there could never be a purely military 
solution to any strategic problem.’ Daniel Moran explains, ‘Military objectives 
derived from political purposes, and strategic plans should in turn be defined by, and 
proportionate to, the objective.’11 The ‘strategic approach’ can be broadly understood 
to be largely a consequence of the Clausewitzian impact on strategy and military 
theory, Waldman writes: 
 
Ostensibly, the concept of war as an instrument of policy is 
straight-forward. The use of military force is a means to a higher 
end—the political object. War is a tool that policy uses to achieve 
its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. So, the 
purpose for which the use of force is intended will be the major 
determinant of the course and character of a war.12 
 
The first element of the Trinitarian system is thus concerned with rational calculation 
as a strategic act of bargaining. The words ‘strategy’ and its derivative ‘strategic’ 
should therefore be clarified by some simple qualifications that are of methodological 
consequence. 
                                                
10 Ibid., p.78 
11 Moran (2002), p.29 
12 Waldman (2010), p.2 
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2.2.2. Sub-Proposition A – Vertical Design (Strategy) 
P1A: The quintessential characteristic of ‘strategy’ is that it is an instrumental link 
between means and ends; and ‘strategic’ action or interaction, implies instrumental 
design advanced to reach a particular end or objective(s) given the assumptions of 
adversarial or competitive behaviour. 
 
Basic Theory & Explanation: Whilst strategy is not an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ - there is no strictly agreed upon definition within the field of strategic 
theory and studies. Early definitions of strategy in the European tradition deemed 
strategy as ‘all military movements out of the enemy’s cannon range or range of 
vision’, the Swiss General and strategist Antoine Henry de Jomini (d.1869) wrote of it 
as ‘the art of making war upon the map’13; but following Clausewitz’s introduction of 
war’s relation to policy, a broader meaning came to be enjoyed amongst strategic 
thinkers and military theorists. 
 
Clausewitz himself used the terms ‘art of war’ (Kriegskunst), ‘strategy’ (Strategie) 
and ‘conduct of war’ (Kriegführung) almost interchangeably14 but defined strategy as 
‘the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.’15 According to Clausewitz, the 
strategist must ‘define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in 
accordance with its purpose.’ In other words, ‘he will draft the plan of the war, and 
the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.’16 Clausewitz 
qualifies this explanation further by writing: 
 
Strategy, in connecting these factors with the outcome of an 
engagement, confers a special significance on that outcome and 
thereby on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it. Yet 
insofar as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it 
remains subsidiary and is also to be thought of as a means.17 
 
                                                
13 Cited in Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), pp.2-3 
14 See Echevarria (1995) 
15 OW, p.177 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p.143 (emphasis in the original) 
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Various strategic thinkers have put forth differing definitions or descriptions of 
strategy, for example, Harry Yarger writes: ‘Strategy is fundamentally about choices; 
it reflects a preference for a future state or condition and determines how best to get 
there.’ In doing so, Yarger asserts the comprehensive nature of strategy in that 
‘strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors; and it addresses resource and 
organizational issues; even then some factors simply will remain beyond control or 
maybe unforeseen.’18 Michael Howard defines strategy as ‘the use of available 
resources to gain any objective.’19 These rather broad and abstract definitions can be 
contrasted with more specific military proposals. 
 
The military definition of ‘strategy’ proposed by Basil Liddell-Hart is ‘the art of 
distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy.’20 Beaufre 
defines it otherwise as ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills, using force to 
resolve their dispute’.21 According to Daniel Moran, ‘The goal of strategy is to 
optimize military effectiveness while limiting the social costs of war, relative to the 
interests at stake.’22 Colin S. Gray offers the definition of strategy as ‘the use that is 
made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’;23 and David Lonsdale 
amalgamates the definitions of Clausewitz, Gray and Beaufre to posit ‘the art of using 
military force against an intelligent foe(s) toward the attainment of policy 
objectives.’24 
 
Whilst further definitions and interpretations could be presented,25 the objective 
would not be qualified further in doing so because strategic theory does not advocate 
a particular definition of strategy itself, as we shall explain later in this chapter. 
Therefore it is sufficient for now to acknowledge all of the aforementioned definitions 
and propose for this study, our own definition: strategy is simply an abstract design 
conceived as an instrumental process between means and ends. 
 
                                                
18 Yarger (2006), p.6 
19 Howard (1983), p.86 
20 Liddell Hart (1967), p.335 
21 Cited in Sabin (2012), p.61 
22 Moran (2002), p.25 
23 Gray (1999), p.7 
24 Lonsdale (2007), p.6 
25 See Gray (2010), Jermy (2011), Lonsdale (2007), Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), and Stone (2011). 
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2.2.3. Sub-Proposition B - Horizontal Design (Strategic) 
P1B: The result in war is never final. The instrument of war cannot confer victory or 
legitimacy without political credibility. Military victory is distinct from political 
victory. Peace cannot be imposed unless terms are made acceptable to the 
vanquished. 
 
Basic Theory & Explanation: The choices or decisions of actors (whether states, 
political parties, ethnic groups, military organisations, or individuals) can be 
understood as strategic; ‘which means dependent upon the choices and behaviour of 
other relevant actors regardless of whether those choices concern war or peace.’26 The 
interdependency of action is often adversarial, or competitive, creating dialectical 
responses between actors each attempting to further their interests. The strategic 
design of each side is called the ‘horizontal dimension’ according to Edward 
Luttwak,27 like two wrestlers attempting to defeat one another. Raymond Aron writes, 
‘If strategy has one end, it could be summarized in a single word: peace.’ Aron 
continues to makes the pertinent distinction that peace is ‘not military victory, even 
though each of the belligerents clearly wants a different peace or conceives of peace 
in different terms.’28 The exemplary purpose of strategy in Clausewitzian thought is to 
serve the ends of political victory, to impose an acceptable peace upon the adversary. 
 
Platias & Koliopoulos argue that since the days of Thucydides it was understood that 
strategy maintained a constantly adversarial logic, ‘never conducted in a vacuum; it is 
always directed against one or more opponents who in turn formulate their own 
strategy.’29 Strategic choice and action is, therefore, the product of strategic calculus 
dependent upon the existence and interaction on an opponent within an environment, 
a strategic bargaining dialectic where action and reaction are driven by previous 
behaviour and expectations for the future.30 
 
In other words, ‘A situation is strategic if an actor’s ability to further its ends depends 
on the actions others take. If so, then each actor must try to anticipate what the other 
                                                
26 Lake & Powell (1999), p.3 
27 Luttwak (1987), p.70 
28 Aron (1986), p.97 
29 Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.61 
30 Ibid., p.66  
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actors will do.’ 31 But what one actor chooses is dependent to some degree upon their 
assumptions regarding what the other will attempt. John Stone summarises this point 
by explaining that ‘our choice of strategic objective flows not from the most 
dangerous response our adversary can possibly make, but from his most probable 
response in light of the value he places on victory.’32 Strategic choices are not reified 
responses, rather they are calculated responses to emerging conditions and ‘[i]t is 
exactly this conditioning of strategic choices by political considerations that 
Clausewitz had in mind when he characterized war as a continuation of politics by 
other means.’33 Strategy is the bridge between means and ends, and thus directs 
decision-making and problem-solving towards a common objective - the political aim. 
Strategic actions are like moves on a chessboard, each move ultimately designed and 
calculated to an end, the checkmate of the opponent, but dependent upon the 
responses of the opponent simultaneously. Strategy cannot be wholly conceived 
independent of a setting however, as it is the setting itself which structures and gives 
meaning to strategic interactions. 
 
2.3. The Strategic Setting 
2.3.1. Proposition 2 – Rational Actors seek to control Blind Forces 
P2: If war is an instrument of rational calculation, it is never the first or the last 
resort, but rather it should be the most effective means at one’s disposal. 
 
Basic Theory: The rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of 
clear and attainable objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of 
employing force as part of strategic interactions between actors and the environment. 
This calculus specifically seeks to employ violence in such a manner as to achieve the 
political objectives as fast and efficiently as possible, at the lowest political costs. 
Hostile feelings and intentions can, and often will, contradict rational calculation thus 
making war less political and escalating its tendencies to the extreme.  
Explanation: The strategic setting is the foundational structure of strategic 
bargaining analysis, incorporating the basic constituent variables of strategic 
                                                
31 Lake & Powell (1999), p.8 
32 Stone (2011), pp. 6-7 
33 Ibid. 
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interaction analysis. The strategic setting is a conceptual reconfiguration of the units 
of analysis (two or more actors) as strategic problems and interactions seeking to 
explain how this interaction unfolds.34 In order to do this effectively, strategic 
interaction is structured and distinguished between the actors, their environment, and 
the preferences and beliefs held or demonstrated - all according to the known 
information available to the actors – which, according to Lake & Powell, forms 
analytical categories that ‘serve as the basis for conceptual experiments that recur at all 
levels of strategic interaction.’ According to Lake, using this structural approach, the 
resulting analytical scheme ‘gives theories within the strategic-choice approach their 
explanatory power.’35 The constituent key forms of interactions within the strategic 
setting are: strategic actions, strategic preferences, and the strategic environment. 
Each form of interaction presents a strategic problem to be solved by other units 
involved. These problems set in motion the other interaction but are also created on 
account of them. 
 
2.3.2. Sub-Proposition C - Interaction Analysis (Local Politics) 
P2C: War is a political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a social 
unit, whether an organised political polity or a tribe. Therefore, its instrumental 
purpose reflects its rational purpose. 
 
Basic Theory: Strategic interactions generate expectations and projections of the 
opponent and create preferred methods of engagement or influence bargaining 
behaviour along lines of expected practice and utility of actions, which end in ranked 
assumptions and preferences for action and outcomes sought through the interactive 
process. If political interests are strategically unchecked, or at the mercy of non-
political stewardship, the instrument of war may just as easily be employed to serve 
irrational or unattainable objectives as interests become blinded by passions. 
 
Explanation: Strategic interaction is analysis according to actor and environments 
with no specification or determination of the traditional levels-of-analysis problem; 
meaning systemic, domestic or individual actors are not judged by hierarchy but 
                                                
34 Lake & Powell (1999), p.4 
35 Ibid. (both quotes) 
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observed and tackled according to strategic interaction. If there is no strategic 
interaction at a particular level, there is no need to assume or investigate further. 
Strategic interactions are dissected between local actors, interests, and the strategic 
environment. 
 
The actions available to actors (which can be analysed through sets of decision-
making inferences, plausible reactions, and sequential deduction), inform whether 
competitive or cooperative bargaining behaviour is to be expected or predicted.36 The 
strategic environment also informs the analysis as to the information available to the 
actors thereby making clear what is uncertain or must be inferred during the decision-
making process. The uncertainty and fog of the strategic environment greatly affects 
the corresponding decision-making, in large part subsequently determining the course 
of actions undertaken. A deeper discussion of actors, interests, and the strategic 
environment, reveals the foundational structure upon which the strategic setting is 
built. 
2.3.2a. The Strategic Actor 
The means-end relationship of strategy assumes that actors will make advance 
decisions with an expectation to maximize subjective expected utility whenever 
possible as part of a broad cost-benefit calculus. At the heart of strategic interaction 
between actors is this form of bargaining calculus. The bargaining calculus of actors 
reflect decisions, or strategic preferences, that unlike the legal preferences and 
assumptions of rational choice theories,37 are not completely identifiable or static, nor 
can be ranked according to a preference hierarchy intended to result in particular 
outcomes. This is because the strategic environment is dynamic such that preferences 
cannot be transitive or hierarchical in a linear manner indefinitely; i.e. if A is 
preferred to B and B to C, then A is preferred to C. Instead, strategic preferences are 
aligned with broad policy outcomes that facilitate adaptive and flexible responses to 
maximize subjective expected utility prior to any diplomatic or military engagements. 
Between actors and their environments lie interests for action. Strategic interests link 
interactions between actors.  
                                                
36 Such predictions are commonly made through the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma matrices, and ‘two-
by-two games’, in game theory and modelling. 
37 Walt (2000), pp.5-7 
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2.3.2b. The Strategic Interest 
The identification of ‘preferences’ is broadly used as an indictor of where the strategic 
interest resides within the bargaining calculus of a strategic interaction. Jeffery 
Frieden writes ‘[T]he essential point is that in any given setting, an actor prefers some 
outcomes to others and pursues a strategy to achieve its most preferred possible 
outcome.’38  The ‘preference and pursuit’ reflect the deeper implications of the 
strategic relation between the interaction of the actor, the environment and other 
actors within the environment. Political preferences, expressed through policy may 
explicate what and where the strategic interest of an actor resides, but the 
identification of strategic interests themselves remain problematic. Strategic interests 
are rarely ever purely ‘strategic’ but more often the result of political considerations. 
The problem of political demands is that they are not always the most judicious 
confusing political interests with strategic interests.39  
 
Confusion of political interests with strategic interests is not surprising however, since 
the complexity of the strategic environment is exceptionally dynamic given systemic 
flux and the variables of instability. Constant streams of information and intelligence 
are locked into a strategic loop of variable calculus toward threats and behaviours. 
‘This is the feedback process in principle,’ 40 Thomas Schelling explains, wherein the 
activities of politicians and the military generate multiple variables and sources of 
internal friction that reduces the efficacy of strategic decision-making. Bureaucracy, 
inter-departmental, and cross-party politics provides substantial friction in domestic 
areas such as acquisition and budget allocations that have a direct knock-on effect for 
military decisions, where political motivations of individuals and parties or interest 
groups and increasingly the media, influence the political-decision process. 
 
As the publicity of policy is increasingly affected by internal friction, policy is also a 
spectacle for the audience of systemic actors affecting the internal, as well as the 
external, development and application of military decision-making. Bernard Brodie 
also argues that very often, political judgment does not direct military options in order 
to advance strategic interests. ‘To save wear and tear on their always overburdened and 
                                                
38 Frieden (1999), p.41 
39 Cited in Jermy (2011), p.80 
40 Schelling (2008), p.274 
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frequently limited analytical powers,’ politicians according to Brodie, ‘cling 
obsessively to common accepted axioms, some of which may be old enough to have 
the aura of “traditional” policy.’41 If political preferences are not reflective or 
indicative of the actual strategic interest, and demonstrate a distinct contradiction of 
the expected strategic logic in favour of more politically manageable options, the 
result is an expected disaster. 
 
The identification of the strategic interests advanced by policy must be distinguished 
from the politics involved in its formulation, otherwise Jermy concludes, ‘the strategy 
will be built on weak foundations.’42 Accordingly, the motives for war should 
correspond to the vital interests of the actors such that they check the escalatory 
nature of adversarial violence applied. The final unit of the strategic setting is the 
strategic environment itself, however, to engage this variable correctly we must 
address its Trinitarian roots first. 
 
2.4. The Variables of Chaos 
2.4.1. Proposition 3 – The Non-Linear forces of Chaos, Escalation, and Friction 
P3: The balance afforded by rational calculation is always threatened by the 
variables of chaos and escalation. 
 
Basic Theory: Friction refers to the interplay of probabilities against chance and 
uncertainty. This includes the general elements of friction, incompetence, negligence, 
technical or mechanical failure, and others. Escalation always threatens to destabilise 
the directing control of rational purposes. The more war is fought for less politically 
motivated goals, the greater the propensity for escalation and the increase the 
likelihood of violent and destructive means being employed. 
Escalation may however be deliberately introduced by one side against another as a 
means of shifting the bargaining advantage or the strategic initiative through 
disproportionate force. Policy should dictate the series of actions that aim to translate 
the desired political outcome into a reality whilst overcoming the variables of chaos, 
escalation, and friction. In this sense, strategy seeks to translate vertical or abstract 
                                                
41 Brodie cited in Jermy (2011), p.92 
42 Jermy (2011), p.92 
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will onto the horizontal plane of tangible outcomes. Warfighting is a means of 
translation. 
 
Explanation: The design of policy seeks to align military actions with a consistent 
strategic vision of events, yet as ‘Clausewitz tells us that the conscious conduct of war 
(strategy, etc.) should be a continuation of rational calculation and policy, but also 
that war inevitably originates and exists within the chaotic, unpredictable realm of 
politics.’43 Ideal war is that where ‘war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit 
to the application of that force.’44 When two opposing wills clash both, attempting to 
apply force to each other, the reciprocal consequence between two adversaries creates 
an escalatory logic whereby violence is used at accelerated rates to achieve 
dominance over the other, it become absolute. The ‘unlimited’ logic represents the 
abstract apex of ‘absolute war’ - to apply violent means to achieve an end - which 
should be used with the greatest sense of urgency, that is, at its utmost speed and 
power, without warning or hesitation – supremely a single instantaneous explosion of 
unrestricted force45  against the opponent to decisively crush any possibility of 
resistance. 
 
Despite war’s propensity to escalation, Clausewitz noted the absence of absolute war 
in human history and that the actual face of war was quite a different affair. Bound by 
human reasoning and error, and unforeseen variables, both colluding to create friction 
against escalation, war could never progress from the political decision to the military 
decision is one instantaneous strike. Clausewitz noted the epistemological nature of 
war in reality, absorbed in ‘a kind of friction that is inconceivable’46 between political 
aims and military action which, in its ideal form would be instantaneous, non-local or 
linear, and without friction. 
Harry Yarger47 explains the inconceivable role of friction coupled with the ideas of 
nonlinearity (both continuities and unpredicted threats and opportunities), as an 
interactive process whereby strategic choices generate effects that in turn engender 
reactions, the results of which may or may not create significant changes. Yarger’s 
                                                
43 Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14 [italics in the original] 
44 OW, p.77 
45 Ibid., p.79 
46 Ibid., p.119 
47 Yarger (2006), pp.24-25 
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argument is that friction is generated as consequence of interaction between actors 
irrespective of their relationship to the principal actor – be they friendly, adversarial, 
or indifferent, and their choice of actions – whether purposeful and deliberate, 
reactive, or pre-emptive – all result in shifts at some degree from their previous 
condition. 
 
Hence, the smallest amount of friction is inherently volatile by its nature, and 
escalates internally, inversely affecting the external capacity for military escalation to 
reach its optimum, ‘whether by lack of foresight, slow execution, or factors beyond 
the actor’s control, [it] can amplify itself into a cascade of things going wrong to 
create potential chaos.’48 Epistemologically Clausewitz concludes that the logically 
ideal form of war is impossible to attain in reality on account of not only political 
behaviour49 but even in the theoretical instance of war driven solely by passionate 
motivations for complete destruction of the enemy; the inescapable influence of 
friction will always limit the realistically attainable level of escalation which is 
required. This is what is meant by war in reality (see Figure 1. below). 
 
 
Figure 1. The Fundamentals of War in Reality 
 
2.4.2. The Strategic Environment 
Basic Theory & Explanation: The strategic environment is the most dynamic unit of 
analysis, and can be best understood as a self-regulating system wherein, much like an 
eco-system, an internal complex system of organisation exists which establishes 
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equilibrium for life to be maintained, and flourish. Externally this is manifested by 
conditions suitable for life or habitats to survive according to the needs of the species 
present. Likewise, the strategic environment is composed of actors with formed 
relationships between them. Such relationships may be co-operative or hostile. 
Accordingly, interactions between actors demonstrate strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats. Survival between hostile actors are, nonetheless, still 
balanced by the needs of the system and regulated as such. In cases of extreme threat 
or even eradication to one actor, the environment may adapt in order to reconfigure 
the needs of the environment as a whole in the absence of a former relationship no 
longer present or to remove an actor who threatens to destabilise the system 
completely.50 In other words, the strategic environment will seek to manage threats 
and the use of violence to an acceptable level. 
 
The advancement of politico-strategic interests of actors themselves generates 
friction. To this end, it can be argued that counter-productive effects to one’s strategy 
are often self-inflicted by the strategy adopted because of the manner in which 
interests advanced within the strategic environment are never achieved unilaterally. In 
order to reduce friction, a cumulative strategy is often preferred by strategists in order 
to incrementally advance towards one’s objectives whilst simultaneously protecting 
the platform upon which the strategist is operating, that is to say, building upon one’s 
successes by not compromising the accrued goals already met. The fog and friction of 
war is where the interplay of chance and probability – those innate or non-rational 
forces – are brought to bear. This side of the trinity is a broad and complicated area 
that can be simplified by recourse to a modern variant of explanation: VUCA. 
 
The U.S. Army War College offers the acronym VUCA – volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity, and ambiguity - to describe the strategic environment. 51 The 
understanding of these characteristics is to reinforce the dynamic instability of the 
strategic environment. Whilst the system may self-regulate, it remains nonetheless 
volatile due to the complexities of actor’s choices within the ‘fog of war’ – meaning 
uncertain or incomplete information – and the ambiguities of logical cause-and-effect 
                                                
50 More commonly understood in international relations theory as balance of power, obvious examples 
of such shifts are the French Revolution and the balancing of European nations against Germany twice 
in the twentieth-century. 
51 Yarger (2006), p.18 
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on account of friction. The constant flux generated within the strategic environment 
renders many assumptions speculative and uncertain. More so, the introduction of 
violence escalates the characteristics of VUCA in any given theatre. 52  
 
2.5. Philosophical Conclusions 
The Clausewitzian Trinity (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) is a ‘fascinating trinity’ by 
which to observe the events of early Islam and the formative Jihad.  We have 
explained Trinitarian theory alongside its constituents noted in contemporary strategic 
theoretics, (that is, theories that can be included as part of the ‘strategic approach’) 
according to three propositions: rational calculation, the strategic setting, and the 
variables of chaos. Let us remind ourselves of how Clausewitz defines the trinity: 
 
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; which are to be regarded 
as a blind force; of the play of chance and probability within which 
the creative spirit is free to roam; and it’s element of subordination, 
as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason 
alone.53 
 
Often summarised as the social trinity of ‘people, army, and government’54 whereby 
‘the directing policy of the government, the professional qualities of the army, and the 
attitude of the population all played an equally significant part’;55 Clausewitz’s triune 
lens of strategic interpretation is exceedingly insightful and illuminates how ‘War is 
more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.  
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable 
trinity’.56 This is because in all instances of war, the particulars of the trinity remain 
constant though the specifics will differ. Over a period of time therefore, changes 
inevitably occur because of changes within the strategic setting or environment, 
which can never be stagnant. Accordingly shifts in rational calculation must follow, if 
they are not driving the changes. The trinity itself is all about dynamism. 
 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 OW, p.89 
54 Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.9; and Bassford (2015) 
55 Howard (1983), p.20 
56 OW, p.89 
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Hence, trinitarian analysis or ‘interpretation’ is a valuable means of identifying 
strategic dynamics. This method has been described by Villacres & Bassford who 
write: ‘Interpreting the meandering course of any real-world war as the product of a 
trinity of forces (emotion, chance, and rationality) is altogether different from 
discussing a trinity of actors (people, army, and government).’ 57 Indeed, as strategic 
dynamics evolve, actors will change though the forces of the trinity remain as we have 
mentioned. 
 
For this reason it is important to see that any trinitarian interpretation of events is 
located within the trinity of actors but is concerned with the later repercussions or 
trajectory of their decisions and actions rather than to become bogged down in the 
contingent behavioural dynamics of the event. Social interpretations that are 
considered as events within themselves often lead to trinitarian failure when analysed 
in such manner. This is because such analysis generally assumes that were one set of 
structures to be removed from the analysis, the trinity ceases to exist as a framework 
of interpretation.58  
 
This study indirectly counters such claims by firmly situating trinitarian interpretation 
to an extremely volatile pre-state society over a period of 70 years. Beginning with no 
civil-military institutions or official political establishments, seventh-century Arabia, 
it shall be argued, is especially amenable to trinitarian interpretation. As institutions 
began to form, their development is inextricably bound to the dynamic interplay of 
strategic interactions at the levels of the strategic setting and environment that created 
systemic policies and subsequent institutions for interaction. 
Hence, to recognise strategic developments during a particular Caliphate is to 
understand the events of the previous Caliphate that led to it. Furthermore, the 
forthcoming chapters shall demonstrate how the positive use of Clausewitzian theory 
yields significant analytical benefit when applying trinitarian interpretation to 
understanding the evolving strategic dynamics of warfighting in Islam and those 
policies that directed it, because the primary features of Clausewitzian theory are 
rooted in a similar tension between Jihad as both an absolute ideal and a real 
                                                
57 Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.15 
58 Ibid.; See Kaldor (2006) and Smith (2006) 
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phenomenon. But first, let us observe how Clausewitz adopted a similar approach in 
On War.  
 
2.6. Clausewitz and the ‘Case Study Approach’ 
It is perhaps useful at this point to reassert the line of continuity between the strategic 
theoretics proposed so far and the reasons as to why a diagnostic procedure is needed 
to complete the research method. Let us begin by stating that the strategic approach in 
general is not uniform and some strategists advocate an eternal unity to strategic 
thought that can be transmitted through generations as strategic wisdom.59 According 
to Clausewitz, if theory should reflect reality then a logical hierarchy of laws, 
principles, rules, prescriptions and methods must govern it.60 However, Clausewitz 
was quick to dismiss the possibility that laws should be given a place in a theory of 
war, because laws were understood as ‘universal’ and therefore drove cause-and-
effect determining actions and outcomes,61  and ‘since the phenomenon of war 
consisted of “too much change and diversity” to allow action to be traced to a single 
cause’62 Clausewitz rejected the notion out-right. Principles are deductions on the 
other hand, and reflect the ‘spirit and sense’ of a law,63 but are not universal and 
absolute like laws. A universal principle guides general expectation and hence, for 
Clausewitz, principles, and rules, were acceptable in the theorisation of war because 
they were intrinsically broad and non-absolute. They were general truths subject to 
exceptions and not factual realities. 
 
Drawing from Clausewitz’s original ideas an orientation developed premising strategy 
with political aims that blossomed into the strategic approach that exists today. This 
orientation, is premised upon the emphatic correlation Clausewitz advocated, the 
balance between policy and the instrumental use of force: ‘If we keep in mind that 
war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its 
existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.’64 Debate within the 
                                                
59 See Gray (1999), p.1 
60 OW, pp.151-155 
61 Ibid., p.151 
62 Echevarria (1995) 
63 OW, p.151 
64 Ibid., p.87 
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orientation as to the strategic relevance and validity of historical experiences and 
records is a matter of contention however. 
 
Some modern writers, such as David J. Lonsdale,65 Platias & Koliopoulos,66 and 
Colin Gray, advocate the value of history as a repository for strategic wisdom. Colin 
Gray for example, argues that ‘there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in 
all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and 
strategy changes.’ 67  Furthermore, Gray adds, ‘Because war and strategy are   
unchanged and unchanging in their natures, it has to follow that we should allow 
ourselves to seek education from historical experience.’68 In opposition to such ideas 
are authors, such as Philip Sabin, who argues that the ‘understandable tendency of 
modern observers to focus almost exclusively on potential parallels and areas of 
similarity between ancient and modern experience is in fact misleading and even 
pernicious.’69 
 
Clausewitz, upon whom this research is philosophically premised, is most blunt in 
this regard: ‘The further back one goes, the less useful military history becomes, 
growing poorer and barer at the same time. The history of antiquity is without doubt 
the most useless and the barest of all.’70 Clausewitz’s dismissiveness is a product of 
this theoretical approach, as he explains: ‘the further one progresses from broad 
generalities to details,’ by which he means universals to particulars, ‘the less one is 
able to select examples and experiences from remote times. We are in no position to 
evaluate the relevant events correctly, nor to apply them to the wholly different means 
we use today.’71 Clausewitz devotes an entire section to this issue72 in On War (Book 
Two, Chapter Six) and his judgment in this regard is most salient for this study. 
Therefore, we have proposed to examine the period of 610-680, in a style, as we have 
explained according to trinitarian interpretation, but not explained why until now. The 
why is simply in accordance with Clausewitzian recommendation. Furthermore, the 
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implementation of diagnostic procedure for evaluation similarly conforms to 
Clausewitz’s own approach to validate the theoretics he proposed himself. 
2.6.1. The Curious Case of Napoleon 
For Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era bore witness to warfare reaching its closest point 
to absolute war.73 However, because Clausewitz was deeply troubled by the tension 
between historical changes over time, the influence of circumstances, and the dubious 
applicability of general laws to the conduct of war;74 he did not conduct a historical 
appraisal of the Napoleonic wars but rather a strategic one. Clausewitz subjected 
information available on the campaigns of Napoleon to the theoretical framework of 
On War, redefining the historical events in broader terms to signify a ‘framework for 
study’ or a ‘basis for conceptualization.’75 The campaigns of Napoleon provided 
Clausewitz with a rich canvas of events (not historical details) by which to 
demonstrate the aim of theory and to draw means-ends relationships in order to 
validate theoretical consistency. 76 
 
The process adopted by Clausewitz according to Antulio Echevarria involved placing 
‘the principal elements of war, such as military genius and friction, under the 
microscope,’ examining them in detail before contrasting them against military 
history, in particular campaigns of Napoleon ‘as a sort of crucible to test how each 
element functioned and influenced the others, if indeed it did so.’77 For Clausewitz’s 
method, this was the diagnostic element that revealed the character of Napoleonic 
warfare was at its extreme inclination towards the absolute conception of warfighting. 
 
Clausewitz’s arrival at this position was a result of avoiding the artificiality of 
historical categorisation and interpretation,78 insisting instead upon strategic analysis 
according to broad generalisations demonstrably observed and recorded. For 
Clausewitz, battle and the use of battle for the purposes of the political aim was the 
primary form of historical information.79 Hence, strategic and operational (or tactical) 
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78 See Morillo with Pavkovic (2006); and Keegan (1984), p.25 
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reports were the most important forms of records to subject strategic to analysis to in 
order to arrive at an understanding of the political objective. 
 
Just as Clausewitz was able to subject the Napoleonic wars to strategic examination, 
this study advances the strategic dynamics that drove and developed the warfighting 
practices of Jihad in Islam and subjects those events to the proposition of Jihad as the 
continuation of politik by other means. In his own investigation, Clausewitz was 
theoretically flexible, using the philosophy, physics and strategic thought of his day. 
Similarly, in the following sections we shall propose firstly; a strategic theoretic that 
is inclusive of trinitarian analysis discussed so far, strategic theory and the broader 
strategic approach; and secondly, investigative avenues found in contemporary 
offensive realism to support theoretical flexibility and evaluation. 
 
Having elucidated the basic philosophical elements of the trinity and the requirements 
for diagnostic evaluation by case study method; an explanation of strategic theory 
follows as a prelude to presenting an overall strategic paradigm or theoretic. Where 
Clausewitzian theory provides the philosophical origins and format of the research 
method, strategic theory - being premised upon all of the aforementioned propositions 
either directly or indirectly - serves as the guiding structure of strategic investigation. 
Furthermore, strategic theory synchronises additional qualities integral to the research 
methodology and approach. 
 
 
2.7. Strategic Theory 
2.7.1. Proposition 4 – Pragmatic Judgement not Truth 
Strategic theory is philosophically pragmatic, technically parsimonious, and 
premised upon rational calculation and judgement. 
 
Basic Theory: Strategic theory demands the use of judgement, and makes use of 
existing theoretics in accordance with its own principles and logic, based upon the 
utility of the theory to the investigation. While strategic theory does prefer some 
principles and theories to others on account of methodological connexion, the 
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pragmatic character of strategic theory applies a depth of knowledge to a given 
problem through strategic integration of objectives, to result in a clear strategic 
formulation of the subject that is as much a strategic judgment as it is a calculated 
outcome. 
 
Explanation: Despite the fact that strategic theory is not a falsifiable scientific 
theory, according to M.L.R. Smith ‘it does constitute a theory in the broader sense 
that it advances a set of propositions that if true can be held to explain certain facts or 
phenomena.’80 In the words of strategic theorists themselves, the field is a branch of 
social theory, ‘[E]merging as an offshoot from public choice economics, it shares 
assumptions found in game, drama and rational choice theory.’81 Strategic theory, 
shares with the broader strategic approach, the assumptions that:82  
 
• Actors are purposive, 
• Strategic interactions are the units of analysis,  
• The approach provides a common framework for organising interactions,  
• The approach takes an essentially pragmatic view of theory,  
• and finally, makes a series of methodological bets about what will prove to 
be fruitful ways of analysing and thinking about international politics. 
In a politico-military context, it is ‘concerned with the use of force to achieve the 
goals of one community in conflict with others. It explores how to employ armed 
forces to advance political, social, economic, cultural, or ideological interests.’83 This 
approach is fundamentally concerned with the reciprocal interaction between thought 
and action, action and reaction: ‘tracing the line of thinking of political actors to 
comprehend how they propose to achieve their objectives’;84 and is characterised by 
‘means and ends’ logic alongside a formalised series of explicit assumptions. For 
strategists, ‘[W]ar’s instrumental nature - its logical and practical subordination to 
objectives outside itself-is in theoretical terms its most important characteristic.’85 The 
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basic theoretic of strategic theory or its specific assumptions, are summarised by 
M.L.R. Smith as seven,86 and comprise the core of strategic theory (Figure 3.): 
 
1. The study of ends and means; 
2. The study of the political actor as the central unit of analysis; 
3. Understanding the political actor’s value system and preferences; 
4. An actor’s interest will be influenced by the wider strategic environment; 
5. The actor is behaving rationally in pursuit of its aims; 
6. The acceptance of clashing interests; 
7. and finally, the observance of moral neutrality. 
 
2.7.2. Advantages of Strategic Theory 
Employing strategic theory as the theoretical framework for this research confers 
three salient advantages. The first is theoretical flexibility; the second is parsimony; 
and the third is moral equivocality. An explication of these three features of theory 
will reveal why strategic theory is better suited to an investigation of Jihad as a 
politico-strategic application of the military instrument rather than a general strategic 
approach, an exclusively Clausewitzian study, or common strategic-history approach.  
2.7.3. The Theoretical Flexibility of Strategic Theory 
M.L.R. Smith stipulates that strategic theory is distinct and should not be confused 
with vague subject areas such as ‘strategic culture’, ‘security and strategic studies’; 
confused as being game theory by another name, or a method of studying military 
power alone.87 Nonetheless, research premised upon strategic theory can, and often 
will, include research methodologies from ‘strategic’ disciplines or at least share 
some very similar concerns and assumptions as they do, after all, strategic approaches 
are theoretically inclusive.88 
 
                                                
86  Smith (2011); elsewhere, in an earlier work, Smith (1997), p.2; mentions another pertinent 
assumption, that ‘… one of the principal assumptions of strategic theory is that military force is a 
functional aspect of power, deliberately employed to achieve political objectives.’ According to Smith, 
the basic theoretic is premised upon the essential application of Occam’s Razor to the correlation of 
means and ends. Strategic theory applied therefore, serves as an inquiry by presenting ‘purposive 
assumptions that guide analysis’ – (2011) 
87 Smith (2011) 
88 Lake & Powell (1999), p.6 
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Two fields in particular offer assistance for complex problems tackled by strategic 
theory, both acknowledged by M.L.R. Smith as having early disciplinary influence on 
the growth and development of strategic theory in general - International Relations 
theories, and Game Theory. Whilst strategic theory is predominately a qualitative 
field of research, it does admit occasions where quantitative methods are employed, 
and given the essentially pragmatic nature of strategic theory this is hardly surprising. 
It would be hasty to consider strategic theory a mixed method approach however, as it 
remains qualitatively bound by the nature of its ‘theoretic’ character. 
 
Strategic theory can advance abductive strategic assumptions but cannot assume the 
reasons for behaviour, especially cross-cultural behaviour, without an alternative set 
of assumptions to premise investigation upon. This is where theoretical flexibility 
facilitates the merging of strategic theory with questions of international politics. 
Strategic theory is more closely aligned to the Realist school of thought, but strategic 
theory is neither a Realist theory nor in agreement with all assumptions of Realism. 
Core fundamentals of Realism are however, generally acceptable as initial 
foundations for assumptions regarding the systemic level and behaviour of 
international actors. Subsequent theories derived from Realism which do not 
contravene the basic fundamentals are therefore also amenable to the purposes of 
strategic theorists if and when relevant to an investigation. 
 
2.7.4. The Parsimonious Nature of Strategic Theory 
The second advantageous feature of strategic theory builds upon theoretical flexibility 
but with the streamlining effect of parsimony. The application of strategic theory is 
methodologically premised upon the principle parsimony, which sharpens the 
abductive logic of investigation by reducing complexity according to the units of 
consideration. Strategic theory, does not advocate as constructivists do, ‘an intellectual 
position where everything is “endogenous,” or dependent on everything else’;89 
despite the truth of interdependence, it is not helpful and contrary to the pragmatic 
philosophy of strategic theory and abductive logical inferences. 
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The constructivist trap is to introduce too many variable unknowns, such that in 
mathematical terms, the numerical frequency exceeds the available equations to 
solve the problems. With so many unknown variables, constructivists can only ever 
speculate about plausible alternatives but not explain why any particular solution 
emerges without violating any of their own assumptions that actors and 
environments are mutually constitutive.90 On the other hand, it is short-sighted to 
infer that the application of parsimonious reasoning is always reductionist especially 
in cases where too many necessary variables exist. Often, a multitude of units can be 
accommodated for and reduced to serve theory, because the success of strategic 
theory is measured by the research to provide a strategically consistent and logically 
evident outcome to a question, problem, or subject matter, rather than an all-
embracing explanation. 
 
For example, according to offensive realism, the decision to employ war as a means 
to achieve one’s ends is prejudiced by the ease of an offensive military capability in 
the existing strategic setting, such that when launching offensive operations has a 
greater expected utility over static defensive operations, war will become more 
likely. 91  This application of the offense-defense theory is an example of both 
theoretical flexibility and parsimonious explanation, both of which conform to 
abductive logic and the assumptions of strategic theory.92 
2.7.5. Moral Equivocation 
The final advantage of strategic theory over other strategic approaches is moral 
equivocation, which may be considered as simply an approach that is analytically 
disinterested in ethical norms. The purpose is to enforce objectivity by denying 
subjectivity of research with the researcher.93 Hence, value judgements are never in 
point of fact, but counterfactual. A strategic investigation which involves violence 
emphasises the problems of ‘situating violence, of describing and analyzing its 
structure or structures, of clarifying the ways in which it is structured, of articulating 
its modes and themes, and showing how various kinds of violence may be related’;94 
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over debates of what ought to be, or what is morally right or wrong. In situating 
violence, strategic theorists effectively instrumentalise ethical issues. When military 
force is used in the service of policy, David Lonsdale explains 
 
ethically driven political responses to certain military actions are 
significant. Thus, the strategist must consider whether such 
responses will have detrimental or positive results for the 
attainment of his policy objective. However, it is not the role of the 
strategist to judge the moral worth of an action in an abstract 
manner.95 
 
Strategic theory agrees and continues Clausewitz’s assertion that: 
 
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some 
ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much 
bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. 
Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: War is a 
dangerous business where mistakes that come from kindness are 
the very worst.96 
 
Strategic theory presumes that war and warfighting are concomitant of human social 
relations, on the basis of historical and empirical observation and evidence. Such 
behaviour is embedded beyond eradication. Particular wars may be prevented, but war 
in general will always coexist with human beings. Consequently, strategic theory 
offers no labels for violence as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ except with respect to the ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ judgment behind its employment. If it has been employed strategically, we 
therefore assume the rational calculation of means and ends, costs and benefits, the 
seeking of advantage, and the adversarial logic of engagement. Consequent analysis 
of strategic behaviour is informed by the underlying conception of the nature of war – 
whether a preference for diplomacy or violent strategies is employed; and under the 
conditions from which violence holds its utility and strategic preference. 
 
                                                
95 Lonsdale (2007), p.159, fn.7 
96 OW, p.75 
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In view of the principle of equivocation, the broader issues of Jihad more commonly 
engaged such as ideology, religion, law and ethics, are restrictively addressed within 
the confines of strategic theory. For this reason, only those aspects, which are of direct 
concern to policy and warfare, and assist the strategic analysis, shall be addressed and 
considered. This study does not seek to justify nor condemn war as implemented by 
Muslims in the past or by reference to the present. The interplay of policy and politics 
(politik) are investigated as ethically indifferent bargaining calculations intended to 
achieve political ends, that may have been specifically religious at times or otherwise 
wholly not. This study shall not restrict itself to an apologetic tone of interpretation or 
dependence upon apologetic literature, and thus shall subject the author’s views so as to 
invite criticism, in order to reconstruct and reformulate what has become a dead letter 
in Muslim thinking and Islamic academia. 
 
2.8. Strategic Theoretics as a Disciplinary Matrix 
Strategic theory, given its strengths and weaknesses, is still a relatively young field 
much less established than its earlier incarnations and predecessors. Given this lack of 
establishment, the method and practice of strategic theoretics are not fixed. Thomas 
Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions97 delineates the importance in having 
a standardised jargon or vocabulary to guide research and discussion within a 
particular field of endeavour. A disciplinary matrix of theoretical inquiry Kuhn 
argues, ‘refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular 
discipline;’ forming a ‘matrix’ because it is ‘composed of ordered elements of various 
sorts, each requiring further specification…’98 which according to Kuhn, is necessary 
for the accumulation of knowledge and to avoid stagnation within the field. 
Collectively, the aforementioned propositions, strategic terminology, and structures, 
are constituents of a proposed disciplinary matrix, and as such they form paradigmatic 
functions. 
 
Clausewitz, before Kuhn, expressed a similar conclusion: ‘Theory exists so that one 
need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but 
will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the 
                                                
97 Kuhn (2012) 
98 Ibid., pp.181-2 
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future commander. . . .’99 Exchange the word ‘theory’ for ‘paradigm’, and we have 
essentially the same premise. Hence, rather than propose another interpretation of 
strategy, the research methodology is premised upon a strategic paradigm. Advancing 
a strategic paradigm is important because it will anchor the forthcoming 
interpretations,100 but it will also serve to inform the research of ‘the pre-interpretive 
material on which an interpreter goes to work. That is, they are part of what a 
successful interpretation … must fit.’101 Hence, the congruity of interpretation to the 
paradigm reflects validation rather than previous opinions or references. 
2.8.1. The Strategic Paradigm 
Considering the aforementioned strategic propositions, principles and assumptions of 
strategic theory, in tandem with Clausewitzian theory and the traditional strategic 
paradigm of classical theorists the following core assumptions are proposed as the 
foundational strategic paradigm advanced in this study:102 
 
1. War and warfighting are considered concomitants of human social relations, 
on the basis of historical and empirical observation and evidence. Such 
behaviour is embedded beyond eradication. Particular wars may be prevented, 
or cooperation may be preferred to war, but war in general will always coexist 
with human beings. 
2. War is a political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a 
social unit, whether an organised political polity or a tribe. The instrumental 
purpose of war reflects its rational resolve. 
3. This rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of clear 
and attainable objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force. 
This calculus seeks to employ violence in such a manner as to achieve the 
political objectives as fast and efficiently as possible at the lowest politico-
economic costs. 
4. War is an instrument of rational calculation; therefore it is never the first or 
the last resort, but rather the result of expected utility. The decision to employ 
war as a means to achieve one’s ends is prejudiced by the calculated 
                                                
99 OW, p.141 
100 Endicott (2005), p.48 
101 Ibid. 
102 This paradigm is developed upon the paradigm presented by Handel (2006), pp.xviii-xix 
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expectation of success, such that when offensive operations have the perceived 
or expected advantage war will become more likely. 
5. The same calculus also prejudices the prospects for cooperation and peace, 
such that when diplomatic avenues have the perceived or expected advantage, 
the propensity to warfighting is reduced.  
6. In order to maintain the primacy of those political interests for which war is 
fought, control of the instrument must ultimately reside with the political 
establishment and not the military authorities. 
7. If unchecked, or at the mercy of non-political stewardship, the instrument of 
war may just as easily be employed to serve irrational or unattainable 
objectives. 
8. The balance afforded by rational calculation is always threatened by variables 
of VUCA.  
• Anarchy refers to the interplay of probabilities against chance and 
uncertainty. This includes the general elements of friction, unrestrained 
passions, incompetence, negligence, technical or mechanical failure, 
and others. 
• Escalation always threatens to destabilise the directing control of 
rational purposes. The more war is fought for less politically motivated 
goals, the greater the propensity for escalation and the increase of 
violent and destructive means are employed. 
• Escalation may however be deliberately introduced by one side against 
another as a means of shifting advantage or the strategic initiative. 
9. Any war effort is never restricted to the military instrument alone. A clash of 
wills and a trial of strength include politico-economic, diplomatic, and legal 
pressure directed at the enemy. Such means seek to destabilise the opponent 
and increase or induce those elements, which will unbalance his rational 
pursuits through war. 
10. The result in war is never final. The instrument of war cannot confer victory or 
legitimacy without political credibility. Military victory is distinct from 
political victory. Peace cannot be imposed unless terms are made acceptable to 




The strategic paradigm is not a scientific theory of investigating war, although it does 
serve as a sound foundation upon which a strategic theoretic may be proposed. In 
order to substantiate abductive observation and generalisations drawn from historical 
practice; further dimensions of analysis may be required to reconcile the abstract and 
the reality, to facilitate the strategic paradigm as a bridge, and to act as a theoretical 
guide to test strategic thought. Modelling is the normative quantitative method, 
however a qualitative approach, differential diagnostics, which suits the parsimonious 
ethos of strategic theory, will be applied and entails the following clarifications. 
 
2.9. Strategic Diagnostics 
Strategic theory is philosophically pragmatic and abductively flexible. A hypothesis 
that can explain something is equivalent to what can be actionable for theory. Strategy 
begins with the possible, and has little time for the implausible or the extraordinary. 
This study proposes a version of ‘Differential Diagnosis’ (D/Dx) grounded upon the 
evidence presented that is abductively observed and interpreted, without the labouring 
of validating sources. If something is evidently present and can be applied to a pre-
existing hypothesis, it is considered. This is especially important when there are large 
pieces of information missing in an investigation. 
 
In regard to this study, there simply is not enough information regarding certain 
episodes and events because they have been lost in the passage of time. Walter Kaegi, 
writing on the Muslim conquests between 630-650 and their interactions with 
Byzantium explains that: 
 
The histories of the conquests, irrespective of the language in 
which they are written, do not provide a very good understanding 
of the nature of warfare and the realities of warfare in that period. 
The resulting condition of the sources permits many inferences to 
be drawn, and the information provided is better than having 
nothing, but many questions are left inadequately understood and 
explained.103 
                                                
103 Kaegi (2000), p.273 
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A diagnostic approach can help bridge this gap however. Conceived as a hypothetico-
deductive method, a technique used across many fields (medicine in particular), to 
‘reverse engineer’ an answer on account of unknown or missing variables of 
information. The basic approach when taking a case history is to cluster signs and 
symptoms under a specific classification. This serves as a hypothetical problem set 
that requires interactive differentiation found in explanations of actions based upon 
geostrategic conditions of the strategic environment, the strategic setting of the actors, 
and the flexibility of explanations to predict changes in preferences based upon 
changes in politico-strategic conditions. 
 
Hypothetical sets represent strategic preferences (and interests) that can be established 
on the basis of preexisting theory, inferring from the known features of the actor 
across various contexts, to explain how theory may predict or anticipate under certain 
determined contexts a particular set of preferences that can be expected. 104 
Furthermore, it is possible to overstep the usual trappings of focusing excessively on 
the preferences themselves which is the path of historians, including their meanings 
and applications, instead applying strategic assessment to the actual casual outcomes 
they generate. 
2.9.1. Diagnostic Procedure 
Precedent for such innovative analytical procedures already exist within international 
relations.  An existing approach that is similar in some respects to ours is Stephen 
Walt’s revision of balance-of-power analysis which he terms ‘balance of threat’ – an 
analysis that incorporates aggressive intentions, geographical proximity, and ideology 
as considerations of state preferences, and the degree to which there are inherent 
‘conflicts of interest.’105 Balance of threat is a combined approach that blends national 
preferences, strategies, and the environment into a single factor – ‘not only how 
powerful the actor is, but what it wants, how it proposes to get it, and the setting in 
which this takes place.’ 106   Balance of threat is a form of diagnostics that 
differentiates ‘truth’ as what can be useful for analysis and what cannot be known, 
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meaning the implausible. It is not designed to generate a fact of what is, as much as 
what it cannot be. 
 
The diagnostic procedure is the attempt to classify a problem according to one of 
plausible identification constituted by a cluster of differentials or prime differentials 
that unmistakably identify a class. The application of this method identifies 
differentials to hypothetical problem sets, essentially as classification tests; to 
evaluate the strategic theoretic conclusions arrived through abductive inference as a 
prelude to contextualisation for trinitarian analysis. The result is a (strategic) 
diagnostic opinion. 
 
This diagnostic approach fundamentally demonstrates why something is 
strategically diagnosed rather than what is the proven case. It effectively rules out 
certain options or possibilities in favour of facilitating a more accurate diagnostic 
opinion. Hence, rather than advancing multiple explanations, or the attempt to force 
facts against multiple theories, the strategic assumptions of events are presented as 
logically coherent and demonstrable conclusions; or unambiguous explanations of 
strategic action that provide useful explanation for further study or investigation. 
The differentials and hypothetical problem sets to be employed and subjected to 
diagnostic procedure are derived from Offense-Defense Theory. 
2.9.2. Offense-Defense Theory (ODT) and Strategic Dynamics 
The simplest explanation of this theory is the premise of the offense-defence balance: 
 
When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean 
that it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than 
it is to defend one’s own. When the defense has the advantage, it is 
easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and 
take.107 
 
It is the perception of the offense-defense balance that creates the fear of exploitation 
and the associated costs that reinforces the presence of the security dilemma 
according to Robert Jervis, regardless of whether the actual or perceived vulnerability 
                                                
107 Jervis (1978), p.187 
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(or lack of) is true or not. 108 An actor who believes conquest is easy requires only 
excuses to engage offensively thus presupposing suspicions in the recipient actor that 
an attack is looming. Hence, under conditions of actual defense dominance, an actor 
is more likely to cooperate given the confidence or lack of suspicion on account of 
diminished vulnerability to offensive action. For Van Evera, the prime predictions of 
offense-defense theory are: 
 
1. War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed 
easy, less common when conquest is difficult or is believed difficult; 
2. States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive 
vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states; 
3. A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it 
has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities.109 
 
Fused with a trinitarian interpretation, ‘the security dilemma occurs because of 
uncertainty confounded with a problem of credibility. Each side worries about 
whether the other will attack because it is uncertain about the other's motivations;’110 
which is a reference to the lack of knowledge or certainty regarding the details of the 
strategic setting of the adversary and their policies. Van Evera proposes ten war-
inducing effects that arise when the offense dominates either directly or indirectly, 
which we will use to serve as our hypothetical problem sets. Van Evera explains these 
hypothetical problem sets as follows: 
 
Offense-defense theory’s explanatory predictions derive from the 
hypotheses that comprise its ten explanations. Tests of these 
predictions shed light on both whether and how offense 
dominance (or perceptions of offense dominance) causes war. … 
Offense-defense theory posits that offense dominance leads to 
war through the war-causing action of its ten intervening 
phenomena A-J.111  
                                                
108 ibid., p.170 
109 Van Evera (2004), p.244 
110 Morrow (1999), p.83 
111 Van Evera (2004), pp.244-5; In the vernacular of his article, Van Evera employs the term “offense 
dominant” to suggest that conquest is fairly easy – meaning easier than it usually would be; and 
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Each of these hypothetical problem sets shall be introduced and explained through the 
study at their relevant points of analysis, suffice for now to merely list them and note 
that these hypotheses provide the classification sets for differential diagnosis of 
Muslim strategic interaction at the systemic level.112 
 
1. Hypothesis A: Opportunistic Expansion on account of Offense Dominance 
will lead to war. 
2. Hypothesis B: Defensive Expansion on account of Offense Dominance will 
lead to war. 
3. Hypothesis C: Fierce Resistance to Expansion by other States on account 
Offense Dominance of will lead to war. 
4. Hypothesis D: Moving First when Offense Dominant will lead to war. 
5. Hypothesis E: Windows and larger and more Dangerous on account of 
Offense Dominance and therefore will lead to war. 
6. Hypothesis F: Faits Accomplis are more Common and Dangerous on account 
of Offense Dominance leading to war. 
7. Hypothesis G: States Negotiate Less and reach fewer Agreements on account 
of Offense Dominance leading to war. 
8. Hypothesis H: Secrecy is more Common and Dangerous on account of 
Offense Dominance leading to war. 
9. Hypothesis I: Arms Racing becomes more Intense on account of Offense 
Dominance leading to war. 
10. Hypothesis J: Offense grows even stronger on account of Offense Dominance 
leading to war. 
2.9.3. Diagnostic Stages of Assessment 
The process of diagnostic assessment is a three-stage process; stage one is to outline 
the case history, this is to establish a strategic condition, which is the sum of 
converging strategic interactions resulting in an established pattern of means-end 
behaviours. This is primarily initiated through abductive inference from the literature 
                                                                                                                                      
“defense dominant” that conquest is very difficult meaning that the inherent advantage of defence 
remains intact. Hence, “offense-defense balance” denotes the relative ease of aggression and defense 
against aggression. - ibid., p.227 fn.1 
112 Cited from Van Evera (2004), p.234 
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and earliest sources. Abduction is logical ‘inference to the best explanation.’113 
Abductive logic differs from deduction in that premises are taken as pragmatic 
starting propositions to guide the investigative process rather than established truths to 
be validated. Abductive reasoning suggests the probability of pragmatically useful 
conclusions based upon observations of a case or situation.  
 
Abduction proposes either the most likely case, or the most pragmatic manner in 
which to understand a series of events in order to situate a problem within a 
hypothesis that can be actionable for prediction or explanation as a result. Abductive 
reasoning does not independently validate or suggest that conclusions are definitive, 
only more likely than not. Abductive reasoning is used at this stage to pragmatically 
propose theory based upon observations that are strategically interpreted and then 
tested against hypothetico-deductive problem sets with accompanying predictions 
found in offense-defense theory on the tenability of realist assumptions and 
expectations of the utility of force to serve political ends in the following stage. This 
process infers strategic interactions as symptomatic of an overall condition, and stage 
two of the process uses a method of differential diagnostics to distinguish a particular 
set of strategic signs that correlate to predicted expectations of offense-defense 
theory. 
A symptom is the abductive evidence of differentials or offense-defense variables, 
whilst signs are objectively demonstrated evidence of the offense-defense theory at 
work. Symptoms, accordingly, are less verifiable than signs, since they are less likely 
to be subjected to falsification. Signs are identified as being those hypotheses of 
offense-defense theory whose differential variables are most prominently featured 
within a given case that they are readily identifiable within the context of the strategic 
paradigm. Signs are therefore scrutinised in order to demonstrate the objective 
correlation of rational behaviour in the context of politico-military actions that took 
place.  
 
Thus, whilst the strategic symptoms may well lend themselves to alternative 
interpretations of an emerging condition, even within the remit of strategic theory, the 
focus of this study is to restrict the evaluation to those signs that can be tested in 
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accordance with offense-defense theory. Hence, whilst many alternative explanations 
may be derived from the strategic symptoms, the diagnosis of behaviours in relation 
offense-defense behaviour facilitates the diagnostic opinion that politico-strategic 
decision-making intended similar ends along the lines of rational actor expectations. 
 









Figure 3. Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War 
 
Between stages one and two, a table is presented that displays the identifiable 
symptoms and signs of the given case prior to diagnostic evaluation (Figure 3.). The 
ten hypotheses of intervening phenomena of war-causing action (A to J) are listed 
across the table with the classification sets for differential diagnosis highlighted by 
the following key: 
 
✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = Signs 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = Symptoms 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = Undiagnosed 
 
By transplanting the hypothetical intervening phenomena that leads to warfighting 
against identified Muslim strategic action between 610-680, those policies employing 
the military instrument may be considered as reflective of actions undertaken in 
response to the offense-defense balance resulting in stage three; a final diagnostic 
conclusion proposed for each individual caliphate or administrative period that served 
as a case study. A trinitarian exploration and assessment of the period and the 
consequent effects on policy and Jihad will be juxtaposed against the hypothetical 
problem sets and predictions of offense-defense theory in order to assess the strategic 
dynamics of the case. 
 
In other words, politik, that is, the bargaining dynamics of policy and politics, shall be 
assessed by trinitarian analysis to reveal sound politico-strategic decision-making 
within the strategic setting and environment, based upon the assessments of the 
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hypothetical problem sets of intervening phenomena that led to Jihad. The final result 
is either a validation of the prediction that Jihad was a continuation of politik by other 
means during the period examined, or that the strategic dynamics demonstrated a 
deductive failure of a strategic condition to account for the use of force according to 
offense-defense theory and trinitarian explanation. 
 
2.9.4. Conclusions 
The research methodology presented in this chapter is essentially interested in how 
strategic problems (conceived of as strategic interactions) can change the way we 
think about Jihad, policy, and the interplay between domestic and international 
politics. The research method advances a set of propositions based upon 
Clausewitzian theory to explain the strategic dynamics of Jihad within the context of 
the broader strategic approach, which is pragmatic in utilising means that will support 
investigation and thought concerning the proposed research questions. Strategic 
theory encapsulates this approach, and structures analysis in order to parsimoniously 
trace ‘the line of thinking of political actors to comprehend how they propose to 
achieve their objectives.’114 The result is, as most theories are, ‘not necessarily 
statements about or accurate descriptions of the “real world.” Rather, they are tools 
analysts use to render a complex reality somewhat more tractable intellectually.’115 
Applying strategic theory has reduced the research framework to two distinct avenues 
of analysis, the first is trinitarian interpretation, that is, to consider how the interplay 
between the rational calculation of policy is the product or continuation of the effects 
of the strategic setting and the influence of the strategic environment. 
 
Secondly, how policy that had been created or sustained from trinitarian interpretation 
was applied systemically by examining assumptions via hypothetical problems sets 
provided by offense-defense theory. Both avenues demonstrate not only alignment 
with the core assumptions of the strategic approach, but also more specifically, 
congruity with the essence of strategic theory and both demonstrate the advantages it 
incurs in the form of theoretical flexibility and parsimonious explanation with moral 
equivocation. Accordingly, the strategic theoretic employed in this research is a 
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methodological framework that attempts to simplify the complexity of the subject 
matter; rendering further academic investigation possible by distinguishing 
significant fact from historical observation, promoting strategic relevance as a means 





3.0. The Archetypal Jihad (610 – 632) 
Muslim strategic interaction proper, understood at the systemic level, did not take 
place during the lifetime of the Prophet. Strategic interaction that did occur, was 
either diplomatic, or in the form of military posturing with no direct engagements. 
Consequently, the primary significance for beginning with the life of the Prophet 
resides in the trinitarian interpretation of two particular areas: the first concerns the 
vertical design of strategy, that which concerns nomenclature, or more specifically the 
development of nomenclature to support evolving ideas and the foundational thought 
of the Islamic meta-narrative. The second concerns the horizontal design of strategy, 
that is, those elements of the strategic setting (interaction analysis: tribal politics, 
actors, interests) that would lend themselves to the development and formulation of 
policy that would survive the Prophet himself, and the actors who would remain as 
key variables in the continuation of poltik as Islam grew. 
 
An analysis of the politico-military career of the Prophet is therefore not the objective 
of this chapter, which would be a separate study in itself. Nor is the objective to focus 
narrowly upon certain events that occurred within his lifetime. As previously 
discussed, there simply is no comprehensive biography or study to date that provides 
sufficient information for such,1 nor is it relevant to the research methodology to do 
so. Instead, we shall track those key developments, which occurred alongside - or as 
the result of - particular episodes during the lifetime of the Prophet, with a focus upon 
the specifically politico-military aspects of his biography, referred to specifically as 
maghazi in the Arabic literature. The design of this chapter therefore serves the need 
of establishing a ‘baseline zero’, by which is meant - an original starting point for the 
idea, concept, and practice of Jihad, and to locate this ‘zero’ within the framework of 
trinitarian interpretation and the confines of the strategic paradigm. 
                                                
1 Donner (1979) has provided the most detailed attempt to chart the political rise and victory of the 
Prophet over the Quraysh. There is little that can be added to his article based upon the 
historiographical foundations from which he wrote. 
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3.1. Nomenclature 
Strategic nomenclature has been addressed in the previous chapter; the purpose of this 
section is to align strategic thought and nomenclature with baseline Islamic 
references, terms, and ideas established from its inception. This is an essential step in 
clarifying direction and creating a parsimonious platform for the remainder of the 
study. Just as the previous chapter outlined the research method designed to answer 
the central research questions, this chapter builds upon the research design by 
describing the foundations and background necessary to advance answers to the sub-
set of investigative questions that are driven by the central questions. Specifically, the 
first two sub-investigative questions must be examined from the outset since they 
quintessentially inform the nature of the archetypal Jihad that future version of 
practice either conforms to or differs from: 
 
a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect 
to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance 
strategic interpretation? 
 
b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam?  
 
As these questions suggest, nomenclature is important because it is used to 
operationalise abstract terms in order to maximise analytical precision for clarification 
where misunderstanding of language or its use may lead to error.2 Thus we proceed to 
provide an overview of the maghazi, drawing those salient features and events that 
contribute toward answering the research questions above, as an initial starting point 
to plot the course of trajectory that Jihad would take over the next century. The 
purpose is to arrive at a sound trinitarian interpretation of events that also clarifies the 
dualities, dichotomies, and dialectics that surround the subject matter of Jihad from its 
inception in seventh century Arabia. 
 
                                                
2 Raz (2005), p.6 
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3.1.1. The Pre-Islamic Jihad 
The basic meaning of the word Jihad as used and understood in pre-Islamic Arabia, 
and within the value-system of the jahiliya,3 was an independent meaning of nisus – 
an effort or struggle - physical, mental or otherwise - towards an end or objective, and 
usually a perfective endeavour. Nisus, is a Latin word, preferred in this study over the 
more commonly used verb ‘to struggle’. This is because the perfective implication of 
the word nisus is also present within the conventional implication of Jihad thus 
rendering both words closer and more synonymous than the English word struggle, 
which is equivocal in its moral application. 
 
According to Edward W. Lane’s Lexicon, the morphology of the Arabic word Jihad 
from the stem root of J-H-D  ] ﺪﮭﻬﺟ[  (دﺩ هﻩ جﺝ), denotes: ‘He strove, laboured, or toiled; 
exerted himself or his power or efforts or endeavours or ability; employed himself 
vigourously, strenuously, laboriously, diligently, studiously, sedulously, earnestly, or 
with energy, ...’.4 In its third verbal form conjugation (jaa-ha-da [ﺪھﮪﮬﻫﺎﺟ]) one intends to 
mean an interaction between two sides (such as adversaries) or to strive or fight 
against something or someone.5 Hence, linguistically from its stem meaning to its 
third form, Jihad is an exercise of nisus in relation to another. The subsequent verbal 
conjugations are all derivatives of this basic idea. The involvement of ‘another’ is 
requisite to this form being employed. The other may be within oneself, but 
predominately it is used in relation to an external ‘second’. Correspondingly, Jihad 
may comfortably be employed to denote socio-political activity between two hostile 
wills in contest either internally or externally, as well as the intended nisus to be a 
form of violent engagement.  
 
It is salient to note that the moral character or the motivation behind the Jihad was not 
restricted in pre-Islamic usage. Used solely as a linguistic expression, one may 
equally speak of the Jihad of a thief, or a gangster since the perfective implication 
resided with the element of effort to achieve one’s objective rather than contain a 
value judgment. In this sense, Jihad was morally equivocal. Examples shall follow in 
the ensuing discussion below.  
                                                
3 See the following section 
4 Lane (1968), p.473 (Vol. 2) 
5 Wehr (1974), p.142 
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3.2. The Strategic Setting Prior to Islam 
The maghazi period saliently sets the stage for the crucial value of tribal politics in 
understanding the early strategic dynamics of Jihad. In seventh-century Arabia, a tribe 
was an autonomous sovereign unit that combined all three elements of the trinity in a 
total manner. All members of the tribe served as the population and audience of 
political decision-making, and recipients of tribal policies. Decision-making and 
policies were conducted by the elders, chieftains or appointed leaders of the tribe who 
acted on behalf of the interests of their own tribe as their de facto governing body.6 
And finally, all men of physical capability were warriors or soldiers for the tribe to 
call upon, thus constituting the military element of the tribe.  
3.2.1. The Concept of Jahiliya 
Arab customs and cultural norms and values during the seventh-century were 
particularly resonate with Clausewitz’s explanation of irrational blind forces that are 
inherent in the population or members of the tribe. The jahiliya was an Islamic 
description of a time when ‘Hobbesian’ Arab virtues were dominant. These virtues 
were of course the products of the environment and realities of life that had over time 
developed as they would in any society to establish norms and exhibit certain 
expected behaviour and conduct.7 
 
Most of all, the passions of hostile feelings and intent are abundant in the notion of 
jahiliya; the proud man of the jahiliya was notably violent.8 This was a quality of 
strength in the Arab conception of virtues. To react with disproportional violence to 
an offence or an attack was quite acceptable and demonstrated the greater virtue of 
resolve.9 After all, the Arab man was a desert man that had to be filled with talents to 
survive, and the propensity to resort to violence was one of them. Weakness was the 
worst of attributes that an Arab man could accrue.10  ‘Primordial violence, hatred, and 
enmity’ are a precise set of words to describe tribal competition and intra-tribal norms 
and politics.  
 
                                                
6 Hodgson (1977), p.149 
7 Wehr (1974), p.144 
8 Donner (1981), p.40 
9 Izutsu (2002), p.223 
10 Schwartz-Barcott (2004), pp.103-4 
 92 
In this context, tribal politics are significant. Tribal chiefs and elders, usually 
advanced in age, better understood the ramifications of the jahiliya and its virtues 
amongst the people, especially the youth. Thus, tribal politics were a means to not 
only protect and advance the interests of a tribe but also to protect a tribe from 
bringing danger and destruction upon itself. The tribal elite therefore not only 
conducted diplomacy externally, but also internally. The conduct of war was 
marshaled by the elite and not left to the young, or inexperienced. In short, tribal 
politics was the attempt to subordinate the passions of the Arabs in an anarchic 
society to some form of regulation that did not result in self-extermination.11 The 
consequent raiding practice is an example of a practice that best typifies the accepted 
norms between tribes that harnessed primordial violence, hatred, and enmity and 
subordinated it to the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit 
is free to roam by regulating and promoting a policy-norm that encouraged raiding 
between tribes that became more game-like than actual warring.12 Quigley offers the 
following description of Arab warfighting in the time of Jahiliya when Arabs: 
 
… fought simply to establish superiority, not to annihilate the 
opposition and had the primitive belief that a battle should be 
fought only to the point where superiority was indicated for that 
day. They saw no point in fighting to the death, and had no desire 
to destroy their opponents totally, and had little desire to kill them. 
To fight them was an opportunity for booty or ransoms, or simply 
to obtain a recognition of superiority. It had many elements of a 
game, offered an opportunity to demonstrate one’s masculinity, and 
was carried on with chivalric overtones.13 
 
The most salient feature of the trinity’s application in pre-Islamic Arabia is the total 
nature of its application within each autonomous tribe. In modern terms, the tribe was 
an institutional whole unto itself not compartmentalised institutions serving a central 
authority.14 
 
                                                
11 Donner (1981), p. 40 
12 Gabriel (2007), pp. 23-9 
13 Quigley (2013), p.711 
14 Donner (1981), p. 41; Hodgson (1977), p.149 
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Thus, the soldiers of the tribe were also its population, who were not paid to fight and 
protect but did so for the benefit of the tribe either for existential purposes or within 
the tribal norms of raiding or in service to virtues of jahiliya. The leadership of the 
tribe was often the same whether in relation to the military activity or political.15 
Whilst command of battle might not be in the hands of an elder (due to age), the 
appointed leader on the battlefield would be from the same decision-making group.16 
The point to be drawn here is simply the idea of civil-military relations did not exist. 
Thus, political aims were not the preserve of the tribal chiefs, who would act self-
interestedly. Rather, tribal chiefs were representatives of the tribal will and acted in 
true service of their tribes who were, after all, not only their blood and kin, but also 
literally all they had. Hence, the essence of tribal considerations is eloquently 
described when Clausewitz speaks of ‘an object suspended between three magnets’,17 
since tribal interest was perhaps the single most valuable shared commodity that 
bound tribal members together. 
3.2.2. Warfighting of the Arabs 
The Arabs hailed from a long history of warfighting, mainly amongst themselves, 
known in the Arabic literary tradition as the Days of the Arabs - Ayyam al-‘Arab. 
Additionally, the concept of jahiliyya had long been connected to violence as part of 
those virtues associated to the Ayyam al-‘Arab traditions and how they developed. In 
Haykal’s study of warfare in the Arabian Peninsula he identifies thirty pre-Islamic 
applications of warfighting, from the Ayyam al-‘Arab traditions which were either 
recorded in poetry or existed as a matter of sustained practice by the Arabs.18 
Haykal’s survey of recorded Arab warfighting practices reveals a long history of 
interaction and practice of limited warfare amongst the Arabs. The list can be reduced 
to four broad and limited political objectives that the Ayyam al-‘Arab traditions relate 
about pre-Islamic warfighting: political power, strategic necessity, economic or 
materiel benefits; and finally sovereignty for a divine jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                
15 Schwartz-Barcott (2004), pp. 103-4 
16 Hodgson (1977), p.149 
17 OW, p.89 
18 Haykal (1996), pp.14-29 (translated from the original Arabic) 
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It is clear therefore, that the first proposition of the strategic paradigm has been well 
established by historical evidence - that tribal tensions and warfighting were 
considered concomitants of human social relations in Arabia before, during, and as 
we shall see in subsequent chapters, well after the advent of Islam. Violent behaviour 
as a means to accrue political ends was a deeply embedded socio-political practice in 
pre-Islamic Arab society and culture. Additionally, the model of offense-defense 
theory and the prime predications that we shall test are not incongruent with pre-
Islamic warfighting practices or alien at their conceptual root according to the Ayyam 
al-‘Arab traditions. 
 
3.3. The Baseline Zero (Jihad v.0) 
The evolution of Jihad during the lifetime of the Prophet can be mapped across three 
distinct phases; firstly the Meccan phase during which Jihad was practiced as a means 
to encourage and promote the revolutionary message of Islam – a pacifistic nisus. 
Phase two, the Medinan period, where the evolution of Jihad became a form of 
military nisus. This first incarnation of Jihad as an armed enterprise took the form of a 
violent expression of will for political purposes with the distinct character and 
methods of what would be identified today as guerrilla warfare. 
 
The third and final phase follows the capture of Mecca, where Jihad evolves further 
according to the new political powers that had been accrued through the defeat of the 
Prophet’s main political enemies. This end point marks the official creation of Jihad 
version 1.0. The remainder of this chapter draws salient strategic observations from 
the strategic setting of all three phases to arrive at investigative conclusions that will 
contextualise subsequent chapters. For this period in particular, 610-622, the research 
is heavily dependent upon one source, Ibn Ishaq’s Seerah Rasul Allah primarily 
because almost every other early work on the Prophet’s biography is either a revised 
and regurgitated version of Ibn Ishaq’s work, or a footnote to it.19 A secondary reason 
is that of all English translations of Arabic works currently available, Guillaume’s 
translation of Ibn Ishaq’s remains the most comprehensive, non-abridged work that 
has set the standard until today. 
                                                
19 See Horovitz (2002) 
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3.4. Phase One Mecca – The Strategic Setting 
(610-622) 
The Prophet was born in approximately 570, and claimed revelation from God in the 
fortieth year of his life (610).20 His mission thereafter lasted for approximately 
twenty-three years, thirteen of which were spent in Mecca, and the remaining ten in 
the later political capital he founded called Medina (formerly Yathrib).21 During his 
mission, he challenged and ultimately overthrew the established socio-political status 
quo of Arabia, and imposed the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a in Arabia. The Prophet’s 
rise to power, like that of many revolutionaries, was however unforeseeable. 
 
Born and raised in Mecca – the economic hub of Arabia and the unofficial political 
capital;22 he was orphaned as a young child, and became a shepherd in his earlier 
days, and later a merchant trader as he grew older.23 The Prophet was a well-known 
personality in Mecca where his reputation and character in Mecca was celebrated,24 
was considered as an outstanding representative of his clan.25 However, there seems 
to be no indication in any historical texts, or by academic research, that suggests the 
Prophet had any political ambitions prior to his claims of prophecy. Prior to his 
mission the Prophet appears to have been politically conscious of the various tribal 
politics and the policies of his own tribe, the Quraysh. 26 
 
The Quraysh, who were the most significant political tribe in Arabia,27 was composed 
of ten clans two of which, were especially prominent: the Banu Umayya, or the 
Umayyad House, and the clan to which the Prophet belonged - the House of Hashim 
(Banu Hashim).28 Prior to the onset of the Prophet’s mission, the House of Makhzum 
(Banu Makhzum), wealthy merchants known to have provided military protection to 
the Quraysh, were presiding as the unofficial leaders of the tribe.29 
 
                                                
20 Rahman (2003), p.35 
21 Ibid., p.41 
22 Hodgson (1977), p.156 
23 I.I., pp.69-81; Buti (2007), pp.99-100 
24 Ibid., p.81 
25 Ibid., p.73; Quigley (2013), p.702 
26 See I.I., pp.84-6; I.H., pp.95-7; Buti (2007), pp.116-7 
27 Hodgson (1977), p.154 
28 See Quigley (2013), p.702 
29 I.I., p.121, 164 
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The political significance of the Quraysh was owing to the fact that they were the 
custodians of the Ka’ba in Mecca,30 which the Arab tribes across Arabia venerated, 
conducted pagan rituals and to which annual pilgrimages were made; but also due to 
the fact that they were the geo-strategic junction between the two most important 
trade routes between north and south and east and west. 31  Mecca, the most 
cosmopolitan zone in all of Arabia, was a religiously pluralistic society and the 
Quraysh noted for their political neutrality, were a tribe fond of diplomacy and 
maintaining the status quo.32 The policies of the Quraysh were largely determined 
upon maintaining their trade interests by upholding their regional prestige and 
reputation amongst the Arab tribes, with whom constant contact and commerce took 
place.33 Donner provides an especially vivid description of the Quraysh, writing; 
 
[The Quraysh] had come to dominate the lucrative West Arabian 
transit trade in luxuries such as slaves and spices. They maintained a 
far-flung network of commercial contacts stretching from the 
Syrian entrepots of Bostra, Gaza, and al-‘Arish to the Yemen; they 
concluded economic, and sometimes political, alliances with 
numerous nomadic groups in the deserts of northern and central 
Arabia, whose consent and assistance were needed to facilitate the 
passage of Meccan caravans; and they controlled large amounts of 
capital, invested in their trading ventures not only by themselves, 
but also, it seems, by virtually every resident of Mecca.’34 
 
Consequently, the Quraysh were extremely adept at tribal politics and brokering deals 
amongst the tribes,35 as well as being highly adept financiers and merchants managing 
and profiting from the junction of trade routes they controlled. Maintaining stability 
was therefore a primary concern of the Quraysh, which meant preserving the status 
quo and the regional balance of power, by which they profited.36 
                                                
30 Ibid., p.55 
31 Hodgson (1977), pp.154-6; Quigley (2013), p.702; Hamid (2004), p.101 
32 Hodgson (1977), p.156 
33 Hamid (2004), pp.102-3 
34 Donner (1981), p. 51 
35 I.I., pp.56-8 
36 Ibid., pp.58-9, 65  
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3.4.3. The Mission of Islam – The Overarching Political Objective 
In 610, at the age of forty, the Prophet received his mission from God to bring Islam 
to all of humanity.37 The call to Islam was based on the recognition of God, loyalty to 
Him and obedience to His commands, and not to be subservient to human beings. The 
mission of the Prophet was therefore primarily to align vertically between Heaven and 
Earth, but had distinct strategic interests horizontally between human beings 
themselves. At the horizontal level, revolutionary ideas of social unity based upon 
creed rather then blood ties were brought to bear by the clashing of Islamic 
emancipation from tribal domination. 
 
The mission of the Prophet became a direct threat to the interests of the Quraysh. To 
submit to Islam was a socio-political act as much as a theological stance. To declare 
oneself a Muslim was to simultaneously denounce (or emancipate) one’s allegiance to 
the gods and deities worshipped by the Arabs, and then to any tribe, master, race, or 
culture, before God Himself. The expression of the Prophet’s mission was in modern 
terms, a social revolutionary movement that also sought to protect and defend the 
weak, poor, and oppressed of Arabian society from the more privileged Arabs and 
upper classes. The absolute message of Islam (the vertical axis) resulted in the 
inevitable clashing of interests that ensued, thus firmly placing the Prophet at odds 
with his own people.38 
3.4.4. The Clash of Value Systems and Strategic Preferences 
The horizontal strategic interest of Islam was to emancipate human beings from the 
rule of men to the rule of God alone (that is, realigning the horizontal axis to the 
vertical). This summons was so revolutionary in relation to Arab tribal culture that it 
had to be an absolute.39 The jurisdiction of God could not be shared or negotiated, and 
the only political option presented by the Prophet was to ‘surrender’ or ‘submit’ 
(Islam) to the authority of God. Unlimited in its political ambition, the Prophet 
pursued a policy of proselytisation - da’wa or ‘open calling’40 - to his message, for 
thirteen years in his home city of Mecca. 
 
                                                
37 Q, 34:27; see I.I., pp.104-7 
38 See I.I., pp.117-9 
39 Bashier (2006), pp.21-4 
40 Berjak (2006), p.164 
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Upsetting the social status quo and jeopardising commercial business in Mecca, the 
Prophet’s da’wa brought animosity and violent reactions against him and his small, 
but growing community of followers,41 as Islam proposed an alternative socio-
political community. Social ties were threatened as young men turned from the 
religious practices of their forefathers to join the Prophet’s message. In a tribal 
structure, where social ties were fundamental to not only the identity of a tribe, but 
also to its security, the Prophet became a threat to the established order of socio-
political and economic life in Mecca.42 Islam also brought ideas and a vision of a 
different society that threatened the class based tribal structure and power of the tribal 
elders and political elites such as the Quraysh. That Arabs could be unified outside of 
their tribal families for reasons other than those that served the interests of the tribe 
was anathema.43 
3.4.5. The Escalation of Blind Forces  
Realising the potential threat that Islam posed to unbalance the tribal structure, in a 
strategic environment inherently volatile; the Quraysh resorted to what they did best – 
inter-tribal bargaining and attempted to ‘buy’ the Prophet out of his cause. After a 
failed series of offers where money, women, and positions of political leadership were 
offered to the Prophet in exchange for him ceasing and desisting in his mission,44 the 
Quraysh employed a strategy of coercion by punishment45 beginning an official 
policy of sanctions against the House of Hashim.46 As the Quraysh’s attempts to 
resolve the situation through political bargaining faltered, a progressively less 
political course of action ensued as escalation became unchecked and the strategy of 
coercion by punishment, increasingly violent.47 An unofficial policy of character 
assassination and defamation began48 alongside the encouragement of blind forces of 
violence, hatred and enmity from the lower classes of Mecca directed against 
Muslims - resulting in violent mob attacks against the Prophet and his followers.49 
 
                                                
41 Rahman (2003), p.35; I.I., pp.118-20; Buti (2007), pp.146-52; I.H., p.133 
42 Lings (1991), pp. 60-6 
43 I.I., p.367 
44 I.I., pp.119-120; 132-4; I.H., pp.13-40 
45 Pape (1996), p. 13 
46 I.I., pp.159-61; Buti (2007), pp.161-8 
47 I.H., p.141 
48 I.I., pp.121-2; Quigley (2013), pp.706-8 
49 I.I., p.130, 143-5, &161-67; I.H., pp.173-81, 193-5; Rahman (2003), pp.36-7; I.I., pp.146-55; Buti 
(2007), pp.169-71 
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3.4.6. The Re-Calculation of Policy 
In the year 619, the Prophet’s uncle and political protector - the chief elder of the 
Banu Hashim - Abu Talib died, leaving the Prophet extremely vulnerable.50 The new 
head of the House of Hashim, Abu Lahab, had been an open enemy to the Prophet 
and immediately withdrew the protection of the clan from the Prophet. In effect, this 
meant that anyone could kill him without invoking lex talonis.51 Following a series of 
unproductive policies to erode the internal growth of the Muslims, in particular 
following the failure to maintain a sequence of socio-economic tribal sanctions placed 
on the House of Hashim as a form of punitive coercion;52 the tribal elders of Quraysh 
escalated their attempts to suppress the Prophet’s movement by taking advantage of 
Abu Lahabs’s retraction of protection, and began orchestrating an attempt on his 
life.53 The Prophet, aware that the moment Abu Talib had passed his life was in 
danger, re-evaluated his options and extended his message through a new strategy to 
build political strength through alliances.54 Over the next two years, the Prophet and 
his close circle worked to find new tribal allies.55  
3.4.7a. Analysis of Phase One - Da’wa 
Phase one reveals a paradoxical origin to the concept of Jihad. The horizontal design 
of strategic interaction between the Prophet (and Muslims in general by extension) 
and the Quraysh was evidently premised upon a policy of pacifism and social dissent 
with only two events are mentioned by Ibn Ishaq of violence by Muslims.56 Jihad 
during this stage at the level of practice was distinctly related to a commitment of 
socio-political dissent and proselytisation (da’wa). Nisus was effort exerted to the 
ends of da’wa and the promotion of a new liberation movement, holding to its ideals 
and promoting the radical values the message of Islam espoused. 
 
 
                                                
50 I.I., p.191 
51 I.H., pp.212-3 
52 I.I., pp.172-3 
53 Quigley (2013), p.708-9; Bashumail (1977), pp.41-4 
54 The Prophet’s new strategy was prompted by the revelation of Q, 17:80, according to al-Tabari and 
the majority of the Qur’anic exegetes. - Hamid (2004), p.114 
55 I.I., pp.194-6; Buti (2007), pp.205-7; Sallaabee (2007), pp.77-81 
56 I.I., pp.118, 131-2 
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The Qur’an at this stage maintained the pre-Islamic usage and conventions of Jihad, 
demonstrating the application of the word, for example, when referring to the Jihad of 
men to turn their children from the Truth.57 On the other hand, it was also used to 
acknowledge the efforts being made by the Muslims who were struggling in the midst 
of oppression.58 The quintessential feature of the linguistic definition and application 
of the term Jihad remained the employment of the word in relation to the effort 
exerted to achieve the objective. Although later Muslim scholarship would claim this 
was the period of Jihad al-Nafs,59 that is, self-disciplined restraint and a commitment 
to persevere in the face of violent threat; there was nothing identifiably ‘Islamic’ 
about Jihad at the horizontal stage. Vertically, however it was a different matter. 
3.4.7b. Absolute Jihad 
The first form of nisus in Islam was da’wa as a means of socio-political dissent 
against Falsehood in all its forms especially the practice of paganism, jahiliya, and the 
tribal class systems whilst avoiding violence.60 The meta-narrative of Islam lays out 
the story of humanity according to God’s Providence, culminating in the End of Days, 
all found in the Qur’an, supported by the hadith literature.61 The foundation of the 
metanarrative however, is a tension rooted in faith. Specifically in Allah as the sole 
God with no partners or equals,62 the Prophet as God’s final emissary, and the Qur’an 
as the final revelation from God Himself to humanity as an eternal form of guidance. 
These tenets are considered as fundamental Truth, and anything that clashes or 
contradicts these are considered as Falsehood.63 Submission to God’s will (lit. Islam) 
was fused between Muslims as instruments of God’s Will on Earth and an apocalyptic 
inevitability, whereby history is a constant reminder of the inescapable future and end 
of human experience.64 Accordingly, Truth and Falsehood are locked in a theological 
imperative of an attritional battle that results in a perpetual state of hostility.65 
                                                
57 Q, 31:15; also 29:8; Bonner (2006) p.13 
58 Q, 16:125, 25:52, 29:6, 69 
59 Leaman (2006), pp.437-8 
60 Q, 7:55 
61 Bonner (2006), p.15; Cook (2005), pp.22-6; Kamali (2003), p.207 
62 Q, 2:22, 165, 16:74, 42:11, 112:4 
63 Hamid (2004), p.15 
64 Robinson (2003), p.131 & (2005), p.61 
65 Khadduri (1955), p.64 
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The theological imperative threatened those who opposed the Truth, or ‘light’66 with 
the promise of Hell and violent retribution.67 Whilst not referred to as Jihad in any 
way, war and violence was threatened against those who opposed the Prophet and the 
message of Islam in both life, and death.68 The Prophet, throughout phase one, was 
constant in his cautions to the Quraysh to take him seriously. 69 The Qur’an itself is 
replete with supporting claims of the Prophet.70 Consistently during a state of abject 
weakness, the Qur’an promised the faithful God’s victory would come, 71 
simultaneously threatening the opponents of the Prophet.72 The meta-narrative was 
clearly expounding to the Muslims was that they were part of the perpetual battle as 
instruments of God fighting the abstract absolute Jihad, that is, God’s war against the 
rebels of humanity. This often overlooked element of phase one is vital to 
understanding the dynamics of Jihad. The vertical design of Jihad at this stage was 
theoretically absolute, threatening the most violent form of ‘war’ – eternal damnation. 
Though restricted to speech only, it was nonetheless extremely confrontational and 
provocative. 
3.5. Phase Two (622-630) 
The ‘Medinan’ period has traditionally received greater attention especially from the 
early biographers and chroniclers, mostly on account of being the maghazi proper. To 
this end, alongside Ibn Ishaq, the most useful source on the subject is al-Waqidi’s 
Kitab al-Maghazi,73 which most comprehensively details the four most important 
politico-military landmarks of stage two: The Battle of Badr (624), The Battle of 
Uhud (625), The Battle of al-Khandaq (627), and the Treaty of Hudaybiya (628). 
Each one of these milestones reiterates the consistent failure of the Meccans (that is, 
the Quraysh and their confederates,) to impose a strategic decision against the 
Muslims, thereby generating greater friction in the strategic environment and 
exacerbating the variables of VUCA against themselves. 74  The events of each 
milestone will be addressed briefly. 
 
                                                
66 Q, 61:8, 47:7,  
67 Q, 3:10; 6:128, 25:17-9, 34:40-1, 36:59-62 
68 Q, 67:2 
69 I.I., pp.118, 131 
70 Q, 15:9 
71 Q, 3:139, 24:55, 37:173, 58:21, 61:14 
72 Q, 2:98-99, 257; 3:68, 5:56, 9:61, 22:38, 40:51, 48:29, 63:8 
73 WQ (2013) 
74 See Proposition 8; Quigley (2013), p.712 
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Phase two begins in 622 after managing to avoid an assassination plot by the 
Quraysh,75 the Prophet and his remaining seventy followers76 vacated Mecca by 
stealth to Yathrib, an oasis city 210 miles northeast of Mecca. This shift became 
known as al-hijra, or the ‘migration’, and was later marked the start of the Islamic 
calendar during the Caliphate of ‘Umar. It is easy to overlook the hijra as simply a 
‘migration’ or self-imposed exile; however the strategic importance of the dislocation 
from Mecca is immense. The hijra of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina 
accompanied a significant shift in policy concerning the utility of force to further the 
Prophetic mission.77 
3.5.1. Medina - The Rational Pursuit of Aims 
In the two years following the death of Abu Talib, in the midst of increasing 
oppression from the Quraysh, the Prophet had, alongside his political advisors Abu 
Bakr and ‘Umar, and his uncle ‘Abbas, negotiated a political arrangement whereby 
the Prophet would be appointed as a peace broker between the warring tribes of 
Yathrib (al-Aws and al-Khazraj) acting as a podestà or chief magistrate.78 The terms 
the Prophet laid down to the tribal elders were most salient, that they acknowledged 
him as God’s Emissary, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah, and would 
protect him from external threats.79 This political alliance was the foundation of the 
Prophet’s political support whilst in exile from Mecca.  
 
The prevailing narrative argues that the Prophet lacked the ability to use violence 
because he was deprived of any political authority in Mecca. After ‘migrating’ to 
Medina he acquired the political power and military capability to resist the 
machinations of his enemies and thus launched a series of ‘defensive’ campaigns. 
This narrative, it is argued here, is as romantic as it is speculative and reflects a 
profound dependence upon the much later narratives of the Seera literature that were 
selectively constructed with no serious analysis of events. 
                                                
75 I.I., p.221-3; Lings (2001), pp.116-7  
76 Rahman (2003), p.41 
77 See Proposition 5 
78 I.I., pp.197-207 
79 Bashumail (1977), p.28; Rahman (2003), pp.40-1; I.I., p.208 
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The shift to Medina is more accurately acknowledged here as a ‘strategic relocation’ 
to establish a new base of operations80 and not an emergency evacuation as often 
claimed.81 Even more saliently, the hijra or strategic relocation, took place after the 
Prophet had received permission to use violence against his enemies82 strongly 
suggesting that the strategic relocation was preceded by a new estimation concerning 
the efficacy of violence. 
3.5.2. The New Strategic Environment 
Although having been effectively denied any real political gains in Mecca, the 
Prophet now enjoyed a degree of credible authority and legitimate jurisdiction, at least 
within Medina. The recognition of political authority in Medina was notably not an 
exclusive consequence of his claims to prophecy but rather on account of his political 
empowerment.83 Although politically vested as the chief magistrate of Medina, the 
Prophet was still lacking in reputation and prestige, the most influential factors for 
creating confederacy, and hence found political alliance-building a difficult task since 
no tribe would risk allying with an unproven, weak, and regionally disliked 
community of fragmented ‘tribal defectors.’ 84  Indeed, the message of Islam 
threatened the tribal loyalties and structures across Arabia making all tribes potential 
threats and enemies by default. 
 
Nonetheless, in his religious capacity at least, the Prophet alongside his Muslim 
aides85 identified Mecca as the primary centre of gravity, and the Quraysh as the most 
important strategic actor and adversary.86 The secondary centre of gravity, were the 
allies of the Quraysh, the Banu Khaybar who were a northern buffer of the Quraysh to 
Medina effectively sandwiching the Prophet’s movements. 87 The strategic 
environment was balancing itself against Medina and the surrounding tribes were 
                                                
80 Most contemporary Muslim scholarship advocates that the Qur’anic verses legislating permission to 
war were revealed only after the prophet had reached Medina despite the fact that the two eldest 
sources, Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Hisham both explicitly state otherwise. See I.I., pp.223-33; I.H., pp.228-9, 
Buti (2007), pp.220-1; Bashumail (1977), is one of the few writers who acknowledges the shift to 
Medina as the establishment of a military base of operations. - p.56 
81 Lings (2001), p.118 
82 Q, 2:198 
83 See the sahifa document or ‘the constitution of Medina’ – Rahman (2003), p.42; I.I., pp.231-3, 239; 
on Jewish tensions see I.I., pp.239-70; I.H., pp.275-315 
84 I.H., p.160 
85 I.K., p.219 
86 Bashier (2006), pp.3-5 
87 Donner (1979), p. 242 
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either allied with the Quraysh or had no reason not to directly help or assist the 
Quraysh in crushing the rising Muslim power. 
3.5.3. Guerrilla Warfare 
The new strategic environment essentially demanded two forms of strategic action:88 
firstly, the Prophet had to ensure the primacy of the defence89 by establishing a 
security protocol; secondly, to maintain pressure upon the centre of gravity of the 
Quraysh.90 The combination of these two strategic concerns resulted in the first policy 
of armed force in Islamic history – guerilla warfare. These missions were known as 
saraya (sing. sariya) and were tactical offensive action, ‘which involves the attack but 
not the seizure and holding of territory.’91 The Prophet dispatched small strike teams 
with specific objectives that did not demand a specific strategic decision.92 Missions 
that the Prophet led himself were referred to as ghazawa (pl.  ghazwat).93 
 
It is evident that the Prophet understood the limited time at his disposal before an 
inevitable attack by one of the surrounding tribes against him, and initiated a policy of 
guerrilla-style assaults in the surrounding area. These assaults were designed to not 
only target economic assets94 of the Quraysh95 but also to deter allied tribes of the 
Quraysh from raiding Medina in the hope of extending possible diplomatic 
relations.96Medina was an oasis town off the trade routes and thus fairly innocuous,97 
the Prophet had a strong geostrategic advantage, as he was able to plot raids from his 
new base of operations and have his strike teams retreat back to Medina with 
considerable ease.98 More importantly, he could make a show of force without 
inviting an opponent near his own territory.99 
                                                
88 Bashier (2006), p.5 
89 See OW, pp.484-500 
90 See Rodgers (2008), p.38; Donner (1979) 
91 Van Evera (2004), p.227, fn.1 
92 OW, pp.548-50 
93 The ghazwat which the Prophet led personally against assets of the Quraysh were: Buwat (623) and 
Safwan (623); ghazawat against beduoin tribes: al-‘Ashira (623); - Bashier (2006), pp.11-3 
94 Bashumail (1977), pp.77-8; Gabriel (2007), pp.74-7 
95 See WQ, pp.6-11; the sariya of Al-‘Is (623), Rabigh (623), al-Kharrar (623), Nakhla (624); (Bashier 
(2006), p.5; Bashumail (1977), pp.74-6 
96 See the sariya of Waddan (or al-abwa) (623) - I.I., p.281; I.H., p.328 
97 Rahman (2003), p.40 
98 Gabriel (2007), p.74 
99 OW, pp.469-78 
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The ability to transfer warfighting or raids away from his own base of operations only 
enhanced the guerrilla nature of Jihad. According to Clausewitz, ‘people in arms’, that 
is, guerrilla warfare as part of a larger conventional effort, requires the following 
conditions, all of which we see present in Medina, 100 
 
1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country. 
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke. 
3. The theatre of operations must be fairly large. 
4. The national character must be suited to that type of war 
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, 
marshes, or the local methods of cultivation. 
 
Additionally, by attacking the Quraysh the Prophet bought significant time against 
surrounding tribes and confederates of the Quraysh, who would by default withhold 
from under-taking any form of full-scale action until observing the response of their 
ally. 101  During these years (622-625), the social construction of Jihad began, 
transforming from - and in distinction to - the nisus of Mecca.102  
3.5.4. The Results of Guerrilla Jihad 
The guerrilla tactics of the Muslims resonated with existing tribal raiding tactics and 
practices. The long history of raiding since the Ayyam al-Arab had been exploited by 
the Prophet to serve the political aims of his mission, as proposition four of the 
strategic paradigm states, warfare is an instrument of rational calculation and the 
result of expected utility.103 Aware that he could disrupt the Quraysh by striking at 
their centre of gravity, the guerrilla-style tactics employed by the Prophet were based 
upon circumstances and relative strengths. Guerrilla warfare was adopted because of 
the need to match political objectives with military realities, that is, to align means 
and ends. Because the immediate goal of submission by the Quraysh and thus control 
of Mecca was not within the Prophet’s politico-military means, he had to re-align his 
strategy.104 
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The disparity of politico-military power between the Muslims and the Quraysh did 
not afford the Prophet any rational belief in the expected utility of force to achieve a 
permanent strategic decision.105 The strategy to raid returning economic conveys of 
the Quraysh was not however an easy task at all,106 and the relatively low success rate 
of the Muslims demonstrated this.107 Furthermore, as Clausewitz warns, ‘the danger 
that the enemy army, or part of it, may take revenge on the attacker by inflicting a 
defeat on him later, as punishment for the operation’108 came to pass in 624 after 
several guerrilla raids against conveys of the Quraysh was sufficient to provoke an 
organised military response known as the Battle of Badr.109 
3.5.5a. Milestone # 1: The Battle of Badr (624) 
Targeting a convoy of the Quraysh on its return journey along the northern trade route 
south to Mecca, the Prophet with a guerrilla force of approximately 300 men set out 
on a raiding mission.110 Word reached Mecca of the impending threat and the 
Quraysh mobilised an armed force of approximately 1,000 men to intercept the 
suspected strike by the Muslims. 111  The Quraysh made a show of force and 
dispatched their army not only to protect the cargo, but also to make sure the 
watching Arab tribes would know of the spectacle taking place.112 
 
As news reached the Prophet of the dispatched army sent to meet him, the Prophet 
took counsel and made the strategic decision to confront the armed force of the 
Quraysh.113 Knowingly outnumbered and respectively inferior in military arms and 
capabilities,114 the Prophet’s unexpected choice to engage the Quraysh resulted in a 
sudden, and shocking, tactical victory against the superior military side.115 According 
to Gabriel, the casualty ratio for the Quraysh was around 20% of the total force with 
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approximately the same percentage taken prisoner, as compared to the 10% casualty 
rate of the Muslims; these percentages by traditional Arab standards were 
exceptionally high.116 
 
The tactical victory at Badr,117 would later bring inverse strategic results to Medina, 
but nonetheless, remained a significant political and moral gain.118 In particular, the 
victory at Badr consolidated the transformation of Jihad from its vertical theological 
character down to the horizontal expression of warfighting119 through the various 
guerrilla raids that had become a hallmark of the new independent Muslim movement 
in Medina.120 
3.5.5b. Milestone # 2: The Battle of Uhud (625) 
Reeling from their humiliating loss the previous year, the Quraysh reassembled the 
largest armed force in living memory and decided to march on Medina. The Quraysh 
who called in the support of all their allies to destroy the Muslim movement led the 
confederate army.121 The Muslims still high from the victory at Badr, saw the 
engagement as a providential contest that they were sure to win.122 
 
The result was a battle outside of Medina by a mountain named Uhud, where the 
Muslims suffered a tactical defeat123 and the Prophet himself was injured in battle.124 
The Quraysh, according to characteristic jahiliya customs, withdrew after having 
established military superiority on the battlefield against the Muslims.125 The tactical 
defeat of the Muslims was made worse by the fact that they had clearly failed to 
balance their means and ends. The morale boosting victory the year prior had clouded 
the Muslim rational calculus, delivering a false sense of military capability.126 
                                                
116 Gabriel (2007), pp.100-1 
117 Bashier (2006), p.37; like many others, mistakenly refer to the tactical decision at Badr as being a 
decisive victory when it was clearly not, see OW, pp.248-70. 
118 Gabriel (2007), p.101 
119 See Q, 8:1-75; I.H., pp.373-82 
120 Between the victory at Badr and the next Milestone at Uhud the following year, the raids (ghazawat) 
against Banu Sulaym in al-Kudr; Banu Qaynuqa, Dhu Amarr, and al-Furu’ of Bahran, and the sariya of 
al-Sawiq, and al-Qarada, took place. - I.I., pp.360 -64; I.H., pp.382-87; WQ, pp.87-99 
121 WQ, p.100 
122 Ibid., pp.104-6 
123 I.H., pp.403-4; Bashier (2006), pp.93-8 
124 I.I., p.380; Bashier (2006), p.83 
125 WQ, p.144; I.I., pp.386-7; Gabriel (2007), pp.122-3 
126 See Gabriel (2007), pp.107-130; WQ, p.105 
 108 
It had been the preference of the Prophet to remain within the city and invite urban 
warfare, which would have been the more strategically balanced option given the 
incapacity of the Muslims to prevent the assault on Medina.127 Instead, by transferring 
warfighting into the open against a vastly superior side (that had been prepared over a 
period of a year for war), the defeat was to be expected. Additionally, whilst morale 
was high on the side of the Muslims, the Quraysh, who had suffered heavy casualties 
at Badr were further driven and fuelled by the blind force of jahiliya that demanded 
violent reprisal.128 Although a tactical loss was inflicted, the failure of the Quraysh to 
impose a strategic decision resulted in a political stalemate.129 Even though the 
Quraysh had won, the Prophet, and the Muslims, still survived to fight another day.130 
The Quraysh at full strength with their allies did not seize the opportunity to inflict a 
decisive victory.131 
3.5.5c. Milestone # 3: The Battle of al-Khandaq (627) 
Once again, the audience of Arabia had taken note, the Prophet had managed to 
survive Uhud and defy the Quraysh again.132 In the years following the Battle of 
Uhud, the Prophet began the process of consolidating his political power far 
exceeding the initial terms of agreement between himself and those who appointed 
him as their chief magistrate.133 Eventually, he was able to transform his status from 
an arbiter to the uncontested political authority in Medina. The process of 
consolidation resulted in the marginalisation and exclusion of the Jewish tribes of 
Medina, in particular the Banu Nadir who had been covert allies of the Quraysh,134 
and a crackdown upon political opposition within the Medinan territory.135 These 
actions signified that the consolidation of his political power came in tandem with a 
shift to an aggressive policy of warfighting that also saw the continuation of guerrilla-
styled raids.136 
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Consequently in 627 a confederate army,137 led by the Quraysh returned once more to 
strike at Medina, this time with the intention of decisive victory.138 At the battle of 
Uhud, despite his reservations, the Prophet had not yet consolidated his political 
authority in Medina to over-turn the popular vote to meet the Quraysh in conventional 
battle. 139 The Prophet, now uncontested in politico-military decision-making, was 
able to apply his strategic preference to induce urban warfare against the approaching 
army. This event, also known as the Battle of the Trench, is famous for the trench dug 
around Medina acting as a moat and forcing the adversary into siege warfare.140 
Unprepared for such warfighting with no artillery to attack the confederate army was 
held for 20 days with only minor skirmishes taking place.141 Eventually, after a series 
of protracted attempts to breach the Muslim defences, and multiple episodes of 
political in-fighting and dissension between the confederate tribes and the Quraysh, 
the coalition force fell apart and withdrew from Medina.142 
 
In the aftermath of the Battle of the Trench, emboldened by their resistance to the 
Quraysh-confederate force, the Prophet escalated his crackdown upon political 
opposition within the Medinan territory and laid siege to the tribe of Banu Qurayza 
who had committed a collective act of treachery.143 Following the extermination of 
Banu Qurayza, the Prophet made a show of military strength and prowess144 as the 
guerrilla raids resumed once more with 15 taking place in under a year.145 This 
‘surge’146 of raids pushed the Arab tribes onto the defensive immediately, reacting to 
the Muslims as they seized the tactical initiative that the pagan Arabs had held until 
the Battle of the Trench.147 The tempo of military operations pressed the Arabs, and 
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diminished their morale allowing the Prophet to dictate the pace of the offense and 
disrupt his opponent’s ability to prioritise their own.148 
3.5.5d. Milestone # 4: The Treaty of Hudaybiya (628) 
The failure of the largest confederate army ever assembled in Arabia to breach the 
defences of Medina was a political disaster for the Quraysh and a valuable strategic 
victory for the Prophet.149 The damage to the reputation of the Quraysh was worse 
than that of Badr, whilst the prestige of the Prophet was rising fast amongst the 
unaligned Arab tribes who saw a potentially powerful ally.150 In order to curb the 
rising stock of the Prophet and an attempt to buy time to rebuild their defeated armed 
force and political status,151 the Quraysh offered terms to the Prophet at a landmark 
known as Hudaybiya, during a stand off outside Mecca in 628.152 The Quraysh 
attempting to regain the strategic initiative from the Prophet set the Treaty of 
Hudaybiya, against the backdrop of a failing war effort. 
 
The Prophet had already escalated his guerrilla raids and had exhausted the Quraysh 
in war and compromised their trade routes.153 It is highly probable that the Quraysh 
perceived that they had lost, or were in danger of losing the strategic initiative against 
the Prophet who certainly had gained the tactical initiative from the Quraysh.154 The 
attempt of the Quraysh to maintain the status quo by advancing a fait accompli155 that 
was designed to impose favourable terms of settlement upon the Prophet failed. The 
Quraysh had underestimated the results of entering into a treaty with the Prophet. In 
doing so, they had effectively conferred legitimacy to the Prophet as an actor or tribal 
chief within the tribal political system. 156  Conferring legitimacy by the most 
prestigious tribe in Arabia was in effect also permitting any and all other tribes to 
formally enter into alliance with the Prophet if they so chose to do so. 
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Prior to Hudaybiya, the Prophet’s attempts at alliance building were relatively 
unsuccessful, with all the major tribes avoiding him.157 Although the terms of the 
agreement were heavily stacked in favour of the Quraysh, 158  the Prophet was 
extremely shrewd, negotiating in accordance with his political master plan. The 
sophistication of the bargaining dynamic was quite intriguing given that the primary 
element of the agreement was a ten-year truce wherein no warfighting or raids would 
be conducted by either side159 – a move that essentially guaranteed the Muslims the 
tactical initiative for the next ten years.160 The Prophet had always been after one 
thing – political legitimacy, without which his message could never have held any 
credibility with the Arab chiefs and elders.161 While the Quraysh assumed they had 
regained the strategic initiative through fait accompli, this was actually only a short-
term gain. 
 
The Prophet, playing a long-term game quickly overturned the immediate advantages 
accrued by the Quraysh. The Quraysh had attempted, by imposing restrictions of 
warfighting between them, to reestablish the status quo and prevent any more 
disruption to the balance of power in Arabia whilst simultaneously restoring the safe-
passages of their caravan trade routes.162 They did not realise that by their own terms 
they had restricted their own actions. Donner describes what happened next 
 
the Quraysh, by failing to insist on some clause extending the truce 
to include their allies at Khaybar, made the fatal miscalculation 
upon which Muhammad was, perhaps, depending. By this omission 
they unwittingly converted what they undoubtedly thought would 
be the guarantee of their supremacy into an instrument of their own 
destruction. They had tied their own hands in the struggle with 
Muhammad, but left him free to pursue his consolidation in the 
northern Hijaz and thereby to break out of the vise-grip in which 
the Mecca-Khaybar alliance had so firmly held him.163 
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In a surprising turn of events, the secondary centre of gravity fell.164 The Prophet 
continued to dominate the northern Hijaz region until he ‘was able to subdue all the 
important settlements for several hundred miles up the Hijaz.’165 The northern Hijaz 
was a more fertile region of Arabia with valuable agricultural produce and important 
trade zones for the southern towns and cities such as Mecca.166 By establishing 
supremacy in the north the Prophet could economically strangle Mecca by denying 
them food supplies and access to the oases of the northern Hijaz.167 Now it was the 
Prophet who imposed an embargo upon the Quraysh. 
 
In the two years after the Treaty of Hudaybiya and the fall of Khaybar, the Muslims 
engaged in an additional 17 military operations.168 Diplomatic alliances were forged 
with tribal groups around Mecca during these years, effectively encircling the 
Quraysh under their very noses.169 As the Prophet used a strategy of guerilla strikes to 
diminish and weaken the food supplies, restricted produce and trade from the northern 
Hijaz, it was not long until the Meccan’s experienced famine.170 In that very same 
year, the primary centre of gravity fell as the Prophet seized Mecca in a bloodless 
revolution. 
3.5.6a. Analysis of Phase Two - The Horizontal Reconfiguration of Jihad 
After the Prophet’s migration to Medina, the basic linguistic meaning of Jihad was 
conferred a special but restricted form of employment according to the Qur‘an.171 
Whilst the vertical design, absolute Jihad endured, the newly reconfigured Jihad was 
distinguished from its previous horizontal implication as nisus, and given a distinct 
technical meaning, 172  which was directly connected to the idea of warfighting 
(qital).173 
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Further distinctions were conferred to the new meaning broadening the technical 
employment of the concept of Jihad and uniting it to the expression fi sabil l’Allah - 
which implied nisus specifically expended according to the commands of God 
Himself. Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was an extremely dynamic evolution of the original 
linguistic and horizontal notion of nisus. This evolution reconfigured the Meccan 
interpretation of Jihad by fusing a moral character to nisus, such that Jihad was 
exclusively an extension of nisus in the service of God alone. The reconfiguration of 
Jihad broadened the idea of nisus expended according to the commands of God and 
explicitly included financial expenditure in relation to the ‘war efforts’ taking place or 
in preparations for it, further emphasizing the ‘total’ implication of the Jihad to 
politico-strategic ends. 174 Thus, financial expenditure fi sabil l’Allah was not 
disconnected from warfighting (qital), since it provided the platform for arms 
acquisitions, defensive fortifications, and supplies.175 
 
This suggests that Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was understood to refer to the war efforts as a 
whole, politically, militarily and also socio-economically, and was applicable to those 
elements connected to qital directly or indirectly176 all the same. This expansion in the 
application of Jihad to the horizontal plane is congruent with the emerging guerrilla 
nature of the politico-military activities undertaken by the Prophet with Medina as his 
base of operations in Arabia. 
3.5.6b. Jihad in Reality 
Jihad in Phase two was total, meaning there was no determination of the traditional 
levels-of-analysis problem (systemic, domestic or individual) and a hierarchy did not 
judge it, rather strategic interaction at any particular level could be considered as 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. According to proposition three of the strategic paradigm, the 
rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of clear and attainable 
objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force. Barring the risky 
strategy of direct military engagement at Badr, thereafter the Prophet was careful to 
calibrate the use of force according to the objectives sought. 
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War in reality, that is, Jihad conducted horizontally, was distinct from the nisus of 
Mecca and the notion of absolute Jihad. Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, unlike absolute Jihad, 
required the management of escalation and the variables of friction in order to attain 
the overarching objectives of nisus expended fi sabil Allah. Unlike absolute Jihad, 
the threat of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah had to be limited. Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was limited 
warfare not holy war. Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was waged as fast and efficiently as 
possible at the lowest politico-economic costs. Warfighting methods were strategic 
not religious. 
 
The repertoire of guerrilla actions, which were considered as Jihad included the use of 
‘decapitation strikes’ or political assassinations of tribal chiefs 177  and traitors. 
Furthermore, over the duration of numerous battlefield and raiding engagements 
between the Muslims and the various other Arab and Jewish tribes, the military 
organisation and operational efficiency increased rapidly.178 Eventually, the Prophet 
was able to mobilise with such speed following Hudaybiya that he was able to 
maintain the strategic initiative and strike almost at will across the north creating an 
atmosphere of fear amongst the tribes. 
 
Guerrilla warfare was adopted because it was the most strategically pragmatic option, 
under the continued political constraints and military restrictions that the Muslims 
experienced. Clausewitz wrote, ‘No one starts a war- or rather, no one in his senses 
ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that 
war and how he intends to conduct it.’179 Smith adds to Clausewitz’s dictum, with the 
warning that 
 
Failure to accurately define the role of force in the political process 
can prevent the military instrument from being properly directed to 
achieve appropriate ends. At worst, this can lead to the 
indiscriminate application of violence in a manner which can 
hinder the attainment of objectives. Because low intensity warfare 
strategies often seek to use military engagements as a means of 
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pressure rather than physical denial, their practitioners have to 
exercise considerable political caution in order to avoid both the 
wastage of scarce military resources and the provocation of enemy 
counter-measures which restrict the freedom to operate.180 
 
Whilst the guerrilla character of Jihad remained throughout the period of phase two, it 
was evolving according to expected models of guerrilla movements into a distinctly 
political struggle wherein the Prophet himself was eventually accorded political 
legitimacy by his opponents as his power grew. The guerrilla warfare campaign of the 
Prophet bears close resemblance in its cumulative progression as Mao’s war of 
national liberation. The guerrilla nature of the maghazi precluded the search for 
decisive battle rather the guerrilla campaign had effectively destabilised Mecca, and 
more broadly the regional balance of power in Arabia.181 Warfighting was used to 
serve the political aim but battle was not a sequential strategy characteristic of the 
Clausewitzian emphasis upon direct battlefield engagements.182 Jihad fi sabil l’Allah 
was a revolutionary form of collaborative nisus - a political instrument that included 
warfighting but was not restricted to it; or in Clausewitzian terms, not ‘something 
autonomous but always as an instrument of politik’.183  The Prophet as part of his 
assessment of the conflict scenario with the Quraysh employed a careful but 
calibrated application of guerrilla warfare called Jihad to maximise his political 
interests during the second phase of his mission.184 
 
3.6. Phase Three (630-632) 
In 630, the Prophet, backed by an army of 10,000-armed Muslims and a confederacy 
of Arab tribes, seized Mecca from a sapped and weakened Quraysh in a bloodless 
coup.185 In a remarkable turn of events, not only had the once-persecuted and self-
exiled man of Quraysh returned to overthrow his enemies, but also he achieved it so 
decisively without the use of violence but with a show of force.186 
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The Prophet also used a method known in the Qur’an as ta’lif al-qulub – 
reconciliation of hearts to win over his Meccan captives.187 The essence of this 
political technique is to show generosity in the face of adversity, or mercy in 
triumph. 188  The gesture of forgiveness and sparing the lives of the helplessly 
conquered displayed magnanimity in victory that quickly won over the Meccan 
population, not in the least since violent retribution was expected in accordance with 
traditional Arab values of the jahiliya that promoted acts of retaliation and 
vengeance.189 This technique absorbed potential threats and people of distinction and 
skill into the Muslim movement and conferred upon them managerial and leadership 
positions, binding their interests to that of Islam.190 
3.6.1. Political Victory  
No vendetta was revealed by the Prophet, reiterating the consistent non-zero sum 
strategy he had held since his days of persecution and ridicule in Mecca more than 
twenty years prior. The Prophet was to pass away two years later in 632, however in 
this time significant politico-strategic actions were instigated. After claiming political 
victory, the Prophet returned to Medina and established the Medinan polity as the new 
capital of Arabia, receiving tribal allies and oaths of allegiances there and not in 
Mecca, which he left under the governance of his now allied Quraysh. Policy at this 
stage of the Prophet’s operation broadened such that the revolution directed itself 
internationally. The once guerrilla army, now a legitimate armed force, was directed 
toward the northern external strategic environment of Arabia. 
 
A marked shift in political trajectory also took place following the takeover of Mecca; 
now the Prophet began political dealings as an established political figure and not as a 
guerrilla. No longer did the Prophet approach his political dealings from a position of 
disadvantage but now possessing an armed force of over 12,000 warriors, the Prophet 
launched campaigns to suppress any tribes from reorganising alliances in the wake of 
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Qurayshs’ fall.191 An additional 15 assaults are recorded as taking place over a two-
year period that included the siege and eventual submission of Banu Thaqif (the tribe 
that had formerly rejected and ridiculed the Prophet’s request for political asylum), 
and the show of force towards the Byzantines on the northern frontier of Arabia 
known as ghazwa of Tabuk.192 The Prophet also ordered symbolic strikes that served 
as spectacle for the rest of Arabia.193 From Medina the new capital of Arabia, the 
Prophet dispatched emissaries to the regional Kings, Caesars, and rulers of 
neighbouring lands194 and received deputations from the regional actors.195 
 
In 632, the Prophet died from a fever at his home in Medina.196 Since his mission 
began in 610, he had participated in ‘at least twenty-seven campaigns and deputized 
some fifty-nine others – an average of no fewer than nine campaigns annually.’197 
Whilst politico-military control of Arabia had not been consolidated,198 strategic 
domination of the major political actors had; the capital of Mecca was seized, and its 
most powerful tribe humbled. All politico-military competition had been crushed, and 
the tribes of Arabia were in both awe and fear of Allah’s Messenger. Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah had triumphed as an instrument of limited war in service of the Prophet’s 
Mandate from God.199 
3.6.2. Analysis of Phase Three – Trinitarian Success 
The Prophet applied increasingly escalated pressures against Mecca, employing force 
indirectly alongside political concentration. His magnanimity in victory and pardon 
against the people who had spent considerable effort to malign and harm him, was an 
act of political genius. The result was not only a decisive political victory but also the 
political consolidation of Mecca, and the Quraysh in particular, was permanent and 
lasting. Peace was imposed on his terms alone, his authority acknowledged, and the 
                                                
191 See Rodgers (2012), p.221 for a list of campaigns and troop numbers 
192 WQ, pp.429-65, 480-5; On Tabuk specifically, WQ, pp.485-502; I.I., p.602-9 
193 Khalid ibn al-Walid’s sariya to al-Nakhla was to destroy the temple and idol of al-‘Uzza, one of the 
premiere goddesses worshiped by the pagan Arabs. - I.I., pp.565-6; Rodgers (2012), pp.219-20 
194 I.I., pp.652-9 
195 Ibid., pp.627-44; Bashier (2006), pp.274-281 
196 I.I., pp.678-83 
197 Bonner (2005), p.6; I.I., pp.659-60 
198 The widespread belief is that full territorial control of Arabia had been achieved but this is a gross 
exaggeration of the geo-political situation, as the following chapter will explain. This common error is 
often found, for example in Sallaabee (2007), p.264; 
199 Q 9:33 
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jurisdiction of the Shari‘a was supreme, all within his lifetime. Understanding that 
warfighting itself could never secure such a decisive victory, and given the nature of 
the Prophet’s mission, victory rested within the alignment of the trinity to the 
objectives of his mission. 
 
War in reality was the translation of absolute Jihad into Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. 
According to Clausewitzian theory,200 the aim of warfare is the eventual disarmament 
of the adversary - disarming being the equivalent of the objective - to render the 
opponent incapable of continuing the contest in order to impose terms without 
resistance. Absolute Jihad sought the incapacitation of the opponent - at the very 
minimum his ability to spread his theological claims by overcoming him with 
superior strength to subdue (or crush) his value-system. Replacing paganism and the 
culture of jahiliya with Islam through the horizontal application of Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah achieved the objectives of absolute Jihad also. 
 
The Prophet aligned the calculus of his policies and the overarching objectives to the 
circumstances and dictates of the strategic setting and environment. The theological 
imperative that championed absolute Jihad and aroused hostile feelings and 
intentions201 in the Muslims against the pagan Arabs was tempered by the Prophet’s 
rational calculation of policy and calibrated use of force. The patience and 
forbearance of the Prophet in the midst of continuous morale defeating experiences 
throughout his life contributed to the many qualities that displayed the ‘genius’ 
Clausewitz commented on as the quintessential factor in overcoming the variables of 
chaos.202 
 
Furthermore, by adopting guerrilla warfare, the Prophet was able to operate under less 
friction than his opponents and thus increase operational efficiency over time at a 
greater rate than his opponents. The balance of guerrilla operations to force a political 
decision in his favour was a perfect blend of acute political acumen and strategic 
vision; as Robert Taber succinctly explains: ‘… the guerrilla fighter’s war is political 
and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose is almost 
                                                
200 OW, p.90 
201 Ibid., p.76 
202 Ibid., pp.100-12 
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entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: Guerilla war is the extension of 
politics by means of armed conflict.’203 Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was the ‘people’s 
war’.204 Having examined the maghazi proper, a differential diagnostic shall be 
applied in order to test the tenability of not only the strategic paradigm to explain 
events, but also the claim of the continuation of strategic interactions as 
manifestations of politik. 
3.6.3. Offense-Defense Analysis of Phase Three 
The coup of Mecca is an excellent illustration of the combination of the offense 
having gained critical momentum with critical mass, resulting in a fait accompli par 
excellence. The build up of Phase Two demonstrated how guerrilla warfare led to the 
coup, and that the utility of Jihad was initially battle-centric to achieve the tactical 
initiative, that is, an increasing relation of offense dominance to impose political 
objectives. The abducted signs and symptoms are charted below, revealing that eight 
variables of intervening factors that lead to war are identifiable between the hijra in 
622 and the death of the Prophet in 632.  
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War205 









The nature of guerrilla warfare and opportunistic raiding could be explored under 
symptoms of Hypothesis A 206  or Hypotheses D and E; the three explanatory 
predictions derived from the hypotheses of offense-defense theory (or signs) that most 
clearly elucidate how and why offense dominance perceptions increasingly influenced 
Jihad and the strategic calculus of force employed by the Prophet are F, G, and J. 
 
                                                
203 Taber (2002), p.16 - (italics in the original) 
204 OW, pp.479-83 
205 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
206 Van Evera (2004), p.244 
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3.6.3a. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 10. Offense Grows Even Stronger - Hypothesis J 
 
Hypothesis J proposes that offense dominance is self-reinforcing such that under 
favourable conditions for conquest actors will advocate a more offensive military 
posture and policies to suit it, thus furthering the perception of inevitable war.207 Van 
Evera posits three reasons why offense dominance is self-reinforcing,208 two of which 
are applicable to the maghazi post-Battle of the Trench: Firstly, ‘Alliances assume a 
more offensive character when the offense dominates because aggressors can more 
easily drag their allies into their wars of aggression.’209 Secondly, offense-dominance 
creates a vicious circle whereby a status quo tribe such as the Quraysh, 
 
are less able to protect their allies from conquest when the offense 
dominates because attackers can overrun defenders before help can 
arrive. Thus offense dominance raises the danger of greater offense 
dominance. Once entered, an offense-dominant world is hard to 
escape.210 
 
The Prophet consistently, during the guerrilla phase of his mission, sought to exploit 
windows of vulnerability and opportunity against the Quraysh, always preferring to 
pre-empt his opponents whenever possible. These traits are symptomatic of offense-
defense Hypotheses D and E. Yet, it was not until after the Battle of the Trench that 
the Prophet assumed the tactical initiative and actually began to fulfill the 
characteristics of offense-dominance behaviours associated with both hypo-deductive 
sets. The boldness of the Prophet’s offensive strategic actions striking at his enemies 
and the alliances of the Quraysh at will did much to shift perceptions regarding who 
actually held the offensive dominant position between Mecca and Medina. Later, 
shackled by their own terms agreed to in the Treaty of Hudaybiya, the Quraysh were 
unable to come to the aid of their allies as the Prophet struck at them. 
 
                                                
207 Van Evera (2004), p.228 – Hypothesis J is a cumulative escalation combining all previous 
hypotheses. 
208 Ibid., pp.236-8 
209 Ibid., pp.236-7 
210 Ibid. 
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The message that the Quraysh would not come to the aid of their allies lent greater 
credibility to the Prophet’s increasingly apparent offense dominance over Quraysh. 
Non-aligned tribes, as well as allies of the Quraysh did not have time to forge 
alliances to balance against the common threat of the Prophet’s challenge to the status 
quo. As the hypotheses would predict, in the face of an offense dominate actor, other 
powers (status quo or regional non-aligned/neutral actors) will be more inclined to 
come to the aid of the victim than align with the aggressor. 
 
Far from being an altruistic act, other actors shrewdly calculate the lack of action on 
their part will only encourage, embolden, and signal weakness to the aggressor which 
only threatens their own security later.211 However, the speed of operations by which 
the Prophet conducted his guerrilla assaults meant that he was able to own both the 
strategic and tactical initiative. Accordingly, most of the tribes realised they were on a 
sinking ship so to speak as long as they maintained their alliance with Quraysh, thus 
abandoning them in favour of the Prophet. 
 
3.6.3b. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 6. Faits Accomplis are More Common and Dangerous -
Hypothesis F 
 
Hypothesis F posits that offense dominance will embolden actors to impose situations 
which rationally favour outcomes and payoffs in their favour through offsetting their 
risk against the risk of another such that they are left with only options which suit the 
initiator rather than their own interests. These are more commonly expressed as fait 
accompli tactics in diplomacy and business. Thomas Schelling refers to these 
strategies as ‘the last clear chance’212 and the act of ‘burning bridges’213. Van Evera 
further elucidates the idea writing: 
 
A fait accompli is a halfway step to war. It promises greater chance 
of political victory than quiet consultation, but it also raises greater 
risk of violence. The acting side moves without warning, facing 
                                                
211 Van Evera (2004), p.237 
212 Schelling (1980), p.37 
213 Ibid., (2008), pp.43-4 
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others with an accomplished fact. It cannot retreat without losing 
face, a dilemma that it exploits to compel the others to concede. 
But if the others stand firm, a collision is hard to avoid.214 
 
The march on Mecca in 630, backed by 10,000 soldiers armed for war, was ‘the last 
clear chance’ the Prophet offered the Quraysh and the Meccans in general. The risk 
was that they would resist him thereby provoking an all-out war. However, the 
Prophet had in the intervening years since Hudyabiya built a military coalition that 
had clearly shifted the balance of offense dominance to him making the rewards 
promised by violence more valuable.215 
 
3.6.3c. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 7. States / [Actors] Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G 
 
Accordingly, coupled with Hypothesis F, the explanation of Hypothesis G maintains 
the flush logic of the increasingly offense-dominant approach of the Prophet whereby, 
unlike a few years earlier at Hudaybiya, bargaining and negotiations by words began 
to hold less incentive over bargaining through deeds. Abu Sufyan, who heard of the 
troops amassing to march on Mecca, had preemptively made a visit to Medina to seek 
a political settlement with the Prophet in 629.216 However, just as Hypothesis G 
predicts, negotiations failed217 leaving differences to fester unresolved.218 
 
The Prophet’s entry into Mecca though relatively bloodless was an act of highly 
aggressive bargaining, with scarce concessions for the Meccans. The real significance 
of the political technique of ta’lif al-qulub – reconciliation of hearts – was that it was 
premised upon the fact that the Prophet held in reserve the latent threat hurt and to 
inflict unlimited violence. 219  This not only incapacitated resistance, but also 
exemplified mercy. The culmination of monopolising the strategic and tactical 
initiative was the demonstration of superior offense-dominance to the Quraysh and 
                                                
214 Van Evera (2004), p.232 
215 Ibid. 
216 I.I., pp.543-4; 
217 As-Sallaabee (2007), p.139 
218 Van Evera (2004), p.227 
219 Schelling (2008), pp. 9, 12, 30 
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the skillful de-escalation of the propensity to war by employing a highly aggressive 
diplomacy of violence220 to impose his will. 
3.6.3d. ODT - D/Dx Conclusions 
The differential diagnostics have revealed indirectly or by default the following 
claims; firstly, that the unfolding events of the Prophet’s mission were not accidental 
or coincidental. Clearly, strategic decision-making was taking place throughout his 
mission. The Prophet was largely acting within the parameters of expected rational 
actor behaviours and had an increasingly astute comprehension of how to balance 
political objectives with his available means. 
 
Secondly, the three explanatory predictions (or signs) F, G, and J, derived from the 
hypotheses of offense-defense theory, alongside the symptomatic variables (A, C, D, 
E, & H); supports the overall strategic condition identified throughout the maghazi, 
and the strategic explanations that have been abductively derived. A diagnostic 
opinion that the Prophet employed a diplomacy of violence as a continuation of politik 
coupled with offensive military action is clearly signaled by the explanatory 
predictions F, G, and J, as to how offense dominance perceptions increasingly 
transformed the application of Jihad and the strategic calculus of force employed by 
the Prophet. 
 
It is also clear that the whilst the Prophet’s strategy held established political goals, 
opportunity, vulnerability, and the failure of his opponents to exploit the deficiencies 
of the Muslims largely contributed to an eventually successful mission over the 
Quraysh. Thus, the strategy of the Prophet was operating under the burden of friction 
and the play of chance and probability just as much as the Quraysh. The explanatory 
predictions of offense-defense theory however, demonstrates how the Prophet was 
able to offset and reduce the variables of friction, chance and probability, through 
increasing offense-dominance achieved by attaining the tactical initiative, aggressive 
political bargaining, and escalating offensive power. 
 
 
                                                
220 Ibid., pp.1-10 
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Finally, the diagnostic explanation of signs derived from the maghazi demonstrate an 
entirely rational and strategic explanation of events without any need for religious 
interpretation to substantiate the reasons or causes of events indirectly answering 
research question three. Employing the strategic paradigm alongside the propositions 
of strategic theory, diagnostic evaluation has deduced a set of verifiable hypotheses to 
explain strategic interaction and the utility of force driven by the political goals of 
actors, the strategic interests that were bargained for, and the pressures of the strategic 
environment on decision-making and the utility of force. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were to locate and explicate answers to the following 
sub-investigative questions a. and b. However, exploring these sub-investigative 
questions this chapter has also proposed preliminary findings for research questions 1, 
2, & 3. This chapter began by establishing a working linguistic definition of Jihad; 
and mapped the origins and evolution of the term in relation to politico-strategic 
developments during the maghazi establishing a baseline zero by which to interpret 
the original role and function of Jihad. An examination of both the theory (linguistic) 
and application (maghazi) of Jihad revealed three distinct forms that correlated to 
three stages of strategic dynamics; a conventional linguistic meaning and usage 
existing in pre-Islamic Arabia of nisus; an abstract concept of absolute Jihad that 
developed in relation to an Islamic meta-narrative and the theological imperative of 
Truth versus Falsehood; and finally, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah as an act of policy, thereby 
answering research question two as a consequence. 
 
As the diagnostic testing has revealed, research question 3 is directly revealed by our 
examination of sub-investigative question b.; whilst Jihad was a teleological function 
of Islam, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah and its development as an act of policy was the 
consequence of politico-strategic behaviour rooted in developments of the strategic 
setting and environment rather than a product of a religious worldview. In each stage, 
the idea of warfighting is directly or indirectly only part of the meaning to either a 
greater or lesser degree. The independent variable that governs the extent to which 
warfighting is impressed upon its application is the degree to which the nisus is in 
service to political objectives or as part of a rational calculus. 
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Strategically interpreted, it may be stated that Jihad was a teleological function of 
Islam though warfighting was not, since qital was only one aspect of Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah. As explained, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was broad enough to encompass a variety 
of non-violent or bellicose functions as long as it contained a key element – nisus in 
relation to God.221 Jihad fi sabil l’Allah is a ‘total’ term that signifies a broad ‘war 
effort’ of which warfighting is the foundational expression.222 Where warfighting is 
intended, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was considered, and practiced as limited warfare. The 
practice of limited warfare was, as the baseline zero has demonstrated, a continuation 
of politik by other means (research question 1). 
 
That the Prophet as commander of Jihad par excellence considered and employed 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah in a manner which is strategically interpretable, has been 
corroborated by the propositions of the strategic paradigm and the results of our 
diagnostic examination of the strategic condition during the maghazi. Accordingly, 
the investigation has arrived a strategic definition of Jihad, which includes its 
linguistic meanings but also incorporates the known features of its earliest 
application.  
                                                
221 Meaning in relation to something God has ordered or is pleased by its performance. 
222 Q 4:95 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0. The Evolution of the Islamic Strategic Setting 
This chapter charts the evolution of the Islamic strategic setting and the background 
that created a political crisis and a new strategic setting and environment that differed 
from that which the Prophet left behind. This chapter examines the formation and 
development of policies that shifted the application of warfighting to the ends of new 
political objectives. Specifically, we will examine how the baseline zero of Jihad 
evolved according to the needs and interplay between shifting strategic settings and 
environments during the first administration of the Rashidun Caliphate, and offer 
explanatory avenues for research question 1 - 3: 
 
1. The prime agenda is to ascertain whether Jihad is a continuation of politik by 
other means; that is to ask the question therefore, what is the link between 
politik (policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad? 
2. Logically proceeding from the aforementioned, can a consistent link be 
demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving strategic 
dynamics affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy? 
3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-political 
circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a set of 
strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview 
or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures 
and nature of the anarchic environment? 
 
This chapter begins however by approaching the Caliphate of Abu Bakr from the 
avenue of sub-investigative question c, since the backdrop of the domestic political 
turmoil that generated the crisis environment within which Jihad was instrumentalised 
begins with investigating this question, and continues to influence Abu Bakr’s tenure: 
 
c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive 
policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what 
circumstances did these polices come to bear and how did they evolve? 
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Each Caliphate represents a distinct set of strategic interactions that they would later 
be charcterised by. The Caliphate of Abu Bakr is characterised by the Ridda Wars or 
‘The War against the Apostates’, and contains the earliest forms of force projection 
outside of Arabia proper; as well as the most violent application of the military 
instrument to serve political objectives of all the Rashidun era. Hence, in this chapter, 
the relationship between Jihad and politics during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr is to be 
examined, identifying distinctive policies that directed the application of Jihad; under 
what circumstances these policies came to bear and how they evolved. 
 
4.1. The Rashidun Caliphates (632-661) 
The Rashidun Caliphate - ‘Al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun’ – lit. ‘The Rightly-Guided 
Caliphs’ refers to the political rule of the first four Caliphs who took office following 
the death of the Prophet in 632. The ‘Rashidun’ era developed as a ninth-century 
Islamic revisionist construct loaded with moral accusations and assumptions that was 
used to selectively account for the period of political succession in Islam and the 
violent turbulence that ensued amongst the Companions of the Prophet (al-sahaba). 1 
This thirty-year period would come to be championed as the ‘golden age’ of pious-
political authority within Islam par excellence, after which political office becomes 
associated with moral decadence and irreligious pursuits of power.2 The Rashidun 
period was in many ways, the rise to prominence of an elite group of men crafted by 
the Prophet to lead the umma after him.3 The Rashidun begins with Abu Bakr ‘al-
Siddiq’ (d. 634), followed by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 643), then ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan 
(d. 656) and finally ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, (d. 661).  
 
4.2. The Caliphate of Abu Bakr (632-634) 
The most salient influence upon the course of Islamic history following the lifetime of 
the Prophet belongs to the brief reign of Abu Bakr. The intimate connection between 
the maghazi of the Prophet, and the subsequent Ridda Wars fought by Abu Bakr as 
two parts of the same continuum are vital to explicating the strategic dynamics of 
Jihad as a continuation of politik by other means.4 
                                                
1 Madelung (1997), pp.1-2; Crone (2003), pp.1-3; Donner (1981), p.82 
2 Robinson (2005), p.33 
3 Kennedy (2007), p.51 
4 Donner (1981), p.87 
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Indeed, subsequent Caliphates inherited the strategic background and setting that gave 
rise to the organised development of the Islamic territories (dar al-Islam) that was 
created as much as a consequence of Abu Bakr’s polices as those of the Prophet 
himself.5 
4.2.1. Political Succession 
Abu Bakr (573-634), whose birth name was ‘Abd Allah “Atiq” ibn Abu Quhafa, was 
from the Banu Taym clan of the Quraysh.6 Abu Bakr was the closest friend of the 
Prophet before Islam and during his mission; father-in-law to the Prophet and one of 
the earliest converts to Islam.7 Abu Bakr was known for his political sagacity 
(dhahiya)8 within the tribe of Quraysh, and was a specialist in tribal politics and 
genealogy with a detailed knowledge of tribal power structures, historical alliances 
and rivalries.9 He had served the tribe as chief of compensation and creditor – 
managing the affairs of the tribe in relation to debt crediting and blood money, and 
was in his own right a wealthy businessman.10 
 
The Prophet’s death in 632 tore at the very fabric of the nascent Muslim community 
ushering a crisis of leadership that threatened a catastrophic end to the Muslim 
community. The power vacuum set in motion a series of political contests that would 
contend political leadership of the Muslim community until today.11 The Prophet not 
having left behind a written will or instructions for succession left the Muslim 
community with no direct guidance on how to continue the mission of Islam. 
Accordingly, Wellhausen notes, ‘The political community of Islam grew out of the 
religious community’12 by which he is referring to the events of the succession that 
forced the nascent Muslim community to face the universal realities of power that Ibn 
Khaldun mentioned, but had been veiled from during the tenure of the Prophet. 
 
 
                                                
5 Kennedy (2007), p.56 
6 Sallaabee (2007), pp.27-9, 42 
7 Buti (2001), p.695; Sallaabee (2007), pp.51-4 
8 Madelung (2001), pp.4-5; Donner (1981), p.84 
9 I.I., p.115; Sallaabee (2007), pp.42-3 
10 Sallaabee (2007), pp.42-3 
11 Madelung (2001), p.1 
12 Wellhausen (1927), p.1 
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The appointment of Abu Bakr was contentious at the time, primarily amongst those 
who preferred a representative from the House of Hashim, in particular ‘Ali ibn Abu 
Talib.13 However, it was Abu Bakr who had been instrumental in shaping the 
Prophet’s policy towards the tribes of Arabia;14 a significant element in the institution 
of the Prophet as chief magistrate of Medina;15 and had been the premiere advisor of 
the Prophet throughout the maghazi period.16 Therefore, succeeding the Prophet as the 
Khalifat ul’Rasul Allah – the Deputy of the Prophet, was not a major surprise in 
politico-strategic terms, especially as he was acutely aware of the politico-strategic 
environment he inherited.17 
4.2.2. Crisis Management 
In his inauguration speech, Abu Bakr had pressed the strategic value of maintaining a 
strong military capability and reminded those in attendance that Jihad fi sabil l’Allah 
did not end with the death of the Prophet rather ‘A people do not abandon Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah except that Allah abandons them, leaving them to be humiliated.’18 His 
speech was telling of what was to come as three sets of politico-strategic problems 
surfaced within days of Abu Bakr’s inauguration.19 Growing reports of rebellion 
began to circulate throughout Arabia that threatened open revolts against Islam and 
Abu Bakr’s political authority.20 With the exceptions of the Muslims in and around 
Mecca and Medina, and the tribes of Quraysh and Banu Thaqif, most other tribes that 
had previously been subdued by the Prophet were now potential threats to the new 
Medinan authority.21 The strategic threats can be summarised as three problem sets: 
 
 
                                                
13 Madelung (2001), pp.1-2 
14 Donner (1981), pp.84, 300 - fn.128 
15 Wellhausen (1927), p.1; Sallaabee (2007), p.81; Hamid (2004), p.135 
16 Watt (1961), pp.35-6; Madelung (2001), p.39 
17 I.I., p.689; I.K., records that the Prophet would refer to his advisors Abu Bakr and ‘Umar as his ‘eyes 
and ears’. - p.219 
18 Sallaabee (2007), p.264 
19 For a detailed but pro-‘Ali account of the events surrounding the political issues of succession see 
Madelung (2001), pp.28-45; on the threats of the new Caliph see Sallaabee (2007), pp.264-5, 317; 
Akram (2004), p.127 
20 Akram (2004), p.119 
21 Ibid., p.120; I.K., p.32 
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4.2.3. Strategic Threat # 1: Political Insurrection 
The oaths of allegiance sworn to the Prophet following the fall of Mecca in 630 
became the subject of controversial interpretation between the subordinated tribes and 
Abu Bakr. The vast majority of these tribes had submitted to the Prophet because they 
were unable to resist the imposition of his will as he decisively routed the tribal 
network of Arabia. With his passing, almost all of the tribes considered themselves 
absolved from their oaths of allegiance with the Prophet, and secondarily to the 
rulings of Islam. The Medinan political authority now directed by Abu Bakr however, 
considered the oaths of allegiance sworn to the Prophet (bay‘a)22 as binding and 
permanent oaths of loyalty and obedience.23 The resulting political condition of each 
side was not mutually exclusive or sustainable since it threatened the internal 
cohesion of the new Muslim polity that had been built by the Prophet. However, Abu 
Bakr was not the Prophet, his claims to authority were not credible as far as the Arab 
tribes were concerned, and they challenged the legitimacy of his claim. 
 
Secondly, Abu Bakr faced the internal problem of diminishing political confidence 
and authority, which arose almost immediately as challenges to his strategic decision-
making began. Specifically, the issue of dispatching a 3,000-man contingent under the 
command of Usama bin Zayd towards Syria, to engage the Byzantines 24  was 
challenged in the face of looming political insurrection. By allowing the dispatch, it 
was argued, they were in effect weakening their own defensive capabilities should 
any attack on Medina occur.25 Furthermore, Usama bin Zayd, only eighteen years of 
age at the time with considerably less military experience than many of the generals 
in the Muslim army lacked the confidence of the political elite in Medina to achieve 
military victory.26 Abu Bakr was resolute in dispatching the unit, flatly rejecting any 
change in leadership of the force.27 His answer was simply that the unit and mission 
and been constructed by the Prophet himself, and the last military command issued by 
the Prophet before his death was to ensure the dispatch of the armed force.28 
                                                
22 Sallaabee (2007), pp.247-51 
23 Rodgers (2008), pp.232-3 
24 I.I., pp.652, 678 & fn.917; I.K., pp.24-6  
25 I.K., pp.32-3; Gabriel (2007), p.202; Sallaabee (2007), p.323; Akram (2004), p.117 
26 Buti (2001), pp.667-8; Sallaabee (2007), pp.316, 325-6 
27 Lings (2001), p.339 
28 WQ, pp.546-8; Sallaabee (2007), pp.314-7, 323 
 131 
4.2.4. Strategic Threat # 2: False Prophets 
The second set of problems was the rise of ‘new’ and ‘false prophets’. Each claim to 
prophecy was in fact a claim to political legitimacy and independent sovereignty from 
the Medinan capital.29 Each of the false prophets had amassed large followings with 
armies of fighters ready to contend or overthrow the Medinan authority.30 The copy-
cat claims to prophecy and the Prophet’s political legacy were most prominently 
driven by three individuals: Tulayha bin Khuwaylid of the tribe of Asad in the Najd 
(west-central Arabia); Sajjah bint al-Harith ‘the False prophetess’ who was supported 
by the tribes of Tamim and Taghlib in northeastern Arabia; 31 and Musaymala bin 
Habib aka ‘The Liar’32 (al-Kathab) in north al-Yamama. Lastly, the ‘false prophet’ al-
Aswad al-Ansi from the south (al-Yaman)33 had already been killed via sanctioned 
assassination by the Prophet, but the news of his end only reached Medina after Abu 
Bakr’s inauguration.34 
4.2.5. Strategic Threat # 3: Zakat Collection 
The most politically contentious problem concerned the institution of zakat or the 
mandatory poor-alms levied upon all Muslims.35 Near the end of 631, the Prophet had 
organised and dispatched official delegations responsible for the collection of the 
zakat to every tribe subject to Islam. 36  Most tribes received the Prophet’s 
representatives and paid their dues to the Muslim treasury. The final collection of the 
zakat was not completed by the time of the Prophet’s passing, thus Abu Bakr believed 
he had inherited the responsibility to see the matter through.37 Those tribes who 
contested Abu Bakr on the issue of zakat generally premised their insurrection against 
Abu Bakr’s claims of credible authority justifying the levy of zakat rather than his 
claims to political legitimacy.38 
  
                                                
29 Akram (2004), p.132 
30 BLD, p.145; Sallaabee (2007), p.354 
31 I.I., p.636-7; BLD, p.151 
32 I.I., p.649 
33 Ibid., p.664 
34 BLD, pp.159-162; I.K., pp.26-30 
35 Murata & Chittick (2006), p.16 
36 I.I., pp.648-9; WQ, pp.476-80; Madelung (2001), pp.46-7 
37 I.K., p.31 
38 BLD, pp.143-4; I.K., p.30; Sallaabee (2007), p.353 
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Some tribes who had not paid saw an opportunity to re-negotiate the rates of zakat.39 
Re-negotiation was deemed reasonable given the fragile strategic setting. 
Additionally, the reputation of Abu Bakr was well known across the tribes for being a 
meek, but politically astute man. It would have plausibly been assumed that the 
former political advisor to the Prophet, and a man of Quraysh, known to incline 
towards settlement and tribal diplomacy;40 would recognise the politically fragile state 
of the Muslims following the loss of the Prophet.  
 
Furthermore, the departure of Usama’s unit clearly left Medina militarily 
vulnerable.41 Under such conditions, it would seem reasonable to negotiate or settle 
with the disenchanted Arab tribes who viewed the zakat as an unreasonable tax. This 
sentiment was also shared to a large degree amongst members of Abu Bakr’s own 
administration who considered zakat-avoidance as a lesser crime than false 
prophecy.42 Abu Bakr was challenged by his closest advisors on the utility of force 
against such tribes and the ethico-religious implications thereof.43  
4.2.6. Rational Calculation 
In each of the three strategic threats Abu Bakr declared the actions of those involved 
as ridda – or apostasy. The logic behind the pronouncement was that the Prophet, as 
God’s Emissary, had been the medium of effecting the subordination of the human 
will to God’s Will – which could only have been a permanent condition. 
Consequently, a breach of the oath was a breach against God Himself, an act of 
absolute rebellion (kufr) and thus an act of apostasy. That the Prophet was no longer 
the living medium made no difference. As for those that claimed a share in prophecy, 
they were violating the conclusive status of the Prophet, which was therefore heresy 
and act of apostasy.44 In short, any form of tribal recalcitrance or claims resulting in 
political contests were breaches against God’s Will since he, Abu Bakr, was only 
acting as deputy of the Prophet and not as the Prophet to whom they had made their 
oaths.45  
                                                
39 I.K., pp.30-1; Gabriel (2007), p.205 
40 Rodgers (2008), p.235 
41 I.K., pp.30-2; Akram (2004), pp.117, 119, 122 
42 I.K., p.31 
43 Sallaabee (2007), p.358 
44 I.I., p.689 & fn.920; Gabriel (2007), p.205; Sallaabee (2007), p.353 
45 Gabriel (2007), p.202; I.K., pp.28-31 
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James Morrow describes crises as public actions, whereby external actors can profit 
by the unfolding of events, and especially in the context of security, crises provide a 
stage for leaders to signal their resolve to an audience external or internal of their 
territories, and can make or break leaders’ reputations.46 Crises are opportunities for 
violent escalation or bargaining and de-escalation through negotiations. Based upon 
the strategic setting, and after examining the strategic environment, Abu Bakr 
prepared a strategy that would change the region forever. Two key ideas can be used 
to explain the primary objectives of the two-stage strategy Abu Bakr initiated. Phase 
one was designed to protect the political infrastructure of the new Islamic polity 
created by the Prophet, which was the referent object of security for Abu Bakr; and 
phase two, was to address the broader security threat that the Medinan capital faced 
from the Arabian tribes in the northern grasslands. 
4.2.7. Pure Military Strategy 
Abu Bakr’s strategy in phase one of his security policy was designed to be strategic 
offensive action, ‘the taking and holding of territory’47, that is, the territory of Arabia 
and all tribal territories that refused to submit to the central authority in Medina. 
Saliently, the calculus of the offense-defence dynamic concerns the strategic 
estimation of successful military victory,48 meaning decisive victory, which is not the 
same as political victory. 
 
Because the political objective was to be found in military victory,49 Abu Bakr 
developed a military strategy to serve the objectives of his security policy. According 
to Platias & Koliopoulosa pure military strategy is characterised by the emphasis it 
places on ‘a) first strike capabilities; b) offensive capacity for territorial conquest 
(specific or complete); and c) the intent to achieve decisive victory over the armed 
forces of the enemy.’50 Offense dominance is therefore achieved by converting raw 
military power into suppressed forms of violence, since offense dominance is itself a 
strategic condition not a military one. 
 
                                                
46 Morrow (1999), p.109 
47 Van Evera (2004), p.227, fn.1 
48 Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.8 
49 See OW, p.81 
50 Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), pp.7-8 
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4.3. Phase One: The Ridda Wars (632-633) 
The primary strategic interest, the referent object, for Abu Bakr was the security of 
the new Islamic tribal union, which meant that he had to prevent secession or internal 
fragmentation through challenges to his authority or the claims of new prophets.51 The 
policy of the eradication of paganism on the Arabian Peninsula had been instituted by 
the Prophet prior to his death, and effectively designated that the Arab population of 
the Peninsula had no right of self-determination whatsoever. 52  Abu Bakr now 
understood his role to ‘tie-up loose ends’ that the Prophet had lacked the time to 
complete. Prophetic precedent had also legitimated the use of force for the 
continuation of policy that had been adopted following the political consolidation of 
Mecca that stressed the unlimited use of force against any remnant of paganism or 
pagan practice in Arabia.53 Hence, the ensuing Ridda Wars fought by Abu Bakr 
cannot otherwise be understood as anything other than the continuation of policy set 
by the Prophet. The incident of dispatching the army of Usama was representative of 
Abu Bakr’s resolve to maintain the trajectory and set policies and plans of the 
Prophet.54 
4.3.1. Military Genius  
Abu Bakr appointed ‘Umar ibn al Khattab as his political advisor on Muslim affairs,55 
and Khalid ibn al-Walid Field Marshal of the Muslim armies and his military 
advisor. 56  Khalid ibn al-Walid was the son the former head of the House of 
Makhzum, who were trained in relatively more advanced military skills and practices 
compared to the other clans of Quraysh.57  Khalid ibn al-Walid being the most 
accomplished in the art of war and stratagem had been charged with overseeing such 
duties on behalf of the Quraysh before Islam.58  
 
                                                
51 Rahman (2003), p.56 
52 I.I., p.689; Wellhausen (1927), p.24 
53 This policy excluded the Jews and Christians, although they were barred from Mecca; See Gabriel 
(2007), pp.200-1 
54 Madelung (2001), pp.46-7; Sallaabee (2007), pp.324-5; see El Fadl (2001) for a masterful study on 
the related legal issues 
55 Buti (2001), p.696; Akram (2004), p.118 
56 BLD, p.158 
57 I.I., p.167 
58 Sallaabee (2007), p.41 
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After becoming Muslim shortly before the conquest of Mecca,59 Khalid had served in 
the Muslim army with great fortune, leading the Prophet to declare himself that 
Khalid was ‘The Sword of God’.60 The partnership between Abu Bakr and Khalid 
formed the foundation of the first form of Jihad without the Prophet. It was a drastic 
change; in perhaps its most aggressive expression ever, Jihad was executed with an 
escalated sense of urgency and drive against the entire Peninsula,61 with the unlimited 
objective of total victory. Clausewitz’s statement that war was the application of 
violence to impose one’s will was characteristically expressed as a zero-sum calculus. 
The strategic objective set by Abu Bakr was the destruction of all forms of resistance 
to the Medinan polis, without compromise. 
4.3.2. Isolate and Destroy 
In eerily similar fashion, the following explanation given by Clausewitz encapsulated 
the Jihad designed by Abu Bakr and spearheaded by Khalid ibn al-Walid: ‘If you 
want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of 
resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the 
total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.’62 The bargaining strategy of 
Abu Bakr tested the will of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah against the will of the Arabs who 
resisted him. 
 
The strategy demanded the rapid transfer of warfighting away from Medina to the 
territories of the rebel tribes. Abu Bakr struck in four different directions 
simultaneously over a period of eighteen months.63 With Khalid in command of all 
military operations overcoming friction with remarkable speed,64 the Muslim armed 
forces were mobilised and configured into eleven military divisions, each charged 
with its own vector of attack and strategic objectives.65 The ensuing Ridda Wars 
resulted in a strategic success, paving the way for decisive victory, and devastating 
the apostate tribes who had little hope of any form of military response or retaliation 
against Khalid’s strategic initiative against them. 
                                                
59 Akram (2004), pp.67-73 
60 I.K., p.36; Akram (2004), p.78 
61 Akram (2004), p.126 
62 OW, p. 77 
63 Gabriel (2007), p.208 
64 Buti (2007), p.616 
65 I.K., pp.34-45; Akram (2004), pp.128-9 
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4.3.3. The Pacification of Arabia 
In the midst of the political crisis following the Prophet’s death, Abu Bakr signaled to 
the whole of Arabia not only the continuations of the Prophet’s vision, but the clear 
resolve to crush all opposition and punish rebellion. The offensive posture adopted by 
Abu Bakr towards the apostate tribes was punitive as well as demonstrative.66  The 
need to pacify the threats posed by the tribes was met with a clear demonstration of 
intent to wage war without compromise or, the ‘burning of bridges’67 such that no 
negotiations were recognised. The pacification of Arabia was a demonstration of 
resolve that the new administration in Medina sent to all the Arab tribes but also any 
regional actors watching. Gabriel summarises the events pithily writing: 
 
During the two year period of the wars of the Riddah we see 
Muhammad’s reformed armies operating on a larger scale over 
greater distances than ever before with several campaigns taking 
place at once, all of them operating under the unified command [of 
Khalid ibn al-Walid] to implement a single strategic goal 
formulated by Abu Bakr. The same operational characteristics that 
became typical of the armies of the later Arab conquests were first 
revealed during the Riddah, and it was Abu Bakr who was the 
political and military genius behind it.68 
 
Whilst the objective was not to destroy the tribes themselves, it was to destroy their 
means of resistance and military power. Hence, as an act of highly aggressive 
bargaining, Abu Bakr, upon victory seized political hostages from each of the defeated 
tribes as a means of deterrence against the possible threat of returning challenges from 
the tribes.69 This act alone demonstrates that the unlimited military action authorised 
by Abu Bakr was not intended as an act of extermination, even though the nature of 
the strategic threat risked an all out war of annihilation.70 Additionally, it proves that 
Abu Bakr was well aware that the result of military victory was not final.71 
                                                
66 Schelling (2008), pp.2-6 
67 Ibid., pp.44-5 
68 Gabriel (2007), p.206 
69 Schelling (1980), pp.134-6 
70 Ibid., pp.190-9; (2008), pp.92-9, 105-7; & Propositions 6 & 7– See 2.8.1. 
71 Proposition 10 
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Abu Bakr had gained a fearsome reputation,72 coupled with the reputation of Khalid 
bin Walid who had reduced many tribes to the verge of extinction;73 their partnership 
sent shock waves throughout Arabia. The crushing and decisive victory Abu Bakr and 
Khalid won over the Arabs effectively ended the crisis that originated with the death 
of the Prophet and the leadership vacuum.74 The political consequences of the Ridda 
Wars was to create a new stratification of tribal society in Arabia, with the primacy of 
the ‘Islamic ruling elite’ of Medina consisting of the close and early allied 
companions and tribes to the Prophet (with many of the newly converted Quraysh) 
dominating the structure.75  
 
4.4. Analysis of Phase One – Expressing the Strategic Paradigm 
Thus far we have explained the relationship between Jihad and politics in the backdrop 
of the crisis environment inherited by Abu Bakr’s succession and the security policy that 
developed and under what circumstances. These were the problems set by sub-
investigative question c. Before commencing a diagnostic evaluation of the Ridda Wars, 
in order to contextualise our interpretation of events phase one of Abu Bakr’s 
administration, in the framework of the strategic paradigm, can elucidate more fully the 
strategic logic of interpretation for the problems set by sub-investigative question c. 
 
The conduct of the Ridda Wars conforms quite directly to the fundamental 
propositions of the strategic paradigm. Abu Bakr’s extremely aggressive security 
policy was in fact a well calibrated, albeit risky, strategic use of force. Clausewitz 
wrote that ‘No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - 
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how 
he intends to conduct it.’ 76  Where the maghazi illustrated a great example of 
calibrated use of force for the purposes of limited war; the Ridda Wars were 
exemplary in illustrating the use of unlimited military force for the purposes of 
existential political objectives. In both cases, the strategic objective of an end peace-
state was sought and won. 
                                                
72 Akram (2004), p.119 
73 Ibid., p.141-2; Kennedy (2007), p.56 
74 Rahman (2003), p.57 
75 Donner (1981), pp.88-9 
76 OW, p.579 
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Smith makes the salient remark that ‘Peace is a highly contestable political end-state. 
The attainment of peace through war is not a contradiction. Any objective can be 
pursued by violent or non-violent methods.’77 That Abu Bakr attained his objective 
through escalated warfighting might be perceived as a strategic deficiency, but in 
reality it was quite the opposite as it was clear that policy constantly permeated all 
military operations during the Ridda Wars.78 Clausewitz warned that ‘The result in 
war in never final.’79 The vast majority of the Arab tribes had converted or sworn 
allegiance to the Prophet as he overran resistance in Arabia post-Mecca with 
unrelenting momentum. His greatest political victory, over the Quraysh, would be 
lasting; however, the vast majority of his victories over the Arabs were military and 
thus short-lived. Therefore, as Clausewitz might have predicted the affair of tribal 
subjugation and allegiances arose again once he had passed on. 80  Abu Bakr 
considered the utility of force, its efficacy and the manner in which it was waged as 
the appropriate response to the security threats that surfaced during his 
administration.81 The identification of the enemy as a continuation of the same threat 
that the Prophet faced permitted warfighting as an acceptable variable of rational 
calculation.82  
 
However, unlike the Prophet, Abu Bakr initiated an unlimited and escalated response 
to the crisis, in order to seize and maintain the strategic initiative.83 It may be argued 
that Abu Bakr, being an astute politician, used violence as a language to bargain with 
the Arab tribes, since it was a language they understood well;84 in either case, 
offensive Jihad was the strategic preference for the ends of policy.85 The strategic 
logic behind Abu Bakr’s calculus for permitting all avenues aimed at the destruction 
of the various tribal threats was on account of the strategic environment and the will 
of the Arabs to revolt.86 The immediate goal was the unconditional military surrender 
of the tribes, and their political challenge to central authority. 
                                                
77 Smith (1997), p.ix; Schelling (2008), p.9 
78 See OW, p.87; Smith (1997), p.102 
79 See OW, p.80 
80 Proposition 10 
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82 Tabari (1993), p.43; Kennedy (2007), p.48 
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The strategy was designed in the knowledge that time was not in their favour.87 Abu 
Bakr’s war council understood and considered the stakes to be necessarily of an 
existential nature,88 formulating strategic action according to worst-case scenario 
planning.89 Unconditional surrender had to be obtained as soon as possible, which 
meant the pressure to escalate was extremely high from the onset;90 that in turn 
limited the restrictions placed on a nonzero-sum concept of victory, the hallmark of 
the Prophet’s approach. 
 
The strategic escalation of violence directed toward the revolting tribes was a reaction 
to the aggressive disposition they directed toward the Medinan capital.91 The objective 
of political survival drove the policy of escalated warfighting and the elimination of all 
external and existential threats to the fragile Medinan polis and beyond.92 In phase one, 
the destruction of all existential threats posed by the apostate tribes, was met with an 
unlimited military response with little to no limitations on the use of force as a means 
for victory. The Ridda Wars are hallmarked by the unlimited and offensive use of 
Jihad as an instrument for decisive victory. 
 
4.5. Diagnostic Evaluation of Phase One 
Offense-defence theory cannot explain the reasons why certain propositions or 
preferences exist, why particular variables may affect an actor over others, value-
systems, cultural norms, or beliefs.93 Therefore, we have provided an overview of the 
most salient features and information available concerning the events of Abu Bakr’s 
succession and the Ridda Wars. However, the question may be posed: were there not 
alternative courses of action aside from offensive strategic action? Or, it might also be 
suggested: Was the military strategy designed in accordance with religious or 
Qur’anic injunctions, that is, was it ‘holy war’? The following diagnostics tests both 
of these questions. Abu Bakr inherited a strategic setting in a state of crisis with 
multiple threats looming and the survival of the Prophet’s mission in a most critical 
state. 
                                                
87 Proposition 3 
88 See Johnston (1995), p. 61; Stone (2011), pp. 6-7 
89 Proposition 6 
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91 I.K., pp.32-3; Sallaabee (2007), p.363 
92 Proposition 5; Sallaabee (2007), p.365 
93 See Van Evera (2004), p.264 
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The risks of warfighting were inescapable, and the use of Jihad was an acceptable 
teleological consequence of protecting Islam. Jihad was as an instrument of political 
will employed according to the needs of the inherited crisis environment. The table 
below suggests six symptoms of a strategic condition under which Abu Bakr was 
operating within.  
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War94 









The build up to the Ridda Wars was a clear example of the misperception and thus 
miscalculation of the strategic initiative by one side relative to the other.95 Abu Bakr, 
known for his meek character, was misperceived to have preferred a political course 
of action premised upon negotiation, bargaining, and the constrained use of force 
according to the Arab chieftains who opposed him. However, Abu Bakr had a clear 
preference and estimation of the efficacy of force over diplomatic avenues because he 
was attempting to offset the strategic consequences of the crisis environment through 
superior tactical operations, thereby adopting a distinctly military course of action and 
resolutely refusing any form of negotiation.96 
 
Secondly, history reveals the curious case of the problem of ‘Usama’s mobilisation. 
For all the disagreement within Abu Bakr’s administration, and the perception of 
weakness that it invited from Abu Bakr’s external enemies who were circling 
Medina;97 it seems to have been the very dispatch of the army that created the 
misperception with whom the strategic initiative laid. Either the rebel-apostates 
assumed that Medina was sufficiently reinforced that it was capable of dispatching 
another force, causing them to rethink their strategy, assuming they did not have the 
strategic initiative; or believing they had the upper hand they collectively delayed 
their preparations to strike, whilst Abu Bakr covertly plotted to seized the strategic 
                                                
94 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
95 Morrow (1999), p.110 
96 A symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis G 
97 A symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis A 
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initiative and set in motion his security policy.98 In either case, the delay in striking at 
Medina afforded Khalid ibn al-Walid, under orders from Abu Bakr, to create a 
superior operational time-frame within which to exploit the vulnerability of the rebel-
apostates and crush the ‘false prophets’. There are no indications of any form of 
religious dictate that can explain the adoption of offensive strategic action during the 
build up of the events leading to the Ridda Wars. 
 
These symptoms of the strategic condition undoubtedly resulted in the course of 
military strategy designed and employed by Abu Bakr to serve his security policy, 
and are verifiable by hypothetical problem sets D and E as the clearest signs for the 
explanatory diagnosis of the offensive strategic interaction initiated by Abu Bakr. 
Theses two signs are therefore evaluated in consideration of the plausible tenability of 
alternative non-offensive military action. 
 
1.5.1. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 4. Moving First is More Rewarding - (Hypothesis D)  
+ ODT - D/Dx ♯ 5. Windows are Larger - (Hypothesis E) 
 
Offense-Defense differentials D and E, posit that an actor will maximise rewards by 
seizing the initiative, and that the incentive of a successful surprise attack affords the 
most seductive payoff for preemptive action. Hence the predilection to war is 
heightened by the facility of the offensive under such circumstances. Specifically, 
Hypothesis E concerns the efficacy of violence or the expected utility of force. When 
windows of opportunity and vulnerability are larger, the propensity to engage 
preemptively is raised. The effect of exploiting a window of opportunity is the same 
as a surprise attack or a sudden declaration of war against an unsuspecting actor; it is 
to activate a crisis.99 The more militarily inclined a strategy is, the closer it resembles 
the ideals of absolute war, such that an actor will find a tactical initiative or windows 
of opportunity irresistible.100 
                                                
98 A symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis H 
99 The activation of a crisis is generally a strategic problem, while the operational actions undertaken 
within the crisis are usually tactical matters. - Young (1968), p.337; a symptomatic derivation of 
Hypothesis F 
100 Hence a symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis A 
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Abu Bakr’s preference for the offensive strategic initiative and the design of a pure 
military strategy was clearly an attempt to offset the strategic consequences of the 
crisis environment with superior tactical results. Furthermore, since the attainment of 
his political objectives rested in military victory, the strategic design of offensive 
military action was entirely logical and a clear sign of decision-making within a 
strategic condition. 
 
The strategic logic of pre-emption is the foundation of war’s theoretical route to the 
absolute. Between two opponents, the one able to reach war’s absolute nature the 
quickest will have the advantage.101 This means, if x is able to strike y first with an 
instantaneous blow crushing y or at least his capability to take any further action 
following the blow, then x will have achieved as close as possible the ‘absolute’ level 
of warfighting that was possible for him.102 This explains why Abu Bakr introduced 
an exceptionally high level of escalation into his strategy - the military strategy was 
designed to be explosive in both demonstration and application – using the maximum 
exertion of strength to disarm or render the Arabs unable to resist - attack first, hit 
hard and aim to crush the opponent’s ability to resist. The opponent has no option but 
to surrender, if he survives the assault.103 
 
Between two opponents however, who are aware of each other’s mutual enmity, as 
was the situation for Abu Bakr, such a strike is difficult to achieve. An opportunity 
resides in surprise, another in deception, though both seek the same objective – the 
strategic initiative. If x (the loyalists) can pre-empt y (the rebel-apostates) then x (the 
loyalists) will have a superior time-frame to exploit the vulnerability of y (the rebel-
apostates). The subsequent violence, destruction, politico-strategic pressure, and 
overall friction created by such an attack will either be a strategic success paving the 
way for decisive victory, or at least render y completely on the defensive with little 
hope of any form of military response or retaliation.104  
 
 
                                                
101 See OW, p.75 
102 Ibid., p.77 
103 A symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis J 
104 Another a symptomatic derivation of Hypothesis J 
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The design of Abu Bakr’s strategy was to control the strategic initiative. Naturally 
strategic initiative is lost almost instantly once both opponents mobilise for it, unless 
one side is able to create a superior operating time advantage to the other. Once both 
opponents mobilise the result is essentially a state of war. In order for both sides to 
mobilise, there must be the belief that either timing is in their favour, or they believe 
they have a superior offensive advantage, or are offense dominant in comparison to 
the other. Hence, depending upon the beliefs and capabilities of each side and their 
estimations regarding the other, a state of peace or war is the result of neither side 
controlling the strategic initiative. This diagnostic evaluation confirms the predictions 
of strategic decision-making and action within the crisis environment along lines of 
rational expectation and a prudent estimation regarding the efficacy of violence as the 
only strategic course of action. 
 
4.6. Conclusion of Phase One – The Art of Commitment 
In strategic jargon, the overall strategy of Abu Bakr was a compellent strategy. Just as 
the Prophet during the maghazi employed a diplomacy of violence, the Ridda Wars 
demonstrated a bargaining tactic that Schelling terms, the art of commitment.105 In 
order to assert credibility as the Prophet’s successor, with the full, and legitimate, 
authority of the Muslim community, Abu Bakr imposed a fait accompli (Hypothesis 
F) upon the rebel-apostate tribes. Refusing to negotiate or concede (Hypothesis G), 
Abu Bakr began the process of commitment by exploiting the windows of 
vulnerability and opportunity by moving first to seize the strategic and tactical 
initiative (Hypotheses D & E). 
 
Abu Bakr’s commitment to offensive action was a means to not only exploit the 
operational time frame of tactical action but also to circumvent and discredit the 
commitments of his opponents to defy him by initiating compellent action after 
having threatened a violent response to continued defiance.106 Abu Bakr, who had 
considerably less time in which to operate, could not replicate the Prophet’s 
manipulation of limited war to bring to bear a diplomacy of violence. The urgency of 
the situation demanded that the latent power to hurt had to be brought to bear upon 
                                                
105 Schelling (2008), pp.35-91 
106 Ibid., pp.49, 59, 66-7, 72 
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the threats to his authority as a means of spectacle and thus credibility. Warfighting 
communicated the threat most effectively to the Arabs,107 and the escalation of means 
to unlimited warfighting was a risky albeit strategically sharp calculation, that sought 
to test the will of his opponents, as Schelling explains: 
 
One cannot initiate certain disaster as a profitable way of putting 
compellent pressure on someone, but one can initiate moderate risk 
of mutual disaster if the other party’s compliance is feasible within 
a short enough period to keep the cumulative risk within tolerable 
bounds.108 
 
Far from being a reckless strategy of unlimited war, the calculus of Abu Bakr can be 
strategically interpreted as demonstrating an astute understanding of the strategic 
setting and environment that he had inherited and was operating within, balancing 
means and ends to achieve a decisive victory. Having explored and evaluated the 
strategic condition of the Ridda Wars, the analysis proceeds to the second strategic 
phase of Abu Bakr’s administration, (a continuation of exploring sub-investigative 
question c.) and the evolution of his strategy from a ‘Homeland security’ policy to 
systemic projection of an extended security strategy. 
    
4.7. Phase Two: Border Control (633-634) 
Relative to Arabia, the rich and fertile lands of the northern Fertile Crescent 
symbolised great economic prosperity and an invaluable source of wealth for an 
Empire. For this reason, both the Byzantine and the Sassanid Empires had contested 
each other for the region. The emerging Muslim power base in Arabia however, 
initially conceived of the Fertile Crescent in quite different terms. Abu Bakr’s 
strategic interest in the region, it is proposed, was in continuation of the security 
policy found in phase one. The second stage of Abu Bakr’s policy projected a geo-
strategic calculus that foresaw potential security threats were amassing at the Arabian 
borderlands. It was competition for political control of the nomadic tribes between the 
Muslims and the Byzantine-Sassanid Empires that motivated Abu Bakr’s policy. 
                                                
107 Ibid., pp.81, 86,  
108 Ibid., p.91 
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In other words, the second stage of the security policy was to dominate the nomads in 
the region in order to to ensure the security of the political authority in Medina and 
thereby broadening the regional security of Islam. It is further advanced that this 
course of action had been identified during the maghazi period as Donner writes, 
‘Muhammad’s concern with ensuring control over nomadic groups as a basic strategy 
in building a secure base of power thus seems to have been continued by Abu Bakr at 
the beginning of the expansion into Syria.’109 Certainly the dynamics involved since 
the maghazi through to the Ridda Wars suggested an identifiable consistency 
concerning policy on this issue as shall be explored. 
4.5.1. The Regional Strategic Setting 
The grasslands that separated the Fertile Crescent from the Arabs were patrolled by 
former auxiliaries of both the Persian and Byzantine powers. In 581, at the Syrian 
border, the Christian Monophysite Ghassanid chief was charged with treason and 
seized by Byzantine forces. The Ghassanids who were Arab nomads and auxiliaries of 
the Byzantines, had their privileges and subsidies revoked as they were disavowed by 
the Ceasar, thus ending their long-standing association. Elsewhere, in 605 near the 
Iraqi borderlands the Lakhmids fell out of favour with Chosroes.110 The region had 
been controlled by the kingships of the Arab tribes of the Lakhmid Dynasty and the 
House of Mundhir for generations, but had over time become little more than 
auxiliaries of the Persian Empire maintaining the buffer zone between Iraq and Syria 
against inroads from Arabia proper. They were less formidable than they had once 
been, both sets of auxiliaries weakened and diminished their political leverage from 
the great power allies who had now left them to fend for themselves having depleted 
their military capabilities against one another to the point of exhaustion from 602-
628.111 
 
Beyond the grasslands, lay the great arch of trade routes running across from Sinai 
through northern Levant to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. 112  During the 
Byzantine-Persian wars these routes were disrupted - leaving the buffer zones 
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110 Tabari (1999) devotes an entire chapter in his history to the background and events of the strategic 
setting and the regional actors 
111 Quigley (2013), p.718 
112 Ibid., p.718 
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deprived of trade and opportunities for raids. Left to themselves, a series of reciprocal 
raids between the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids took place that served to diminish 
their military strength vastly.113 With no politico-economic incentives to maintain 
their traditional protection of the region, the Lakhmids left large areas of the 
grasslands virtually unguarded and lawless.114 Following Byzantine-Sassanid peace in 
628,115 the Byzantine Empire moved to restore their auxiliaries as part of their 
renewed strategic interest in the region to build a defensive coalition in the southeast 
region of Syria.116  
4.5.2. The Extended Security Strategy 
Phase two intended strategic offensive action as part of a regional security policy, and 
consequently advanced an offensive strategy aimed at overthrowing the existing 
status quo of the grassland nomads through the use of force.117 The extended security 
strategy had two logical objectives; firstly, to eliminate the threat of the northern 
tribes to the new Muslim polity as independent tribes, and secondly, to prevent them 
re-establishing politico-strategic alliances with the Byzantines (or the Sassanid 
Empire) which could be used to balance power against the Medina. A tertiary 
objective may have been to clear the auxiliaries in order to exploit access to the trade 
routes thus instigating strategic denial of financial revenues to the regional powers. In 
any case, it is clear that the nomadic tribes were perceived as latent security threats to 
the nascent Medinan polis, because they were geopolitical pivots118 that had historical 
ties to the great powers in the region. 
 
Encouraged by the military success of the Ridda Wars, with strategic, operational, and 
tactical developments that facilitated increased logistical capabilities and vast tracts of 
desert between the Islamic polis of Medina and the outside world;119 Abu Bakr took 
counsel with his advisors on the timing of the strikes against the former clients of 
Byzantium and Persia.120 The result of the consultation was the decision to strike in 
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 147 
633 at the former Sassanid auxiliaries first, with the strategic objective of controlling 
the grassland nomads between Iraq and Arabia.121 
4.5.3. Contain and Consolidate - Iraq 
The strategic objectives of the extended security strategy towards Iraq were clearly a 
continuation of policy from the Ridda Wars, whereby the nomadic Arab tribes were 
systematically hunted and suppressed to prevent any future challenges or new 
alliances.122 Although significant territorial gains were made, this first phase of attack 
did not seek to conquer the territory of Iraq, as it was to politically control the 
grassland Arabs and reduce any threat of regional balancing by the Sassanid Empire, 
who indirectly maintained control of the buffer zone between Iraq and Arabia. 
 
The intended targets reveal the strategic interest in Iraq, which would also be the case 
for Syria: the Arab and Arabic-speaking nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes that 
occupied those regions.123 The Sassanid Empire had become war-weary from years of 
warfighting with the Byzantines, and it is unlikely they even knew of the Muslim 
strikes in the region until much later. Even so, with limited manpower available it is 
highly probable they were not inclined to protect their former auxiliary Arab tribes as 
the historical records say nothing of any assistance being forthcoming. Under the 
military command of Khalid, the Muslims armies swept through the region and took 
control of the buffer zone between Iraq and Arabia, seizing large sections of the 
Persian territories.124 By early 634, Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to join the Muslim 
offensive launched towards Syria and to engage the Byzantines.125 
4.5.4. Contain and Consolidate - Syria 
The regional security policy to contain the independent Arab nomadic tribes extended 
northwards towards Syria. A handful of Syrian-Arab nomadic tribes presided over the 
buffer space between Arabia and the Byzantines, most notably the Ghassanids who 
had previously operated under annual payment as proxies for Byzantine interests in 
the region before the Sasanian occupation.126 
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It seems retrospectively plausible that the identification of the independent nomadic 
tribes of the north as a force multiplier for Byzantine interests in Arabia was 
originally identified by the Prophet, which is why he organised the expedition of 
‘Usama prior to his death.127 Nonetheless, the northern incursions of ‘Usama had 
provided a sufficient reconnaissance expedition for Abu Bakr to plan his assault. By 
633 Abu Bakr had dispatched three military forces to engage the Byzantines, Khalid 
joined with these forces and assumed supreme command, naturally a series of 
victories ensued.128 
 
The most important of these came when the combined Muslim force decisively 
defeated the Byzantine forces at Ajnadain, southwest of Jerusalem.129 Shortly after the 
victory at Ajnadain, in 634, Abu Bakr died aged 63,130 after having served as Khalifat 
al-Rasulillah for two years, three months, and three days.131 Before his death, to avoid 
another crisis of succession, he consulted with his war council and decided to appoint 
his political advisor ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab as his successor.132 
4.5.5. The Legacy of Abu Bakr 
The Caliphate of Abu Bakr was the Caliphate of Jihad. Though extremely short, his 
tenure enhanced the prestige and reputation of the Muslims as a serious contender for 
regional power, simultaneously bequeathing the Muslims with unprecedented 
strategic vantage points from which to exploit and penetrate both regional powers. By 
decisively crushing all forms of resistance and threats, actual and potential, Abu Bakr 
had created considerable strategic depth between the Medinan polis and the regional 
powers. The swift annexation of former Sassanid and Byzantine territories 
demonstrated the attacking potential of the Muslims to the regional powers, but also 
sent a clear message throughout Arabia. 
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4.5.6. Analysis of Phase Two – De-Escalation to Limited War 
In phase two, the strikes against the nomadic tribes were also an extension of the 
homeland security policy. Sub-investigative question c is also concerned with how 
policy directing the application of Jihad, come to bear and how did they evolve? Phase 
two of Abu Bakr’s administration clearly demonstrates an evolution of Jihad in service 
of ‘homeland security’ into a policy of extended security. Effectively, the extended 
security policy was a strategy of denial, that is, denial of any form of territorial 
encroachment into Arabia by the tribes themselves or as auxiliaries of regional powers 
who might have used them as proxies. Accordingly, it is likely that the objectives were 
twofold; firstly, to remove any possible external threats or alliances with regional 
powers with strategic vantage points into Arabia; and secondly, to increase the 
strategic depth which the Medinan capital enjoyed from the regional powers. The 
security policy of Abu Bakr had the overall strategic goal it is suggested, of 
securitising the borders and territory of the Muslims such that with no resistance or 
internal threats to central authority, a process of unification could begin. 
  
Phase two was a return to limited war and the de-escalation of the military strategy of 
the Ridda Wars. The strategy of phase two did not have the same urgency of phase 
one, and therefore required greater controls on the use of force. To prevent the 
strategy returning to pure military strategy, Abu Bakr issued specific instructions 
regarding the conduct of war to each of the military units he dispatched to maintain 
political control and use calibrated violence.133 Flying on high morale after the 
victories of the Ridda Wars, and having learnt to navigate with tactical and 
operational mobility never seen on the Arabian Peninsula;134 the Muslim armed forces 
were able to easily overrun the defences of the war-weary and the surprised opponents 
they encountered. 135  The qualitative difference between the Muslims and their 
opponents was morale as the quintessential force multiplier. It is reasonable to assume 
that Abu Bakr must have understood that brimming morale could accommodate 
deficiencies in military and technological capabilities.  
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4.6. Diagnostic Evaluation of Phase Two 
To consider Abu Bakr’s reign therefore, as a continuation of political design, is 
further substantiated in the context of actions taken during phase two. The table below 
emphasises the continuation of those signs and symptoms sustained from the Ridda 
Wars with the emphasis of Hypothesis B and H as explanatory diagnostics of the 
extended security policy initiated by Abu Bakr. 
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War136 
Period A B C D E F G H I J 
Phase Two 
633-634 




4.6.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 2. Defensive Expansion - Hypothesis B 
Hypothesis B is an almost self-explanatory exercise in strategic interaction and 
provides support to the claim of politico-strategic consistency in Abu Bakr’s policies. 
According to Hypothesis B, defensive expansionism on account of insecurity is the 
either the product of an emerging security dilemma or a believed threat. Whilst the 
threat against Islam during the Prophet’s lifetime was removed, new existential 
threats emerged in Arabia thereafter. 
 
No external regional actor had a significant effect on the Muslim political 
consolidation of Arabia, however, that was not to say there could not or would not be. 
The latent possibility of external intervention would most certainly have aroused 
Muslim perceptions of insecurity and fear, especially after the Ridda Wars. Since 
early inception after all, the collective Muslim psyche had been developed by the 
concept of absolute Jihad, considering themselves in a state of perpetual hostility with 
everyone outside of themselves. On these imperatives alone, even without the turmoil 
of the Ridda, it is entirely plausible that regional security would have independently 
developed as policy. 
 
                                                
136 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
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The extended security policy of Abu Bakr during phase two correlates to the 
assumptions and theory of Hypothesis B and the theory of a continuing broader 
strategic policy from the maghazi period to consolidate the broader areas of Arabia 
and the Arabic speaking populations.  
4.6.1. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 8. Secrecy is More Common and Dangerous - Hypothesis H 
Hypothesis H is a continuation and extension of Hypothesis D and E, and maintains 
the same symptomatic demonstrations of the offensive strategic actions of the security 
policy of Abu Bakr as employed during the Ridda Wars. Hypothesis H, explains that 
when the offensive dominates, foreign and defence policy is more secretive. 137 
Timing, or the strategic initiative, affords advantage based upon superior information 
to offset the timeframe of operation between two actors, such that the initiative of a 
first strike is virtually guaranteed or retains a high level of probable success 
(Hypothesis D and E). 
 
Van Evera explains the offense dominance behaviour in this case as follows: ‘It can 
ease surprise attack by concealing preparations from the victim. It opens windows of 
opportunity and vulnerability by delaying states’ reactions to others’ military 
buildups, raising the risk of preventive war.’138 Regionally, the Arabs had never 
constituted a serious strategic or military threat to either Empire, merely requiring 
management via auxiliaries. Therefore, there had never been any real consideration 
that Arab interests would have extended into the grasslands. 
 
Looking back at the maghazi, there is an identifiable trend between the Prophet’s 
increasing politico-strategic strength (in other words, increasing offense-dominance) 
and the frequency with which he engaged in tactical subterfuge and misdirection to 
mask his strategic designs.139 Following the Treaty of Hudaybiya to the conquest of 
Mecca,140 all the way through to the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and the beginnings of the 
Caliphate of ‘Umar,141 an element of secret policies seems to have been in place that 
had specified targets designated long since back to the days of the maghazi. 
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Indeed, between 628 and 630 (from the Treaty of Hudaybiya to the conquest of 
Mecca), the Prophet authorised seventeen offensive strike missions against his 
opponents, never relinquishing the strategic initiative.142 Although experiencing some 
losses, the general offensive of the Muslims grew stronger and stronger finally seizing 
Mecca (see Hypothesis D, E and J). For example, in 629 the Muslims made military 
contact with a Byzantine force approximately 5-6,000 strong at a town named Mu’ta 
in modern-day Jordan, part of Byzantine Syria at the time. A force of 3000 men was 
dispatched by the Prophet to breach the Byzantine border, although the specific 
objective remains unclear. It has been suggested that the objective was to retaliate for 
the murder of a Muslim envoy sent to the Ghassanid tribe,143 or as part of a show of 
force alongside a missionary objective, or even that the objective was to raid a 
Byzantine armory in the location. 144  
 
The result of the engagement was a tactical defeat for the Muslims who lost several 
high-ranking commanders and had to depend upon the recently converted Muslim, 
Khalid ibn al-Walid, to rally the Muslims to a strategic retreat to avoid a decisive 
loss.145 A month later, it is reported that the Prophet dispatched another mission to 
strike at Bali and Quada’a - two northern tribes who were part of the ‘Ghassanid 
frontier defence coalition’ that had defeated the Muslims a month earlier.146 It seems 
that the re-organisation of the northern Byzantine frontier defences in response to the 
Muslim infiltration was also provocation enough for the Prophet to preemptively 
strike rather than wait for their organised response. The initial task force sent to 
disrupt the frontier defence coalition was later reinforced by the dispatch of Abu 
Bakr, ‘Umar, and Abu Ubayda, to augment the strike.147  
 
Furthermore, prior to the march on Mecca in 630, ‘Aisha, the wife of the Prophet and 
daughter of Abu Bakr narrates a discussion that took place as she prepared provisions 
for the Prophet’s departure.148 Abu Bakr, unaware of a scheduled journey of the 
Prophet enquires as to the nature of the trip. He quickly surmises, from the fact that 
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his own daughter would not reveal to him details of the journey that the Prophet was 
preparing for a ghazwa. Abu Bakr proposes the three most likely targets to be a. the 
Byzantines, b. the Arabs of the Najd region, or c. the Quraysh. The Prophet confirms 
the latter. 149 Once again, the early identification of the Byzantine threat can be clearly 
seen on the Prophet’s radar. Additionally, this event takes place before the Quraysh 
have been overthrown, that is, still within the guerrilla phase of the Prophet’s mission. 
 
Thus, it is entirely plausible that the events of 629/630 set in motion a secret policy 
that intended to subdue the Ghassanid frontier defence coalition to pave the way for 
further incursions into the Byzantine territories.150 This was continued by Abu Bakr 
and finally completed during the reign of ‘Umar. These points suggest the plausibility 
of the extended security policy of phase two by Abu Bakr as a continuation of policy 
designed and initiated by the Prophet.151 In more dramatic terms, Donner arrives at 
the same conclusion, suggesting that the Islamic domination of the Near East 
specifically was a continuation of the Prophet’s master plan that Abu Bakr 
completed.152 
 
There is an obvious series of additional events such as the diplomatic delegations sent 
to both Caesar Heraclius153 and Choreses in 628;154 the expedition to Tabuk (northern 
Syria – Byzantine territory) in 630;155 and the final military dispatch of the army of 
‘Usama to the Byzantine borders; that are all sure indications that the Prophet had 
political designs against the regional powers. Hence, not only were the Arab nomads 
taken by surprise when the armed forces under Khalid struck, but so were the 
neighbouring regional powers, Byzantium and Sasanian Persia. The misperception 
and miscalculation by all strategic actors concerning Abu Bakr resulted in significant 
losses; the Arab opposition during the Ridda Wars suffered a humiliating defeat; and 
the Arab auxiliaries of the regional powers were swept aside with such speed and 
determination that both empires were left exposed to military inroads into their 
territories. 
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The diagnostic assessments of phase two build upon those demonstrated during phase 
one, with the same consistency in predicted by offense dominance behaviours. The 
administration of Abu Bakr over both stages of his security policy reveals a definitive 
preference for offensive strategic action, that is, the expected utility of Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah as a mechanism to serve and attain political objectives. Abu Bakr displayed a 
certain preference and belief in the estimation of the efficacy of violence, and the 
continued presence of the offense variables as constitutive of his rational calculus, 
inevitably resulting in war in the name of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. The diagnostic 
examination therefore provides direct explanations affirming the positive to research 
questions 1 and 2. 
 
During the administration of Abu Bakr, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was identifiably a 
continuation of politik by other means (research question 1); and a consistent link can 
be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving strategic dynamics 
affected Jihad as a mechanism for an extended security policy (research question 2). 
Offensive military action during the Ridda Wars, were as we have diagnostically 
examined, a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic 
environment. The extension of policy to the grasslands was largely determined and 
designed as a result and consequence of the anarchic environment and a belief in self-
help (research question 3). In conclusion, by way of summarising the results of our 
examination of politik during Abu Bakr’s administration we shall map the trinitarian 
developments of the period 632-634.  
 
4.7. Trinitarian Interpretation of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr 
The first evolution of Jihad from the practice of the maghazi began during the crisis of 
succession inherited by Abu Bakr that forced him to operate under the conditions of 
an impending crisis within the anarchic environment. ‘In general terms a crisis’ Oran 
Young writes, ‘can be thought of as an acute transition in the state of a certain system 
or, to be even more specific, as a decisive or critical stage in the flow of events that 
together constitute an acute transition’. 156  The strategic dynamics between the 
practices of the maghazi through phase one and then phase two of Abu Bakr’s 
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security policy reflects the vital importance of such an acute transition because of the 
nature and setting of the anarchic environment. 
 
Accordingly, the Caliphate of Abu Bakr is perhaps the most significant stage in the 
evolution of the strategic dynamics of Jihad. The Ridda Wars were a clear 
demonstration of the return of tribal politics, rousing the emotions and irrational 
forces (primordial violence, hatred, and enmity) of the tribal society against central 
authority. Abu Bakr did not have the time that the Prophet had had to sublimate the 
problem. Instead, through rational calculation (policy) Abu Bakr adopted a military 
strategy of compellence to achieve his ends. Enlisting the military genius of Khalid 
ibn al-Walid, Abu Bakr was able to mastermind the overthrow of various centres of 
gravity that spread across Arabia from his seat in Medina. Jihad was employed to 
deliver overwhelming military force, since political goals were inexorably fused with 
military victory the escalated use of force was strategically sound.157 Jihad was 
applied as a demonstration of military strength that reflected the resolute political will 
of Abu Bakr. 
 
Jihad functioned as a bargaining signal of resolve, escalating Muslim warfighting to 
the only instance of zero-sum conceptualisation during the Rashidun period. 
Consolidating the strategic initiative with an escalated degree of violence, and the 
military prowess of Khalid ibn al-Walid, was the difference that ultimately secured 
decisive victory. By crushing the ability of any tribe to resist his authority, Abu Bakr 
simultaneously neutralised the ability of the Arab tribes to form any system of 
confederacy or conspiracy against him. Under such circumstances, Abu Bakr was able 
to impose peace terms upon the Arabs as a whole, more comprehensively and with 
greater finality than the Prophet had. In other words, as the diagnostic examination 
has demonstrated, strategic behaviour during the Ridda Wars was rooted in a set of 
strategic preferences and assumptions as a consequence of the crisis environment and 
the nature of anarchy rather than as the product of a religious worldview (research 
question 3). The first phase of Abu Bakr’s administration was dedicated to the 
restoration of the policies and central authority established by the Prophet during the 
maghazi (research question 1). 
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The second phase of Abu Bakr’s administration was the resumption of polices set by 
the trajectory of the maghazi period (research question 2). Abu Bakr identified the 
centres of gravity that needed clearing before the policy proper could be implemented. 
This resulted in the initial assaults of the grasslands that separated Arabia from the 
Fertile Crescent, and the Byzantine and Sassanid powers. Building upon the 
successive decisive victories of the Ridda Wars, Abu Bakr harnessed the momentum 
of the blind forces at play, buoying morale and an increasing fervour to fight the good 
fight (Jihad fi sabil l’Allah); Abu Bakr devised an extended security policy to 
dominate the borders in order to seize the strategic advantage of a first-strike 
capability against the regional powers. 
 
Abu Bakr was able to mastermind decisive victories against the auxiliary tribes of the 
grasslands and annex the various centres of gravity as strategic vantage points for 
invasion. By the end of his tenure, Abu Bakr had decisively dominated Arabia proper 
and established new territorial gains from former Byzantine and Persian interests. The 
Prophet’s mission to make Islam as the dominant force in Arabia before spreading out 
universally was consolidated by Abu Bakr, whose administration can be conceived of 
in strategic terms as nothing other than a continuation of politik by other means 
(research questions 1 & 2). 
 
The metanarrative of Islam supported the direction that strategic logic had dictated 
but not the manner in which Jihad was instrumentally applied (research question 3). 
Retrospectively, as Young explains ‘Crises do, nevertheless, tend to have important 
catalytic effects in crystallizing and setting in motion forces of change that are only 
fully consummated over a longer period of time.’158 The long-term effects of this 
transition would be revealed during the subsequent caliphates of Abu Bakr’s 
successors, where ‘the impact of crises on relevant attitudes, perspectives, and 
expectations can be far greater and more influential than their palpable impact.’159 
Thus, whilst Abu Bakr’s administration was highly successful, it is best understood as 
a vital transition stage in the strategic dynamics of Jihad from an instrument of 
emancipation and security to an instrument of systemic force projection to serve 
foreign policy objectives. 
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The victories during the Ridda Wars were final in a strategic sense, but the crisis that 
started it all would return to haunt the Muslim community again and again. Though 
Abu Bakr decisively removed all forms of resistance amongst the Arabs thereby 
unifying the central authority at its most vulnerable point, the premium placed upon 
warfighting to impose terms was sustainable only while he lived. In that sense, the 
administration failed to achieve a permanent political victory. The result in war is 
never final,160 Clausewitz wrote, and as a matter of policy violence is always a means 
and not an end.  
                                                
160 See Proposition 10; OW, p.80 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0. The Rise of the Dar al-Islam 
This chapter charts the evolution of the Islamic strategic setting following the death of 
Abu Bakr and the rise of the dar al-Islam or the ‘Islamic territories’ on the 
international stage. The dar al-Islam was built in part as a consequence of policies 
and shifts in the application of warfighting. This chapter examines how the security 
policy of Abu Bakr evolved according to the needs and interplay between shifting 
strategic settings and emerging strategic environments during the administration of 
‘Umar ibn al-Khattab - the second of the Rashidun Caliphs. This chapter is 
particularly interested to explore research question 4 and sub-investigative questions c 
and d. but not excluding analysis of research questions 1, 2, and 3 and sub-
investigative question b.1 An examination of sub-investigative question c is the pivot 
from which the other research questions are addressed. This is because the complexity 
of the strategic setting and its effects on policy at the systemic level is of primary 
concern for strategic interpretation. 
 
Strategic analysis in this chapter factors the variables of VUCA into consideration 
which ‘may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove 
to be good and others bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may be 
surmised, but never entirely known.’2 Accordingly, the focus of strategic explanation 
is not the external anarchic environment but rather the realities of what happened 
underneath the surface and outward appearance of external strategic interactions. The 
Caliphate of ‘Umar is characterised by the Futuhat or ‘expansions’ at the systemic 
level of the dar al-Islam, where the dar al-Islam rose to become a regional power. 
However, the reality of this rise was far more complex than it appears to have been. 
For this reason, the more accessible variables of strategic interpretation are those that 
pertain to the bargaining dynamics of the domestic strategic setting, which in turn, 
inform explanation of systemic policy and action, that is, the Futuhat or ‘expansions’. 
 
                                                
1 Sub-investigative question a. on the definition of Jihad remains static since our exploration of the 
question in chapter 4 until the end of the following chapter. 
2 Yarger (2006), p.18 
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5.1. Preliminaries 
A constant and consistent issue of the lack of early source materials has already been 
discussed from the perspective of historiographical research. Early oriental scholars 
were generally dismissive of the early Muslim historical collections, but frustrated by 
the evident lack of external source material otherwise. Little was known about the 
systemic interactions of the dar al-Islam by outside commentators and the same was 
true of the Muslim sources. Hence, the Futuhat genre of historical literature is often 
ambiguous to whether certain territories were taken by force (anwatan) or by peaceful 
surrender and negotiated tax settlement (sulhan).3 
 
A striking example is the case of Damascus; the various narrations recounted by the 
early Muslim chroniclers describe Khalid ibn al-Walid storming the city via the 
Eastern Gate in 636, but also another narration is mentioned stating that the 
commander of the army, Abu Ubayda, was in the Western sector of Damascus 
concluding a peaceful surrender of the city at the same time.4 Given the importance of 
Damascus at that time, it is a strange turn of events that there might be uncertainty as 
to how it was captured and by whom. This leads to the inference of a general premise 
that consideration of strategic dynamics during this period cannot be situated within a 
discourse that depends upon operational and tactical levels of analysis and record. 5 
Indeed, even at the strategic level historical information is impoverished. This 
inference emphasises the importance of abductively exploring sub-investigative 
question c. as the backdrop of contextualisation and explanation for the primary 
research questions investigated in this chapter. 
 
Secondly, an extremely pervasive theme throughout the Muslim Futuh literature is 
that of providentialism, and thus raises the contextual importance of sub-investigative 
question b. in this chapter to validate these claims or deny them. As Robinson 
explains, the early Muslim chroniclers took a distinctly unilateral approach to history:  
 
What happened outside of the caliphate might have been of some 
interest to the curious, but information was necessarily scarce, and 
                                                
3 Kennedy (2007), p.19 
4 I.K., pp.89-91; Buti (2007), p.616; Kennedy (2007), p.20 
5 Donner (1981), p.269 
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besides, why should it have a sure place in the historiographic 
vision if God had not yet made it part of His order by sending 
successful armies to conquer it?6 
 
According to Bernard Lewis, ‘These [Futuh] were not seen as conquests in the vulgar 
sense of territorial acquisitions, but as the overthrow of impious regimes and 
illegitimate hierarchies, and the “opening” of their peoples to the new revelation and 
dispensation…’7 Lewis further explains that ‘The use of the root fth is thus not unlike 
the twentieth century use of the verb “liberate”, and is indeed sometimes replaced by 
the latter verb (harrara) [freedom or liberation] in modern Arabic writing on early 
Islamic history.’8 These linguistic clarifications provide a connection to how the 
dominant conception of the Futuh was linked to the policy. 
 
Robinson elaborates further upon this perspective, explaining the providentialism 
attached to this genre of work: ‘With God Standing at the centre of history, the task 
that fell to Muslim historians was therefore not so much to explain human actions as it 
was to exemplify known truths and to teach lessons by describing them.’9 Caution 
must be attached to this statement which, although fairly accurately represents much 
of the earlier sources pre-dating the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, the later sources cannot be so 
generalised. In particular, the voluminous work of Ibn Khaldun, which in many ways 
is the exact antithesis of the early approach described by Robinson. However, the 
point is extremely important as it reinforced the meta-narrative and the idea of Islam 
as a Divine Mandate. 
 
Donner summarises the importance of the Futuh literature as a key historiographical 
theme;10 firstly because the Futuh provided a narrative justification for the Muslim 
conquest and rule over non-Muslims in the form of a quasi-teleological overtone of 
the Divine Plan or meta-narrative of the theological Imperative.11 Secondly Donner 
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8 Ibid., pp.93-4 
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10 Donner (1998), pp.177-180 
11 According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam and al-Azdi, the futuh - the ‘openings and victories’ - were 
tantamount to the signification of ‘truth overcoming falsehood’, that is, the righteousness associated to 
the actions of conquest –see Mourad (2000); and Mulalic (2012), p.123 
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notes, the Futuh literature provided a medium of promoting future Jihad and 
encouraging Muslims to follow the duty and practice of their pious predecessors 
simultaneously providing ‘raw material for the nascent Islamic community as it began 
to grapple intellectually with its own identity and with its position as the ruling 
community that dominated others.’ 12 Thus, in the sections that follows, the 
investigation of a strategic condition will also account for the influence of domestic 
power politics and providentialism on the influence of Jihad and those policies that 
governed it’s application (sub-investigative questions b. and c.).   
 
5.2. Dynamic Expansionism 
The Caliphate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab is celebrated amongst Muslim historians as the 
great tenure of the futuhat.13 Amongst Sunni Muslims, the Caliphate of ‘Umar is the 
most glamourised example of the righteousness associated with Islamic rule, and was 
the most popular Caliph of the Rashidun era.14 The Caliphate of ‘Umar was known 
for strict internal rectification. A developed system of civil infrastructure developed 
during his rule and the homeland security policy established by Abu Bakr was 
subsumed and sublimated as a function of a new policy - the policy of Da’wa. 
 
‘Umar built upon Abu Bakr’s legacy and drew first blood against both of the regional 
powers, Byzantine and Persia, delivering crushing blows to their empires with such 
bold offensive behaviour that it was recorded in the annals of historians thereafter as 
‘a fundamental watershed of world history.’15 ‘Umar continued firmly upon the 
politico-strategic trajectory set by Abu Bakr, completing the conquests of both Iraq 
and most of Syria, and raising even greater armies than his predecessors. Between 
634-638 ‘Umar had consolidated the Muslim expansion of Syria and Armenia 
effectively pushing out the regional hegemon – the Byzantine Romans; ‘Within the 
short time span of 10-15 years they conquered the lands of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and 
Persia, halving the territory of the ancient Byzantine empire based in Constantinople, 
and bringing the Sasanian Persian empire to a close.’16  
 
                                                
12 Donner (1998), p.180 
13 Rahman (2003), p.60 
14 Madelung (2001), p.76 
15 Bonney (2004), p.54 
16 Cook (2001) 
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The Caliphate of ‘Umar has been celebrated as the period of the great expansions of 
Futuh. The vast territories acquired under the Caliphate of ‘Umar read as a long list of 
victories that in the popular Muslim conception reflected a clear consciousness of 
providentialism. In particular, the territorial expansions against the regional powers 
are listed below.17 Whilst each campaign listed could be extensively researched, the 
focus of these expansions is the shifts and effects upon the strategic setting and not 
the operational and tactical details of the military campaigns. Yet to answer research 
question 4, the usual pre-occupation of detailing long lists of territorial conquests 
during ‘Umar’s administration distracts from the most salient dynamics between the 
military conquests of the period and its relationship to policy, namely the driving 




Figure 4. - Conquests Against the Regional Powers 634 – 644 
                                                
17 See also I.K., p.220; Rahman (2003), pp.62-73 
18 BLD, pp.165-212; I.K., pp.88-93 
19 Ibid., pp. 213-222; Rahman (2003), pp.67-73 
20 Ibid., pp.226-234; 
21 Ibid., pp.305-310; 
22 Ibid., pp.335-345; 
23 Ibid., pp.346-351; 
24 Ibid., p.342, 352-362 
25 Ibid., pp.401-408; I.K., pp.94-8; Rahman (2003), p.65 
26 BLD, pp.409-452; Donner (2012), pp.128-130 
27 BLD, pp.409-452; Donner (2012), pp.126-9 
28 I.K., p.217 
29 Ibid., pp.217-219 
30 Ibid., pp.214-215 



















































5.3. The Caliphate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644) 
‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (579-644) belonged to the clan of Banu ‘Adee ibn K‘ab of the 
Quraysh.1 Before his conversion to Islam, he had been appointed to represent the tribe 
of Quraysh as their chief ambassador2 and was noted as being ‘a man of strong 
determination, a keen sense of duty and a remarkable gift for administration.’3 From 
amongst the earliest of converts to the Prophet’s mission,4 ‘Umar had served the 
Prophet diligently and was noted as being from amongst the Prophet’s closest 
advisors.5 ‘Umar was distinguished in title from Abu Bakr, who was the Khalifat ‘ul-
Rasul ‘l-Allah (The Deputy of the Prophet), with the title of Amir al-Mu’meneen 
(Commander of the Believers).6  
 
This contrast in titles reflects the first sign of a shift in policy between the two Caliphs 
and the evolving strategic dynamics of Jihad.7 Abu Bakr, as Deputy of the Prophet, 
maintained the politico-strategic trajectory set by the Prophet; ‘Umar, as Commander 
of the Believers, laid the foundations for the Muslim homeland, or the dar al-Islam 
(lit. the territories of Islam) by building upon the strategic environment shaped by his 
predecessors. Jihad, under the administration of ‘Umar, it is proposed, was 
subordinated to an act of foreign policy, specifically known as the Da’wa. The 
administration of ‘Umar reveals two important shifts in the strategic dynamics of 
Jihad during his tenure. The first was between 634-640; the second, being thereafter 
until his death in 644. 
5.4. Stage One Post-Ridda (634-640) 
Had the scope of Jihad been limited to concerns or threats against the survival of the 
Islamic government, then the policies of Abu Bakr would have been sufficient to 
maintain a defense dominant stance against any offensive or threatening behaviour 
from the regional powers. ‘Umar’s decision to engage offensively therefore suggests 
that Jihad was instrumentally applied as a further development in its application from 
his predecessors. However, strategic interactions are never dictated by one will alone. 
                                                
1 Rahman (2003), p.60 
2 Sallaabee (2007), p.42 
3 Rahman (2003), p.60 
4 I.I., pp.155-9 
5 I.K., p.219 
6 Buti (2001), p.705; I.K., p.87, 223 
7 Hodgson (1977), p.207 
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Having secured the domestic tribal population during the Ridda Wars, Abu Bakr had 
sought to expand security through the neutralisation of the borderlands with the 
regional powers. Such an unprecedented move was initially extremely successful with 
sweeping victories for the Muslims. Contemporary theory would argue that Abu 
Bakr’s extended security policy, or ‘attempts to establish buffer zones [,] can alarm 
others who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who 
believe that their own vulnerability will be increased’ Jervis explains, leading to the 
logical conclusion that: ‘When buffers are sought in areas empty of great powers, 
expansion tends to feed on itself in order to protect what is acquired, … .’8 Hence, 
‘Umar’s policy of offensive engagement with the regional powers during the post-
Ridda stage, was in alignment with standard strategic logic, and it is proposed, a 
continuation by consequence of the earlier security policy by default and not by 
design. The domestic power politics that drove the subordination of Jihad to a new 
reformed policy (sub-investigative question c.) is explored next. 
5.4.1. Post-Ridda Political Damage Control 
Before ‘Umar’s policy of offensive strategic action could be put into play, political 
damage control had to be managed following the previous administration. The post-
Ridda community had exhibited the dominance of the Quraysh over all other tribes in 
Arabia, with the highest serving generals and governors being either Meccan or 
specifically from the ranks of the Quraysh.9 The efficiency of Abu Bakr’s security 
policy had decimated tribal competition in Arabia leaving the Quraysh and their 
loyalist allies as undisputed masters of the Arabs. 
 
However, Abu Bakr had failed to achieve a decisive political victory over the Arab 
tribes. Instead, he had dealt them a crushing military victory that had resulted in their 
shame and humiliation amongst the loyalist Arabs and sullied their reputations. 
‘Umar, unsurprisingly as former chief ambassador of the Quraysh, set in motion a 
diplomatic course of damage limitation amongst the Arab tribes.10 Just as the Prophet 
had in his annexation of Mecca shown magnanimity and pardon to his defeated foes, 
showering them with gifts and position within his movement;11 so too did ‘Umar, 
                                                
8 Jervis (1978), p.169 (both quotes) 
9 See Kennedy (2007), pp.52-3 
10 Madelung (2001), p.60 
11 See 3.6. 
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reintegrating the surviving rebel-apostates into the Muslim community as full 
members. ‘Umar would henceforth build his administration based upon meritocracy 
rather than tribal aristocracy as Abu Bakr had.12 
 
Almost immediately, ‘Umar took himself to task in re-negotiating the terms of the 
political settlement Abu bakr had imposed by releasing political hostages taken as 
collateral against any further tribal uprisings. ‘Umar also announced an amnesty for 
other political prisoners and the surviving rebel-apostate tribes.13 Because the terms of 
the new political bargain were more generous to the remnants of the rebel-apostate 
tribes than that of Abu Bakr had been, ‘Umar was able to consolidate their loyalty to 
him almost immediately. Furthermore, by offering the surviving apostate tribes full 
re-integration into the Muslim society ‘Umar simultaneously increased the size of the 
Muslim army since many of them enlisted as either an act of gratitude or to 
demonstrate loyalty to the new Caliph.14 
5.4.2. Administrative and Military Reform 
‘Umar’s penchant for administration shined as he set about radically transforming the 
Medinan polis. During Abu Bakr’s administration, Medina continued to serve, as it 
had done for the Prophet, as a base of operations. During ‘Umar’s tenure, political 
infrastructure developed alongside civil and bureaucratic administration with regional 
governors dispersed over the newly conquered territories and peoples. In particular, 
the fiscal system and justice system became more formalised than under Abu Bakr, 
with courts, policing infrastructure, and official records and registries implemented.15  
 
‘Umar disbanded Abu Bakr’s war council and commissioned a special council of 
advisors that was known as the shura committee or the consultative body of his 
administration.16 ‘Umar’s shura council had been a development of his meritocratic 
approach17 wherein he appointed the close and highest standing members of the early 
Muslim community who had served the Prophet, or those with elite skills that 
warranted their place on the council, irrespective of their tribal backgrounds. All 
                                                
12 Madelung (2001), p.58 
13 Ibid., p.59-60 
14 Donner (2012), p.127 
15 I.K., pp.219-20; Rahman (2003), p.61 
16 As-Sallabi (2008), pp.181-8; see al-Raysuni (2011) 
17 The Qur’anic principles of this practice are mentioned here Q, 3:159; 42:38 
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politico-military decisions were passed through the council including socio-economic 
policies and matters of criminal justice.18 
 
However, it is the military instrument in particular that was restructured with rosters 
compiled of military personnel (diwan) laying the foundational infrastructure for a 
standing army. 19 This restructuring was a direct consequence and evolution of the 
policies set by Abu Bakr, but also the springboard for all later conquests and the 
changing policy of Jihad from security to expansionism. ‘Umar’s new meritocracy 
had no place for Qurayshite aristocracy, even less so it seems for those who had been 
part of the loyalist army that had so decisively crushed the rebel tribes. In the 
reorganisation of the military, ‘the members of the Qurayshite aristocracy, so 
prominent in the leadership of the Muslim armies under Abu Bakr, were 
conspicuously absent.’20 
 
The Ridda Wars had significantly increased the operational efficiency of the Muslims, 
and the preliminary military engagements in both Iraq and Syria further increased 
operational capabilities. These operational developments were complimented by 
enhanced logistical knowledge and substantial battlefield experience, with units 
engaged in year-long campaigns and missions.21 Furthermore, the accompanying 
victories spearheaded the growing momentum within the military ranks of the 
Muslims affording an unshakable belief in their Jihad. With an increasingly efficient 
military, brimming with morale and victory, ‘Umar took a bold step to reinforce the 
army by sacrificing one man for many. 
5.4.3. Sheathing the Sword of God 
No single act of political re-negotiation was perhaps more indicative of the new 
authority and shift in policy concerning Jihad than ‘Umar’s bold demotion of Khalid 
ibn al-Walid from Field Marshal of the Muslim Armies to that of a private as his first 
political order.22 The impact of ‘Umar’s action was the most salient example of the 
new shift in policy that subordinated the will of Jihad to foreign policy, as distinct to 
                                                
18 As-Sallabi (2008), pp.184-5, 188 
19 I.K., pp.219-220; Rahman (2003), pp.61-2 
20 Madelung (2001), p.60 
21 Donner (2012), pp.104-5 
22 Madelung (2001), p.60; WQS, p.159 
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the security policy of Abu Bakr, which was a military strategy of victory and 
dominance. In order to realign Jihad with limited warfare, the general of the Ridda 
Wars had to be removed in order to subordinate Jihad to the design of a new policy 
without challenge.23 
 
Furthermore, it had been primarily at the hands of Khalid that the defeated rebel and 
apostate tribes, who would be given amnesty under ‘Umar, had been hunted and 
beaten. Under Abu Bakr’s administration, only loyalists during the Ridda campaigns 
were enrolled into the Muslim armed forces and hence were recipients of the 
associated plunder and prestige that victory brought. Khalid would not have 
welcomed former rebels and apostates back into the army he was commanding.24 
Khalid’s demotion cleared the way for military enrollment of the former rebels and 
apostates. Hence, in sacrificing Khalid, ‘Umar was able to not only bolster military 
recruitment, but also raise the size of his military forces to numbers previously 
unknown by Arabian standards.25 Although demoted, Khalid maintained a position in 
the military as Chief of Staff and a military advisor.26  
5.4.4. Popular Government 
As the Muslim military establishment began its formal development under the 
direction and management of ‘Umar, new policies of internal rectification and 
meritocracy conveyed an atmosphere of greater of social justice that bolstered 
popularity. Van Evera writes: ‘Popular governments can better raise larger, more 
loyal armies that can bypass others’ border forts and can operate far from home with 
less logistical support. This gives popular regimes greater offensive power.’27 ‘Umar 
could not have been unaware of the growing offensive military power at his 
disposal,28 and the consequences of the extended security policy had effectively 
opened access to clear areas of exploitation belonging to the Sassanid and Byzantine 
empires29 creating the belief in an impending security dilemma brought on by the 
acquisition of the grasslands.  
                                                
23 Hodgson (1977), p.207 
24 Akram (2004), p.135 
25 Donner (2012), p.127 
26 I.K., p.150, 197; Madelung (2001), p.60; Rahman (2003), p.64; As-Sallabi (2008), p.107 
27 Van Evera (2004), p.242 
28 Symptom of Hypothesis I 
29 Symptom of Hypothesis D & E 
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Yet the Caliphate of ‘Umar was arguably premised upon balancing domestic stability 
with developments in the systemic strategic setting rather than maximising territorial 
acquisition. Hence, in order to retain careful calibration of the domestic setting with 
the systemic, a vehicle of communication was needed to balance systemic strategic 
action that could not have been ignored. To meet the impending threat of the security 
dilemma, during the administration of ‘Umar, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah fast became a 
function of foreign policy, designed to promote and expand the Islamic meta-narrative 
and the territorial sovereignty of Islam.30 However, the shift in policy of Jihad as an 
instrument of security to an instrument of foreign policy required a language with 
which to frame the new direction of Jihad and its application. 
5.4.5. On the Rhetoric of Righteousness 
If we recall back to the days of the maghazi, the Prophet’s proselytisation to the 
message of Islam was referred to as da’wa, lit. to call or invite. The invitation was a 
return to God, submitting before His sovereignty and abandoning the authority of 
men. The objective of da’wa automatically infused a sincere belief amongst the 
population in the noble cause of the Da’wa policy, and conferred popular credibility 
on its implementation. The da’wa had been a liberating ideology, and backed by the 
use of force - Jihad fi sabil l’Allah – during the maghazi. Now, it became instituted as 
a core constituent of ‘Umar’s foreign policy, reframed and projected systemically as a 
form of ‘humanitarian interventionism.’ By reframing the continuation of policy from 
the maghazi, the ‘righteous’ cause of the Da’wa policy would not only be 
emphasized, but the application of violence would be divinely sanctioned as it served 
the purposes of furthering or defending the jurisdiction of God’s authority on earth, 
whilst predicating its legitimacy upon the absolute Jihad.31 
 
Both the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires had military capabilities and standing 
armies that far exceeded the Muslim military capabilities, let alone the tactical 
experience of fighting large-scale battles. Nonetheless the Muslims were able to not 
only meet and sustain warfighting with their more powerful opponents, but also to 
eventually defeat them both. 
                                                
30 Symptom of Hypothesis G 
31 Symptom of Hypothesis F 
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The morale that was generated from a belief in providential righteousness was the 
quintessential force-multiplier that certainly infused courage and efficiency honing 
the military assaults of the Muslim armies. Morale, as Clausewitz noted,32 being 
unquantifiable, and thus an unpredictable variable in the strategic calculus of war, 
would prove to be vital for expansions under ‘Umar. The roots of this morale was 
undoubtedly the result of earlier successive victories during Abu Bakr’s Caliphate, 
encouraging the introduction of a policy that continued warfighting and the potential 
domination of adversaries. Thus, instilled with a sense of providential righteousness, 
unfazed by their deficiencies in arms and strategic capabilities compared to their more 
illustrious opponents and with a transformed belief in the righteousness of their cause; 
the Muslim armies directed by the policy of Da’wa pursued a relentless path of 
expansion developing an unshakable belief in their own offense dominance.33  
 
At this point we have elucidated the political background and circumstances that gave 
rise to the reformulation of Abu Bakr’s security policy. During Abu Bakr’s 
administration, Jihad was transformed from an instrument of political revolution 
serving as a vehicle for religious emancipation and social equality, into an instrument 
that served an aggressive homeland security policy. In its second-stage development 
(post-Ridda), geopolitical and geostrategic interests heavily directed the regional or 
extended security policy. Jihad was subordinated to the political aim of achieving 
immediate regional hegemony as well as controlling the strategic initiative and depth 
required to offset territorial invasion or as a prelude to expansive incursions of pre-
emptive strikes. 
 
As suggested in the last chapter, it is very likely that the second-stage development of 
Jihad during the administration of Abu Bakr was a consequence of pre-determined 
policy that had been designed since the days of the maghazi. The continuation of this 
policy under ‘Umar became known as Da’wa. The Da’wa policy was initiated on 
account of the inherited strategic environment and geopolitical and strategic setting 
rather than by intended or unilateral design. These preliminary observations are the 
clearest signs for diagnostic evaluation. 
 
                                                
32 See OW, pp.184-5 
33 Symptom of Hypothesis J 
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5.5. Diagnostic Evaluation of the Da’wa Policy 
The diagnostic testing of stage one of the Da’wa policy as a strategic condition 
conforming to the preliminary strategic interpretation and symptomatic hypotheses 
concerns two fundamental questions firstly, was the policy determined by teleological 
consequence of absolute Jihad (the Islamic meta-narrative and the promise of God’s 
Providence), that is, sub-investigative question b.; and secondly, was the Da’wa 
policy an aggressive policy of imperial ambition (sub-investigative question d.). 
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War34 
Actor A B C D E F G H I J 
Stage One 
634-640 




The symptomatic indications of the strategic setting and environment conditioning the 
creation and application of the Da’wa are extremely convincing and are presented in the 
table above. Nonetheless, they are symptoms of the strategic condition and not clear 
signs of its state. As we shall proceed to examine, the nature and function of the Da’wa 
policy has been subject to alternative accounts that seek explanation in a context other 
than being purely strategic. These alternative explanations challenge the proposed 
hypothesis we have laid out above. If these alternatives can be discounted then our 
proposed strategic interpretation can be supported by diagnostic opinion. Diagnostic 
evaluation is conducted on Hypothesis A followed by Hypothesis C. 
 
5.5.1. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 1. Opportunistic Expansion – (Hypothesis A) 
In chapter 3, we explicated the teleological connection between Islam, absolute Jihad, 
and Jihad fi sabil l’Allah reflecting the shifting strategic dynamics of the period. In 
this section, we shall consider the issue in relation to policy design, specifically, was 
the Da’wa policy designed as an instrument of Providence whereby the means 
justifies the ends, or strategic opportunism? 
 
                                                
34 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
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A basic premise of offense-defense theory is that windows of opportunistic expansion 
will invite aggression, even by temperate powers, on account of the perceived ease of 
action and belief in success. The simple principle is that weakness invites the strong, 
meaning those stronger than the weak and not necessarily the strongest power in the 
vicinity. Under conditions of anarchy, actors will maximise their ability to accrue 
power through relative gains and exploit windows of vulnerabilities and opportunity. 
Self-help and advancing one’s interests are dependent upon relative power in relation 
to one’s neighbours and the regional powers, or competitors. 
 
The premise does not however suggest that the opposite, that the weak do not attack 
the strong since the first military actions recorded in the maghazi literature 
demonstrate no inconsistencies in this point of fact, nor the strategic actions of Abu 
Bakr. However, why ‘Umar initiated the aggressive expansions of the Futuh is the 
subject of many, arguably antiquated, beliefs that overlook the central influence of the 
perceived security threat that we have proposed. These theories are unanimously 
rooted in the fundamental assumption that survival drove the Futuh, rather than 
security. 
 
Hugh Kennedy’s ascription to such a belief claims the dynamics of the Futuh 
(including the Ridda Wars as a precursory form of conquest by another name) were 
driven by the threat of survival based upon the scarcity of resources within the 
Arabian Peninsula.35 Kennedy, borrowing from Reuven Firestone, regurgitates a form 
of the popular ‘ecological thesis’36 that posits a unified Arabia following the Ridda 
Wars was faced with a lack of inter-plunder and raiding opportunities and as a matter 
of maintaining the new found socio-political cohesion and stability, looked outward 
beyond the desert for material growth to assuage the threat of civil implosion or a 
Malthusian population disaster.37 
 
On the other hand, Fred Donner disagrees and advances two striking points 
concerning the fallacy of hunger, overpopulation or the desiccation of pasturelands; 
                                                
35 Kennedy (2007), p.56 
36 Donner (1995), p.342 
37 Kennedy (2007), pp.56-7; Firestone (1999), pp.124-5; On the idea of poverty, famine, Malthusian 
overpopulation, economic necessity and scarcity which drove the Muslims outward rather than Jihad, 
see Bonner (2006), pp.62-3 
 172 
firstly, ‘ ‘Umar is said to have complained that he had difficulty locating enough men 
to conscript into the armies during the third phase of the conquests, which suggests 
that overpopulation was hardly a problem in the peninsula.’ And secondly, ‘How, 
after all, could any significant “surplus” population have managed to survive in an 
area of such precarious agricultural resources as were possessed by Arabia?’38 
Montgomery Watt also firmly discounts the credibility of such arguments stating that 
the ecological thesis and arguments based upon economic changes have ‘no good 
evidence’ to support them.39 Watt further argues that the evidence suggests that 
during ‘Umar’s administration the Futuh had the opposite effect of actually increasing 
food supplies and general economic health of the region with the influx of massive 
revenues accrued from taxation and territorial gains which included agriculture and 
livestock.40 
 
There is simply, as Watt and Donner have argued, no good evidence to support the 
claim except the economic interpretation based upon inferred rational assumptions of 
behaviours undertaken as a result of perceived scarcity. Arguably, the origins for the 
ecological thesis are more convenient than demonstrable or even logical. This is 
because, the perceived threat of impending reprisal strikes from the regional powers, 
imagined or not, is a greater and more logical explanation of strategic offensive action 
than the claim of hunger to spark massive military mobilisation and conquests. 
 
Additionally, consistent anecdotes found throughout all the collected histories by the 
early Muslim chroniclers suggest economic incentives were held otherwise.41 In such 
instances, it has been consistently recorded that Muslim commanders refused bribes 
and economic enticements to retreat. This claim is surprising if booty and fresh 
pastures were the primary objective, as the ecological thesis suggests. It is highly 
implausible that starving nomads would have gambled sure economic gains over 
improbable military victory against vastly superior military forces. The ecological 
thesis implicitly proposes scarcity as the driving force for strategic action, which is 
clearly contradicted by historical actions even if the narratives are dismissed as later 
fabrications. 
                                                
38 Donner (1981), p.267 
39 Watt (1953), p.3 
40 Ibid., pp.3-4 
41 See WQS, pp.60-1; I.K., pp.78-81; Rahman (2003), pp.63-4; 
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Whilst a constant stream of war booty was politically expedient for the continued 
credibility of the Da’wa policy as well as supporting domestic policies, Donner 
convincingly offers an explanation that is both logical and realistic regarding the 
material encouragements of plunder to the incentives for the Da’wa, arguing that ‘the 
two dimensions were complimentary, not contradictory’: 
 
The Believers were motivated by religious commitment but saw the 
material benefits that came with their expansion as the natural 
consequence – or, rather, the divinely ordained consequence – of 
their success in creating a righteous new order. In their view, the 
influx of wealth that followed their conquests and expansion was 
nothing less than God’s grace to them for having adopted his 
cause.42 
 
The question actually concerns motivation; and to this end, assumptions of security 
provide the most parsimonious explanation that preserves strategic consistency and is 
logically demonstrated one the side of the Muslims. Strategic conditions are not 
unilaterally dealt with however and consideration of the opponent(s) elucidates 
further why the Hypothesis A is best understood in the context of security and 
systemic anarchy. In both instances the Byzantines and the Sassanids, despite the 
strategic vantage points acquired by Abu Bakr, the Muslims were not afforded the 
belief that they were capable of militarily exploiting them. Rather, ceding the newly 
acquired strategic depth through political bargaining with the regional powers was the 
most likely and expected course of action. Van Evera states that ‘Balancers balance to 
avert regional hegemony; hence pure balancers oppose expansion only by potential 
regional hegemons.’ 43 Undoubtedly the great powers in the region were the war 
weary Persian and Byzantine empires,44 and as is the practice of great powers, 
balancing small threats is usually left to weaker allies more local to the problem, or if 
the threat is too small to be threatening, it is left to reach its own inertia. 45 
 
                                                
42 Donner (2012), p.143 
43 Van Evera (2004), p.243 
44 See Bonner (2006), p.58 
45 On balancing, bandwagoning, and theories of alliances, see Walt (1987) 
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Undeniably, neither power could have foreseen the rise of the dar al-Islam in its early 
inception. Although the Prophet’s message was disregarded outside of Arabia, the 
‘Roman Emperor’ Heraclius monitored the Prophet’s rise to power,46 but considered 
that the Arabs themselves would later topple him. Likewise, during the reign of Abu 
Bakr, the Ridda Wars were expected to destroy the emerging dar al-Islam internally; 
and had it not; it was not conceivable that the Arabs would have reached out to strike 
at the grassland nomadic tribes as they did. This explains why they were initially and 
constantly offered economic incentives to withdraw as part of a political settlement, 
and not treated as serious military threats. 
 
The point of emphasis here is that they were offered political settlements; economic 
aid was only part of the bargaining process.47 The belief that the empires possessed a 
‘defense-dominant’ status in relation to the Muslim armies was the fundamental 
strategic miscalculation. The costs of war, was presumably another politico-strategic 
miscalculation on the part of the war-weary Romans and Persians who did not factor 
the influence that providential zealotry empowered the Muslims with to fight Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah. By the time the Byzantines and Sassanids realised that the new Caliph 
had no intention of bargaining or backing down from warfighting, substantial 
territorial gains had already been accomplished in both regions by Khalid’s forces and 
the Muslims had seized the tactical initiative and the geostrategic pivot points needed 
to access both empires.  
 
The overall events clearly signalled a strategic condition that was treated as such by 
all sides, sooner or later. Hence, strategic opportunism cannot be discounted as a clear 
signal for the commencement of the Futuh, based upon the open areas of exploitation 
that demanded one of the regional actors to take control. The failure to balance by 
Persia and Byzantium, led to the Muslims retaining the military initiative, with larger 
windows of strategic vulnerability and tactical exploitation  (symptoms of Hypotheses 
D, E, and F), Van Evera explains: 
 
 
                                                
46 I.I., pp.654-7 
47 See WQS, pp.60-1; I.K., pp.78-81 
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Historians have often suggested that a “breakdown in the balance 
of power” caused war. They usually mean (and should recast their 
claim to say) that states failed to engage in balancing behavior, 
which made aggression easier, causing war. War occurs not when 
the balance of power breaks down, but when balancers fail to 
balance, leaving aggressors unchecked, ….48 
 
The Persian attempts to buy-off the small emerging Muslim power with offers of 
economic and agricultural aid are best explained as part of a series of ‘buck-passing’ 
and ‘external balancing’49 attempts that backfired and delayed affirmative military 
action such that when the Persians for example, were forced to ‘balance’ the emerging 
threat of the dar al-Islam themselves it was too late to resolve the threat militarily. 
The consistent belief that the dar al-Islam was a failing project seems to have been 
the standard reason for political apathy towards any direct action, despite increasing 
border skirmishes and deployments by the Muslims towards their frontiers. The 
poorly armed desert Arabs were taken so lightly that they were allowed considerable 
leeway to build momentum (symptom of Hypothesis J) such that the perception of 
offense-dominance was fused with morale.50  
 
In conclusion, the diagnostic opinion reached, is that the inherited strategic setting 
and environment generated the policy of Da’wa as a means to engage in limited war 
to pre-emptively offset anticipated or emerging security threats and seize the strategic 
and tactical initiative. Stage one of the Futuh in this sense, were opportunistic 
expansions not by the choice of one strategic actor alone but rather as demanded by 
the characteristics of VUCA and basic assumptions of self-help and anarchy. The 
successes of the Muslim incursions were greatly assisted by catastrophic 
miscalculation and misperceptions by the regional powers and actors resulting in a 
balancing collapse. 
 
                                                
48 Van Evera (2004), p.243, fn.32  
49 See Mearsheimer (2001), p.156-162  
50 Hugh Kennedy (2007), p.24 
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5.5.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 3. Defensive Resistance  - [Hypothesis C] 
If increasing offensive power coupled with strategic opportunism is the most 
parsimonious and logical explanation for the commencement of hostilities; how 
tenable is the hypothesis that sub-investigative question d. broadly probes, suggesting 
that the Da’wa might later have served as a means of imperial policy. In other words, 
was the Da’wa policy championed for selfish interests, seeking territorial expansions 
and enlarged political dominion; or, was the Da’wa a form of intervention designed to 
liberate oppressed populations according to the values preached by the Islamic 
metanarrative. Or was there another reason for its continuation? To be even clearer, 
was absolute Jihad a driver of the Da’wa policy once hostilities commenced? 
Hypothesis C tests the claims of the continued influence of the Islamic meta-narrative 
and the promise of God’s Providence, that is, sub-investigative question b.; and 
secondly, the claim that the Da’wa policy was an aggressive policy of imperial 
ambition (sub-investigative question d.). 
 
Seeking regional domination was not an issue for ‘Umar’s administration or later 
caliphates in general, politically or domestically in the midst of two imperial powers 
battling for regional hegemony. In fact, it seems more plausible to state that having 
systemic ambitions was the cost of entering the systemic arena, or as Schelling writes 
concerning military victory, the price of admission.51 Hence, detraction of the idea of 
Da’wa as being an imperial or hegemonic function of Islam is a problem for ethicists 
of war and violence and not the concern of strategic theorists.52 Of course, such a 
policy has its contentions as a product of a political-religious authority, since it raises 
the question of whether the Da’wa policy was a policy exclusively designed to serve 
religious functions (da’wa), or a politico-strategic consequence of anarchy. 
 
Whilst it cannot be argued otherwise that Abu Bakr adopted an aggressive offensive 
military strategy that sought decisive victory during the Ridda Wars, his policy of 
limited warfare thereafter, like the maghazi, and the offensive campaigns during the 
Caliphate of ‘Umar, are often interpreted as being defensive military strategies, which 
                                                
51 Schelling (2008), p.13 
52 See 2.7.5. 
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are defined as ‘attempts to retain the existing status quo by the use of force; in other 
words, it aims at repelling the enemy’s offensive.’53 
 
The supposition is that the offensive action undertaken, whether by the Prophet, Abu 
Bakr or ‘Umar, was pre-emptive in the full knowledge of an impending attack by 
external forces and thus entirely justified. Whilst we have already clarified these 
assumptions regarding the maghazi and defensive expansionism on account of the 
regional security threat (Hypothesis B) during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, ergo, the 
following examination of Hypothesis C is advanced with the assumption that the 
initial Futuh were extensions of the consequences of policies set by the Prophet and - 
or a continuation of the trajectory set by the extended security policy of Abu Bakr (as 
demonstrated by Hypothesis A). 
 
Offense-defense theory expects fierce resistance to defensive expansionism by 
neighboring actors prompting a cycle of violence (Hypothesis C). As a function of 
realist theory of international relations, offense-defense theory considers only the state 
actor when considering defensive resistance; in reality it strategically takes the form 
of two interactions – and therefore this hypothesis is amendable to a second actor – 
namely that of the local population. Therefore, having examined the strategic 
interaction between the Muslim offensive and the Byzantine and Persian empires in 
the previous diagnostic; we will consider the Da’wa policy and the defensive 
resistance by the populations of the Byzantines and Sassanids to the Muslim 
conquests. 
5.5.3. Defensive Resistance by the Population 
Luttwak, in his strategic history of the Byzantine Empire notes the natural defensive 
resistance of the populations to any new religious imposition. Luttwak notes the 
nature of the territories that the Muslim armies conquered were after almost three 
decades of war and reciprocal invasions between the Byzantine and Sassanids, 
decrepit and war-torn. Luttwak describes the contest between the regional powers 
which 
 
                                                
53 Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.8 
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had ruined many of their cities, destroyed commerce, emptied their 
treasuries, exhausted their manpower, and wrecked frontier 
defenses and field armies alike, while bitterly antagonising 
provincial populations on each side, left undefended to be 
despoiled by enemy looters yet harshly taxed before and after.54  
 
Quigley in his history of political stability, describes the environment in the following 
manner: 
 
They [the Muslim forces] intruded into areas of disorganized 
peoples, largely alienated from their former rulers and protected by 
weak, unreformed, and passive military garrisons. To many of 
these peoples the alternative offered by the Muslims seemed a 
welcome relief from disorder.55 
 
Moreover, the inhabitants of these regions were also representatives of the religious 
rivalries between the Christian Romans and the Zoroastrian Persians. With each 
empire championing each faith, their rulers accordingly either discriminated against 
the religiously diverse indigenous populations, or rewarded those who shared their 
religious affiliation. More valuable than the new territorial gains, was the Muslim 
achievement of a surprising political victory over both the Roman and Sassanid 
empires,56 by winning the consent of the new conquered inhabitants. Luttwak reduces 
the surprising political victory down to two salient actions the Muslims imposed; the 
first, was the sweeping reduction in taxes that had debilitated the inhabitants replacing 
it with the Jizya tax; the second, ‘was truly paradoxical’ Luttwak writes, ‘by imposing 
discriminatory rules on all non-Muslims, the Muslim Arabs ended the arbitrary 
religious persecutions that had recently oppressed the majority of the inhabitants of 
Syria and Egypt.’57 The Muslims thereby neutralised any form of hostility from the 
conquered peoples and ‘paradoxically’ gained their acceptance as the new legitimate 
political authority.  
 
                                                
54 Luttwak (2011), pp.198-9 
55 Quigley (2013), pp.719-20 
56 Luttwak (2011), p.199 
57 Ibid., p.199, 201-11; see also Donner (2012), pp.108-111; Quigley (2013), p.720 
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This pattern of political victory seems to have been a consistent trend that 
accompanied Muslim expansions continuing for over a century, such that, as 
Blankinship writes, the norm was ‘Once Muslim rule was established it faced little 
actual resistance from its inhabitants’.58 This trend was in some instances even more 
pronounced and evidently demonstrated by the case of the willingness of the newly 
conquered Jews and Christians in conquered regions of Syria to bear arms and fight 
alongside the Muslims to defend the conquered territories from renewed Byzantine 
assaults.59 In the Caucasus region, territory was contested between the Byzantine and 
Sassanid empires, and just as in Syria and Iraq, the conquering Muslims were 
received with a sense of relief from their previous Byzantine, Sassanid, and Khazar 
subjugators as their political demands were relatively modest, disposing the local 
population toward them.60  
 
This paradoxical development affords explanation, where the more traditional thesis 
of the ‘violent conquest model’61 is commonly advanced. This hypothesis suggests 
that the initial successes of Abu Bakr’s policies to strike against the Arab tribes in 
Byzantine Syria and Sasanian Mesopotamia created a certain lust for battle that Abu 
Bakr’s successors would continue implicitly ascribing imperial ambitions to the 
Futuh. The model supposes that defensive resistance by the local populations were 
met with crushing military response. However, the major problem with this line of 
argument according to Donner is that literary accounts recorded by predominately 
Near Eastern Christian writers of wanton Muslim bloodlust finds no archeological 
evidence of widespread destruction despite archeological explorations to find them.62 
 
[E]arlier generations of European scholars believed that conversion 
to Islam were made at the point of the sword, and that conquered 
peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now 
apparent that conversion by force, while not unknown in Muslim 
countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished 
                                                
58 Blankinship (1994), p.23 
59 BLD, pp.210-11; I.K., p.239 
60 Qurbanov (2010), p.114, 116 
61 Donner (2012), p.107 
62 Ibid., pp.106-7 
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to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam 
were voluntary.63 
 
In fact, the archeological data suggests the contrary, and sociological evidence has 
arrived at a similar conclusion that the Muslim conquerors did not invade, rape, and 
pillage the territories they seized. Instead, all historical records unanimously record 
that conversions were, as Kennedy writes, a ‘long-drawn-out process, and it was not 
until the tenth and eleventh centuries that the majority of the population[s] was 
converted to Islam. Conquest and settlement took only a decade; conversion of the 
majority took three hundred years.’64 Furthermore, archeological discoveries have 
revealed that the religious infrastructures of competing faiths were not destroyed, 
such as churches and synagogues, and even pagan establishments. 
 
These facts overwhelmingly suggest a consistent application of the Da’wa policy as 
an indifferent means of intervention whereby politico-strategic control was sought 
over religious conversion or imposition.65 The implementation of the Shari‘a in 
conquered lands was as much a matter of law and order as it was a symbol of power 
and victory for the absolute Jihad. Thus the population was not targeted once the 
imposition of the Shari‘a had been established. It can be confidently stated that the 
extreme ends of extermination or even genocide were never considered as strategic 
goals and in distinct contradiction of the aims of the da’wa that was the foundational 
philosophy of the policy. Accordingly, in its ideation, the policy was not directed 
towards resources or territory, it was about the people, keeping alive a sense of hope 
that they would emancipate their hearts to God, and therefore it was never a strategic 
option to consider extermination when employing Jihad on the offensive. 
  
The emancipatory zeal to ‘liberate’ the non-Muslim lands from the tyranny and 
oppression of their human masters is a rational and parsimonious explanation for the 
credibility of the Futuh as a matter of policy. Of course, this does not mean that all 
those who served in the Muslim armies shared such lofty ideals. ‘Although we cannot 
hope to explain the mystery of human faith, however, we can point to its undeniable 
                                                
63 Lapidus (2002), p.198 
64 Kennedy (2007), p.6 and 63 
65 Bonney (2004), p.64; see also Blankinship (1994), p.22 
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role in human affairs;’ Donner writes, there are numerous examples in the Arabic 
literature, attesting to the fact that whilst many did fight for the sake of plunder, many 
did not, yet, ‘even if not every Muslim was so inspired, there can be little doubt that 
some Muslims, in their zeal to do well by the new religious and social dispensation of 
Islam, would have clung firm to the Islamic state and fought for its interests to the 
death.’66 
 
Rather Jihad was a means of limited war, and political emancipation became a known 
feature of the Muslim conquests. The process of creating and expanding a new nation 
is often achieved through destroying the indigenous people of the lands that have been 
conquered; the Muslim practice shows the complete opposite. Given a growing 
reputation for better socio-political treatment, it is not implausible to posit that 
domestic resistance was weak or non-existent in many cases on account of Muslim 
popular reputation. Van Evera predicts that popular regimes have a greater 
momentum of the offense for both conquest and self-defense than unpopular regimes, 
whereby conquest becomes easier because of domestic support.67 
 
Muslims, that is, the Arabs, were kept separate from the conquered populations as a 
matter of policy during ‘Umar’s administration. They were to remain for the most part 
in garrisons, as an occupying force in many ways, amongst their respective tribes that 
had been resettled to the particular location.68 The administration of local systems was 
left to the conquered peoples themselves, with taxation the primary interest of the 
Arabs. Since the socio-economic advantages were still too early to be recognised 
owing in large part to the fact that the Muslims had not yet become the regional 
hegemon, and given that conversion was not compulsory, the conquered population 
were generally happier than they had been prior to the Muslim arrival. 
 
Politically, such as states today seek to expand their own ideologies with an infused 
character of ‘righteousness’ that, self-legitimates the use of violence for the ends of its 
establishment; the Da’wa policy and interventionism (a euphemism then, and today, 
for aggressive expansionism) was justified on account of righteous emancipation from 
                                                
66 Ibid., p.256; see also Kennedy (2007), pp.51, 63; see also I.K., pp.109-112; BLD, pp.412-13 
67 Van Evera (2004), p.241 
68 Quigley (2013), pp.721-2 
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the tyranny of human law. As such, Jihad as an instrument of foreign policy (Da’wa) 
outwardly returned to a closer rendition of the Prophetic approach than it had been as 
a function of security. Jihad was realigned to the theological imperative of absolute 
Jihad horizontally expressed as limited war. 
 
  
5.6. Stage Two - Political Stability (640 - 644) 
By way of concluding our exploration of the Futuh, we must therefore dissect the 
Da’wa policy further and answer the primary research questions 1-4.69 To recap our 
examinations thus far, we have proposed that the true investigative value of the 
strategic dynamics of Jihad during the Caliphate of ‘Umar resides in interplay of 
domestic political developments alongside the perception of an imminent security 
dilemma with the regional powers (sub-investigative question c.). The resulting Futuh 
campaigns were not designed to advance territorial conquests per se (sub-
investigative question d.) and whilst the belief in Providence certainly emboldened 
the war effort, Jihad was more broadly a consequence of the Muslims entering the 
systemic space and coming to terms with the anarchic environment (sub-investigative 
question b.). 
 
Additionally, the effects of the policy at local and domestic levels were positive; with 
domestic audiences supporting the expansions and local conquered populations 
expressing little to no resistance thus affording successive strings of political and 
military victories.70 Tracing the strategic dynamics thus far has revealed that the 
Da’wa policy absorbed the security policy designed by Abu Bakr and subordinated 
warfighting in the name of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah to foreign policy goals. However, 
developments in the domestic strategic setting also generated a new and un-named 
socio-political policy of resettlement.71 
                                                
69 This section is also an in-depth elaboration of sub-investigative question c. 
70 Greater discussion of this point is to follow. 
71 References to resettlement are designated as ‘hijra’ or migrations such as that undertaken by the 
Prophet during the maghazi. Was this a means of identifying the connection to Precedent or simply the 
application of its conventional linguistic meaning to the act, it is not clear. See Hodgson (1977), p.211 
 183 
5.6.1. The Resettlement Policy 
Although writers have discussed resettlement policies during this period,72 they have 
not been connected for the purposes of politico-strategic design. Such an insight is 
acutely strategic because the foundational interpretation is trinitarian. Because the 
policy is never explicitly mentioned but only described, the early Muslim historians 
have not discussed explanations for its origin. It is proposed in this study that the 
resettlement policy was in fact a stealth policy of pacification by demographic 
redistribution, only made apparent by the passage of time. The resettlement policy 
that began during the Caliphate of ‘Umar would continue to be implemented 
throughout the remaining Rashidun and Umayyad Caliphates up until the ‘Abbasid 
Dynasty.73 The resettlement policy served to develop the evolving dar al-Islam by 
extending political control over the disparate Arab tribes that had been pacified by 
Abu Bakr’s security policy and subordinating them to the structures of a developing 
military establishment.74 
 
The previously autonomous tribes were, through resettlement, absorbed into the 
political directives of the Da’wa policy. The power struggles of the later Caliphates 
would be accentuated by the implementation of this policy on account of the 
discrepancies in socio-economic benefits and privileges that accompanied 
resettlements.75 But for now, let us now examine the internal mechanics of the policy 
to better understand how and why it developed. 
5.6.2. Origins 
The origin of the policy begin with events in Persia with the defeated Sassanid King 
Yazdegerd III who had fled Persia following the defeats of his armed forces at 
Nahavand in 640; attempted to reunite the Persians and force battle upon the 
emerging Muslim power in the region by inciting attacks from within recently 
conquered localities such as Bosrah, which was now under Muslim control.76 
                                                
72 In particular see Donner (1981); Qurbanov (2010); Hallaq (2005); Quigley (2013); Hodgson (1977). 
73 Qurbanov (2010), p.114 
74 Donner (1981), p.265 
75 These events are to be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
76 I.K., p.160 
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The region, which had various non-Persian communities, such as the Kurds in Ahwaz, 
was requested to assist in the balancing.77 However, the paradoxical consequence of 
Yazdegerd’s continued efforts to incite the local populations to rise up against the 
Muslims was to change the resettlement policy of ‘Umar. Previously, it had not been 
policy to encourage Arab resettlement into the new territories, but with sustained 
provocative propaganda being used by Yazdegerd throughout the region it was feared 
that a general uprising coming from the non-Arabs was a potential threat.78 
 
‘Umar, under the counsel of one of his advisers Ahnaf ibn Qays, instituted a new 
policy in 64079 of settling the Arabs in newly conquered territories as a means of 
combating the anti-Muslim sentiment that might otherwise grow.80 Accordingly, it 
was the change in policy that would have a greater influence on the continued 
expansions, especially because shifting Muslim populations to the new territories 
reduced logistical burdens. ‘Umar, used the resettlement policy designed with Ahnaf 
ibn Qays, to make strategic strongholds within the new territories to be used as 
springboards for continued expansions.81 This practice would continue well into the 
following caliphate with ‘’Uthman, continuing the population resettlement policy, 
transferring large segments of the Muslim population from Bosrah to the Levant and 
Egypt to balance the local populations where some local dissent had begun to arise.82  
 
The resettlement of the nomadic tribes from within Arabia into the newly conquered 
territories and the newly emerging frontiers, took place alongside the garrison (sing. 
misr, pl. amsar) developments and distributions that occurred across the new 
territories.  Most notably, beginning in Iraq with Basra in 635, followed by Kufa, then 
Jabiya in Syria, Fustat in Egypt, and Qayrawan in Tunisia.83  
 
 
                                                
77 Ibid., p.158 
78 Rahman (2003), p.69 
79 The timing of the policy incidentally occurs within a several months after Khalid’s permanent 
discharge from the Muslim armed forces, suggesting the planning for the policy had begun earlier that 
year perhaps with the onset of stirring domestic discontent. 
80 I.K., p.163 
81 Ibid., p.165 
82 Ibid., p.260 – the event took place in 655. 
83 Quigley (2013), p.724; Hallaq (2005), p.30 
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Of contemporary authors and works written in the English language, Fred Donner has 
been the most influential source of analysis concerning the origins of the Islamic 
state, the conquests, and the shifting demographics of the region.84 It is difficult not to 
depend on his works as a foundation for historiographical information. However, his 
studies on the matter are intended to serve historiography not strategic analysis, 
rendering them extremely useful but at the same time deficient in the answers a 
strategic theorist searches for. Thus we shall propose a set of politico-strategic 
interpretations of the policy continuing upon the analysis presented so far, based in 
large part by default upon Donner’s studies. The politico-strategic features of the 
resettlement policy of ‘Umar can be interpreted and summarised as four distinct 
vectors: 
 
1. Systemic Projection of Military Force 
2. Islamic Propaganda (da’wa) 
3. Security protocol 
4. Policing 
 
5.6.3. Systemic Projection of Military Force 
Firstly, and arguably the most demonstrative feature of the Da’wa policy, was the 
strategic objective of dispersing latent military force within and across the new 
territories as a buffer, but also as a force multiplier to support and augment the 
Muslim troops in those regions. This meant that not only could those troops be 
redeployed without leaving a vacuum, but also that they were not isolated from their 
language, customs, and culture even if foreign tribes were resettled in the same 
locale.85 Additionally, garrisons effectively facilitated the bounding of troops from 
one area to another thus easing the logistical burdens of supply and deployment as a 
network of garrisons streamlined the movement of soldiers from newly acquired 
towns and regions to the next. Donner, explaining it as follows, has noted this feature: 
 
 
                                                
84 Donner (1981), (1998), (2008), (2012) 
85 Quigley (2013), p.723; Hodgson (1977), p.207 
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On the way to the front, the core forces so assembled were also 
able to raise further recruits as they passed through the territories of 
various tribes and could contact the tribesmen at the wells and 
towns they frequented. These recruited tribesmen were not simply a 
horde wandering aimlessly toward the Fertile Crescent, 
furthermore, but were organized into contingents of a relatively 
well-coordinated army whose objectives and general movements 
were established by the ruling elite.86 
 
Hence, garrisons were in effect forward operating bases (FOB) that were necessary to 
push new frontiers in the Muslim expansion: ‘The Arabs only occupied the most 
important places in the conquered lands, while small groups of soldiers defended the 
transportation routes; the rest of the army, its greatest part, continued to fight.’87 The 
net political outcome was a chain of political control that continued to direct military 
operations extending from Medina into Syria, Iraq, and then north into the Caucasus; 
and as far east as China; and as far west as North Africa. 
5.6.4. The Hunt for Yazdegerd 
An example of this ability to systematically project force deep into new frontiers is 
found in the hunt for Yazdegerd. The successful expansions into Persia forced 
Yazdegerd to flee Persia with the Muslim armies in pursuit following the Battle of 
Nahavand. As Yazdegerd took flight from one city to another, the Muslim armed 
forces chased and conquered the cities on his trail, creating FOBs in their wake. 88 
When the Muslims, under the orders of ‘Umar, continued expansion beyond the 
territory of Persia into Khurasan territories, it was a continuation of policy to deny 
Yazdegerd any gains in his lost territories, but also to reduce the strategic depth 
between the Muslims who were still predominately located in Arabia and the 
frontiers.89  
 
                                                
86 Donner (1981), p.253 
87 Qurbanov (2010), p.117 
88 See Kennedy (2007), pp.182-91 
89 I.K., p.211 
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Yazdegard sought the help of regional powers, writing to the king of the Turks, the King 
of Sughad (the Principality of Chaghaniyan), and the emperor of China.90 Ibn Kathir 
notes that the Turks assisted and fought alongside Yazdegard but retreated after citing 
over-extension and the belief that victory would not be possible; the King of Sughad91 
sent supplies and some soldiers to bolster Yazdegard’s forces but nothing more; and the 
Chinese Emperor sent an envoy who, after compiling a report on the Muslim forces for 
the Emperor, returned to Yazdegard with the advice that he could not win and should 
seek a diplomatic settlement. The Emperor feared that direct involvement would bring 
the military situation to his borders also.92 Yazdegard’s flight would continue into the 
reign of the following Caliph, until he died.93 The point of interest is the continued 
projection of military force that the resettlement policy afforded in tandem with the 
development of garrison networks that was able to project orders from Medina all the 
way into Khurasan, the Caucasus, and to the borders of China. 
5.6.5. Islamic Mission (da’wa) 
Secondly, ‘as Muslims,’ Hodgson explains, ‘the Arabs were not merely an army of 
occupation. They were also representatives of God’s good order among mankind, 
founded on adherence to His revelation.’94 Hence, the motive to embed an ‘Islamic’ 
presence in the new territories as a means of applying soft-power for the purposes of 
religious and political propaganda was the second strategic feature of the policy.95 We 
have already indirectly discussed this area under section 5.4., nonetheless, a few 
additional comments may be made. 
 
The intended targets of the resettlement policy were the resettled Arabs who were 
mostly new Muslims, and predominantly from nomadic backgrounds. Religion was 
used as a means to assist the transition and enforce military discipline within the 
garrisons,96 most importantly ‘by providing organizational goals that were supratribal 
in the context of a justifying ideology.’97 
                                                
90 Ibid., p.212 
91 Sughd is the land of Soghdia, which is north of the Hissar Mountains in modern Uzbekizstan. See 
Kennedy (2007), pp.230-1 
92 I.K., pp.212-14 
93 See Kennedy (2007), p.191 
94 Hodgson (1977), p.208 
95 Ibid., pp.199, 209 
96 Hallaq (2005), p.31; Hodgson (1977), pp.209-10 
97 Donner (1981), p.258 
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Qurbanov, in discussing the effects of the resettlement policy notes the same 
intentions that were identifiable in the Caucasus regions of expansion such as 
Azerbaijan (which was acquired during the administration of ‘Uthman), writing: 
 
The Arabs also conducted a resettlement policy and territorial 
expansion was directly associated with spreading their religion. 
The conquerors wanted the Muslims, with their way of life, 
traditions, and views, to coexist with the indigenous people; this is 
precisely how Islam was spread.98 
 
Hence, there is a direct connection between our exploration of Hypothesis A & C 
since the belief in Providence contributed to the political policy of domestic non-
interventionism. 
5.6.6. Security Protocol 
Critically, the transformation of the security policy to a protocol of resettlement has 
been often overlooked in relation to the continued success of the Futuh. Arab 
migration during the administration of ‘Umar was clearly intended to serve as an 
alternative means of continuing the security policies of Abu Bakr. The short-term 
measures that Abu Bakr had implemented in the wake of his decisive victories over 
the Ridda rebels were not sustainable. ‘Umar (in counsel with his advisors), initiated 
the mass resettlements to recruit and enhance military strength rather than allow the 
subjugated tribes to become idle or attempt to regroup for subversive insurrection. 
 
Sometime prior to The Battle of Nihavand ‘Umar took counsel with his 
administration on the possibility of leading the army against the Persians in what 
would be recorded in the Arabic annals as ‘the victory of victories’99 so decisive was 
the battle. However, he was persuaded otherwise, on the basis that should he leave 
Medina there would be uprisings from the Arab tribes in the Najd (central Arabia, 
including modern-day Riyadh).100 
                                                
98 Qurbanov (2010), p.115 
99 Rahman (2003), p.71 
100 BLD, p.471 
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Four years earlier, ‘Umar had expressed a similar desire to join the expeditions 
against the Byzantines and the Persians, and was warned by ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib: ‘If 
you depart from this land, the Arabs will rise up against you from all quarters,’101 
suggesting the continued management of the Arabs was a matter of policy not 
resolution. Therefore, the concerns of Abu Bakr’s security policy were maintained 
albeit while being implemented differently. Garrisons served in a secondary capacity 
as a means to monitor and control the resettled tribes who were the instrumental 
conduits for the Da’wa policy’s implementation. Consequently, under the cover of the 
Da’wa policy, problematic Bedouin tribes were resettled away from the centre of 
government in Arabia and to the frontiers where their energies could be used to serve 
policy and not disrupt it. 
5.6.7. Policing 
The final feature of the resettlement policy, was of course a means of enforcing 
politico-military control over the territories, this was the enforcement and collection 
of taxes or the Jizya or taxation from the local non-Muslims. Donner writes: 
 
It is generally agreed that the garrisons were established primarily 
to control the non-Arab populations of the conquered domains, to 
defend Arabia from invasion by either the Byzantines or the 
Sasanians, and to function as the springboards for further Islamic 
campaigns into yet unsubdued areas.102 
 
Where local uprisings or rebellions occurred, such as in the Caucasus 103  the 
resettlement of Arabs meant that they were in effect a strategic reserve to the 
stationed troops: ‘The Arab settlement zone covered territory from the south to the 
north; Islamic armies were deployed in the central cities, strategically important 
districts, and in places where there were potential military threats.’104 This meant that 
not only were lines of political communication constant such that ‘Umar was aware of 
                                                
101 Buti (2007), p.617 
102 Donner (1981), p.266 
103 Qurbanov (2010), p.115 
104 Ibid., p.116 
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events taking place so far away, but also that taxation could be recorded and collected 
systematically with minimal disruption.105 
 
Lastly, and most obviously, the garrison network served as frontline defences, 
especially those in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt against Sasanian or Byzantine aggression.106 
Hodgson notes that ‘Each garrison town was situated for maximum military 
effectiveness-normally near enough to the desert that a potential retreat thither 
remained open.’107 Aside from the desire to recapture lost territory, an even more 
pressing reason for expected aggression from the empires was the cost of the newly 
acquired territories that had conferred control of the trade routes across the grasslands. 
Now, the dar al-Islam could not only hold to ransom trade from east to west, but also 
from the south (the Yemen) to north.  
5.6.8. The Resettlement Policy as Political Stability Programme 
The resettlement policy then can be seen as a means to support the Da’wa policy by 
means of continued pacification with the long-term objective of creating enduring 
unification amongst the Arab tribes through a unifying faith in Islam. As expansions 
were sustained, continued material prosperity afforded the administration the 
resources to countermand traditional tribal loyalties for the ‘greater good’ of the 
policy.108 
 
Understanding the strategic setting and the dynamics that existed in the environment 
since the administration of Abu Bakr and then that of ‘Umar, provides a more 
convincing explanation of the strategic interests that retrospectively advanced Islamic 
expansion with such momentum following the death of the Prophet. What is often 
explained as an unforeseen explosion of invasion and conquest out of the deserts of 
Arabia is in fact quite the opposite, and our investigations has explicitly shown they 
were, ‘necessary for straightforward political and strategic reasons.’109 Unfortunately, 
this particular facet of the conquests has received virtually no academic attention bar 
that detailed by Donner. 
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5.7. The Trinitarian Imperative for Resettlement 
Whilst we have illustrated the politico-strategic features of the resettlement policy, it 
remains to be explained how ‘Umar was able to demographically displace large 
segments of the tribal populations from their traditional desert territories. Whilst this 
may seem somewhat superfluous to events, it saliently demonstrates the strict 
attention to detail that strategic theoretics demands in the analysis of bargaining 
dynamics. As shall become clearer in the following chapters, the policies, whether 
Da’wa or resettlement, are forged in the heat of politik. 
5.7.1. Controlling Blind Forces and the Play of Chance and Probability 
The massive expansions that had taken place within the first six years of ‘Umar’s 
administration were so profound as to have shifted the balance of power in favour of 
the Muslim presence in the region.110 Now as an established regional actor with a 
growing garrison network and massive territories to administer alongside their 
populations, the continued expansions required increasing amounts of manpower 
simply to maintain the acquired territories. 
 
The resettlement policy provided two very important strategic solutions to ‘Umar’s 
administration. Firstly, resettlement under the cover of the Da’wa policy could be 
used to re-integrate the former Ridda tribes that had been subdued and effectively 
humiliated into the new unified Arab-Muslim community. A chieftain could through 
resettling his entire tribe, not only distance his tribe from their current state of 
inferiority in the midst of victorious loyalists; but the move also held the potential for 
tribal redemption and restored reputation in living memory through the participation 
in military victories.111 This possibility provided powerful incentives for former rebel-
apostate tribes not only to accept military service and excel,112 but also to voluntarily 
uproot themselves from their traditional homelands into foreign territories.113 
 
Secondly, the resettlement policy served to strategically placate the ability of the 
former rebel tribes to re-group and pose a continued threat to the Medinan 
government. ‘Umar used the cover of the Da’wa policy alongside a political technique 
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instituted and crafted by the Prophet known as ta’lif al-qulub – or ‘reconciliation of 
hearts’.114 The first stage was to align the goals of the Da’wa with the loyalties of the 
rebel tribes to ensure cooperation. This was achieved through the same avenues as 
those directed towards the loyalist tribes that were, via guaranteed stipends and 
religious exhortation to the meta-narrative of absolute Jihad and Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. 
 
Hence, ‘Umar established ‘a system of stipends or direct salary payments (‘ata’) to 
warriors serving in the Islamic armies,’ and with characteristic diligence ensured that 
payments were predictable in order to create ‘a direct and enduring link between the 
interests of those recruited into the Islamic armies and the interests of the state and the 
ruling elite in a way that merely sharing in the distribution of booty from a successful 
campaign could not.’115 The strategic result was that rebellion or desertion by a tribe 
would result potentially, in a zero-sum outcome - in effect to lose a handsome and 
consistent stipend. 
 
The second stage combined the first with a focus on buying the tribal chieftains 
themselves, or their loyalty at least. The promise of additional booty, or ‘by granting 
them special gifts of land to be held as private estates; these appear to have been 
larger tracts than the […] lands distributed to the ordinary tribesmen.’116 The logic 
was simple enough; the tribe would rebel only in accordance with the political 
strategy of their elders. If the Medinan polity satisfied the interests of the chiefs, then 
they had no reason to rebel or to encourage rebellious behaviour from within. In fact, 
it would be in their interests to ensure the loyalty of their tribal members.   
 
Additionally, they could present a degree of largesse to their tribe that would appear 
to be from their own fortunes (but in reality a simple redistribution of the secret 
payments made to them) to encourage warfighting to meet the objectives of the 
Medinan polity in difficult terrain or environments. Thus, ‘Umar’s administration of 
the diwan served as a register of the military payroll, that was used to bind the loyalty 
of the tribal chiefs to the objectives of the Da’wa policy. 
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By buying out the tribal chiefs, ‘Umar ‘increased the status of the tribal leaders and 
their ability to command and control the tribesmen under them.’ In doing so, ‘Umar 
drove a new bargain that ‘attempted to tie tribal leaders to the state by special acts of 
favoritism and to exploit the nexus of tribal allegiances focused on them to the 
advantage of the state.’ 117 Consequently, the central government was able to 
effectively recruit ‘nomadic tribesmen into the Islamic armies and ensure their 
settlement in garrison towns away from the desert and the home territories of their 
tribes.’118 Thus, the new bargain enhanced the military strength of the army whilst 
simultaneously decreasing the military power available for rebellion.  
5.7.2. The Resettlement Policy as Military Enrichment Programme 
We have proposed that the resettlement policy was a function of grand strategy 
promoted via the Da’wa policy. Rational calculation was used to manage the variables 
of the military establishment via the resettlement of the Arab population to curb the 
propensity of blind forces escalating and also to manage friction that accompanied it. 
Additionally, social-cultural friction was de-escalated by resettlement, as well as 
enhancing the efficiency of military capabilities and force projection. The 
resettlement policy was a very shrewd strategic policy that began after effectively 
conquering both Syria and Iraq, establishing dominance in the region. 
 
‘Umar having permanently retired Khalid ibn al-Walid, filled his void with massive 
manpower to enhance combat operations as he set his sights on destroying Sassanid 
power and taking Persia proper. The consequences of this form of enrichment shall be 
discussed in the following chapter, however it is important to note that these actions 
were symptomatic and fall within the remit of Hypothesis I, concerning the 
development of military power. The remaining years of ‘Umar’s administration were 
thus extremely politically stable, popular, and prosperous as continued political and 
military victories ensued until his death. 
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5.8. Final Conclusions 
 
The evolution of Jihad, it is argued in this chapter, during the administration of ‘Umar 
was a direct consequence of the policies that not only directed it - the Da’wa policy - 
but also additional policies that were a sub-function of the Da’wa itself. The military 
expansions that resulted were the consequences of systemic pressures that drove, in 
part, the evolution of Jihad as a continuation of politik. The domestic politico-military 
relations of the new Muslim community drove deeper creative political responses by 
‘Umar’s administration, rather than the battlefield exploits of the Muslim armies 
during the Futuh. The Caliphate of ‘Umar does reveal a second evolution in the 
strategic dynamics of Jihad, which would be lasting, and eventually enshrined into 
legal code by the later jurisconsults. This evolution was a consequence of policies 
implemented by Abu Bakr that was in turn, inextricably bound to the mission and 
policies of the Prophet. The dynamism behind the successive evolutions between 
administrations therefore reveals an escalating relationship between the influence of 
the strategic setting and the inherited strategic environment of each period. 
 
Despite episodes of vast expansions, our trinitarian interpretation of events has 
revealed the subtle complexities involved in the strategic dynamics of Jihad that are 
often lost in the customary historical recollection of victories, chronology, and the 
naming of generals. The Caliphate of ‘Umar is by far the most politically 
sophisticated tenure of the Rashidun era, whereas Abu Bakr’s regime was by far the 
most militant. However, in each case, we see the development of policy as a reaction 
to domestic political bargaining moves, that is, not as the will of one man alone. 
Accordingly, the strategic dynamics of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was continually evolving 
on the basis of horizontal and pragmatic socio-political developments that resulted in 





6.0. The Vicissitudes of Jihad (644 - 661) 
The Caliphate of ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (644-656), is the penultimate administration of 
the Rashidun period. Fraught with political reverberations from his predecessors, the 
strategic dynamics of Jihad during his administration altered little from the trajectory 
set by ‘Umar. The last Caliphate of the Rashidun era is that of ‘Ali (656-661) and is 
more commonly known as the period of Fitna, or the First Civil War in Islamic 
history, which is the final theme of the Rashidun era. The research questions 
addressed in this chapter are a continuation of those set on the strategic dynamics of 
Jihad from the previous administration, in particular the broader issues of Jihad as a 
continuation of politik. 
6.1. Preliminaries 
The second half of the Rashidun period is extremely contentious and religiously 
sensitive amongst Muslims. The drama that unfolds concerning the accusations of 
socio-political impropriety on the part of ‘Uthman, the events surrounding his death, 
the ‘election’ of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib to office, and the ensuing Civil War; has become 
so politicised with several hundred of years of propaganda from both defendants and 
detractors of various allegiances that it is difficult to be certain how much of what has 
been recorded is actually the case. 
 
Although it stands to reason that even lies require some truth to circulate, the 
historical sources cannot be discounted as completely false either. Our approach in 
this study has been to accept the records as they stand since strategic examination is 
distinct from historiography and textual analysis. Thomas Schelling explains best the 
approach of strategic theorists to issues such as these, since strategic analysis is: 
‘usually about the situation, not the individuals – about the structure of incentives, of 
information and communication, the choices available, and the tactics that can be 
employed.’1 Thus far we have remained firm to this principle in our treatment of the 
maghazi, Ridda Wars, and the Futuh and continue so in this chapter. 
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6.2. The Caliphate of ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (644 – 656) 
 
‘Uthman ibn Affan (d. 656) was one of the earliest converts to Islam, having been 
converted to Islam by non-other than Abu Bakr himself.2 ‘Uthman was also the son-
in-law to the Prophet twice over and a close confidant.3 His clan, Banu Umayya, was 
a sub-clan of the prominent Banu Abd Shams clan of the Quraysh.4 Most of the 
Prophet’s feud with the Quraysh was during the leadership of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb 
(d. 650/2), the head of Banu Abd Shams who became the unofficial leader of the 
Quraysh following the death of al-Walid ibn al-Mughairah after the Battle of Badr in 
624.5 Banu Abd Shams was from the elite clans of the Quraysh. Consequently, 
‘Uthman’s heritage was one accustomed to politics, and wealth, for he himself had 
been an extremely wealthy merchant prior to spending all his wealth during the 
maghazi.6 ‘Uthman had also served as an advisor to both Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.7 
 
In 644, during the pre-dawn prayers (fajr) in Medina, an assassination attempt upon 
‘Umar left him critically injured and dying.8 At ‘Umar’s request, the tribal elders of 
the Arab tribes were to vote and elect his successor at the time of his imminent death.9 
Unsurprisingly, ‘Uthman was elected, a decision that echoed the faith placed in a man 
from Banu Umayya to lead, over the other candidates that included ‘Ali ibn Abu 
Talib, of the Banu Hashim and relative of the Prophet.10 The decision not to elect 
‘Ali, a constant grievance of his supporters (the shi‘at ul-‘Ali),11 was a clear sign that 
early Islam functioned according to political decision-making over irrational forces or 
genealogical claims.12 
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6.3. Period One - A Continuation of Policy by the Same Means 
The link between the maghazi and the administration of Abu Bakr has been well 
established in Chapter 4. Furthermore, we have already explained in the previous 
chapter how ‘Umar attempted to balance the inherited domestic environment and 
manage the strategic setting, whilst contending with the consequences of the extended 
security policy which had caught the attention of the regional powers at that point. 
The initial Futuh up until 640, wherein the resettlement policy came into being, were 
a continuation of policy derived from the security policy of Abu Bakr albeit in new 
theatres and against the backdrop of systemic strategic settings. The new policy of 
Da’wa balanced a volatile security policy by rooting its aims in limited war. 
Thereafter, in order to maintain the delicate domestic peace, ‘Umar developed a grand 
strategic doctrine that attempted to achieve a trinitarian harmony of interests 
according to events on the ground that were married to systemic interactions. The 
grand strategic Da’wa policy or the ‘Umar Doctrine henceforth, was used to not only 
promote the absolute Jihad, but to enhance Trinitarian harmony through Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah. 
 
Just as the Ridda Wars had cleared the way for ‘Umar’s strategy of limited war – the 
Futuh; the initial Da’wa policy was a consequence of a pacified internal security 
environment inherited from Abu Bakr. The ‘Umar Doctrine effectively consolidated 
pacification of the problematic tribes and secured cooperation, thereby creating firm 
political stability within the Muslim community. ‘Uthman inherited a domestic setting 
that was enjoying virtually no internal dissidence or rebellion to his authority or 
existing policies. Consequently, the utility of force and the central concerns of 
security for the emerging dar al-Islam were restrictive and bound to a tighter calculus 
of balanced escalation and diplomatic avenues as set by the ‘Umar Doctrine and the 
Da’wa policy. Thus we can state, in relation to research question 2, that the first 
period of ‘Uthman’s administration was clearly a continuation of the Da’wa policy 
and strategic dynamics of Jihad. Clearly a consistent link existed so as to establish 




This pattern of strategic dynamics affecting Jihad extended to ‘Uthman’s 
administration also, at least to begin with. In his first official communications with the 
Military establishment ‘Uthman sent letters to the commanders posted in the various 
garrisons and on the frontiers 
 
You are the guardians of the Muslims and their shield. ‘Umar gave 
you a particular mission which is not hidden from us, rather it is 
known to everyone. I do not want to hear that any one of you has 
changed the deal, lest Allah replace you with someone else. So 
watch what you do and I shall try my best to fulfill the mission that 
Allah has enjoined on me.13 
 
The content suggests a continuation of the Da’wa policy, with the trajectory of 
military action and pre-planned missions to continue without alteration. By ‘known to 
everyone’ it is clear this is in reference to ‘Umar’s shura council, which was the 
foundation of his administration and of which ‘Uthman had been part. Hence, 
‘Uthman had inherited ‘Umar’s position in full knowledge of the policies in place and 
future mission planning that had been discussed or ordered. ‘Uthman’s warning of 
replacement is further evidence to the effect that strategic planning and military action 
was to continue without amendment and that he backed the strategies and policies that 
were in place.14 The reference to himself, is furthermore a reiteration and reassurance 
to the military establishment that he was aware of the shoes he had to fill, and would 
support them as ‘Umar had done so.15 The salient feature of this communication was 
plausibly to encourage the status quo by policy through action that would take place 
between administrations and to assuage any fears. 
6.3.1. The Systemic Strategic Setting 
‘Uthman’s inheritance of the dar al-Islam did not result in any significant shifts in 
foreign policy itself, although new events transpiring on the systemic stage forced 
‘Uthman to undertake (or more accurately permit,) new forms of military activity. 
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The employment of Jihad during ‘Uthman’s administration can be reduced to four 
areas of dynamic systemic interactions:16 
 
1. Pacification of local revolts and counter-insurgency operations in recently 
acquired Muslim territories by Persian and Byzantine instigators 
2. Establishing a defense-dominant stance at borders through the establishment 
of border posts and garrisons 
3. The continuation of expansions, in particular in those areas beyond the 
insurgency zones so as to prevent logistical support 
4. The development of naval sea power 
 
The second area of systemic interaction has already been discussed in the previous 
chapter and only a few additional comments need be made. The third and last areas of 
systemic interactions cover the most salient developments concerning the strategic 
dynamics of Jihad and are subject to additional offense-defense analysis. 
6.3.2. Counter-insurgency Operations 
In the previous chapter, we examined defensive resistance to expansion by the local 
population as part of an investigation of Hypothesis C of differentials for offense-
dominant behaviour. The sub-premise of Hypothesis C we stated, expects fierce 
resistance to defensive expansionism by the local population prompting a cycle of 
violence. Evidently, not all subjugated regions and populations were content with 
Muslim rule as the counter-insurgency operations that took place during ‘Uthman’s 
administration indicate. These developments in the area concerning the strategic 
dynamics of Jihad were strategic interactions related to the haunting principle of 
Proposition 10 of our strategic paradigm, namely Clausewitz’s warning that the 
result in war is never final.  
 
In 645, a Byzantine attempt to recapture Alexandria from the Muslims resulted in 
insurrection against Muslim rule, 17  allowing the Byzantines to briefly seize 
Alexandria again before losing it once more to a reinforced Muslim army the 
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following year.18 In 646, troops were dispatched from the garrison in Kufa to lead 
counter-insurgency operations in Azerbaijan and the region of al-Rayy (modern 
Dagestan),19 where peace was eventually imposed by military decision after a series 
of broken treaties.20 
 
Troops were also sent from Kufa to Syria, to help disrupt the influence of Byzantine 
subterfuge in the region.21 ‘Subversion’, Van Evera comments, ‘is a form of offense, 
and it affects international relations in the same way as do offensive military 
capabilities.’22 This truism explains why military force was sent to suppress a minor 
insurrection even though no direct Byzantine assault took place. Furthermore, in 650, 
counter-insurgency operations in al-Bab and Balanjar (northern Caucasus) also took 
place.23 In these instances, the garrison networks were essential to the restoration of 
territory and the suppression of insurgency; in particular, the garrison of Kufa once 
again experiencing significant combat that would further battle-harden their 
warfighting capabilities. 
 
Although the reasons for insurrections are not clear, with the traditional Muslim 
sources simply citing ‘rebellion’ rather than explain the strategic setting or socio-
political grievances (if they were the issues). It is known that Cyrus of Alexandria (d. 
642) had surrendered Alexandria to the Muslims without the population’s knowledge, 
which would plausibly explain their hostility to Muslim rule and their willingness to 
rebel.24 What is known in principle, is that ‘Unpopular regimes are more vulnerable to 
subversion or revolution inspired from abroad’;25 and that the instrument of war 
cannot confer victory or legitimacy without political credibility.26 It is clear that 
Muslim rule during ‘Uthman’s administration did meet with some resistance and that 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was employed to suppress insurrection or recover lost territory. 
 
                                                
18 BLD, p.351; Kennedy (2007), p.162 
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26 See 2.2.3. (sub-proposition B) 
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Three salient conclusions can be drawn on account of these interactive developments; 
firstly, Jihad was employed for ‘counter-insurgency’ purposes, albeit, in a manner 
non-distinct from previous applications of Jihad. The positive outcome of these 
episodes is that Jihad was used as a ‘defensive’ measure to reacquire lost territory. 
Secondly, through decisive victory, (or fait accompli27 in the case of Alexandria);28 
the Muslims had won the right to impose terms, and held the strategic initiative over 
their new subjects. At some point however, they lost tactical initiative, which the local 
population gained thereby claiming first strikes against the Muslim authorities or 
being able to forge clandestine alliances with external powers. 
 
Whilst much of the political decision-making and tactical information concerning 
battles during early Islam was not recorded, this curious case of the ‘initiative’ 
differential apparently suggests early cracks in military discipline that had been 
strictly regulated under ‘Umar, and previously under management of Khalid ibn al-
Walid. The last point continues from the aforementioned laxity onto the second form 
of strategic interaction, regarding the failure in establishing complete defense-
dominant border posts and garrison defenses. 
6.3.3. Border Control and Defense-Dominance 
Developments in areas of systemic interactions concerning the strategic dynamics of 
Jihad were not restricted to offensive military campaigns but also applied to the 
functions of border control zones and coast guarding known as ribat or murabata 
which were considered as military actions fi sabil l’Allah.29 The garrison network 
established through the ‘Umar Doctrine was transforming already under ‘Uthman’s 
administration into less segregated establishments, in some instances into bustling 
zones of social interactions, in particular Kufa and Basra in Iraq; Damascus, Syria; 
and al-Fustat in Egypt.30 The Arabs locked away in their garrisons receiving monthly 
stipends had money to spend, and the locals, perhaps with great curiosity, had goods 
to sell them.31 
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The policing function of the garrisons established by the ‘Umar Doctrine had also 
created newer, smaller outposts at the frontiers and regions less densely populated but 
still containing a border that required guarding. The efficiency that the garrison of 
Kufa in particular, demonstrated in dispatching troops to the various regions to 
support and suppress insurrection, fortifies the efficiency of those strategic features to 
which the garrisons were intended to function. However, striking failures were also 
apparent, such as in Alexandria where Byzantine ships were able to easily overrun the 
garrison; and the failure of the garrisons and murabata to effectively police the local 
populations in the Caucasus. 
 
The deterrent purpose of the garrisons and murabata in some regions were clearly 
lacking, such that defensive strategies had to be employed so as to hold the recently 
acquired territories and prevent recapture. The early expansions were not quick, but 
rather explosive, and disproportionate military power ensured that the Muslims would 
have to fight hard for many years, and continue multiple battles before achieving 
decisive victory. The first two forms of strategic interaction therefore suggest that the 
garrisons were still developing in their efficiency of purpose but still strong enough to 
maintain the new status quo, thereby retaining the initiative at the strategic level. The 
retention of the strategic initiative resulted in an unabated continuation of the Da’wa 
policy. 
6.3.4. Continued Expansions 
The third area of systemic interaction concerned the continuation of the Da’wa policy. 
As explained above, the military commanders were practically left to continue with 
their orders from the previous administration.32 ‘Uthman, seemingly left them to 
indulge their military goals and roam free. Accordingly, the frontiers continued to 
either hold or extend, in many instances as in the case of the Armenian provinces and 
local territories, battle between the Muslims and the Byzantines was a matter of 
decades-long sustained attrition.33 Gains were made in North Africa and Spain via 
Egypt, as well as further inroads into Armenia in the campaigns that started in the 
year 647.34 
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34 BLD, pp.287, 311; I.K., pp.240-1; Kennedy (2007), p.207 
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Famously, during ‘Uthman’s tenure, the Persian highlands and Fars were consolidated 
(650)35 and the Roman army led by Constantine II was also defeated in 653.36 In 652, 
inroads were made into the Sudan after the defeat of the Kingdom of Makuria.37 Of 
particular note were the extensions of the Muslim frontiers into Khurasan (modern 
day Afghanistan, Amu Darya and Uzbekistan,) taking Herat, Merv, and Balkh 
between 650-2;38 moving in as far as the River Oxus (654), Makran (modern day 
Pakistan), and to the borders of India.39  
 
Whilst continued expansions and the creation of new frontiers certainly suggest the 
enduring success of the Da’wa policy; the continuation of expansions cannot be 
reduced to a matter of simple party-political harmony. ‘Umar had, in the last two 
years of his reign, halted most of the campaigns arguing that it was more prudent to 
consolidate before resuming Jihad fi sabil l’Allah again. 40  Indeed, substantive 
expansions did not take place during ‘Uthman’s administration relative to his 
predecessor.41 
 
Hence, we might ask why the expansions continued, or why ‘Uthman did not simply 
halt the expansions to consolidate the vast territories already acquired as ‘Umar had 
begun to do?42 In other words, why did ‘Uthman simply continue (or resume) the 
policies of his predecessors? More specifically, we might recall that Abu Bakr took 
radical actions immediately after his appointment, and ‘Umar’s massive politico-
military reforms was also an early development of his administration. However, 
‘Uthman’s administration began without any significant changes such that the Da’wa 
continued. Addressing research question 3 specifically frames the broader context of 
the issues as follows: firstly, to what extent was Jihad and strategic behaviour the 
product of a religious worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and 
consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment? 
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The investigation of the previous administration clearly resulted in the later, and it is 
proposed that ‘Uthman also followed suite. In strategic terms, if war is an instrument 
of rational calculation, it is never the first or the last resort, but rather it should be the 
most effective means at one’s disposal.43 By adhering to the Da’wa policy, it can be 
argued that either ‘Uthman continued to use Jihad as part of a rational 
instrumentalisation of war ends that were established upon clear and attainable 
objectives resulting from a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force in the strategic 
interactions between actors and the environment. Or, decisions were left to the 
military to continue implementing the Da’wa policy, thereby jeopardising the risks of 
escalation through non-political restraint or stewardship?44 To provide answers to 
these questions, an examination of the strategic environment sheds greater clarity. 
6.3.5. The Regional Strategic Environment 
Shadowing almost thirty years of war, the weakened and war-weary empires of the 
Byzantine and Sassanids had both been left fragile and militarily vulnerable. Yet, with 
no tertiary power conceivably capable of posing a military threat to either spent force, 
a few years of peace by default was probably anticipated by all in the region. What 
was perhaps inconceivable however was that it would be the Arabs who would seize 
the strategic initiative against the great powers. 
 
Luttwak expresses the military shock as follows: ‘In 632 when Muhammad died, no 
reasonable person could have foreseen that the Roman empire [sic] that had possessed 
Syria, Egypt, and all the lands between them for six centuries would lose every part of 
them by 646.’45 The uncertainty that originated with Abu Bakr continued with his 
successor ‘Umar, whose stage one Da’wa policy of ‘defensive expansion’ was 
another unforeseen development.46 
 
Despite the clear avenues of exploitation into both Byzantine and Sassanid territories 
following the cursory military operations under Abu Bakr’s extended security policy, 
it was probably not considered a strategically plausible avenue of approach for the 
significantly weaker Muslim military to attempt to exploit which is why when the 
                                                
43 See 2.3.1. (see P2) 
44 See 2.3.2. (see P2 : Sub-Proposition C) 
45 Luttwak (2011), p.199; also Robinson (2005), p.124 
46 See 4.6.2. & 5.6.2. 
 205 
Muslims did, they were able to demolish their opposition fairly quickly.47 Going 
head-to-head with regional powers in the face of vast discrepancies in military power 
could hardly have been conceivable and was largely the product of the failure to 
balance the strategic environment by the regional powers. By the time of ‘Uthman’s 
administration, the Muslims had turned over an incredible asymmetry of military 
power. How the Muslims did this is a vital precursor to diagnostic evaluation and 
testing. 
6.3.6. Naval Power 
The development of naval power to meet the demands of dynamic systemic 
interaction during the administration of ‘Uthman also provides an answer to research 
question 4: Can the strategic dynamics of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests 
of Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation for the 
origin and evolution of warfighting? Understanding the development of the Muslim 
naval fleet is extremely important as it signalled most clearly the continuing 
conditions by which offense-dominance was responsible for the continuation of 
policy. 
 
Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan (d. 680) was the son of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb the leading 
tribal chief of the Quraysh who had opposed the Prophet. He was also ‘Uthman’s 
cousin, and effectively became his right hand man during his administration in a 
manner similar to, but not as vital as, Khalid ibn al-Walid had been to Abu Bakr 
during his administration. Mu‘awiya had been appointed as Governor of Syria during 
‘Umar’s administration,48 and had sought to develop a naval fleet at that time. ‘Umar 
had flatly refused the proposal.49 Now under ‘Uthman’s administration, Mu‘awiya 
sought and received permission to develop the first Muslim naval ships. These ships 
were invaluable in the defeat of the Byzantine attempt to recapture Alexandria in 645 
following the insurrection of the population.50 
 
                                                
47 Donner (1981), p.269 
48 BLD, p.217; Mu‘awiya had made a similar request of ‘Umar who flatly rejected the idea. See I.K., 
p.244 
49 Kennedy (2007), p.326 
50 Rahman (2003), p.75 
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In 649, and thereafter, Mu‘awiya’s strategic vision to extend the Muslim projection of 
force began as he sought and received permission again from ‘Uthman this time to 
build a full naval fleet. The Navy fast became an extremely efficient force-multiplier 
to the projection of the Da’wa policy, and was quick to seize Cyprus, an important 
strategic naval base of the Byzantines.51 The navy continued to develop, capturing the 
Rhodes Islands in 653/4,52 before crushing the Byzantine naval fleet of approximately 
500 warships in 655 on the coast of Lycia in the Battle of the Masts.53 Since his days 
as Governor of Syria under ‘Umar and then ‘Uthman, Mu‘awiya had been in constant 
military engagement with the Byzantine armed forces.54 His vision to create a naval 
fleet was therefore undeniably a strategic decision and an important evolution in the 
strategic dynamics of Jihad that would extend its application in the form of sea power. 
By diagnostically examining the development of naval power alongside other 
developments mentioned so far, the investigation can arrive at a sound diagnostic 
opinion regarding the strategic condition and action undertaken during the 
administration of ‘Uthman. 
 
6.4. Diagnostic Evaluation 
The continuation of the Da’wa policy during ‘Uthman’s administration is signalled 
and very simply explained by a cluster testing of Hypotheses C, A, and I, alongside 
VUCA analysis, which emphasises the role that uncertainty and fog in the strategic 
environment plays on decision-making by actors that subsequently determine the 
course of actions undertaken. As the table below shows, the prevalence of symptoms 
that encouraged offense-dominant behaviours were complete.  
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War55 
Actor A B C D E F G H I J 
‘Uthman 
644-656 
✖ ✗ ✖ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✖ ✗ 
 
                                                
51 I.K., p.244; Rahman (2003), pp.76-7; Kennedy (2007), pp.326-7 
52 Kennedy (2007), p.327 
53 Rahman (2003), pp.80-1; Kennedy (2007), p.327 
54 Rahman (2003), p.96 
55 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis ✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable 
of analysis ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
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Since ‘Uthman continued the policy of Da’wa from ‘Umar, it is not surprising that the 
majority of the phenomena A-J were secondary causation, that is, inherited from the 
previous administration, driving offense-dominant behaviour.56 
6.4.1a. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 3. Defensive Resistance  - [Hypothesis C] 
Strategic interactions are never the product of one actor. ‘Umar had not created the 
strategic environment in which the Byzantines, for example, were operating. The 
strategic environment was still in flux and thus status quo actors sought to rebalance 
the environment along its previous configuration wherein they dominated. The rise of 
the Muslims as an actor in the systemic strategic environment reiterates the fog and 
friction at play, and brings to mind the strategic importance of acknowledging VUCA 
– volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity - to describe the strategic 
environment. The self-regulation during ‘Uthman’s administration of the strategic 
environment was a game of survival of the fittest. Some basic theory elucidates the 
sequence of events within a rational framework of expected utility of action. 
 
‘The basic problem’ Van Evera posits ‘is that resources are more cumulative when 
conquest is easy. The ability to conquer others and to defend oneself is more elastic to 
one’s control over strategic areas and resources.’ This means that gains are more 
additive – ‘states can parlay small conquests into larger ones - and losses are less 
reversible. Hence small losses can spell one’s demise, and small gains can open the 
way to hegemonic dominance.’57 Therefore, regional actors will attempt to balance 
the system and maintain the status quo when disturbances in the strategic environment 
arise, especially those that signal hegemonic ambitions. Either a defensive actor is 
strong enough to deter, or is defense dominant with respect to the aggressor; or states 
acting in concert (organised or otherwise) will attempt to maintain status quo; or a 
great power intervenes as an off-shore balancer:58 ‘States therefore compete harder to 
control any assets that confer power, seeking wider spheres for themselves while 
fiercely resisting others’ efforts to expand.’59 
                                                
56 This explains the insertion of Hypothesis F 
57 Van Evera (2004), p.230 
58 On the subject of regional hegemony, balance of power and balancing, a greater depth of discussion 
will be afforded to this area in the following chapter. 
59 Van Evera (2004), p.230 
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The unexpected surge from Arabia that resulted in catastrophic military defeats for 
both the Byzantine and Sassanids who were unable to organise and effectively deny60 
the Muslim expansions did result in the dar al-Islam attaining a state of regional 
offensive dominance over all other actors. Defensive resistance is a strategic denial of 
the offensive capability of the aggressor to gain momentum such that it is able to 
carry itself to a state of regional offensive dominance over all other actors. This is 
partly an extension of the premises proposed in Hypothesis A and symptomatically 
Hypothesis J. 
 
The result of the Muslim incursions into Byzantine and Sassanid territory was to 
promote offense behaviours amongst status-quo states over defense.61 Some of the 
expected offensive reactions Jervis notes as follows: 
 
• Become the aggressor: ‘Attacking is the best route to protecting what you 
have’; 
• ‘Incentives to strike first will turn crises into wars.’ 
• ‘Decisive victories and conquests will be common.’ 
• ‘States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be hard for any state to 
maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them.’ 
• ‘Cooperation among status-quo powers will be extremely hard to achieve.’62 
 
These symptoms of offensive behaviour are all apparent from even a cursory reading 
of the historical events that ensued.63 We shall not detail these since their occurrence 
is not the issue but the norm. The relevant feature for our analysis is that it is clear the 
strategic environment was attempting to rebalance itself as a result of waning 
powers.64 The security dilemma and basic principles of self-help were animating all 
sides toward offensive military action. 
 
                                                
60 Jervis (1978), p.187 
61 These are symptomatic expressions of Hypotheses B, C, D, E, F, G, & I 
62 Jervis (1978), p.211 
63 See Kennedy (2007) 
64 See 2.4.2. 
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‘The security dilemma’ Jervis explains, ‘is at its most vicious when commitments, 
strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through 
expansion.’65 This brings the discussion to a head regarding the continued validity of 
Hypothesis A to the Da’wa policy. By re-evaluating Hypothesis A in relation to 
Hypothesis C, we are testing either that the relative ease of offensive action in the 
regional strategic environment was the underlying reason to continue along the 
trajectory set by the previous administration; or the continued Muslim expansions 
were designed or advanced as a matter of rational calculation and in accordance with 
the vicissitudes of the systemic strategic environment. 
 
6.4.1b. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 1. Opportunistic Expansion – [Hypothesis A] 
The basic hypothesis of Opportunistic Expansion posits that ‘When conquest is easy, 
aggression is more alluring: it costs less to attempt and succeeds more often.’ This 
means that aggressive offensive actions are conducted with ‘less fear of reprisal 
because they win their wars more decisively, leaving their victims less able to retaliate 
later …  and even quite benign powers are tempted to attack if the offense is strong.’66 
Carroll Quigley champions the idea of Hypothesis A in his study on Weapon Systems 
and Political Stability arguing that the ease by which the cursory futuh during Abu 
Bakr’s administration were achieved invited continued and increased military 
enthusiasm as submission was easily attained at relatively low costs.67 
 
‘Umar continued the opportunistic practice, with the implicit suggestion that 
Hypothesis J came to play a great role in the consolidation of events. Luttwak 
similarly proposes that Abu Bakr’s extended security policy was nothing more than 
opportunism in the shadow of exhausted superpowers, that gained momentum 
resulting in the Futuh during ‘Umar’s administration. Weak and impoverished 
political systems of the conquered had only made the Muslim victories seem greater 
than they were.68 
 
                                                
65 Jervis (1978), p.187 
66 Van Evera (2004), p.229 
67 Quigley (2013), p.717 
68 Luttwak (2011), pp.198-9 
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Donner also suggests that ‘The initial conquests had a centralized impetus but had 
nonetheless been carried out ad hoc, in response to the unpredictable developments on 
various fronts;’ that is, according to the dictates of the strategic environment subject 
to VUCA and the manipulation of the strategic setting. But Donner attributes the 
offense-dominant character of the Jihad during the Futuh as a consequence of an 
opportunistic preponderance of military power: ‘… we might say that the embryonic 
regime in Medina that provided such centralized direction as existed was dwarfed by 
the military forces that were at its service.’69 These forces are a reference to the 
engorged army that resulted from the resettlement policy of the ‘Umar Doctrine. 
Thus, according to Donner, Hypothesis A and I reflect the underlying cause for the 
offensive character of the Futuh. Before reconciling the problem of attribution 
between Hypothesis C and A, and examination of Hypothesis I is necessary. 
6.4.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 9. Intense Arms Racing [Military Power] – [Hypothesis I] 
Hypothesis I (is symptomatically related to D, E and G, and thus indirectly to H, B, & 
C) and is a matter of arms escalation or more broadly, controls on military power. 
Hypothesis I posits that actors have seven incentives to build larger forces when the 
offense is strong;70 if the defense dominates, the strategic logic is reversed which 
means less emphasis is strategically placed upon acquiring a large force, because the 
impetus to the offense is reduced significantly.71  Van Evera lists these as the 
following, all of which are relevant to this section with the exception of the last point: 
 
1. Resources are more cumulative. Wartime gains and losses matter more. Gains 
provide greater increase in security, and losses are less reversible.  
2. Self-defense is more difficult because others’ forces have more inherent 
offensive capability. 
3. States are more expectant of war. Their neighbors are more aggressive, so they 
must be better prepared for attack or invasion. 
4. The early phase of war is more decisive. Lacking time to mobilize their 
economies and societies in the event of war, states maintain larger standing 
forces. The possibility of quick victory puts a premium on forces-in-being. 
                                                
69 Donner (2012), p.172 (both quotes) 
70 Van Evera (2004), pp.235-6 
71 For a chain reaction created by defense dominance see Van Evera (2004), p.236 
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5. States transfer military resources from defense to offense because offense is 
more effective. Others then counterbuild because their neighbors' capabilities 
6. States hold military secrets more tightly when the offense dominates. This 
causes rational overarming, as states gauge their defense efforts to worst-case 
estimates of enemy strength.72 
 
Therefore, the first avenue of examination is to ascertain whether the decision to 
invest in naval power was a function of increasing military power of the dar al-Islam. 
6.4.3. Growing Military Power 
Whilst there is no doubt that the growing military force at the disposal of the caliphs 
was as much an offensive encouragement as it was a force multiplier for morale, it is 
salient to remember that Abu Bakr refused to admit the defeated apostates or their 
tribal members into the Muslim armed forces preferring smaller, loyalist cadres than a 
potentially larger military force. Although the administration of ‘Umar witnessed a 
reversal in this policy with a view to specifically enlarge the standing army of the 
Muslims, ‘Umar maintained the basic premise of Abu Bakr’s policy in theory. ‘Umar 
did admit the former apostates and their tribes back into military service; he did not 
permit the newly conquered non-Arabs to join the Muslim armed forces. Instead, the 
non-Muslim citizens of the conquered lands (ahl al-Dhimma) were specifically 
exempted (or barred) from military service in lieu of paying the Jizya. 
 
Thus even though ‘Umar sought to actively enlarge the capacity of the military,73 he 
still restricted its admission criteria to those who were Muslims. However, the fact 
that military rosters (diwan) had to be compiled so as to register the ever increasing 
number of soldiers does credit the argument that the numerical abundance of willing 
warriors had to be accommodated in some manner. Therefore, it is more accurate to 
state that the Futuh were determined in part by the combination of the resettlement 
policy designed to augment the Da’wa policy to promote systemic regional interests, 
whilst maintaining the foundations of security implemented by Abu Bakr. 
 
                                                
72 Point seven reads: States reach fewer arms control agreements when the offense dominates, because 
agreements of all kinds are fewer. Hence states are less able to limit arms competition through 
agreement. – See Van Evera (2004), pp.236 
73 I.K., p.105 
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The resettlement policy was a proxy to the continuation of the security policy of the 
previous administration. Reinforcing military power was a means to an end other than 
conquests, although the continued enhanced numbers undoubtedly assisted it. 
Accordingly, ‘Umar did invest heavily in the military instrument but not in arms 
racing per se. ‘Umar’s refusal to authorise a naval programme more than likely was 
based upon the belief that the dar al-Islam enjoyed a greater degree of defense-
dominance over their enemies, thereby placing less emphasis on acquiring a larger 
military force, or innovation in military capabilities. 
 
‘Umar’s assessment of having reached a level of defense-dominance was most likely 
on account of two developments that had taken place already, these were geostrategic, 
and logistical. Geostrategic advantage was in the form of natural strategic depth and 
geographic insulation from invasion. Logistical advantage was a result of the garrison 
distributions that created a string of forward-operating bases for military force to be 
streamlined and projected forward at an unrelenting pace. Combined, these two 
factors afforded an invaluable strategic advantage for the Muslims to transfer 
warfighting onto the territories of their opponents with little to no risk at the rear. 
Additionally, a defeat would only create a frontier, not a risk of territorial loss of the 
homelands. Furthermore, the costs of war were reduced since logistical supplies and 
the distribution of warfighting capabilities to the frontiers were highly efficient.  
 
Mu‘awiya must have disagreed with ‘Umar’s assessment of the situation, at least in 
the northern theatres of the Levant. To better understand Mu‘awiya’s strategic vision 
in naval development, a brief glance at his strategic interactions is telling. Mu‘awiya 
had consolidated the Muslim control of the Levant territories within two years of 
‘Uthman’s ascendancy. Since being instated as governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya had also 
instituted a policy of annual pre-emptive strikes on the neighbouring regions, 
specifically those still under control of the Byzantines (often Anatolia or along the 
Aegean coast).74 The more famous strikes were known as the ghazawat al-sa’ifah or 
the ‘summertime campaigns’ because they were conducted during the summer 
season.75 However operations were conducted during the winter just as frequently.76  
                                                
74 Humphreys (2006), p.2 
75 I.K., pp.249, 252 
 213 
It is against this background of constant military engagement that the development of 
a navy is most salient. Mu‘awiya’s vision to build a naval force reflects not only a 
strategic vision, but also a policy choice intended by the acquisition of particular 
military capabilities. Simply put, Fordham writes: ‘Decision makers build military 
(and other) capabilities based on the policies they expect to pursue and the 
international conditions they expect to face. State leaders who expect to use force 
more frequently will build more military capabilities.’77 Although the relationship 
between armament acquisitions and the decision for direct military engagements 
appear to be reciprocal,  
 
… choices about capabilities must be made long before force is 
actually used, it is important to consider the extent to which any 
observed relationship between capabilities and policy choice stems 
from the decision makers’ anticipation of their future needs and 
their resulting decisions about military spending and 
procurement.78 
 
Mu‘awiya envisioned that the battle for control of the strategic initiative through 
naval supremacy demanded a shift in ratios of forces between the small Muslim navy 
and the Byzantine fleet if the Muslims were to maintain and improve upon their 
relative capacity to conquer and defend territory.79According to J.C. Wylie, maritime 
strategy normally consists of two phases: ‘The first, and it must be the first, is the 
establishment of control of the sea. After an adequate control of the sea is gained 
comes the second phase, the exploitation of that control by projection of power into 
one or more selected critical areas of decision on the land.’80 Control of the sea, 
consists of ensuring one’s own use of the sea whilst simultaneously denying the 
opponent or others use of the sea.81 
 
                                                                                                                                      
76 A list of both summer/winter and land/sea operations between 661-680 are provided in Bewley 
(2002), pp.50-1 
77 Fordham (2004), p.636 
78 Ibid. 
79 Van Evera (2004), p.231 
80 Wylie (2014), p.125; also Corbett (2004), p.87 
81 Wylie (2014), p.125 
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The annual operations instituted by Mu‘awiya served two important functions: firstly, 
they kept the borders in a state of deterrent agitation whereby the Byzantines did not 
risk pre-emptive strikes during the non-summer seasons but rebuilt their forces and 
remained on the defensive throughout in expectation of the customary Muslim assault 
in the summer. Hence, the Byzantines began to develop a defensive military strategy 
rather than offensive, leaving the initiative of the offense with Mu‘awiya. Mu‘awiya 
would seek, and later did seek, to institute a similar naval policy, harassing the 
Byzantines with regular naval operations.82 These attacks ‘blunted’ the Byzantine 
offensive forces reducing their capability to strike at the Muslims.83  
 
Secondly, the seasonal routine in striking at the Byzantines across the border became 
a series of annual ‘training exercises’ maintaining the Muslim armed forces’ 
development. ‘Uthman approved of Mu‘awiya’s policy since it brought a regular 
income of booty and captives for ransom and slavery, as well as pacifying the 
neighbouring regions, although this is mostly likely to have been post-facto, given 
that Mu‘awiya was prone to unilateral decision-making in his political capacity.84 It 
was Mu‘awiya’s fondness of pre-emptive strikes that spurred his strategic institution 
and development of the Muslim navy, which brought substantial dividends to the 
Muslim expansions and regional dominance. Thus, the momentum of military power, 
or more accurately, the momentum of Jihad was continued offensive strategic action 
in order not to lose the strategic initiative that had been gained. 
6.4.4. Diagnostic Evaluation 
Hence we have two sides of a story, on the one hand, Hypothesis C argues that 
systemic interactions will follow avenues of expected utility thus revealing predictive 
behaviours within the strategic environment as it seeks to regulate and reestablish a 
balance of power. In the case of the Futuh these seem to have been fairly accurate. On 
the other hand, we have Hypothesis, A which posits that the random and 
unpredictable events of the strategic setting determined the ease by which the 
Muslims continued to enjoy their offense dominance and parlayed it into a greater 
momentum for continued expansion. 
                                                
82 Bewley (2002), pp.48-9 
83 Symptomatically expressed by Hypotheses D & E. 
84 I.K., p.262 
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In both instances, VUCA analysis is apparent albeit in different modes of exploration. 
This explains why, VUCA analysis ‘… may suggest a variety of equally attractive 
solutions, some of which will prove to be good and others bad. Certain knowledge is 
often lacking and intentions may be surmised, but never entirely known.’85 This point, 
that information is lacking and intentions are ultimately conjecture, forces a 
parsimonious and strategically logical explanation that is not intellectually offensive. 
If we understand both sets of Hypotheses correctly, the disparity is resolved not 
within their differing interpretation of events, but at their natural end. 
 
That is, both argue that it was the achievement of offense dominance in relation to 
other actors that continued warfighting or Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. Hypothesis C is 
somewhat self-contained in its propositions and predictions but acknowledges the 
intervening factors contained in Hypothesis A and later Hypothesis J. Hypothesis A is 
an explanatory hypothesis for the starting point of events that, in the context of an 
evolving situation, parlays into Hypothesis I, and later Hypothesis J. In both sets of 
hypothetic-deductions, the underlying resolution is found in the attainment of offense 
dominance. Hypothesis C argues that offense dominance is contended for at the 
systemic stage or environment and conferred through results; whereas Hypothesis A 
suggests that offense dominance is a matter of perception, not necessarily reality, that 
becomes a matter of established fact through continued momentum and the 
accumulation of victories. 86  It was according to these demands of offensive 
momentum that consideration of Hypothesis I must be understood as a compound 
strategy combining other intervening factors - Hypothesis D & E - Moving First is 
More Rewarding and Windows are Larger, and More Dangerous. 
 
In diagnostic conclusion, the Caliphate of ‘Uthman, during its first period, reflects the 
Da’wa policy in full swing, with Jihad employed as a fully offensive instrument. The 
Caliphate of ‘Uthman was a period wherein all ten variables of intervening factors are 
present clearly illustrating the strength of the offense during ‘Uthman’s 
administration. 
                                                
85 Yarger (2006), p.18 
86 Donner and Quigley might be forgiven for their failure to recognise these distinctions, since their 
analysis is given as historians; Luttwak however, steps on his own foot in this instance as he fails to 
recognise the paradoxical reality of the perception of the offense and the absurdity of strength it 
confers. 
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The continued frequency of warfighting and conquest was therefore expected 
according to the prime predictions of offense-defense theory. 87 The cumulative 
increase of offense-defense variables between the period of the maghazi until the 
administration of ‘Uthman demonstrates an escalating offense-dominant approach and 
perception of warfighting as a means of policy.88  
 
6.5. Period Two - The New Crisis Environment 
Jihad continued to serve as a function of the Da’wa policy89 before political echoes of 
grievances that had previously been managed resurfaced. The Caliphate of ‘Uthman 
would develop a series of internal security issues that revived the problems faced 
during the administration of Abu Bakr; and the consequences of socio-political 
‘blowback’ accrued from the policies of ‘Umar. ‘Uthman’s tenure was fraught with 
complaints and grievances based on a failure to maintain the standards of consistent 
internal rectification from his predecessor’s example. These problems of socio-
political dissent and insurrection, though important, have traditionally 
overshadowed the more salient features of the strategic dynamics of Jihad that 
occurred during the administration of ‘Uthman which we have examined.  
 
If the Ridda Wars defined the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, and the Futuh than of ‘Umar, it 
was a series of internal insurrections (bughat) that characterised the Caliphate of 
‘Uthman. The insurrections, that demanded counter-insurgency operations against 
non-Muslims, have been discussed above under Period One. The second period of 
‘Uthman’s tenure was marred by Muslim insurrection that created an internal crisis. 
Whilst the second period of insurrection saw no active developments in the strategic 
dynamics of Jihad, there were by implication, passive developments to the 
employment and function of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. 
6.5.1. The Shadow of ‘Umar 
The Futuh during the Caliphate of ‘Umar was so successful that an abundance of 
wealth was acquired by the Muslim polity. In the hands of formerly desert merchants 
was the wealth and riches of the Byzantine and Persian empires. With vast lands 
                                                
87 Van Evera (2004), p.244 
88 A clear symptom of Hypothesis J 
89 Rahman (2003), p.74; Donner (2012), p.133 
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under the Medinan authority and with the taxable administration of the dar al-Islam, 
immense revenues poured into Medina that was duly redistributed throughout the 
Islamic community and its economy. 
 
The socio-economic and political prosperity associated with ‘Umar’s reign is 
undoubtedly a factor which heavily contributed to the stability of his reign and the 
resounding enthusiasm for the Da’wa policy that cloaked the resettlement programme. 
The correlation between good government and the internal rectification of his tenure, 
and the resulting external security has a distinct Confucian-Mencian accent 
suggesting that the ruler’s cultivation of virtue was the basis for security and 
prosperity of the dar al-Islam.90 Before his expiration, ‘Umar had left written counsel 
for his successor. From amongst the many instructions and recommendations, were to 
be fair and just in the distribution of war booty, to prevent the monopolisation of 
wealth by one clan or class, fear favouritism, and an emphatic stress upon the equality 
of the Muslim citizenship.91  Economic prosperity had been enjoyed during the 
Caliphate of ‘Umar, but during ‘Uthman’s tenure the prosperity was in even greater 
abundance and socio-political problems formed as a consequence.92  
6.5.2. The ‘Umar Doctrine  
‘Uthman continued the resettlement policy of the ‘Umar Doctrine but with some 
changes. The resettled Arab tribes were encamped just outside of conquered towns in 
garrisons. ‘Umar had established clear directives regarding protocol between the 
inhabitants of the garrisons: they were not to engage with the locals financially so as 
to disrupt the local economy or to own land and engage in agriculture.93 The locals 
were free to continue their lives as normal, administrating amongst themselves with 
the exception of bearing or acquiring armaments. Thus, bar fiscal interactions in the 
form of tax collection, the Arabs were essentially segregated from the conquered 
peoples. The Arab settlers would receive regular stipends paid to their tribal chieftains 
who would then redistribute within the tribe. Soldiers stationed at the barracks were 
also given a regular wage with pensions for retired soldiers and their dependents.  
                                                
90 Johnston (1995), p.63 
91 As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.88-94 
92 Ibid., p.203 
93 Hodgson (1977), p.212 
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‘Umar had ensured that those Arab tribes which had been dislocated from Arabia and 
resettled in the new lands were not financially lacking and thus remained supportive 
of his administration.94 ‘Uthman raised the stipends of the troops by 100 dirhams 
above the rate set during ‘Umar’s administration. 95  Furthermore, ‘Umar had 
prevented the rich and famous of Mecca and Medina from settling in the new 
provinces to curb their influence in those regions and their desire to create new wealth 
by benefitting from the newly acquired trade routes.96 ‘Uthman however, was unable 
or perhaps unwilling to continue this segregation and especially in the new Iraqi 
territories, instructing his governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, ‘to settle 
some of the nomads in places away from towns and villages where they could make 
use of empty lands (presumably as farmers?); others were granted stipends and 
assigned to the cities, towns, and frontier posts as garrison troops.’97 Wealthy Meccan 
families began establishing new financial ventures.98 With vast sums of plunder 
requiring administration, distribution became a hotly contested issue, as did seats of 
political office within the newly acquired territories. 
6.5.3. From Meritocracy to Nepotism 
Under the previous administration, the character and reputation of ‘Umar was 
sufficient to manage tribal competition for power and standing. However, the new 
Caliph, ‘Uthman, did not have the character of ‘Umar or the resolve of Abu Bakr.99 
Thus ensued a series of complications as ‘Uthman sought to continue the policies of 
distribution, taxation, and resettlement that had been instituted under the previous 
administration. In his list of counsels to his successor, ‘Umar had explicitly stated: 
‘Do not leave anyone who was appointed during my reign for more than one year’.100 
In part, this order had been made in light of the ageing ‘old guard’ that had served the 
Prophet, Abu Bakr, and ‘Umar, where age would have raised questions as to their 
competencies in posts as governors or military commanders. 
                                                
94 Quigley (2013), pp.721-3 
95 I.K., p.237 
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As a result, ‘Uthman looked to a younger generation of leadership, unsurprisingly 
from within his own clan and to the affront of other tribal clans.101 ‘Uthman’s 
judgement on employing appropriate officials to replace those commissioned by 
‘Umar was consistently challenged on the grounds of nepotism especially since the 
character and conduct of those officials and governors appointed by ‘Uthman were 
contentious at the very least.102 ‘Uthman was accused of exploiting the Muslim 
treasury, unfair distribution of war booty, territorial distributions and land estates.103  
 
A general resentment grew, especially amongst the other Arab tribes, who previously 
enjoyed a modicum of political inclusion during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, especially as 
their standing in the political order of ‘Uthman’s administration dwindled. Discontent 
bred opposition groups that began to form both outwardly and as underground 
movements.104 ‘Uthman’s reputation quickly tarnished as he fast became perceived as 
a ‘weakling’105 and a puppet of Banu Umayya. It was widely held that ‘Uthman was 
either naïve or complicit, to not see that the Banu Umayya were attempting to rebuild 
and recover the political influence and power they had held before Islam.106 Indeed, of 
important note is that ‘Uthman had no previous military experience, never having 
been commissioned by the Prophet to lead any of the saraya;107 and had a less than 
flattering past having deserted the battlefield at Uhud.108 Additionally, as a man of 
Banu Umayya, ‘Uthman did have a superficial political background with many 
political contacts but no real experience in political leadership and decision-
making.109 
 
Rather, ‘Uthman had shone in areas of financial and economic development, and his 
administration did enlarge the wealth and prosperity of the dar al-Islam.110 Despite 
the flourishing economy and state of prosperity, the apparent degeneration of internal 
rectification developed by ‘Umar was constantly highlighted by the detractor’s of 
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‘Uthman. The cabal of Banu Umayya was the primary target of political unrest, as 
charges of internal corruption were levelled against ‘Uthman. Problems of 
government and tribal politics increasingly overshadowed the issues of external 
security threats and foreign policy such that the Futuh lost momentum.111 
6.5.4. Insurrections 
Successful territorial gains in North Africa and Spain had come at great cost. As 
politico-military efforts were concentrated externally, domestic dissidence rose and 
was left unchecked in the Muslim territories. With most of the Muslim armed forces 
stationed at the frontiers or engaged in protracted conflicts with external opponents, 
domestic dissent was able to flourish. In particular, major cities in Egypt and the 
Medinan capital in particular, were short of military and security personnel.112 By 
655, dissent had already spread throughout the Muslim territories with protests and 
revolts cited in the garrison of Kufah.113 
 
A restricted policy of resettlement in Egypt114 had reduced the strategic features of the 
‘Umar Doctrine to maintain a standing reserve in the form of settlements for policing 
and management of the non-Muslim population. With only three garrisons, in Fustat, 
Alexandria, and Aswan (a defensive outpost in the north guarding against Nubian 
strikes); insurrectionaries exploited the bare security conditions and travelled to 
Mecca and Medina to incite the growing political dissatisfaction there also. In the 
same year, delegations were sent from the major garrison-towns of Kufah and Fustat 
to seeking to remove ‘Uthman from office.115 
 
By 657, rebel forces from Egypt, Kufah, and Bosra, made a coordinated march toward 
Medina to overthrow ‘Uthman.116 The insurgents had timed the siege to coincide with 
the Hajj pilgrimage season, meaning that Medina would be less populated and thus 
more vulnerable, in addition to the fact that ‘Uthman had refused to allow any 
security forces to protect the city.117 Medina was under-siege as the insurgent forces 
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encircled a defenseless Medina. The Caliph was detained in his residence under 
insurgent cordon for forty days before being killed; his residence looted, and the State 
Treasury (bayt al-mal) pillaged.118 The violent murder of ‘Uthman triggered the First 
Civil War of Islam, more commonly referred to in the earliest Arabic literature as the 
Fitna. 
6.5.5. Diminishing Returns of Jihad 
The events leading up to the First Civil War in Islam occurred in tandem with the 
deterioration of the Jihad fi sabil l’Allah.119 Insurrections developed as ‘Uthman’s 
credibility plummeted. Accordingly, ‘domestic legitimacy is a conditio sine qua non 
for the success of a grand strategy. All strategies, all strategic designs will collapse 
unless there is domestic legitimacy’;120 and therefore, the support of the Da’wa policy 
began to dwindle. As support for the Jihad fi sabil l’Allah became overshadowed by 
internal politics, the growing inertia of the Da’wa policy resulted in the fears of 
‘Umar being realised as the former rebel tribes began to regroup under the cover of 
political dissidence.121 ‘Uthman’s attempts to keep a firm grip upon central authority 
faltered as his attempt to consolidate power within the security of his own kinsmen 
was perceived as pure nepotism, effectively excluding former tribal allies and 
strengthening the disenfranchised tribes who now saw an opportunity to make relative 
political gains lost since the administration of Abu Bakr nearly two decades earlier. 
Both the security policy of Abu Bakr and the ‘Umar Doctrine were undone. 
 
‘Uthman clearly had an extremely low estimation of the utility of force, and was 
adamant in his refusal to employ the military instrument against his challengers.122 
‘Uthman also refused Mu‘awiya’s offer of an armed security force to be sent to guard 
the city of Medina from any uprisings or direct attack on the Caliph.123 One is 
reminded once more of the fallacy that Clausewitz exposes: 
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Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some 
ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much 
bloodshed, […]. Pleasant as it sounds, … War is a dangerous 
business where mistakes that come from kindness are the very 
worst.124 
 
Unlike his predecessors who were far from shy in enforcing law and order, ‘Uthman’s 
famous pacifistic character,125 condemned the political stability of the dar al-Islam to 
civil war. Yet, there may be another viable, political explanation, for ‘Uthman’s 
restraint on force. 
6.5.6. The Political Restraints of Jihad 
There are two reasons in the context of this study so far, that might better elucidate 
why ‘Uthman did not employ force against the insurrections. Both passively reveal an 
existing dynamic of Jihad that originated at its inception, and was upheld during 
‘Uthman’s administration. Our study thus far has revealed that when examined, 
research question 3 consistently results in an answer that promotes the strategic 
explanation that Jihad was predominately determined as a result and consequence of 
the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. The influence and consequence 
of religio-political circumstance or strategic behaviour rooted in a set of strategic 
preferences that were religiously determined, has been largely negligible. This is not 
to argue that it was not present, but rather the influence of strategic actors and their 
value systems has not been demonstrated to have overruled or to have contradicted 
expected strategic actions or decision-making, especially regarding systemic strategic 
interactions. 
 
Relative to the domestic strategic setting, ‘Uthman’s lack of action raises serious 
questions as to why the military instrument was not employed as they had been by 
Abu Bakr for example. Firstly, the strategic calculus of ‘Uthman’s political 
circumstances was complicated by the number of actors involved. Not only did 
‘Uthman have to continue the external projection of the dar al-Islam via the Da’wa 
policy as discussed above; but also political dissidence and threats of revolt to his 
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political authority. External enemies such as the Byzantines could be demonised to 
the extent of being a zero-sum threat, but internally such a reconfiguration of the 
threat was not possible. The conditions of apostasy and rebellion by the Arab tribes 
during the period of Abu Bakr’s administration were not synonymous with ‘Uthman’s 
circumstances, and thus the hard line taken by Abu Bakr was not a viable strategic 
option for ‘Uthman without invoking all-out civil war. 
 
Secondly, whilst the external enemy could be destroyed, internal threats by Muslims 
effectively negated the military instrument being engaged as a matter of Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah. The policy of Da’wa could not authorise its use, nor could a political decision 
cite precedent to Abu Bakr’s security policy either. The policies of the ‘Umar had 
strengthened the Arab tribes considerably and to use military force against the tribes 
was unthinkable. Furthermore, Jihad was, as an instrument subordinated to policy, 
employed either to extend or defend the jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah, or the territories 
of the dar al-Islam. Since these were not violated on account of political grievances 
and contests for power by Muslims against Muslims, Jihad as an instrument of policy 
was effectively retired on such matters. Consequently, we see that for the first time 
since Jihad was practiced, an essential limitation is revealed to the scope of its 
application. If we recall in chapter 3, we addressed sub-investigative question a.: 
 
a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect 
to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance 
strategic interpretation? 
 
Since Jihad fi sabil l’Allah in its horizontal expression, could only be used in service 
(nisus) of making the jurisdiction and sovereignty of God paramount, which included 
defending its institutions where founded; an internal, that is Muslim, threat to 
authority could not be considered synonymous with non-Muslim threats to authority. 
To be even clearer, since the challenges to ‘Uthman’s authority were based upon 
diminishing credibility, his overthrow did not seek the non-implementation or 
eradication of the dar al-Islam but the continuation of it. Under such circumstances 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah could not be subordinated to a policy of counter-insurgency since 
the insurgents were themselves believers. 
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Since Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was an expression of the absolute Jihad at the horizontal 
level, unlike the systemic environment that we have previously discussed above, Jihad 
was inherently regulated by religio-political circumstances at the domestic strategic 
setting. This means that research question 3, has a second answer, previously 
unrevealed by our investigation. The pressures to escalate could not override the 
inherent restrictions of warfighting against Muslims that was the by-product of the 
meta-narrative and essence of absolute Jihad. Consequently, strategic behaviours did 
not follow rational expectations of the utility of force. This perhaps also explains why 
the rebels to Abu Bakr’s authority were classified as apostates, since had they been 
considered Muslims; Abu Bakr could not have waged the military instrument against 
them. 
 
The conclusions we must draw from this episode are two: firstly, there must have 
been some precedent known or imparted by the Prophet that informed both Abu Bakr 
and ‘Uthman that warfighting in the name of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was restricted to 
non-Muslims only; and secondly, that Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was effectively a systemic 
instrument, bar exceptions such as apostasy or invasion. 
 
6.6. Trinitarian Analysis and Conclusions 
The Caliphate of ‘Uthman represents the first failure to balance between internal 
rectification and external power management in the history of Islam. Remarkably the 
shortcomings of his administration are never considered for strategic reasons, perhaps 
because of the overwhelming influence of irrational forces at play. These influences 
most notably begin but also recurred consistently throughout remaining successive 
administrations. It would be easy to identify the first element lacking during his 
administration – that of leadership, both politically and militarily, the character of 
‘Uthman fell short in the shadow of his predecessors. ‘Uthman’s dependence upon 
Mu‘awiya to continue and innovate created a vital evolution in the strategic dynamics 
of Jihad via naval power. ‘Uthman’s individual ability to manage the non-rational 
elements of warfare decreased fairly consistently during his administration with the 
Da’wa noticeably increasing in inertia under his command. 
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‘Uthman’s fall from grace began as soon as his credibility was called into question. 
Accusations of nepotism and a breach of Islamic austerity on the part of political 
leadership had been the main crimes levied at ‘Uthman, neither of course were illegal 
by the Shari‘ah, though were frowned upon. 126  Perhaps the examples of his 
predecessors, including the Prophet himself had created expectations of behaviour and 
conduct appropriate for the Caliph, though not explicitly declared, had become 
conventionally a priori expectations that ‘Uthman had fallen short of in the eyes of 
others. Some argued radical change of character, citing the corrupting effects of 
power upon once good men.127 Whilst others found reasons in apocryphal accounts of 
the inevitable decline of Muslim community and righteous leadership said to have 
been predicted by the Prophet himself.128 
 
Secondly, ‘Uthman’s credibility was further damaged as his dependency upon the 
political skill and experience of the Banu Umayya became increasingly apparent. 
‘Uthman as the legitimate Caliph was undermined by his lack of political acumen in 
being exploited by his clan to empower themselves.129 Finally, ‘Uthman failed to 
show the same determination in maintaining political control over tribal cabals as his 
predecessors had done. As his political authority dwindled, violent uprisings laid 
claims and contested his power. Lacking the political resolve or ability to militarily 
crush the uprisings in his midst, as Abu Bakr had so emphatically done, the violence 
spread and escalated beyond his control. ‘Uthman sought to de-escalate in the face of 
increasingly escalatory blind forces by committing to relinquish the initiative.130  
 
Conceivably it was a wise idea in theory in order to calibrate the potential risks of 
violence. And perhaps, ‘Uthman had the foresight to recognise that were he to 
escalate matters by the use of force, he would not have been able to win swiftly and at 
low costs, thereby creating a state of civil war. The irony is that his attempts to de-
escalate and discard the use of force still resulted in civil war. 
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Policy was completely undermined by the politics of the domestic strategic setting; 
violence and emotions were rousing as tribal power politics and the virtues of jahiliya 
returned to the fore.131 This occurred for various reasons as we have mentioned, 
however the failure to effectively adapt and continue the security protocol 
implemented by ‘Umar to check tribal tensions and prevent any escalation in political 
claims is perhaps the most obvious culprit that led to domestic weakening. 
 
It was without a doubt, the failure of the resettlement policy (that is, its strategic 
features designed to have held the integrity of policy together)132 that had created the 
fissures from which civil strife would flow. The mass demographic shifts and 
relentless conquests had created an enlarged Muslim community that had an 
increasingly less ‘Islamic’ character as the ‘old guard’ from the days of the maghazi 
were dying from battle or old age.133 The result was to be five years of civil war 
inside the dar al-Islam, and the end of Muslim cohesion cemented by Abu Bakr and 
consolidated by ‘Umar. 
 
From a trinitarian perspective, the Caliphate of ‘Uthman was the caliphate of friction. 
Everything escalated that could have ‘whether by lack of foresight, slow execution, or 
factors beyond the actor’s control, … [amplifying] itself into a cascade of things 
going wrong to create potential chaos.’134 ‘Uthman was overshadowed by an inherited 
strategic setting and environment that had been too delicately balanced by his 
predecessor, whom he could not equal. The reason why his administration continued 
for so long can almost definitely be attributed to the momentum of the offense 
[Hypothesis J] and morale created by his predecessors. As the prosperity and 
privileges came to require renewal ‘Uthman had not managed to balance the re-
negotiations of the bargaining dynamics within the domestic strategic setting 
accordingly, and the swinging pendulum collapsed. 
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6.7. The End of The Rashidun (656 - 661) 
The Caliphate of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (656-61) is the last administration of the 
Rashidun period. The strategic dynamics of Jihad during this administration was 
negligible at the systemic level. This is because the period of ‘Ali’s administration 
brought a halt to foreign policy as the pressing concerns of domestic instability 
brought on by the murder of ‘Uthman overshadowed the Da’wa. Thus, since the 
beginning of military operations in 622 under the command of the Prophet until 656, 
Jihad had been employed without cessation to advance and defend the interests of the 
dar al-Islam and the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a. The first hiatus of Jihad lasted the 
duration of ‘Ali’s tenure. ‘Ali’s administration, was essentially an administration of 
martial law, serving as an involuntary transition government between ‘Uthman and 
the next Caliph. 
6.7.1. Preliminaries 
The maghazi period, which was also a civil conflict, was not as bloodied and anarchic 
as the events of the Fitna that characterises ‘Ali’s administration. The growing 
animosity and tensions that quickly spiraled into civil war were a distinctly Arab 
affair.135 The policies of the ‘Umar Doctrine remained largely intact that separated the 
conquered populations from the Arab settlements. As an intra-tribal power struggle 
between the Quraysh ensued, the Da’wa effort was overshadowed and effectively 
withdrew from any new developments at the systemic level. 
 
The sequence of events traces the essential features that fueled the Fitna. These 
events did not alter the policy of Da’wa in its philosophy of purpose, but they would 
heavily influence and transform the authority and claims of legitimate ‘right’ to apply 
the Da’wa on behalf of the Muslim community. The events that transpired during 
‘Ali’s administration between the former Companions and associates of the Prophet, 
is highly controversial and sensitive. Accordingly, exactly what happened during 
many events is uncertain. Various factions that were created during the Civil War or 
Fitna have continued until today to transmit a selective memory of events. 136 Donner, 
who has succinctly summed up the strategic interests of these writings, explains: 
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… this theme represents historicizing legitimation in Islam par 
excellence, since the purpose of many fitna accounts is to describe 
how leadership of the community was won (or lost) by a particular 
person or party through a sequence of mundane events, and to 
lament or celebrate those events. The events themselves can be 
viewed either from the victor’s side as divine confirmation of his 
claim to rule, or from the loser’s vantage point as an explanation of 
how the ‘legitimate’ candidate (legitimate on moral or genealogical 
or other grounds) was deprived of his rightful rule by deceit or 
oppressive force.137 
 
Consequently, it is difficult to relate or examine the specific events of the politik 
during this period. Thus broad sketches of events suffice the purposes of this section. 
Henceforth, this chapter covers only those matters pertinent to the research questions 
stipulated below, in full knowledge that the period was fraught with numerous other 
events and problems some of which have been included in the footnotes below as 
references to surrounding events. On the whole, what happened during the Civil War 
or Fitna, led to the rise of the Umayyad Caliphate making this administration an 
important transition stage in the dynamic evolution of Jihad. 
 
To this end, we continue to explore the consequences of research question 3 and sub-
investigative question a. in this final section as a continuation of developments from 
the administration of ‘Uthman and the rise of Muslim insurgents.  
6.7.2. The Fitna 
The major concern of this period and the core issues of the Fitna as it unfolded in 
history and as related in the literature, are connected to the following historical 
sequence of episodes that comprised the First Civil War of Islam: 138 
 
• The political dissidence and eventual mutiny and murder of the Caliph 
‘Uthman; 
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• The election of ‘Ali as his successor, and the political contests for the 
leadership of the dar al-Islam by Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan, ‘Aisha bint Abu 
Bakr,139 Talha ibn ‘Ubayd Allah,140 and Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwam141;142 
• The ensuing contests via battles for political power: the battles of the 
Camel,143 Siffin,144 and against the Kharijites at Nahrawan;145 
• The issues and repercussions of political arbitration that occurred between the 
Caliph ‘Ali and his main political rival Mu‘awiya and the battles between 
them;146 
• The eventual murder of ‘Ali and the attempted murder of Mu‘awiya147 
• The coup of Mu‘awiya following ‘Ali’s death and the abandonment of Hasan 
(son of ‘Ali) to contest Mu‘awiya’s leadership;148 
• The various groups and factions who refused to acknowledge Mu‘awiya and 
the subsequent Umayyad House as legitimate authority, and the rebellions 
against them.149 
 
6.8. On The Caliphate of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (656 – 661) 
‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (d. 661) was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and the son 
of Abu Talib, the former chief of Banu Hashim and the Prophet’s political protector in 
Mecca until his death.150 ‘Ali had been the first male convert to Islam,151 and had 
gained a strong reputation as a fierce warrior having distinguished himself on the 
battlefield on a number of occasions.152 Considered by some to have been the natural 
successor to the Prophet,153 ‘Ali had been consecutively passed over three times. 
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6.8.1. The Strategic Setting 
In 656, ‘Uthman was murdered by an angry mob of insurgents who stormed his 
residence and killed him as he sat reading the Qur’an.154 ‘Uthman’s tenure as caliph 
had lasted approximately twelve years. ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib accepted leadership155 and 
was named as his successor within a day by his long-time supporters in Medina and, 
according to some reports, the insurgents who had murdered ‘Uthman.156 ‘Ali’s 
appointment received marginal to little support of the Meccan and political elite of 
Quraysh as a whole, most of whom were in Mecca at the time.157 This lack of support 
from the now well-established political elite, coupled with the fact that many of the 
insurgents who had stormed the residence of ‘Uthman and killed him had endorsed 
and supported ‘Ali’s claim to power, created a storm of political opposition to the new 
administration.158  
 
The election of ‘Ali as ‘Uthman’s successor by a select portion of non-Quraysh clans 
and tribes, some of whom had been deemed rebels during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, 
others who had partaken of ‘Uthman’s murder, fragmented the Muslim community 
into three political factions:159 firstly, those who supported ‘Ali as the new and 
legitimate caliph; secondly, the clan of Banu Umayya (and their allies) who 
maintained that legitimacy of rule ‘had through ‘Uthman become “their property”’ 
and that no new caliph could be appointed until ‘Uthman’s murderers were brought to 
justice; and lastly, the majority of the ruling elite from the Quraysh who sought a 
return to a caliphate based upon the precedent of Abu Bakr or ‘Umar – meaning an 
elected appointee through their own collective decision-making. 160  These three 
factions formed the basis of the actors who fought for political control during the 
Fitna and those claims and ideals that would further outlast both the caliphate of ‘Ali 
but also the Umayyads.161 
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6.8.2. Political legitimacy 
The move by ‘Ali to establish his capital, or perhaps more accurately, base of 
operations, in the garrison town of Kufa was symbolic of the militant character of his 
administration.162 The events of the Fitna had removed the central authority that had 
unified the tribes.163 ‘Ali’s attempts to impose his claim of legitimate leadership were 
in effect an attempt to reestablish centralised authority to remove the state of anarchy 
through martial law. 
 
The events of this period clearly reflected the return of the tribal strategic 
environment that the Prophet had been operating within however, ‘Ali lacked the deft 
hand of inter-tribal diplomacy that his predecessors were able to fall back on. 
Accordingly, ‘Ali was unable to replicate the success of his predecessors in decisive 
political victory against those who discredited his claims to leadership. The political 
elite of Quraysh gathered in Mecca, defying ‘Ali’s request for recognition as the new 
Amir al-Mu‘mineen,164 with ‘A’isha, the surviving widow of the Prophet, rallying the 
Quraysh to revolt. It was not the Quraysh however who contested ‘Ali for political 
power most rigorously, but the clan of ‘Uthman led by Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the 
Governor of Syria, now the appointed leader of the Banu Umayya who pressed his 
own claim of leadership against ‘Ali.165  
6.8.3. Trinitarian overview of the Civil War 
The blind forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity - feature as the most 
quantitatively dominant qualitative feature of ‘Ali’s administration. The qualitative 
nature of ‘Ali’s administration is extremely significant in that it experienced the 
greatest outpouring of uncontrolled and escalating irrational forces since the 
beginning of the maghazi. Inheriting a fractured domestic strategic setting, where the 
swinging pendulum of socio-political balance had collapsed, ‘Ali’s administration 
was barely capable of overcoming the interplay of chance and probability, that is, the 
fog and friction of civil war, without resorting to escalated warfighting to meet 
escalating claims for power. 
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Of course, this resulted in a politico-strategic disaster for ‘Ali’s administration. ‘Ali 
however, was hardly at fault for the collapse of societal harmony that previously had 
existed,166 but lacked the political acumen of Abu Bakr or ‘Umar to navigate through 
the problems of VUCA in the strategic environment and harness the strategically 
correct means-ends policies to re-establish trinitarian harmony. There was one man 
who could however, his rival and eventual victor - Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan.  
 
Clausewitz wrote: ‘No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- 
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how 
he intends to conduct it.’ 167  Mu‘awiya demonstrates the weight of political 
shrewdness that balanced the forces of escalation during the Civil war. Mu‘awiya’s 
extensive political experience outweighed ‘Ali’s, coupled with the backing of the 
northern armies; was able to rationally calculate and out-maneuver ‘Ali through 
superior politico-strategic calculation of the strategic environment and the operational 
centres of gravity.168  While Mu‘awiya’s actions during this period clearly exhibits a 
grasp of the politik involved, balancing rational calculation with armed force; ‘Ali’s 
administration were almost always reacting to unfolding events attempting to manage 
the innate forces of VUCA more often than not through escalating military action. 
 
The Battle of the Camel in 656 was a tactical victory but a political disaster as ‘Ali 
took to battle against the widow of the Prophet. Again, at the Battle of Siffin 657, 
despite being on the verge of tactical victory with a view to decisive victory over 
Mu‘awiya, ‘Ali bowed to pressure from within his war cabinet and halted the final 
stages of battle to accept Mu‘awiya’s request for arbitration.169 With no real policy 
direction, as an administration of martial law, ‘Ali fell victim to a catastrophic 
political blunder by entering into diplomatic arbitration with Mu‘awiya,170 from 
which he relinquished the initiative and was effectively undermined and politically 
rendered dead weight by his own followers. 
  
                                                
166 Hodgson (1977), pp.216-7 
167 OW, p.579 
168 Donner (2012), pp.165-70 
169 See 6.7.1. 
170 Bewley (2002), p.27 
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The details of the process of arbitration are sketchy, with multiple versions of events 
recorded in the early sources.171 What is known is that ‘Ali made the fatal mistake of 
not attending the final round of negotiations in person, sending in his place a 
representative that was more neutral than partisan to ‘Ali’s cause. The ensuing 
negotiations reached a settlement in which Mu‘awiya was able to politically out-
manoeuvre ‘Ali’s representative, and thus ‘Ali’s claim and jurisdiction over the 
Muslims.172 With the jurisdiction of martial law effectively compromised, from this 
point onwards, the brittle administration ‘Ali presided over fell to pieces as no 
rational forces were able to contain the irrational outpouring of violence and emotion.  
 
As internal collapse took place, tribal power politics and the virtues of jahiliya 
returned alongside questions of faith that began to permeate the shattered 
administration as former supporters turned into open enemies to ‘Ali (the Kharijites or 
‘seceders’) resulting in a battle between former allies at Nahrawan in 658.173 As ‘Ali’s 
army exhausted themselves through political infighting and actual war amongst 
themselves, Mu‘awiya was able to dominate the remainder of proceedings as he 
gathered greater political support throughout the Muslim territories as the audience of 
non-Quraysh and other Muslims watched ‘Ali’s government collapse.  
 
After four years and nine months, a protracted series of battles,174 negotiations,175 and 
internal fighting176 between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya, it was a Kharijite assassin who killed 
‘Ali as he went for prayer in 661.177 Mu‘awiya had already seized control of most of 
the Muslim territories from ‘Ali, including Mecca and Medina and was able to press 
his claim for leadership to convince Hasan the son of ‘Ali to forgo any claim to power 
in exchange for an annual pension of significant proportion.178 In doing so, he was 
able to bring the civil war to an end and unite the Muslims under central authority 
once more. 
                                                
171 See Hinds (2010); Bewley (2002), pp.23-5 
172 Hodgson (1977), pp.214-6 
173 See Kenney (2010) 
174 Madelung (2001), pp.168-173; I.K., pp.330-7; 362-74, 428-33 
175 I.K., pp 342-44, 366-9, 387-90 
176 Ibid., pp.345-6; 390-400 
177 Rahman (2003), pp.90-1 
178 See I.K., pp.44-5, 483; also Donner (2012), p.167; and Rahman (2003), p.91 
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6.8.4. The Domestic Dynamics of Jihad 
Armed with this background of events, analysis returns to sub-investigative question 
a.: What is Jihad and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation? Whilst 
systemic evolution in the practice of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah did not alter, salient shifts in 
the perception of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah took place in the midst of the Fitna. Most 
strikingly was the shift in the rightful claim to authorise Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. 
Depending on the source, ‘Ali did unlike his predecessor ‘Uthman, invoke Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah against his Muslim opponents.179 
 
‘Ali himself is recorded as complaining that his calls to rally an army in the name of 
Jihad would fall upon deaf ears whilst Mu‘awiya’s calls for the restoration of justice 
by vengeance of ‘Uthman’s killers and the usurpation of political power (by ‘Ali), 
was met by obedience.180  There are four politico-strategic reasons that can be 
advanced for this lack of enthusiasm towards ‘Ali’s rallying calls. Firstly, ‘Ali had a 
coalition force to depend on that was factious and united only in their desire for 
power,181 but Mu‘awiya on the other hand, commanded a loyal and trained armed 
force that not only had conquered Syria,182 but regularly experienced battle in some 
form or another in protecting the borders or the annual campaigns against 
Byzantium.183 
 
Secondly, whilst Mu‘awiya held political control of his territories and allies firm, ‘Ali 
suffered terminal deterioration in his political credibility as caliph following the failed 
arbitration between himself and Mu‘awiya in 658 which had essentially deposed him 
as caliph.184 Political infighting and rebellion arose within the territories under his 
official authority but many of the tribes revolted against what they conceived to be the 
inevitable failure of ‘Ali’s political administration and the ever-widening power 
vacuum.185 
 
                                                
179 Abou El Fadl (2002), pp.34-6 
180 I.K., pp.424, 428 
181 Hodgson (1977), p.216 
182 Wellhausen (1927), p.58 
183 See 6.4.2. 
184 I.K., p.428 
185 Ibid., p.426 
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Thirdly, ‘Ali’s attempt to incite the rightful claim to authorise Jihad fi sabil l’Allah 
lacked any credibility since his predecessor ‘Uthman, never initiated Jihad against his 
Muslim opponents even when they had besieged him. Furthermore, most of the 
insurgents had joined ‘Ali’s armed forces and given him control of the Caliphate on a 
platter; thus to incite Jihad fi sabil l’Allah on account of political rebellion or 
insurgency would by necessity also mean that they had been legitimate targets of 
Jihad for ‘Uthman, and thus were also liable for his death. To wage Jihad was to 
condemn themselves. Mu‘awiya on the other hand, never cited Jihad specifically but 
called for the restoration of justice and retaliation against ‘Uthman’s killers – both 
claims being acceptable according to the Shari‘a and traditional Arab values. 
 
Lastly, is the idea that the domestic nature of the Fitna rendered the instrument of 
Jihad inoperable against Muslim opposition. This was evidenced by the fact that most 
of the Companions of the Prophet (al-Sahaba), a number going from the hundreds to 
thousands, living in Medina had refused to partake in the Fitna, most of them 
withdrawing after ‘Uthman’s murder and remaining neutral between ‘Ali and 
Mu‘awiya. This seems to reinforce the proposition previously stated, that it had been 
known Jihad was not to be waged against Muslims, or was effectively rendered an 
illegitimate use of the military instrument. 
 
However, the Kharijites whose break from ‘Ali’s camp after the event of arbitration, 
attempted to reconfigure recourse to authorising Jihad by declaring its commission as 
a legitimate independent instrument of military means in the face of oppression or 
political heresy. Their argument was that through arbitration, ‘Ali, and Mu‘awiya by 
extension, had apostatized by ruling outside of the Qur‘an; this meant that they were 
now legitimate targets of Jihad since they were no longer Muslims. Perhaps, their 
attempts had been encouraged by ‘Ali’s own claims to invoke Jihad which had been 
collectively ignored by the Companions. This event becomes the first recorded 
instance in Islamic history wherein Jihad fi sabil l’Allah is advocated outside of 
official central authority. The claim was in effect, the attempted privatisation of 
politico-religious rectitude laid claim by extension, to the right of waging Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah. Whilst this development had little direct systemic consequence, it was 
an important historical development. 
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However, to stress the strategic dynamic, the Kharijite innovation in the conception 
and practice of Jihad was to self-authorise Jihad fi sabil l’Allah external to central 
authority of the Muslims, such as the Caliph, thereby removing the employment of 
Jihad from structured policy to raw means. This was a reverberation to both the pre-
Islamic use of the term as well as the early second-stage function of Jihad bar it’s 
authorising figure. Up until this point, it can be conclusively stated, Jihad had been 
exclusively authorised in relation to policy. During the Fitna, after central authority 
had been overthrown, when ‘Ali’s claim to authority had been undermined, and with 
no other outstanding candidates available, Jihad was taken up as an individualistic 
enterprise without legitimate claim. 
6.8.5. Systemic Recession 
‘Ali’s administration was a bloody and violent political drama, where the interplay of 
tribal politics fused with religious fervor as the dar al-Islam plummeted into civil war. 
Systemic expansions virtually halted as the domestic crisis consumed the energies of 
dar al-Islam and absorbed the political will of the Muslims. Research question 3 has 
an almost self-explanatory answer at this stage; nonetheless the answer may be stated 
as follows: inconsequential changes took place systemically, with no movements in 
the strategic dynamics of Jihad as an instrument of policy. 
 
Although there were some territorial skirmishes during ‘Ali’s tenure, these were more 
accurately responsible or can be attributed to the continuation of policy by 
commanders in the respective theaters of operations, far removed from the political 
upheaval of the Fitna. To this extent, in relation to research questions 1 and 2, a 
continuation of policy is apparent although not necessarily having been issued from 
central government, but rather carrying on its own momentum reacting to the 
pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. Territories were often lost, as the 





6.9. Conclusions of Caliphate of ‘Ali 
Just as Abu Bakr’s administration was really the continuation of the Prophet’s 
policies; ‘Ali served more as an Advocatus or ‘Lord Protector’ of the dar al-Islam in a 
fashion more similar to Oliver Cromwell than a Caliph relative to ‘Umar and 
‘Uthman. In the end, the administration of ‘Ali was the Caliphate that never really 
was. Recorded in history as the fourth of the Rashidun, ‘Ali’s administration is best 
conceived as a transition government of martial law between the administrations of 
‘Uthman and eventually Mu‘awiya rather than an official institution of the Caliphate 
series. Nonetheless, almost certainly for reasons of political conviviality and 
harmony, the Muslim historians and later jurists designate ‘Ali’s administration as the 
last of the Rashidun era. 
 
Hodgson writes that throughout the early period ‘writers have marked off the periods 
of the caliphate according to extraneous criteria.’186 Hodgson argues that writers have 
followed later Sunni Muslims in acknowledging the administration of ‘Ali and for 
some peculiar reason, the brief claim to power that his son al-Hasan held before being 
bought off his claim by Mu‘awiya; as the fourth Medinan (and sometimes ‘fifth’) 
‘Orthodox’ caliphate. 187  Mu‘awiya on the other hand, and the Sufyanids are 
considered ‘Umayyads’ bunched together with the later Marwanids. Hodgson argues 
that the modern historian need not be bound by such considerations as the older 
Muslim historians, for whom the division between ‘Orthodox’ and ‘Umayyad’ caliphs 
had an emblematic value:  
 
When ‘Ali came to be lumped with the three Medina caliphs (quite 
late), Mu‘awiyah was correspondingly lumped with the 
Marwanids. This allowed the Muslims to split the work of 
establishing the caliphal structure into two parts: into the ‘good’ 
side of that work (including whatever was approved, of the work of 
subsequent caliphs), which was ascribed to ‘Umar; and into the 
‘bad’ side (including much of what ‘Umar did), symbolized in the 
setting up of ‘kingship’, which was ascribed to Mu‘awiyah and the 
                                                
186 Hodgson (1977), p.221, fn.7 
187 Ibid. 
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‘Umayyads’. For this purpose, ‘Uthman was ‘Orthodox’ and not 
‘Umayyad’.188  
 
If the Caliphates are to be numbered of the early period of Islam, then they are indeed 
four spread across five administrations. The first Caliphate by default belongs to the 
Prophet, but its administration was completed by Abu Bakr, thus delineating the first 
Caliphate proper; the second and third, belong exclusively to ‘Umar and ‘Uthman; the 
administration of ‘Ali was a transitional government or protectorate during the Civil 
War before the establishment of the final Caliphate of early Islam, that belonging to 
Mu‘awiya to whom our final chapter is concerned with. 




7.0. The Rise of the Jihad State (661 - 680) 
 
This chapter examines the formation and restoration of policies that reignited 
systemic warfighting to the ends of political objectives specifically, the administration 
of Mu‘awiya bin Abu Sufyan victor of the First Civil War of Islam (656-661). This 
chapter explores the culmination of research question 2, 3, and 4; sub-investigative 
question b and in particular, sub-investigative question d: 
 
d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the 
early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates 
strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy? 
 
7.1. The Caliphate of Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan 
Mu‘awiya was the first Caliph of the Umayyad House and the head of the later known 
‘Sufyanid’ branch of the dynasty.1 Although commonly referred to as the ‘first king 
of Islam’,2 Mu‘awiya adopted the epithet of his predecessors Amir al-Mu’meneen 
(Commander of the Believers).3 Mu‘awiya had served the Prophet as an officer in the 
Muslim army and also as secretary4 and scribe of the Qur’an,5 being particularly 
noted for his political acumen.6 He would later serve as governor of Syria from 639 
until 656 officially, retaining ‘unofficial’ control of power in Syria until he was 
declared as the new Caliph in 661.7 Mu‘awiya’s tenure as Caliph would continue until 
680, after which he appointed his unpopular son Yazid (680-3) his successor;8 and 
then his grandson whose rule lasted less than a year ending the controlling influence 
of the Sufyanid branch belonging to the Umayyad House in 684.9 
                                                
1 Hawting (2002), p.34 
2 I.K.a, p.21; Bewley (2002), pp.52, 59 
3 I.K.a, p.48; Humphreys (2006), p.104 
4 Bewley (2002), pp.3-6 
5 Humphreys (2006), p.6; I.K.a, p.22 
6 Hawting (2002), p.44; Robinson (2005), p.65 
7 During the Caliphate of ‘Umar from 639-644 and the Caliphate of ‘Uthman 644-56. 
8 See Rahman (2003), pp.98-9; and I.K.a, p.82; Yazid’s attempts to press his claim for legitimate 
recognition resulted in the Second Civil War in Islam (680-692) – see Donner (2012), p.177 
9 Rahman (2003), pp.104-4 
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Two decades of rule under Mu‘awiya was domestically a calm affair compared to the 
turbulence that had been experienced since the Caliphate of ‘Uthman, and broadly 
speaking was an ‘unqualified success.’10 It has been noted that it was more or less 
during this period that the dar al-Islam develops to become what would be recognised 
by contemporary standards as a state; 11  with infrastructure developing to 
accommodate a full standing army, taxation systems, administration and bureaucracy.  
 
7.2. The Two Faces of Mu‘awiya 
Mu‘awiya’s administration was a product of the socio-political turmoil of the Fitna 
and not considered a natural development of Islamic political transition.12 In this 
sense, the administration of Mu‘awiya, and the Umayyad Caliphate in general, was 
retrospectively considered the first truly political administration that facilitated the 
political organisation of the Muslims into a recognisable political state. Mu‘awiya’s 
apparently legendary political skill that reduced his estimation on the efficacy of 
violence, preferring to win without warfighting, and using low-coercion diplomacy 
and economic incentives as strategies rather than dependence upon offensive 
dominance. 
 
Early accounts of Mu‘awiya unanimously portrayed him as ‘a clever and successful 
ruler who got what he wanted by persuasion rather than force.’ 13 Mu‘awiya’s policies 
appeared to have had the character of ‘accommodationism’,14 as Mu‘awiya fondly 
practiced the method of ta’lif al-qulub. Mu‘awiya was known to shower gifts to 
regional actors, and when pressed as to his motives he would answer that he preferred 
to bribe than decapitate, or that ‘a war costs infinitely more.’15 Mu‘awiya’s political 
philosophy was summarised in his own words when he said: ‘I never use my voice if I 
can use my money, never my whip if I can use my voice, never my sword if I can use 
my whip; but, if I have to use my sword, I will.’16  
 
                                                
10 Robinson (2005), p.24; Kennedy (2007), p.349 
11 Donner (2012), p.172 
12 Khan (1973), p.69 
13 Hawting (2002), p.42; also Humphreys (2006), p.3; Bewley (2002), p.11 
14 Johnston (1995), p.112 
15 Bewley (2002), p.39 
16 Hawting (2002), p.42; also Bewley (2002), p.11; Humphreys (2006), p.3 
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Mu‘awiya became the proverbial godfather of the Umayyad House and probably the 
only Umayyad representative to enjoy legitimate acceptance by the majority of the 
Muslim population (bar the Shi‘at ul-‘Ali) during his lifetime. Later generations 
would accuse Mu‘awiya and his descendants as having imposed a kingship (mulk) 
over the Muslims, no different to practice of designating a king by the title of ‘Caesar’ 
or ‘Chosroes’17 as opposed to the egalitarian rule of the Rashidun. Ibn Khaldun, 
arguably the most important socio-historian Muslim scholar in Islamic history, was 
also one of the few Muslim historians, who wrote positively concerning the Sufyanid 
period of Umayyad rule casts them in a better light,  
 
The Umayyads continued to hold on to the power that had been 
established for them and to preserve it, and to protect the power 
that Allah had given them. They aspired to lofty matters and 
rejected base ones. Eventually, the power passed to their wasteful 
descendants who were only concerned with the gratification of 
their desires and with sinful pleasures.18  
 
Two things follow from Ibn Khaldun’s comment; firstly, the early recognition that the 
legitimacy of their rule was based upon the Divine Right that followed the aftermath 
of the Fitna; and secondly, the credibility of their government was tied to their 
pursuance of ‘lofty’ matters, which systemically could have only meant one thing – 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. The transition between the successive Marwanid administrations 
(684-750)19 succeeding the Sufyanid administrations of the Umayyad House, were 
plagued by the problems of legitimacy that sullied the reputation of the Umayyad 
House until its fall in 750.20 Successive generations of Marwanid administrations 
often sought to tie their policies to a credible origin - Mu‘awiya and his two-decade 
long administration during which he pressed his claim to legitimate authority, 
inherent ‘right’, and in many ways, royal distinction.21 
                                                
17 Hawting (2002), p.12 
18 Ibn Khaldun (1980a), p.424 
19 Hawting (2002), p.47; Robinson (2005), pp.23-6 
20 Donner (1998), pp.187, 189, 191 
21 Blankinship (1994), p.24 
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7.2.1. Manifest Destiny 
Ibn Khaldun is adamant of two things; that the early historians agreed that the 
Umayyad (Sufyanid) administrations of which Mu‘awiya was the standard, were 
legitimate and credible authorities that acted in the interests of maintaining the 
integrity of the dar al-Islam; and secondly, that their policies were a continuation of 
those set by the Rashidun and therefore in accordance with the trajectory of the 
Prophet.22 Ibn Khaldun, though broadly speaking of the Sufyanid administrations, 
inadvertently characterises the qualitative nature of their policies writing: 
 
Even though they were kings, their royal ways were not those of 
worthless men and oppressors. They complied with the intentions 
of the truth with all their energy, except when necessity caused 
them to do something (that was worthless). Such (a necessity 
existed) when there was fear that the whole thing might face 
dissolution. (To avoid that) was more important to them than any 
(other) intention. That this was (their attitude) is attested by the fact 
that they followed and imitated (the early Muslims). It is further 
attested by the information that the ancients had about their 
conditions.23  
 
The Caliphate of Mu‘awiya was a return to the Caliphate of ‘Umar in many ways,24 
and perhaps with a view to achieving the status and immortality of ‘Umar in the 
collective memory of the Muslims, Mu‘awiya sought legacy over absolute 
dominion.25 It is proposed that the reintroduction of the Da’wa policy backed by 
unceasing Jihad was in no doubt a policy driven and maintained by the demands of 
credible demonstration. Just as the Prophet and the Rashidun (bar ‘Ali) had 
demonstrated that God was with them through the spectacle of war, Mu‘awiya 
astutely recognised that victory in battle afforded the greatest demonstration of God 
legitimating his rule and establishing his legacy.26 
 
                                                
22 Research question 2 is therefore historically validated according to Ibn Khaldun. 
23 Ibn Khaldun (1980a), p.423 
24 Hodgson (1977), p.217 
25 Humphreys (2006), p.104 
26 Luttwak (2011), p.212 
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Abu Bakr and ‘Umar were the only two real policy-making administrations at the 
systemic level, with ‘Uthman’s administration continuing the work of ‘Umar. Both 
administrations were ‘parabellum’ governments, that is, administrations in 
preparation for or in anticipation of war to protect or promote Islam, premising their 
identities based upon the metanarrative of Islam and the concept of absolute Jihad. 
The perpetual contest of absolute Jihad naturally resulted in a state of hostile tension, 
sometimes argued as a permanent condition of the international.27 The anarchical 
society was, according to the meta-narrative the result of denying God’s 
Sovereignty.28 Mu‘awiya had been a part of the Rashidun legacy. He was well versed 
in the policies of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, and had substantial politico-military 
experience. He had participated in the crucible of the Ridda Wars as Abu Bakr and 
Khalid against the odds destroyed the rebel-apostates.29  
 
Mu’awiya is reported to have said of his predecessors: ‘As for Abu Bakr, he never 
craved for the world and it never wished for him. As for ‘Umar, it sought him but he 
never wished for it. And as for us, we are immersed in it.’30 Elsewhere, Mu‘awiya 
stated: ‘I desired the way followed by Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, but I was unable to 
follow it’.31 Mu‘awiya is further reported to have said to Abu Bakr’s son ‘Your father 
smoothed the terrain for me and set up the basis of our dominion. If your father acted 
arbitrarily [meaning not according to some undisclosed policy ordered by the 
Prophet], then we are content to follow in his footsteps.’32 Mu’awiya had emerged 
from the ashes of the Fitna with God’s favour, and believed that he had to take 
measures to prevent the Muslim community from sinking back into chaos. It was this 
sense of mission and purposes that arguably influenced Mu’awiya more than anything 
else. In fact, there is no reason to suggest that Mu‘awiya sought other than to continue 
and build on the example of his predecessors, with the belief in Providence and 
Manifest Destiny as the bedrock, 33  with the policies of the Rashidun as the 
foundation. 
                                                
27 Spencer (2002), p.145; Khadduri (1955), pp.51-4 
28 Wellhausen (1927), p.8; Robinson (2003), p.130 
29 Bewley (2002), p.48 
30 I.K., p.221 
31 Bewley (2002), p.33 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sub-investigative question b. is thus proposed as being extremely relevant to the strategic actor as 
part of the value system that influenced decision-making. 
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7.3. The Grand Strategy of Da’wa 2.0. 
Mu‘awiya did not publically promote any particular ‘version’ of Islam nor can be 
identified as having a specific foreign policy that substantively differed to the 
trajectory set by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab. 34  Mu‘awiya’s new Caliphate differed 
however, in that it focused on the more secular concerns of strategic interactions that 
had been swept under the current of Providence by his predecessors. Islamic history 
has long held that the maghazi and Rashidun periods of leadership represented the 
establishment of God’s Sovereignty on earth and that leadership of the dar al-Islam 
should be religious or pious, before political. Piety, and not policy, represented an 
ideal aspiration of the emerging Muslim collective that was fronted as the duty of the 
Caliph. However, Mu‘awiya’s new grand strategic Da’wa policy was clearly a 
consequence of the strategic environment rather than by the religious determination of 
policy. 
 
A second difference between Mu‘awiya’s Da’wa policy from its previous incarnation 
was that material incentives that were previously complimentary to the da’wa, 
became an established strategic objective within the new version of policy. In other 
words, where previously the material gains were a welcome bonus to the primary 
objective of da’wa; now, the material rewards of missionary practice became very 
much an integral variable in the politico-strategic calculus and military planning. This 
reconfiguration of the Da’wa policy from the ‘pure’ practice of the Rashidun was 
heavily criticised by those who viewed such variables to be contaminating a pure 
calculus fi sabil l’Allah.35 
 
Looking back at the military campaigns and policies undertaken by Mu‘awiya during 
his administration, it can be proposed that he had two identifiable objectives: first and 
foremost, to maintain and enhance the domestic political stability of the dar al-Islam; 
and secondly, to disrupt regional systemic stability. Both objectives were sought 
within the confines of a total strategy of Da’wa that like the original Da’wa policy of 
‘Umar, served as a covert means to marry systemic goals with domestic stability. 
                                                
34 Humphreys (2006), pp.1, 19 
35 Ibid., pp.3, 10 
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7.3.1. Political Stability Measures 
By design or not,36 the Banu Umayya, or the Umayyad House, had within thirty years 
following their fall from power in Mecca, repositioned themselves within the new 
political structure rejoining the elite ranks of political power and authority; 
 
As a result the Fitna has often been interpreted as the climax of a 
struggle for power within Islam between that class of Meccans 
typified by the Umayyads, the wealthy and powerful leaders of pre-
Islamic Mecca, and those, largely from a lower social stratum, 
whose acceptance of Islam was more wholehearted. To use 
expressions frequently applied, it was the result of a struggle 
between the old and the new aristocracy.37 
 
Emerging from the ashes of the Fitna as the uncontested Caliph, the pragmatic and 
politically astute Mu‘awiya was able to reorganise his administration with great 
political efficiency so as to maximise his authority with the remaining tribal elders. 
Mu‘awiya moved quickly to consolidate public opinion and win the favour of the 
Arab political elite through a decentralised government more aligned with traditional 
Arab tribal policymaking.38 This domestic stability prompted a sense of internal peace 
and prosperity and externally facilitated the resumption of the Da’wa policy from the 
temporary hiatus of the First Civil War. 
 
Although Medina had always been the capital of Muslim power, bar ‘Ali’s brief claim 
to power operating out of the garrison town of Kufa;39 Mu‘awiya established his 
capital in Damascus, Mecca or Medina would never be a seat of power again in 
Islamic history.40 Successive Muslim governments would avoid both cities that were 
infused with the legacy of Prophet and most likely, the expectations of religious 
standards and conformity that no administration wanted to be judged by.41 
                                                
36 Hawting (2002) notes that it has been suggested, predominantly within the Shi‘ite literature, that the 
Fitna had been engineered by the Umayyads as a means to reclaim their former glory – pp.31-2 
37 Ibid., p.31 
38 Donner (2012), pp.170-2; Robinson (2005), pp.63-4; Bewley (2002), p.31-3 
39 Rahman (2003), p.85 
40 Hodgson (1977), p.217 
41 Wellhausen (1927), p.54 
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7.3.2. Post-Fitna Damage Control 
Mu‘awiya was in his element when it came to bargaining and balancing the fragile 
peace following the Fitna.42 Mu‘awiya held an extremely sensitive strategic calculus 
to his policies, whilst adhering to the trajectories set by his predecessors and was 
relatively restrained in his use of force and the estimation of force to advance his 
interests in general. Mu‘awiya had grown up in a powerful political household and 
had learnt the art of politics.43 The Quraysh were a political tribe whose more recent 
economic successes had only entrenched their diplomatic credentials amongst the 
Arab tribes. As regional balancers between tribal politics and economic fortunes, the 
Quraysh were, as a tribe, highly adept politicians. In the traditions recorded of 
Mu‘awiya he is portrayed as someone who embodied the concept of hilm par 
excellence. Hilm was ‘a traditional Arab virtue signifying subtlety and cunning in the 
management of men and affairs and it is seen as a desideratum for the traditional Arab 
leader.’ 44 
 
Mu‘awiya’s style of bargaining was well-known to prefer ‘using flattery and material 
inducements rather than force, ruling in the style of a tribal shaykh who has no 
coercive power at his disposal and depends upon his own reputation and persuasive 
skills.’45 Furthermore, Mu‘awiya was able to win over public opinion by avoiding the 
pitfalls of his predecessors by actively responding to the demands of the public.46 
Mu‘awiya would discharge governors who lost the public vote so to speak, preferring 
to appoint or re-appoint based upon opinion polls of whom the regional public 
preferred. 47  A return to meritocracy identified the character of Mu‘awiya’s 
administration.48 Additionally, taxation was balanced, and the citizens were not only 
protected, but also prospering under his fiscal, economic and social reforms. Political 
dissidence was tolerated so long as allegiance was maintained,49 and the form of 
dissidence did not escalate beyond words and ideas.50 
                                                
42 Bewley (2002), p.32 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hawting (2002), p.42; see also Humphreys (2006), p.3; Bewley (2002), p.11 
45 Ibid. all; and Hodgson (1977), p.219 
46 Bewley (2002), p.54 
47 Ibid. 
48 Quigley (2013), p.741; Hodgson (1977), p.219: Bewley (2002), p.56 
49 Hodgson (1977), p.218; Blankinship (1994), p.24 
50 Bewley (2002), p.52 
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7.3.3. Administrative Reforms 
Mu‘awiya stabilised the Muslim community by returning to the model of ‘Umar’s 
administration, but realised that it was inherently unstable following the Fitna. The 
decentralised nature of ‘Umar’s administration was not safe for the new strategic 
setting and environment, and therefore began political and military reforms to slowly 
introduce a central government and authority that was independent of tribalism and 
the haunting culture of jahiliyya. Quigley argues that Mu‘awiya’s administrative 
reforms were conducted on the model of the Persians, but were part of a long-term 
programme to centralise government with institutions of policing, judiciary, and 
financial bureaus that he never lived to see out.51 Most of these reforms were 
introduced slowly so as not to undermine the tribal system still in play at the time of 
his early administration. It would not be a far claim Quigley argues, to suggest that 
Mu‘awiya’s master plan had always been to supplant the tribal politics of the Arabs 
that had ravaged the Muslim community with a new model of central authority.52  
 
Muawiya’s chief reform was in political organisation. It is possible 
that he was not clear as to his real aims in his own mind, but the 
general trend of his reforms was to replace the previous system of 
Arabic tribal exploitation by a relatively secular state organized as 
a dynastic monarchy in the Omayyad family. This system would 
have subordinated all subjects, Arabs and non-Arabs, Moslems and 
non-Moslems, to the state.53 
 
Hodgson similarly agrees that the long-term goal of centralisation was what 
Mu‘awiya’s administrative reforms were designed to implement as ‘Mu‘awiyah took 
measures to make the central control of revenue more effective than ‘Umar had made 
it.’54 In the midst of the anarchy generated during the Fitna, Mu‘awiya sought to 
create a quasi-Hobbesian Leviathan to bring stability amongst the Arabs and by 
extension, throughout the dar al-Islam.  
                                                
51 Quigley (2013), p.739 
52 Bewley (2002), disagrees and argues that the shift to centralisation coincided with the decadence of 
the later Marwanid administrations, finally becoming state practice under the ‘Abbasid dynasty from 
750 onwards. – pp.68-72 
53 Quigley (2013), p.739 
54 Hodgson (1977), p.218 
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7.3.4. The Reinstatement of the Shura Council 
Mu‘awiya’s initial preference for a decentralised administration meant that political 
decision-making was inclusive of all members of the political elite, new or old, who 
were invited to offer and discuss their opinions on policy.55 It is commonplace 
amongst writers on the Umayyad period to judge the entire dynasty in one fell swoop 
at their worst.56 The consultative practices (al-shura) that were the foundational 
method of policy and decision-making during the Rashidun era, it is claimed, did not 
exist the moment after Mu‘waiya’s official status as Caliph.57 This is simply not true 
and reflects popular regurgitation of the selective source materials we have previously 
discussed in our literature review. 
 
The truth of the matter is that the administration of ‘Umar is the only real example of 
al-shura during the Rashidun period. Abu Bakr presided over a war counsel, a 
qualitatively different model of consultation and decision-making compared to the 
shura council of ‘Umar. During the administration of ‘Uthman, the basic institution of 
the shura council remained the same as inherited from ‘Umar but gradually 
experienced diminishing participation as ‘Uthman would increasingly ignore, 
overrule, or just choose otherwise to the council.58 Finally the administration of ‘Ali 
reflected what the practice of shura had become by his time with political 
fragmentation and infighting rife so as to render the practice redundant. It was 
Mu‘awiya who restored the practice of al-shura to his administration, and in 
particular to the issue of policymaking for systemic strategic interaction. 
 
At this juncture it should be quite clear that in relation to research question 2, the 
overwhelming historical evidence confirms that Mu‘awiya certainly attempted to 
revert back to a continuation of politics and policies that the ‘Umar Doctrine had 
established albeit within the context of the new strategic setting and environment. 
 
                                                
55 Bewley (2002), pp.52-8 
56 Madelung (2001), pp.309-10 
57 al-Raysuni (2011) in his study of the practice of shura is guilty of indulging this point whilst grossly 
exaggerating the practice amongst the Rashidun. See pp.94-113 
58 I.K., pp.261-2 
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7.3.5. The Return of the ‘Umar Doctrine 
‘Ali had not been as politically astute as his predecessors;59 Mu‘awiya, a man better 
adapted to politics, understood that the stability of his new regime depended upon his 
ability to control the tribes such that ‘[t]he success of their integration of the 
tribesmen into a state, then, depended as much upon their ability to use tribal ties for 
their own ends as it did upon their ability to override those ties.’60 Donner continues 
to explain that this policy, that originated with the ‘Umar Doctrine calculated that 
 
… the effectiveness with which the rulers were able to control the 
thousands of tribesmen now under their charge and to bring them to 
do their bidding, was also the result of the elite’s keen awareness of 
the ingrained strength of tribal ties and of the ways in which these 
ties could be used to foster, rather than to obstruct, their 
consolidation of power.61  
 
In the post-Fitna years of his administration, there is little doubt that Mu‘awiya was a 
proponent of the ‘Umar Doctrine.62 Using the tried and tested methods that he himself 
had applied as a governor under orders from ‘Umar, Mu‘awiya was well aware of the 
doctrine and the political objectives of the resettlement policy. The move to reinstate 
a decentralised and open shura council paid dividends for Mu‘awiya as he was able to 
lure the tribal chiefs into his court and secure their allegiances through inclusive 
decision-making, political status, and financial incentives. The allegiance of a tribal 
chief was tantamount to the allegiance of the whole tribe. 
 
During the first decade of the Umayyad Caliphate, Mu‘awiya not only continued the 
resettlement policy of the ‘Umar Doctrine but also the particulars of the policy such 
as non-intervention into non-security matters and administrating tax collection alone 
without interference into internal affairs of the locals.63 He differed with ‘Umar on 
enforcing Arab segregation between the populations and soldiers however.64 
                                                
59 Humphreys (2006), p.107; Madelung (2001), p.310 
60 Donner (1981), p.258 
61 Ibid. 
62 Quigley (2013), p.738 
63 Qurbanov (2010), p.116 
64 Quigley (2013), p.738 
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7.3.6. Military Reforms 
Alongside the re-institution of the resettlement policy came the positioning of forward 
operating bases and border outposts (ribat) along the frontiers of the dar al-Islam, 
signaling the firm entrenchment of military operations continuing previous 
expansions.65 Mu‘awiya maintained a personal highly disciplined armed force in 
Syria, who had been under his command since his days as governor.66 Mu‘awiya’s 
Syrian armed force were fiercely loyal to Mu‘awiya who in turn, ensured they were 
well paid and their families were provided for when sent on extended campaigns into 
remote areas.67 Mu‘awiya made a point of improving organisation and infrastructure 
of the garrisons of Kufa and Basra;68 and selectively appointing strong commanders 
and lieutenants in Basra and Kufa;69 which was in order to maintain the integrity of 
the strategic features of the resettlement policies and discipline of the garrisons.70  
 
Mu‘awiya was also very particular to appoint loyal and battle-hardened men to 
positions of command.71 Additionally, Mu‘awiya presided over extensive military and 
naval reforms, which Quigley argues ‘revolutionized their organisation and tactics.’72 
By this Quigley is referring to the introduction of drill and discipline that the 
Byzantine armies had used. Mu‘awiya’s almost three-decade long relationship with 
Byzantine armed forces had left a strong impact on him,73 as he modeled his armed 
forces upon Byzantine naval and infantry tactics and maneuver. Additionally, 
Admirals of the navy were given the same status and prestige of army generals.74 In 
addition to military reforms, and between the administrative, Kennedy notes the 
establishment of the institutions of the shurta (police) 75  and the haras (close-
protection units) within the same year of Mu‘awiya’s ascension to official power.76 It 
is in the context and background of these developments that we propose the new 
Da’wa policy initiated by Mu‘awiya. 
                                                
65 Donner (2012), p.172 
66 Hodgson (1977), pp.217-8 
67 Bewley (2002), p.48; Kennedy (2005), p.12 
68 Blankinship (1994), p.24 
69 Quigley (2013), p.738 
70 Bewley (2002), pp.54-5 
71 Humphreys (2006), pp.105-6 
72 Quigley (2013), p.738 
73 Humphreys (2006), p.105 
74 Bewley (2002), p.49 
75 Rashid (1983), pp.83-4 
76 Kennedy (2005), p.13; Lev (2006), p.622; Ebstein (2010), p.113; Hawting (2002), p.35 
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7.3.7. Imperial by Divine Right 
In a strategically sound development, it is proposed that Mu‘awiya restored the Da’wa 
policy to advance the strategic interests of the dar al-Islam by reigniting the residual 
energies left over from the Fitna in combination with ‘weaponising’ providentialism.  
Mu‘awiya’s policy of Da’wa was built upon the meta-narrative Islam and the human 
condition that concludes with the need for da’wa as a means to human emancipation 
from dependency and servitude to other human beings, to God alone. The new Da’wa 
policy was designed to reignite the fervor of righteousness and emancipatory mission 
of da’wa that had propelled the Futuh,77 by translating the absolute Jihad as a matter 
of national policy and thus the duty of the military establishment.78 Campaigns 
against the dar al-Harb (lit. the Territories of War) – any territory not under the 
jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah, therefore became not only a matter of foreign policy, but 
also a spectacle for both Muslims and non-Muslims. As far as Muslims were 
concerned, the Da’wa policy was designed to remind them that God was with 
Mu‘awiya, thus to overthrow the government would be to overthrow or at the very 
least, undermine God’s Will and Judgment in the matter of authority.79  
 
In relation to the non-Muslims of the dar al-Harb - the ‘Divine Right’ of Mu‘awiya 
could only be maintained by demonstration. Warfare in the medieval period, whether 
in Europe or the Middle East, shared the Judaic notion of inviting God’s Judgment 
through battle.80 Jan Honig, writing on European warfare in the Middle Ages, 
explains the simple formula that translates exactly to what we propose was 
Mu‘awiya’s underlying motivation, and what would become the obsession of the 
Umayyad House and it’s conception of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah as a battle-centric policy: 
 
In a society which believed that an omnipotent and omniscient God 
determined the course of history, ultimately for good and not ill, 
there naturally arose the problem of knowing the will of this 
supernatural being. Means were sought of inviting God to divulge 
His intentions. One means was the trial by battle. […] Battle was 
                                                
77 Khalidi (1994), pp.65-67 
78 Hamid (2004), p.15; Robinson (2005), p.60 
79 Robinson (2003), p.133 
80 Donner (1991), p.37 
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not a simple test of strength, but a test of divine favour and 
justice.81 
 
In Clausewitzian terms, battle was a test of the opponent’s power of resistance – ‘the 
total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.’82 Contrary to popular opinion 
amongst their detractors, it is more than plausible that Mu‘awiya and the Umayyad 
House firmly believed in their legitimate claim to political authority over the Muslim 
population that had been demonstrated in the crucible of the Fitna. Mu‘awiya’s new 
Da’wa policy sought to invoke the philosophy of Old Testament Jewish Holy War,83 
most reasonably something Mu‘awiya had learned about through his extensive 
dealings with Christians and Jews in his capacity as governor of Syria, and the 
Byzantine Empire;84 and follow in the footsteps of the heroes of Israel such as Joshua, 
Gideon and Samson who understood that there was no room for peaceful coexistence 
with their mutually exclusive systems of faith and values.85 
7.3.8. Holy War 
The Imperial policy of Da’wa’ authoured by Mu‘awiya raises the question of Jihad as 
a teleological consequence of Islam.86 There are many verses in the Qur’an revealed 
during both phases two and three of the maghazi that suggest warfare is a permanent 
condition coupled with the hadith narrations found in various collections.87 Although 
the Judaic notion of warfighting as a means to bring about God’s Judgment is inherent 
to the notion of absolute Jihad, it seems that for Mu‘awiya’s designs, the value of 
absolute Jihad was the weaponising effect of morale that accompanied it rather than 
the objective of spreading the da’wa or actually invoking God’s Judgment.88 A Holy 
War of forced conversion seems to have been very far from Mu‘awiya’s objectives, as 
would a war of genocide or mass extermination. 
 
                                                
81 Honig (2001), p.121 
82 OW, p.77 
83 See Deuteronomy 7:1-6 
84 Robinson (2005), p.60 
85 Armstrong (2001), p.8 
86 Sub-investigative question b. 
87 See Q, 2:216, 244, 251; 9:5 & 25; a comprehensive selection of hadith from various collections are 
presented in Ibn al-Nuhhas (2002), pp.13-38; Spencer (2002), p.145; and Khadduri (1955), pp.51-4 
88 Humphreys (2006), p.104 
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Indeed, the later policies of his Marwanid descendants made the very distinct point to 
actively discourage conversions whilst simultaneously championing the mission of 
da’wa and the imperatives of absolute Jihad.89 For sure, absolute Jihad shared the 
same theo-philosophical foundation of a state of war found in the Old Testament yet 
the practice of Jihad in reality hitherto Mu‘awiya was anything like the practice of 
Jewish warriors. The state of war between the dar al-Islam and Hellenistic 
Byzantium, for example, was not one of extermination. Walter Kaegi explains: 
 
This limited coexistence and occasional reciprocity or symmetry of 
policies – and it would be wrong to assume much symmetry – in no 
sense involved any concession by either leadership of ultimate 
principles and claims, which prevented or at least restricted any 
easy positive evolution toward genuine coexistence.90 
 
The Rashidun had all translated the existential threat of the state of war – absolute 
Jihad - between Islam and all other faiths and value systems into a pragmatic Jihad of 
relative gains under conditions of anarchy and relative security. The horizontal 
expression of the Da’wa policy had sought the offensive domination of the enemy 
but the friction of the systemic environment had reduced the initially explosive Jihad 
to an eventual form of attritional warfare. Mu‘awiya’s policy against Byzantium in 
particular, despite its grand imperial character was also non-zero sum and interpolated 
attrition into the strategic calculus over decisive victory. 
 
Therefore, both sub-investigative questions b. and d. share a common explanation, 
that Jihad was subordinated to a policy of imperial ambitions that were premised upon 
teleological foundations of the meta-narrative of Islam. Providence was used to 
encourage Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, which was backed by a Divine Promise of victory.91 
The desired result would be a heightened offense since the value of the Divine 
Promise transcended mortal threat, almost encouraging death. 
 
                                                
89 See Hawting (2002), p.4; Fierro (2007), pp.8-9 
90 Kaegi (2000), pp.254-5 
91 Q, 2:246-9 & 8:19 
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‘Indeed,’ Blankinship writes, ‘the persistence of the Muslim movement forward on all 
fronts, for nearly a century, can only be explained if this basic doctrine of early 
Muslim ideology is taken into account.’92 Where the existential threat perceived by 
the anarchic environment drove the Da’wa policy under ‘Umar and later ‘Uthman, the 
new Imperial Da’wa policy was effectively a pragmatic means to extend political 
dominion in the name of God’s Sovereignty and balance domestic stability. Just as 
claims of conquest for material benefits alone during the Futuh can be dismissed as 
simplistic; so too, would it be to accuse Mu‘awiya of using Jihad to be solely a front 
for dynastic ambitions and material gains. 
 
Donner and Blankinship likewise reach this conclusion, arguing that the character of 
early Islam was always that of a committed religious Believers’ movement, even 
during times of prosperity. A firm religious conviction in spreading God’s writ, 
infused with an apocalyptic inevitability dominated the general belief and support for 
Jihad over the corollary material gains which were increasingly concomitant with the 
success of the policy.93 ‘Such a persistent dedication to armed struggle as exhibited by 
the early Muslims required an ideological belief to back it, even if worldly 
expectations also played a role.’ Blankinship writes, ‘After all, the Muslim fighters, 
especially in the earliest period, were not professional soldiers but, nevertheless, 
carried out the jihad continuously, despite numerous debacles and defeats.’94  
 
Mu‘awiya’s will to invite God’s Judgment through the trial of battle reiterates the 
battle-centric approach of the proposition that ‘War is an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will.’95 Accordingly, the best explanation for the design of an 
imperial policy is to be found in the supreme confidence that Providence might afford 
in decision-making as the ultimate force-multiplier. After all, if military capabilities 
alone are enough to inspire bullish confidence to advance offensive strategic action, 
what then of the Promise of God Himself?96 
 
                                                
92 Blankinship (1994), pp.1-2 
93 Donner (2012), pp.197-9 
94 Blankinship (1994), p.2 
95 OW, p.75 
96 Luttwak (2011), p.198 
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7.4. The Pragmatic Imperial Holy War 
In building the new empire, it is proposed that Mu‘awiya had four primary 
imperatives that the imperial Da’wa policy was designed to deliver: firstly, the Da’wa 
policy was needed to reinforce the meta-narrative of Islam and the certainty in 
absolute Jihad thereby increasing the recruitment of warriors to advance the frontiers 
of Islam. A new generation of warriors was to be recruited, who had not been part of 
the Rashidun era, but longed for the glory and immortality that only the battlefield 
could enshrine in history. Hodgson sums up the problem and answer that Mu‘awiya 
had to address: 
 
As was appropriate to the restorer of the caliphal state, the 
conquering force of Islam was renewed; but the expansive power 
was no longer so overwhelming. A new political balance had had 
time to develop in such lands as had not been overwhelmed at first, 
and henceforth further conquests were due as much to the resources 
of an established major empire still in full vigour, as to the pressure 
of the mass enthusiasms which seemed almost to carry themselves 
forward in the time of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman.97 
 
The secondary imperative demanded that warfighting had to be sustained for domestic 
purposes, and this was the greater or more pressing socio-political imperative. 
‘Mu‘awiya’s decisions were politically informed: he knew perfectly well that the 
caliphate was founded on jihad; that it was its raison d’etre and the Arab soldiery 
who had created it knew no other métier.’98 During periods of conquest, there had 
been no rebellions during the administration of ‘Umar,99 and it was when the Jihad 
began to slow down during the administration of ‘Uthman that the bughat began to 
arouse. Mu‘awiya understood that ‘[w]ithout new campaigns to provide them with a 
sense of purpose and direction, they would turn to fighting amongst themselves and 
even against him.’100 Ibn Khaldun explains the strategic setting as follows: 
 
                                                
97 Hodgson (1977), p.219 
98 Humphreys (2006), p.104 
99 Kaegi (2000), p.269 
100 Humphreys (2006), p.104 
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The restraining influence of religion had weakened. The restraining 
influence of government (mulk) and group (asabiyya) was needed. 
If, under those circumstances, someone not acceptable to the group 
had been appointed as successor (to the caliphate), such an 
appointment would have been rejected by it. The (chances of the 
appointee) would have been quickly demolished, and the 
community would have been split and torn by dissension.101 
 
By government and group, Ibn Khaldun is referring to political authority and ties of 
solidarity. Thus, Mu‘awiya sought to tie his Divine Right of authority to the 
imperative of Jihad as a means to bind the community to his authority by means of his 
policies. As the Amir al-Mu’meneen he was empowered to lead the Da’wa, to wage 
Jihad, and expand the dominion of God on earth;102 and as Muslims, their duty was to 
support him through the various means of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. Thirdly, as a 
consequence of the former imperatives, warfighting had to be sustained in order to not 
only maintain and deploy ongoing military operations, the soldiers payrolls and 
pensions; but also the war booty which provided alongside material plunder, extended 
territories rich in agriculture, livestock, as well as captives for ransom, slaves, and 
most of all, taxes.  
 
Finally, Mu‘awiya was undoubtedly aware that it was during the Caliphate of Abu 
Bakr that Arabian hegemony was consolidated; and during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, 
that the dar al-Islam established itself as a regional hegemony, the foundations of 
which the Umayyad dynasty would be built upon. Between the Caliphate of ‘Uthman 
and Mu‘awiya only bloody civil strife halted the systematic politico-military 
expansion of the dar al-Islam. Mu‘awiya must have recognised that the earlier 
successes of the Rashidun had cleared the region of great powers and even managed 
to intimidate offshore threats. Mu‘awiya knew that he had to maintain or regain the 
strategic initiative of his predecessors. 
 
                                                
101 Ibn Khaldun (1980), p.431 
102 Humphreys (2006), p.104 
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7.5. Return of the Security Protocol 
So far, we have examined the immediate measures and policies undertaken by 
Mu‘awiya that were essentially designed to create, maintain and promote domestic 
stability. In doing so, we have already demonstrated the continuation of policies that 
subordinated Jihad to a politico-strategic calculus that Mu‘awiya designed to be 
‘total’ in its effects and influence. Jihad was subordinated to imperial designs and 
dressed in the robes of holy war as a means to reunite the Muslim community against 
the external world. 
 
However, the strategic dynamics of Jihad do not end with the identification of its 
continuation as an instrument of political design; rather, there exists another subtle, 
yet telling evolution in the application of warfighting that has hitherto yet to be 
explored. This element that shall be investigated for the remainder of the chapter, and 
tested diagnostically, since it concerns the qualitative nature of the offense in relation 
to the second objective of Mu‘awiya’s grand strategy of Da’wa – to disrupt regional 
systemic stability. The table below lists the cluster of signs and symptoms identifiably 
present during the period of investigation. Diagnostic evaluation begins with 
hypotheses H, F, G, followed by D and E. 
 
Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War103 
Actor A B C D E F G H I J 
Mu‘awiya 
661-680 
✗ ✗ ✗ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✗ ✗ 
 
7.5.1. Strategic Misdirection and Disruption 
‘Regarding the caliph Mu‘awiya in Syria,’ Hawting writes, ‘the period of his rule is 
portrayed as one of internal security and external expansion and aggression.’104 
Whilst Mu‘awiya resumed the Jihad and all fronts following the hiatus of the First 
Civil war, ‘We do not know where they went or what were either their immediate or 
                                                
103 Key: ✖  = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
✗  = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis 
104 Hawting (2002), p.41 
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long-term objectives’; 105  Humphreys writes, which is peculiar given that the 
investment and resources needed for war would not have been lost on such a 
politically astute man. 
 
Indeed, the most accurate answer is that the specificities of decision-making were not 
recorded as to be the exact locations to which operations were directed and for what 
ends. Thus, the early Muslim historians note the campaigns and their general 
directions, such as Anatolia, Constantinople, North Africa, and the most frequently 
vague – against the Romans or Byzantines; but rarely more information than this 
except the outcome of the expedition and notables who might have died during 
them.106 Poor historical record keeping is probably less to blame than the more 
plausible recognition that military campaigns became less publicised under Mu‘awiya 
than they had been during successive Rashidun administrations. For one reason, 
Mu‘awiya ‘drew on all tribes as much as possible for his military backing, playing 
them off against one another when necessary, but keeping the interests of all tied in 
one way or another to the state’;107 this form of political manipulation would have 
allowed him to create a hierarchical set of information distribution. Such an artifice 
can be gleamed from the manner in which he had instructed his lieutenant and foster 
brother, Ziyad to manage the tribal factions in Iraq;  
 
by using one group to control another, and by using the tribal 
notables to control the masses of ordinary tribesmen, he managed 
to keep most groups of tribesmen from becoming too powerful and 
preserved among them at least a modicum of interest in serving the 
state.108 
 
The overall strategy would have been one of misdirection; busying the tribal chiefs 
with local politics but not excluding them from the open floor of the shura council in 
the knowledge that they would agree to Mu‘awiya’s preferences as long as they could 
secure his backing for their own, more pressing, tribal politics. Furthermore, the tribal 
chiefs would be less inclined to discuss matters of international politics over their 
                                                
105 Humphreys (2006), p.2 
106 Ibid., p.106; Kennedy (2005), p.12 
107 Donner (1981), pp.276-7 
108 Ibid., p.277 
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own, and even less inclined to busy themselves with informing others about 
Mu‘awiya’s intentions.  
7.5.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 8. Secrecy is More Common and Dangerous - Hypothesis H 
Hypothesis H, explains that when the offensive dominates, foreign and defense policy 
is more secretive. 109  As a matter of policy, that is rational calculation, the 
reinstatement of the Da’wa to serve the interests of restoring, and advancing, the 
interests of the dar al-Islam towards regional hegemony would have been sound 
judgement. (Assumption A). Even if Mu‘awiya believed that he still controlled the 
strategic initiative or remained offense dominant in relation to other regional actors 
(Assumption B); the prime predictions (2 & 3) of offense-defense theory would 
forecast a resumption of limited war in either case: 110 
 
2. States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive 
vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states; (Assumption 
A) 
3. A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it 
has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities. (Assumption B) 
 
The important relation of Hypothesis H is that of information and timing. 
Assumptions A and B stipulated above are both amenable to considerations of 
Hypothesis H in this context regarding secrecy and information, Van Evera explains 
the correlation as follows: 
 
Governments cloak their foreign and defense policies in greater 
secrecy when conquest is easy. An information advantage confers 
more rewards, and a disadvantage raises more dangers: lost secrets 
could risk a state’s existence. Thus states compete for information 
advantage by concealing their foreign policy strategies and military 
plans and forces.111 
 
                                                
109 Van Evera (2004), pp.227-8 
110 Ibid., p.244 
111 Ibid., p.233 
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As regards timing, conquest is given the advantage to position based upon superior 
information to offset the timeframe of operation between two actors such that the 
initiative of a first strike is virtually guaranteed or retains a high level of probable 
success (Hypothesis D and E). Van Evera explains the offense dominance behaviour 
in this case as follows: ‘It can ease surprise attack by concealing preparations from 
the victim. It opens windows of opportunity and vulnerability by delaying states’ 
reactions to others’ military buildups, raising the risk of preventive war.’112 
 
Hence, Hypothesis H is really an extension of the symptoms presented by Hypothesis 
D and E, and maintains the same symptomatic demonstrations of Jihad as directed by 
Abu Bakr and practiced by Khalid ibn al-Walid during the Ridda Wars and the 
extended security policy. As for the Caliphates of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, the Da’wa 
Policy that directed Jihad did not have any need of it. The shura council planned and 
directed decision and policy making such that the Da’wa followed rigid protocols 
becoming an exercise in fait accompli tactics (Hypothesis F). Although military 
commanders must have taken a very different approach to the operational and theatre 
level requirements of information and intelligence, grand strategic policy was driven 
by a sense of providentialism over calculi based upon strategic interactions. 
 
Mu‘awiya’s shrewd political acumen presented a character of calculated reserve that 
masked his intentions and motives to policies both foreign and domestic. 
Accordingly, Mu‘awiya’s secrecy on military movements, policies and operational 
planning may have been simply a matter of habit; but again, his biography reveals a 
markedly consistent approach to keeping his cards close but playing a devastating 
hand. In other words, as Humphreys writes: ‘He consulted widely and listened closely 
but did not show his hand. … Neither his friends nor his enemies ever quite knew 
what he was thinking until it was too late to do anything about it.’113 Thus, the 
consideration of Hypothesis H is not only amenable to Hypothesis D and E, to which 
we shall elaborate upon later, but also to Hypothesis F – Fait accompli or strategic 
coercion. 
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7.6. Coercive Diplomacy 
 
It is useful at this point to suggest that Mu‘awiya’s calculus on the efficacy of 
violence and the value of offense-dominance was not only on account of his 
privileged upbringing, but also a progression of experience that he brought with him 
into his administration. Since his days as governor, a post that he held for over a 
quarter of a century, he had managed not only a domestic constituency as vast as 
Syria and later during the Fitna Iraq; but had been at the forefront of the relentless 
campaigns of Jihad against Byzantium in the northern frontiers. Mu‘awiya’s 
accommodationism was a product of seasoned practice in the art of coercive 
diplomacy and violence. 
 
Mu‘awiya’s initial military contact with the Byzantines coincided with the 
fortification and increased resistance of Byzantine strongholds and defensive 
strategies under Emperor Constans II,114 accordingly, Kaegi notes: 
 
Mu‘awiya probably gained valuable experience in how to fight and 
negotiate with the Byzantines. He probably also gained an 
appreciation of the terrain and logistical problems of Anatolia. No 
other caliph had so much personal military experience against the 
Byzantines.115 
 
We may take two steps back to advance this one step forward in the analysis as we 
refer back to Hypothesis F and thus indirectly to Hypothesis G to elaborate their 
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7.6.1. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 6.  Faits Accomplis are More Common and Dangerous -
Hypothesis F 
 
We previously explained116 that Hypothesis F proposes that offense dominance 
introduces the variable of escalation by promoting strategic preferences to impose 
zero-sum outcomes and payoffs in their favour by strategically undermining rational 
options of the opponent to a common denominator that suits the instigating actor. 
Offense-defense theory advances the claim that such diplomatic tactics become more 
common and dangerous because of offense dominance, which in turn increases the 
risk of war between actors: 
 
Faits accomplis are more common when the offense dominates 
because the rewards they promise are more valuable. When 
security is scarce, winning disputes grows more important than 
avoiding war. Leaders care more how spoils are divided than about 
avoiding violence, because failure to gain their share can spell their 
doom. This leads to gain-maximizing, war-risking diplomatic 
strategies-above all, to fait accompli tactics.117 
 
It may be retrospectively gauged that the administrations of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman used 
the Da’wa policy as an aggressive form of diplomacy threatening the full force of 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. This was hardly a religious motivation as it was a strategic 
recognition of the perception that offense-dominance generates, Van Evera writes: 
‘Faits accomplis are more dangerous when the offense dominates because a 
successful fait accompli has a greater effect on the distribution of international 
power.’118 Diplomacy wasn’t co-operative because it had to be violent.119 War booty 
was essential to not only reward tribesmen for their participation, but also to maintain 
the incentives for the resettlement policy. 
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Hence, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah became the latent threat120 that would punish resistance 
to the imposition of Islamic sovereignty. The demand of the da’wa, that is, the right 
of Islam to be offered as a means of self-determination for a population came at the 
cost of a fait accompli – accept to become a client of the dar al-Islam and pay tribute 
(Jizya) or face the full force of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. Hence, Jihad was an instrument 
of threat – the power to hurt;121 and the Da’wa was a policy characterised by the fait 
accompli. The policies of the ‘Umar Doctrine, under which Mu‘awiya operated, used 
this form of coercive violence as the momentum of the Da’wa overran territories with 
little resistance and scarce negotiations. Hypothesis G may be reintroduced as an 
elucidation. 
 
7.6.2. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 7.  States Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G 
 
Fait accompli is not a viable strategy if an actor seeks to negotiate. The generation of 
risk is so high that the expected reaction of the intended target will be nothing other 
than violence if they refuse; ‘Hence faits accomplis are more alarming and evoke a 
stronger response from others. States faced with a fait accompli will shoot more 
quickly because their interests are more badly damaged by it.’122 Consequently, 
bargaining and negotiations are trickier because there is less incentive for co-
operation between actors. 123  Political bargaining becomes more aggressive with 
scarce concessions. The Rashidun period generally records few cases of negotiations 
other than faits accomplis. This is not to claim that there were not diplomatic contacts 
and exchanges between the Muslims and systemic actors, but that they were tentative 
and almost always backed by the threat of latent force. During the administration of 
‘Umar, truces were scare except in the event of terms that were highly favourable to 
the Muslims,124 that in effect, designated a sense of victory (winning without fighting) 
by their very consolidation. 
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Kaegi notes that strategic interactions from the late 630s and 640s were ‘a grudging 
temporary existence of a sort. Neither government ruled out from the beginning 
occasional and useful or necessary diplomatic contacts to settle or neutralize specific 
problems.’125 Political bargaining between ‘Umar and Heraclius were not uncommon, 
for example in 640/1, arrangements were made to return defectors and defecting Arab 
tribes in response to ‘Umar’s threat of seizing the Christian population of the dar al-
Islam and subjecting them to captivity or expulsion. 126  Additionally, practical 
concerns such as prisoner exchanges; 127  armament controls and restrictions on 
communications between groups and persons on either side of the frontiers were also 
mutually arranged.128 Maintaining the strategic initiative that originated with the 
inroads made during the administration of Abu Bakr had become the strategic focus 
of the Da’wa policy during the Rashidun administrations whereby the combination of 
the security dilemma and the perception and attainment of regional offense 
dominance overshadowed the strategic value of co-operative strategies or nonzero-
sum preferences. 
 
Mu‘awiya who had worked under this policy realised that the strategic setting and 
environment that he now operated in had become a different playing field from the 
days of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman. Hence, given what has been recorded concerning 
Mu‘awiya’s pragmatic and accomodationist inclinations, it can be assumed that 
Mu‘awiya would probably have preferred to use coercive threats to encourage weaker 
offshore powers to adopt isolationist policies, or to seek alliances with him rather than 
engage in extended warfighting. 
 
Where diplomatic contacts have been recorded, the expected strategic behaviour that 
Hypothesis G predicts is invariably demonstrated.129 For example, as Governor of 
Syria in 650, Mu‘awiya conducted a truce with the Byzantine Emperor but broke the 
treaty seizing a window of opportunity (Hypotheses D & E) to use his developing 
naval power to seize Rhodes in 653.130 Mu‘awiya was not able to consolidate his 
control over the territory and by 654 had conducted another treaty with the Emperor 
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for a truce in exchange for tribute. 131  Van Evera explains the reason for the 
predictable actions of Mu‘awiya: 
 
States break agreements more quickly when the offense dominates 
because cheating pays larger rewards. Bad faith and betrayal 
become the norm. The secure can afford the luxury of dealing in 
good faith, but the insecure must worry more about short-term 
survival. This drives them toward back-alley behavior, including 
deceits and sudden betrayals of all kinds-diplomatic faits 
accomplis, military surprise attacks, and breaking of other solemn 
agreements.132 
 
Without a doubt, Mu‘awiya’s fledgling naval capability was still in its infancy and the 
Byzantines maintained the strategic control of the sea. In the offensively weaker 
position, Mu‘awiya, in accordance with the predictions of Hypotheses D & E, 
exploited the vulnerability that emerged as any commander would. 
 
Again, during the Fitna, in order to protect his rear as he advanced to engage ‘Ali’s 
forces at the Battle of Siffin in 657, Mu‘awiya brokered another truce with 
Byzantium, which according to Blankinship, Mu‘awiya had to pay as much as 
100,000 dinars per annum.133 Blankinship suggests that over the duration of the Fitna 
(656-661) that this truce was probably renewed on multiple occasions;134 reinforcing 
the technical humiliation of the situation and the authority of Mu‘awiya.135 By 
injunction of the Qur’an,136 the early Muslims did not cede tribute to non-Muslims 
even in the face of overwhelming odds and technological and numerical inferiority. 
Mu‘awiya though having had concluded truces as a governor did pay tribute, and 
therefore has claim to being the first governor to pay tribute to a non-Muslim ruler, 
which he duly broke after consolidating the caliphate in 661.137 
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The enduring state of hostility with Byzantium had been a source of great agitation 
with ‘Umar, who had preferred to create a buffer zone between the Byzantine north 
and the Syrian frontier rather than enter into a truce or negotiated settlement with 
them.138 The idea of ‘buffer zones’ is to create neutral zones of military action and 
thus enhance strategic depth between adversaries. Around early 650s, an attempt was 
made to make Armenia a buffer zone between the Byzantium and the dar al-Islam.139 
The design was intended to reflect ‘friendly’ relations Kaegi claims, and not to create 
a ‘neutral’ zone; this initiative faced strong opposition from the Byzantines.140 
 
The practice of creating ‘buffer zones’ had been used during the administration of 
‘Uthman by Mu‘awiya as Majeed Khadduri and Walter Kaegi both correctly highlight 
that Cyprus was a ‘buffer state’ against the Byzantines.141 Additionally, policy seems 
to have also desired the creation of a buffer zone in northern Syria during the 
administration of ‘Uthman also.142 Cyprus was however, in modern parlance a 
‘neutralised’ state. The difference between neutrality and neutralisation has best been 
explained as follows: 
 
Neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed 
hostilities . . . These rules state, for example, that a neutral may not 
permit use of its territory as a base for military operations by one of 
the belligerents, may not furnish military assistance to the 
belligerents, and may enjoy free passage of its nonmilitary goods 
on the open seas and, under conditions, through belligerents 
blockades. A neutralized state is one that must observe these rules 
during armed conflict but that, during peace, must also refrain from 
making military alliances with other states.143 
 
As Hypothesis G would suggest, treaties favouring ‘neutralization’ over ‘neutral’ 
were conducted with states on the premise of continued impartiality, however such 
treaties never extended the Muslim pledge to defend or utilise the military instrument 
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in their defence.144 Baladhuri mentions that during the Rashidun era 648/9, Mu‘awiya 
negotiated a treaty with the governor of Cyprus on the basis of their continued 
neutrality between the Muslims and the Byzantines. 
 
The agreement maintained that the Muslims would not strike at their territory in 
exchange for their neutrality and Jizya, but at the same time, the Muslims were not 
under any obligation to defend them if another state aggressed against them.145 
Because of Cyprus’s neutrality, the Muslims did not prevent tribute being paid to 
other powers.146 However, their ‘neutralisation’ meant that they were not to hide 
information regarding the movement and deployment of the Romans, and that they 
were not permitted under the terms of their agreement with the Muslims to conclude 
military alliances with other powers.147 Armed with this background of the strategic 
behaviour of the Rashidun and Mu‘awiya during his tenure as governor, let us 
examine how the continuation of the Da’wa policy took place as a prelude to our final 
diagnostic tests. 
 
7.7. The New Offensive of the dar al-Islam 
In the five-year hiatus of the Da’wa policy where Jihad on all fronts had lost its 
offensive momentum and taken a defense dominant posture, surviving regional actors, 
the Byzantines in particular, had not remained idle. With time to regroup and 
reorganise, especially at the Syrian frontiers that enjoyed a break from Mu‘awiya’s 
incessant attacks; the strategic initiative was arguably up for grabs.148 It is highly 
plausible that Mu‘awiya considered that the dar al-Islam had lost, or were in the 
process of losing, its former offense dominant status in the region. In order to 
reestablish dominance, an aggressive policy of limited war was needed. 
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7.7.1. The Purge 
One of the first matters of business Mu‘awiya attended to was to purge the remaining 
fire of the Fitna from within the ranks of the military by reactivating the Jihad.149 
Mu‘awiya did not forget the continued successes of his policy of pre-emptive strikes 
when he was made Caliph.150 Accordingly, the customary seasonal raids of Syria 
against the Byzantines were extended to all frontiers of the dar al-Islam. Seasonally, 
campaigns were re-launched for scheduled periods of time wherein gains were either 
made or not.151 
 
Although Mu‘awiya directed great energy against his opponents, Hodgson writes, 
‘little permanent advance was achieved in Byzantine territories except for the 
subjection of the Armenian highlands.’152 These set campaigns were often up to 
twelve months in duration. Whilst the continued benefits of training and military 
experience were accrued through constant skirmishes that became a matter of policy, 
these campaigns lost the urgency that they had initially been premised upon. In many 
ways they became training exercises before they were actual attempts to make 
operational military inroads into the opponents territories.153  
 
Syria was geo-strategically vital for the western surge against Byzantium, whilst Iraq 
served a similar geo-strategic relevance for the east. The earlier strategic vision 
Mu‘awiya had developed a Muslim navy was now fully recognised as Mu‘awiya 
projected power across the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Mu‘awiya set about 
reclaiming any lost territory to the Byzantines during the Fitna along the Lebanese 
coast, and coastal areas in general resettling Persians to aid the defences,154 since 
these were essential to the protection and development of a progressively important 
maritime force that was emerging as part of an increasingly aggressive naval 
policy.155  
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In 671, Mu‘awiya made significant inroads Eastwards, where ‘many further eastern 
Iranian lands were systematically subdued, including part of the middle Oxus valley. 
Much of Anatolia was garrisoned for brief periods,’156 which coincided with the re-
conquest and occupation of Khurasan and the establishment of garrison settlements to 
permanently relocate Arabs into the region157 as part of a new surge supported by 
50,000 troops from Iraq as a permanently stationed force to transform the Muslim 
presence in the area, and the continued penetration into Transoxania.158 
 
Mu‘awiya’s surge also included the fall of major cities in ‘the east and northeast into 
Sind and the lower Indus, across Afghanistan (Kabul taken 664), and toward 
Turkestan, crossing the Oxus to capture Bokhara and Samarkand, and extending 
Islamic rule to the Jaxartes.’159 Mu‘awiya made successful strikes into Armenia and 
the Balkans and Anatolia in 662,160 recovering significant war booty in addition to 
positive military victories. These initial campaigns encouraged another in the 
following year that penetrated as far as Constantinople.161These operations continued 
with another major surge into the Balkans and Anatolia en route to Constantinople in 
669.162 
 
As Jihad was resumed against the Byzantines, and territorial gains were made most 
notably in the Mediterranean (Sicily in 668, Rhodes in 672, and Crete in 674);163 
augmenting the increased penetration into North Africa as far as modern-day 
Algeria,164 from the garrison base established in Qayrawan in 670 (present-day 
Tunisia).165 Mu‘awiya should have fought for control of the sea along the coastal strip 
of Northern Africa where the Byzantine projected their naval control from their base 
in Carthage, but instead directed operations that eventually seized important 
Byzantine naval bases from land sides: having taken Acre (in Syria) and Alexandria 
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in 642, Carthage was added in 698 under Mu‘awiya.166 Without control of the sea, a 
prolonged blockade of Constantinople between 674 and 680 took place following 
failed attempts to seize the city in 670.167 
 
‘What was the objective of this constant warfare?’ Humphreys, much like most 
observers asks, ‘Most commentators, noting that Anatolian towns were constantly 
raided and pillaged but never permanently occupied beyond the Taurus passes, have 
argued that the only goals were pillage and plunder.’168 Humphreys interprets that 
Mu‘awiya was directing ‘a war of attrition, to sap the economic and demographic 
foundations of Byzantine rule in Asia Minor and the Aegean and to wear down the 
Byzantine armies which Constans II and Constantine constantly struggled to 
rebuild.’169 Certainly the campaigns directed to Asia Minor throughout Mu‘awiya’s 
reign suggests that he was employing a strategy of exhaustion (ermattungsstrategie) 
against the Byzantines. However, throughout his career since his days as governor 
until his death as caliph, despite annual raids both summer and winter, into Anatolia 
with penetration often of thousands of kilometers deep into Byzantine territory, 
Mu‘awiya failed to secure any real territorial gains.170 
7.7.2. Ermattungsstrategie 
The basic strategy during the administration of ‘Umar (which subsequently carried 
over to that of ‘Uthman,) against Byzantine centers of gravity were to direct mass 
concentration of force and economy of effort to ‘from the poorly guarded periphery 
against nodal points, choke points or pressure points, rather than centers of 
population, where most Byzantine troops and their leadership were based.’ By zoning 
into the Byzantine population center through the removal of concentric circles of 
armed defence and population resistance, by the time the Muslims reached the 
targeted center of gravity, ‘the outcome of battle elsewhere’ made the Byzantine 
control of the center no longer defendable.171 
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In 644, Mu‘awiya participated in the campaigns onto the Anatolian plateau engaging 
the Byzantines in strategic and predatory raids.172 Mu‘awiya learnt that constant 
harassment of the Byzantines even during the winter months was an unexpected 
strategic force-multiplier as the Byzantines, who believed the Arabs to be similar to 
Persians who did not fight in cold weather, disturbed the Byzantines as they were 
forced to react to costly winter raids and added pressure to their warfighting 
capabilities.173 The Byzantines never really came to terms with developing successful 
tactical responses to the shifting patterns of attack the Muslims employed against 
them since the 630s.174 
 
Mu‘awiya continued the success of these strategies but with limited resources, unable 
to fortify smaller territorial gains with the stationing of garrisons in addition to 
logistical and supply problems on account of weather and terrain. Consequently, 
Humphreys argues, Mu‘awiya commissioned continuous short raids that were 
intended to serve as a means of attrition.175 However, an astute man such as 
Mu‘awiya would have realized the futility of repeating raids for no purpose. 
 
Instead, Kaegi explains, Mu‘awiya’s strategy of exhaustion was at the very least a 
means to ‘keep up appearances’ and maintain some level of prestige with his domestic 
audience, enriching the Muslims, and thus encouraging more tribesmen to enlist for 
Jihad whilst simultaneously maintaining pressure and devastation upon the Byzantine 
territories through the ‘loss of property and human lives and captives, and diminution 
of commerce and agriculture.’ 176  Yet, the strategic explanation for Mu‘awiya’s 
application of the Da’wa does not seem to correlate to his grand imperial policy. In 
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7.7.3. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 4. Moving First is More Rewarding - Hypothesis D 
Although both Hypotheses F and G are compelling to argue that the offense 
dominated Mu‘awiya’s application of Jihad, we are frustrated by the seemingly 
disparate strategic action of Mu‘awiya to the tests. The plausible false-positive 
diagnosis would be a matter of falling into the trap of the sins of confusion.177 
Concerning Hypothesis D for example, Mu‘awiya’s predecessors more accurately 
took strategic action in order not to lose the strategic initiative rather than to gain it, 
which they maintained through continuous warfighting. Because they rarely suffered 
crushing defeats, even lost battles were temporary setbacks, which did not make them 
suffer the loss of initiative. Oran Young writes that under conditions of real or 
perceived crisis, 
 
There is, in general terms, a presumption in favor of policies that 
permit an actor to acquire and retain the initiative at the strategic 
level. This presumption arises from considerations having to do 
with the ability to define the basic issues in the international arena, 
the acquisition of political support, the maintenance of morale, and 
the value of forward momentum in international politics.178  
 
However, Mu‘awiya’s calculus of the ‘initiative’ differential was probably that he had 
lost the strategic initiative but could still hold the tactical initiative as a prelude to 
controlling both. Thus we see the results of Hypothesis D validated but as a matter of 
offensive-defense dominance, that is, as a matter of maximising the tactical initiative. 
This leads to Hypothesis E, which is a better reflection of Mu‘awiya’s calculus to 
hold the tactical initiative. 
7.7.4. ODT - D/Dx ♯ 5. Windows are Larger - Hypothesis E 
Given the probable loss of offense dominance, Mu‘awiya resorted to force to stem 
and interfere with regional powers. According to this hypothesis, such action suggests 
that the utility of force maintains efficacy even for a waning power in so far as it 
facilitates the lock down of windows of vulnerability through preemptive war.179 
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The main contention suggested in Hypothesis E is that shifts in the balance of power, 
in arms or resources, are potential strategic triggers to employ force especially in the 
case of waning powers. But, even though the signs and symptoms of Mu‘awiya’s 
strategic preference are present, it would be another false-positive result to attribute 
Hypothesis E to Mu‘awiya’s strategic behaviour absolutely. This is because, the 
preemptive warfighting of the Muslims during the Futuh was never intentionally 
employed, even if it appeared so, instead as Kaegi asserts 
 
Most striking is the Byzantine armies’ inability to gain the 
initiative, move readily, and project their power during the course 
of military operations from the very start of the Muslim invasions. 
Too often the Byzantines merely reacted to Muslim initiatives or, 
even more frequently, just remained passive. This conscious or 
unconscious ceding of the initiative to the Muslims contributed 
significantly to the ultimate outcome.180 
 
Just as they had under ‘Umar, Mu‘awiya’s armed forces forced battle upon 
Byzantium, choosing where and when, the ordeal would occur.181 Thomas Schelling 
summarises the basic strategic idea and problem the following manner: 
 
The danger of major war is almost certainly increased by the 
occurrence of a limited war; it is almost certainly increased by any 
enlargement in the scope or violence of a limited war that has 
already taken place. This being so, the threat to engage in limited 
war has two parts. One is the threat to inflict costs directly on the 
other side, in casualties, expenditures, loss of territory, loss of face, 
or anything else. The second is the threat to expose the other party, 
together with oneself, to a heightened risk of a larger war.182 
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The one theater that appeared to be an offense-dominant approach was against 
Constantinople. Mu‘awiya identified Constantinople as the Byzantine center of 
gravity, and launched strikes to pillage and plunder a route into the Byzantine center 
of gravity without fear of counter-attack and to prevent Byzantine forces access to the 
Muslim naval base at Cyzicus.183 These land-based campaigns were augmented by a 
naval blockade, which was actually a series of continuous naval strikes designed to 
isolate the city and disrupt its commercial and economic activities so as to decimate 
its revenue streams.184 
 
The novelty of the joint-operations took the Byzantines by surprise who were not 
expecting such operational innovation from the Muslims,185 lasted between 674-678, 
sapping the strength of the Byzantine Empire but culminating in defeat for the 
Muslims. Humphreys notes, ‘Mu‘awiya’s hope of bringing down the Byzantine 
Empire through a relatively low-cost and low-risk strategy of attrition and harassment 
had failed; he avoided further confrontation for the rest of his reign.’186 Mu‘waiya 
was forced to seek a humiliating truce, and pay a tribute as high as 3,000lbs of gold, 
with slaves, and horses, per annum.187 The reality was his aggressive policies against 
the Byzantines were more defensively designed than offensively intentioned. 
 
7.8. The Strategic Dynamics of Defense Dominance  
The foregoing diagnostics reveals that Mu‘awiya adopted a defense-dominant 
preference premised upon a minimax strategic calculus. Johnston explains a minimax 
strategy as the minimisation of maximum losses; a ‘quintessentially conservative, 
risk-averse strategy that eschews high-payoff victories (i.e., the extermination of the 
adversary or the acquisition of its political, economic, or territorial assets) because 
these are high-risk victories.’188 Such high-risk victories were the hallmark of the 
Rashidun era, especially during the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. 
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The process of diminishing pay-offs associated with high-risk victories began proper 
during the Fitna for Mu‘awiya, though in retrospect, it accompanied him since his 
days as governor during the Caliphate of ‘Uthman.189 Mu‘awiya understood that 
‘[w]hen the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to 
move forward, destroy, and take.’190 Hence, Mu‘awiya’s minimax strategic calculus 
included the preservation of his armed forces, with his strategy of exhaustion keeping 
Muslim casualties to an acceptable level of management that did not affect morale.191 
 
Mu‘awiya situated the utility of force in achieving defense-dominance for the dar al-
Islam – where conquest was acknowledged as being very difficult thus maintaining 
the inherent advantage of defence.192 Defense-dominance Johnston writes, is where 
‘[t]he purpose of force is to avoid maximum loss rather than achieve total victory. In 
strategic terms a preference for minimax strategies can be translated into a preference 
for deterrence through the capacity to deny the enemy military victory.’193 The 
emphasis upon attaining defense-dominance is perhaps the most implicitly consistent 
strategic preference found in the second decade of Mu’awiya’s reign after having 
realised that no real strategic gains had been made by the earlier objective set in 
Anatolia.  
 
What began as an initially aggressive policy of war against Byzantium194 revealed 
itself to be a defense-dominant strategy whereby the strategic objective of these 
operations was to keep ‘the Byzantines off balance by diverting their attention to 
defense and removing any hope of embarking on major offensive strategic policies 
against Muslim Syria.’ 195 Mu‘awiya had most likely conceded he had lost the 
strategic initiative but did not want the Byzantines to believe that he had. 
Furthermore, believing that he was in a strategically weaker position, he intentionally 
introduced the variables of escalation196 by designing an imperial grand Da’wa policy, 
as a means to project the illusion of strength though he knew that the dar al-Islam was 
                                                
189 See 7.6. 
190 Jervis (1978), p.187 
191 Kaegi (2000), p.247 
192 Van Evera (2004), p.227 fn.1 
193 Johnston (1995), pp.121-2 
194 Kaegi (2000), p.246 
195 Ibid., p.247 
196 See Proposition 8 
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at its weakest. The continued Jihad was opportunistic (Hypothesis A) in the hope of 
building sufficient momentum to wrestle the initiative back and to serve as a catalyst 
for the offense to grow stronger (Hypothesis J). 
 
In fact, another paradoxical development was that the continued raids in the region 
had ‘compelled their opponents to devote much time and effort to developing 
countermeasures.’197 Paradoxically, as Mu‘awiya invited absolute Jihad to regain the 
strategic initiative, military victories became increasingly scarce and trivial as the old 
enemy Byzantium also adopted defensive strategies and deterrence based tactics. The 
result was the development of a status quo balance of power in the region. Hence the 
final evolution of the strategic dynamics of Jihad in this study reveals that following 
the first hiatus of Jihad since the maghazi period, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was translated 
as a defense-dominant policy working off the tactical initiative to regain the strategic 
initiative whilst still subordinated to the Da’wa policy, albeit in its imperial 2.0. 
version. 
 
7.9. Trinitarian Conclusions of the Caliphate of Mu‘awiya 
The Caliphate of Mu‘awiya is the most unrecognised and unappreciated of all 
governments of early Islam. A trinitarian interpretation of events surrounding 
Mu‘awiya’s administration of the Caliphate has ended in a qualitatively different 
conclusion however to his predecessors. Mu‘awiya’s success was undoubtedly due to 
his foresight and understanding to balance the Clausewitzian trinity that facilitated the 
restoration of the Caliphate to its days of former glory under ‘Umar. Although the 
resumption of the new imperial Da’wa policy did not yield the spectacular successes 
that had been amassed during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, the Muslim territories were 
enlarged and Mu‘awiya used his deft hand in tribal politics to reestablish the ‘Umar 
Doctrine through an enlarged version of the shura (joint political decision-making) 
that had been extremely successful during his administration. Mu‘awiya 
accomplished this by effectively buying the favour of tribal chiefs, who in turn acted 
as agents of Mu‘awiya controlling and checking the escalation of irrational forces 
within their respective tribes. Thus, Mu‘awiya was free to pursue foreign policy 
unhindered by domestic threats of insurrection or interference. 
                                                
197 Kaegi (2000), p.247 
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The harmony and return of prosperity experienced during Mu‘awiya’s regime was 
unequivocally the result of trinitarian harmonisation, or perhaps more accurately the 
reestablishment of trinitarian harmony following the Fitna. Mu‘awiya’s defense 
dominant preference premised upon a minimax strategic calculus to advance the 
interests of the dar al-Islam through Jihad was extremely successful in masking his 
politico-military weaknesses and creating an illusion of military power. In doing so, 
Mu‘awiya balanced the elements of the trinity within the given strategic setting and 
environment quite covertly but consciously. 
 
Although his reputation would be sullied and his dynasty vilified by the new rulers of 
the dar al-Islam, his final re-characterisation of Jihad as an instrument of imperial 
ambitions would remain, with Jihad becoming synonymous with the holy war of 
absolute Jihad. The qualitative nature of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah had radically altered 
during the administration of Mu‘awiya, for the ends to which it was subordinated to 
policy, how it was conducted, and the increasing escalation of attributing the absolute 
Jihad to the decision-making process at horizontal levels of policy. Arguably, 
Mu‘awiya intended these changes to have been temporary during the process of 
recalibration of the systemic environment and the attainment of the strategic initiative; 
however, in the tradition of his predecessors, he did not live to see his master plan 
come to fruition. Mu‘awiya died after 19 years and 3 months exactly according to Ibn 
Kathir,198 his Leviathan survived him but was killed by the ‘Abbasid revolution of 
750. 
 
                                                
198 I.K.a, p.112 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8.0. Investigative and Substantive Conclusions 
 
In our introductory chapter we stated that this study aims to chart the strategic 
dynamics of Jihad through the identification of critical stages and events that formed a 
consistent process of evolution that is congruent with our proposed strategic 
theoretics. Thus far we have used the Clausewitzian case study-approach, and 
presented our findings in the context of Trinitarian interpretation and the strategic 
paradigm at the end of each chapter. Combined, they have provided a lens through 
which to identify shifts in the variables of policy and politics for the application of 
Jihad. In this section we shall review the findings of the investigation, as a prelude to 
our final substantive conclusions. 
 
8.1. Sub-Investigative Research Questions a. – d. 
This investigation begun with the central research question to ascertain whether Jihad 
is a continuation of politik by other means, that is to ask the question, what is the link 
between politik (the interplay of policy and politics) and the application of force in the 
name of Jihad. In order to systematically investigate this link and establish the 
relationship between the efficacy of violence and politico-strategic decision-making; 
the prime agenda was compartmentalised into three further research questions and 
four sub-investigative questions to dissect the mechanics of Jihad and highlight the 
evolutions of its form, which we termed strategic dynamics. 
 
The cascading dissection of the central research question was designed to not only 
simplify the central agenda by separating various avenues of exploration into smaller 
sub-investigative explanations; but also to incrementally build a simple yet finely 
tuned analysis of the evolving strategic dynamics of Jihad. Following a strict 
methodological procedure the investigation began by establishing a baseline zero of 
Jihad (sub-investigative question a.) as a means to establish an initial standard of 
strategic interpretation from which to derive strategic dynamics (research question 4), 
that is, shifts and evolution in its practice. 
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This would allow the investigation to explore the tenet of a consistent link (research 
question 2) to have existed, and thus a continuation of politik by other means, that is, 
a consistently established instrument of rational calculation (the fundamental 
proposition of the Trinitarian system). In order to distinguish Jihad as an instrument 
of rational calculation distinct from an instrument of theological imperatives (research 
question 3), this study applied a strategic paradigm rooted in strategic theory as a set 
of guidelines to distinguish strategic action from the non-strategic; that is, to 
differentiate decision-making based upon an identifiable and understandable strategic 
calculus, from preferences and assumptions rooted in a ‘believers’ framework of 
interpretation which was informed by meta-physical considerations (sub-investigative 
question b.). 
 
The former would, reveal through the investigation that Jihad was instrumentally 
conceived and applied as an instrumental means to political ends by strategic actors 
operating within the strategic setting and environment (sub-investigative questions c. 
& d.). The following sections detail the findings of the sub-investigative questions as 
a prelude to discussing their implications for the broader research questions. 
 
8.1.1. Sub-Investigative Questions a. & b.  
a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect 
to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance 
strategic interpretation? 
b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam? To what extent does 
providentialism influence the application of Jihad as the means that justifies 
the ends? 
The investigation and clarification of sub-investigative questions a. and b. were 
interlinked as a prelude to contextualising research questions 2, 3, and c. within the 
case study of the maghazi. A strategic definition was proposed by means of dissecting 
the term Jihad into an ideological framework of interpretation (vertical) and a 
pragmatic interpretation of its practice (horizontal) termed the baseline zero. This 
facilitated the distinction between the words Jihad as an ideological expression of the 
Islamic meta-narrative, absolute Jihad, and Jihad in reality as a political instrument.  
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This division of the term was subsequently used to advance strategic interpretation by 
distinguishing ideological motivation of strategic actors acting in the name of Islam 
from politico-strategic decision-making and bargaining based upon the strategic 
setting and environment, allowing for the clashing of interests to be included within 
the analysis. 
 
The baseline zero demonstrated that at the vertical level of meaning, distinctions of 
‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ are empty in relation to absolute Jihad, retaining 
significance only as a matter of horizontal translation. This is because absolute Jihad 
was a ‘cosmic’ or theological contest for dominance that transcended the human life 
(that is, rooted in post-apocalyptic Judgement ending of human existence on earth) 
rather than war rooted in normal human lifespan(s). The violence threatened by 
absolute Jihad was, in a sense, beyond distinctions of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ 
since it was commanded by God Himself. 
 
The meta-narrative that derived from the absolute Jihad placed a premium upon 
believers to not only adhere to their faith in exchange for salvation, but also the nisus 
exerted for the missionary da’wa. Absolute Jihad was therefore very similar to 
previous monotheistic faiths that shared a similar bargain for Heaven in exchange for 
worldly servitude (nisus) to God. 1 This elucidation of absolute Jihad revealed an 
essential teleological connection to Islam (sub-investigative question b.) that arguably 
was as monotheistic as it was Islamic. 
 
The baseline zero situated the original concept of Jihad in the metaphysical dynamics 
of absolute Jihad. Accordingly, the elitist mindset of the early Muslims viewed the 
external world as a clear existential threat or a micro-security dilemma. Hence, 
absolute Jihad, ideologically represented the metaphysical and theological imperative 
of the cosmic battle; and the teleological relation between absolute Jihad and nisus 
was determined by the Islamic meta-narrative rather than politico-strategic events, 
until the hijra of the Prophet.  
 
                                                
1 See Q 9:111 
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In the second phase of the Prophet’s mission, the reconfiguration of the horizontal 
Jihad developed in accordance with the increasing demands of strategic interactions. 
The instigation of guerrilla campaigns by the Prophet against the Quraysh and 
regional tribes was the idiom of military action2 and served two ends, that of security 
and that of survival. In terms of security, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was the instrument of 
security for the new Muslim polis, simultaneously functioning as the means to secure 
survival in an increasingly hostile strategic environment that was perceived as 
existentially threatening. The ends of survival became especially prominent at the 
Battle of the Khandaq when the pagan Arabs sought for the first time a decisive war 
against the Muslims.  
 
The first shift in the dynamics of Jihad therefore took place as absolute Jihad was 
translated horizontally into Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. This shift from the vertical to the 
horizontal was the necessary reification of the absolute Jihad. The result was a 
reframing of the word to signify a far broader concept of nisus than previously 
understood within the Arabic language. In the vernacular of the Muslims, the Arabic 
Jihad became inseparable from the notion of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, which included but 
was not limited to, the idiom of military action. Military action and its associated 
activities, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, was motivated by the belief in God’s Providence and 
sanctioned by numerous Qur‘anic injunctions. In practical terms, the sanction to 
employ violence created the social construction of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, which 
subsumed the application of violence as a form of guerrilla warfare in its first 
practiced dynamic. However, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah included all activities that aided 
the war effort and was thus fluid in its breadth of application. Syllogistically, Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah is logically explained as: 
 
• Jihad fi sabil l’Allah is nisus in service of the Islamic metanarrative (Absolute 
Jihad) 
• Jihad fi sabil l’Allah includes warfighting (qital) 
• Therefore a form of nisus (Absolute Jihad) is Jihad fi sabil l’Allah 
o or Jihad fi sabil l’Allah can also be warfighting 	  
                                                
2 Schelling (2008), p.126 
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This syllogism does not preclude the fact that an act of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah can be 
completely bereft of any form of violent activity, only that violent actions can be 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah so long as the initial premise holds true – that the nisus exerted is 
in service of the Islamic metanarrative (absolute Jihad). The most salient finding of 
this syllogism is that Jihad fi sabil l’Allah is the idiom of military action in the name 
of Islam. In other words, Jihad when employed as qital fi sabil l’Allah - is war - that 
is, the activity of warfighting. 
 
During the administration of Prophet’s successor, Abu Bakr, the threat which tribal 
rebellion posed was deemed existential. The new strategic setting was beset by the 
threats of political insurrection, the rise of ‘False Prophets’ vying for political power, 
and the refusal to pay the Zakat. The teleological function of Jihad was invoked by 
reference to absolute Jihad, and implemented as a pure military strategy. The ensuing 
Ridda Wars utilised force to either compel obedience, or isolate and destroy all 
opponents of the new Medinan administration. The notion of Providence, though not 
explicitly apparent,3 must have been a factor in the belief of the strategic actors 
involved, specifically Abu Bakr and Khalid ibn al-Walid. However, the management 
of the political crisis environment was distinctly a strategic affair overriding of the 
influence of providential beliefs. There were no alterations in either understanding of 
absolute Jihad or Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. In other words, Jihad fi sabil l’Allah remained 
as the idiom of military action in the name of Islam, or qital fi sabil l’Allah – war. 
 
During the administration of ‘Umar, the development of the Da’wa policy was 
accompanied by a rhetoric of righteousness to bolster credibility of the military effort 
against the regional powers whilst balancing domestic stability. The strategic design 
of the Da’wa translated action between absolute Jihad and Jihad fi sabil l’Allah as a 
matter of official foreign policy along the lines of an early idea of ‘humanitarian’ 
interventionism. The result was to marry systemic threat to policy, reinforcing 
assumptions of self-help. There were no alternations to the terms absolute Jihad and 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah per se, except that the application of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah to 
policy became a dominant feature of Muslim politico-strategic thought thereafter. 
 
                                                
3 Sub-investigative question b. was not addressed in Chapter 4 for this reason. 
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No alterations or changes took place during the administration of ‘Uthman except the 
actual demonstration of restraint in invoking Jihad fi sabil l’Allah against fellow 
Muslims, or to be more precise, the ineligibility of invoking Jihad fi sabil l’Allah 
against fellow Muslims. The following administration, that of ‘Ali, attempted a 
reversal of this principle but failed and the attempted privatisation of Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah was a short-lived claim. 
 
The role and influence of Providence resurfaces during the administration of 
Mu‘awiya as he effectively ‘weaponised’ providentialism in order to increase the 
credibility of the new imperial agenda. The meta-narrative that created the absolute 
Jihad was cast into foreign policy in a manner formerly unknown. Previously, the 
vertical impact of absolute Jihad had to be translated into strategic action, which took 
the form of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. In other words, it was a means but not an end. 
However, Mu‘awiya fused the unlimited demands of absolute Jihad to foreign policy 
creating a permanent state of war. The essential distinction is that during previous 
administrations, the state of hostility that existed between the dar al-Islam and the 
external world was a product of anarchy and assumptions pertaining to survival, and 
thus security. The new state of tension Mu‘awiya created was predicated upon the 
theological imperative of absolute Jihad and the Manifest Destiny of the dar al-Islam to 
emancipate human beings from the tyranny of godless political institutions. It was, for 
all intents and purposes, a battle-centric policy of perpetual ‘holy’ war. 
8.1.2. Sub-Investigative Questions c.  
 
c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive 
policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what 
circumstances did these polices come to bear and how did they evolve? 
 
The investigation of sub-investigative questions a. and b. highlighted the relationship 
between the Islamic redefinition and practice of the term Jihad as part of the Prophet’s 
evolving mission to bring Arabia under the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a.4 This evolution 
further revealed the relationship between Jihad and politics, the concern of sub-
                                                
4 See Q 9:33 
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investigative question c.; as the guerrilla campaign against the Arabs and the Quraysh in 
particular, was a consequence of challenging the tribal political system.  
 
The maghazi demonstrates two forms of bargaining, that is, the process and interplay 
of politics and policy. The first was the metaphysical bargain between God and the 
Muslims by which the believers translate the cosmic absolute Jihad horizontally and 
engage Jihad fi sabil l’Allah in exchange for the promise of victory in this world 
(Providence) and God’s favour in the next.5 The second, was the manner in which 
warfighting (qital fi sabil l’Allah), was instrumentally used to communicate the 
resolve of the Prophet to pagan Arabs. 
 
The limited nature of the battle between the Muslims and the Quraysh, like all limited 
wars, was a process of two things, ‘the outcome of the war, and the “mode” of 
conducting the war itself.’6 Whilst the Quraysh, and the Arabs in general held to the 
traditions of the Ayyam al-‘Arab, the guerrilla tactics adopted by the Prophet was 
itself a means to re-negotiate the terms of peace by undertaking an aggressive conduct 
of warfighting not practiced by the Arabs. Under existing traditions, the means to 
raise dissent against tribal power would have faltered as it had in Mecca during phase 
one of the mission. The strategic relocation (al-hijra) to Medina was clearly a means 
to drive a more aggressive form of bargaining against the Quraysh. Indeed, the shift to 
Medina was the beginning of a phase whereby political bargaining was conducted by 
deed rather than words. The language of violence was a historically early attribute of 
the Islam, from the absolute Jihad that threatened latent eschatological violence, to 
the guerilla practice of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah. 
 
It was not until the impasse at Hudaybiyya that tacit bargaining (in the form of a 
guerrilla campaign) finally resulted in an explicit political settlement, albeit a 
temporary one. The distinctly politico-strategic character by which Jihad was 
instrumentally applied was therefore a means to drive political purposes. The 
temporary peace with the Quraysh opened new political avenues that resulted in the 
formation of alliances as well as the return to Jihad this time against hostile allies of 
the Quraysh. 
                                                
5 Q 4:74, 9:111, 61:10-13 
6 Schelling (2008), p.135 
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Once again, violence was efficiently employed to either impose a military decision or 
demonstrative so as to induce political settlements over battle. Accordingly, 
Clausewitz’s definition of strategy, reflects the mindset and practice of the Prophet 
and his estimation of the utility of force: 
 
Strategy, in connecting these factors with the outcome of an 
engagement, confers a special significance on that outcome and 
thereby on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it. Yet 
insofar as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it 
remains subsidiary and is also to be thought of as a means.7 
 
Indeed, Schelling explains that, ‘It is in the wars that we have come to call “limited 
wars” that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously. 
The critical targets in such a war are in the mind of the enemy as much as on the 
battlefield;’8 which is perhaps the best explanation of why and how Jihad was 
employed by the Prophet and the course of actions that instrumentalised Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah to the objective of striking at the principles or values of the opponent. Maudidi 
writes: ‘The objective of this attack, moreover, is not to coerce the opponent to 
relinquish his principles but to abolish the government which sustains these 
principles.’9 The ‘pure conflict’ of absolute Jihad, if translated at its ideal would have 
resulted in a war of extermination,10 instead a nonzero-sum strategy of limited war 
deescalated the tension of absolute Jihad through horizontal translation. 
 
Schelling captures the essence of the resulting form of conflict, when he writes: ‘For 
this reason, [de-escalating from ‘pure conflict’] ‘winning’ in a conflict does not have 
a strictly competitive meaning; it is not winning relative to one’s adversary. It means 
gaining relative to one’s own value system’.11 The da’wa of the Prophet, that is his 
missionary aims, was an expression of this translation, evidenced by his war against 
the Quraysh as an indirect means to eradicate paganism and the culture of jahiliya as a 
prelude to imposing the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a. 
 
                                                
7 Ibid., p.143 (emphasis in the original) 
8 Schelling (2008), p.142 
9 Maududi (1980), p.26 
10 See sub-investigative questions a. and b. 
11 Schelling (1980), pp.4-5 
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The Caliphate of Abu Bakr further emphasised the importance of sub-investigative 
question c, since the domestic political turmoil generated the crisis environment that 
resulted in distinctive security policies that directed the instrumental application of 
Jihad. During the administration of Abu Bakr Jihad as the idiom of military action was 
escalated to its extreme function as a pure military strategy. Abu Bakr, like the 
Prophet, bargained by violent communication12 to compel submission of the Arabs. 
Jihad was a means of the shortest path to the objective. Jihad was instrumentally used 
as a mechanism of policy that sought to generate risk through demonstrable 
escalation, coupling capabilities to objectives. The strategic employment of Jihad to 
the outcome of the Ridda engagements conferred a special significance to ‘the 
outcome and thereby on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it. Yet insofar 
as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it remains subsidiary and is 
also to be thought of as a means.’13 Peace was eventually imposed by Abu Bakr and 
brokered by latent threat in the form of political prisoners.14  
 
Jihad had served a strategy of offensive compellence as a prelude to dominance. In the 
service of a homeland security policy, Jihad was employed with ruthless efficiency in 
the fog and VUCA of the strategic environment. As a matter of the extended regional 
security policy, under conditions of self-help, Jihad was instrumentally employed to 
tactically navigate between the broader strategic and geopolitical space of Arabia. In 
both instances, Jihad was instrumentally utilised to serve policies that were the 
consequence of domestic politics and the continuation of politik from the maghazi. 
 
The Caliphate of ‘Umar was symbolised by the formation of the ‘Umar Doctrine 
which subordinated Jihad to the will of official foreign policy, thereby further de-
escalating the warfighting spirit of the previous administration and sublimating its 
energy externally toward a common threat. The resulting harmony between politico-
military affairs ushered in an era of prosperity and social cohesion in the aftermath of 
civil discord. The administrative and organisational developments during ‘Umar’s 
administration managed and balanced the elements of the trinity with a grand strategy 
of Da’wa. 
                                                
12 Schelling (2008), pp.144-7 
13 Ibid., p.143 (emphasis in the original) 
14 On hostage taking as a form of political bargaining see Schelling (2008), p.143 
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Furthermore, the development of political organisation and infrastructure was 
connected to the foundations of a new military establishment predicated upon the 
former homeland security policies of Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr’s homeland security 
policies had neutralised threats generated from the grassland Arabs and created 
considerable strategic depth for the Medinan polis, but had also ‘rocked the boat’ by 
territorially encroaching upon the borderlands of the regional powers. ‘Umar’s 
offensive policy of Da’wa was conceivably driven by the belief that an impending 
series of reprisals from one or both of the regional powers had to be anticipated.  
 
Whilst a belief that God would ensure victory for the Muslims in any offensive action 
taken was undoubtedly held sacrosanct by ‘Umar’s administration; it can be argued 
(in response to sub-investigative question b.) that the continuation of offensive 
strategic action in the region was not motivated by teleology or Providence but by 
rational assumptions of anarchy, self-help, and the belief that security threats were on 
the horizon. Indeed, the initial domestic political reforms undertaken within days of 
‘Umar’s appointment as Caliph suggests a rational calculus of means and ends over 
and above religious considerations for politico-strategic action (research question 3.). 
 
Political restructuring of the administration was also a means to bargain via signals 
shown to the various Arab tribes who had been involved in the Ridda. Retaining the 
outcome of submission and surrender imposed by Abu Bakr upon the rebel tribes was 
dependent upon the ability to politically manage the tribes in defeat.  This form of 
political bargaining ‘… depends on how the adversaries conduct themselves as much 
as on the division of spoils;’ Schelling explains, ‘it involves reputations, expectations, 
precedents broken and precedents established, and whether the action left political 
issues more unsettled or less settled than they were.’15 It is this backdrop of events 
carried over from the Ridda Wars, which we have argued, influenced and directed the 




                                                
15 Schelling (2008), p.143 
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The new political arrangement necessarily evolved alongside the highly successful 
Futuh, ‘[A]nd like any bargaining process, a restrained war involves some degree of 
collaboration between adversaries.’ 16  The new collaboration between ‘Umar’s 
administration, and the tribal chiefs, extended to the introduction of a policy of 
resettlement that projected the military power of the dar al-Islam into the newly 
conquered territories. The investigation has already detailed the intricacies of the 
resettlement policy in subduing the latent potential of domestic insurrection, suffice to 
note that the rising offensive power of Jihad as the idiom of military action in 
subordination to the Da’wa was critically generated by domestic politics over 
religious injunction. The manner in which it was deployed was however, in response 
to the pressures of the systemic environment (research question 3.) The idea that the 
domestic strategic setting and its power politics, over and above religious motivations, 
drove the subordination of Jihad to foreign policy is consistent with the trend of 
intervening tribal politics from the maghazi into the Fitna as a greater influence upon 
the development of policy than religious ideals (also a function of research question 
3.) 
 
The assassination of ‘Uthman was part of the attempted re-negotiation of the 
distribution of tribal political power that had become increasingly centralised during 
the administration of ‘Uthman. The breakdown of tribal political harmony inherited 
from the previous administration directly impacted the Da’wa policy and thus the 
application of Jihad. As the former collaboration between previous adversaries for 
tribal power crumbled the first hiatus of Jihad as the idiom of military action in the 
name of Islam began. The emphasis placed upon policies to maintain and enhance 
domestic stability had come undone and although no substantive changes took place 
in either the Da’wa policy or warfighting over the next 4 years (during the contested 
administration of ‘Ali), the political turmoil of the domestic strategic setting took 
precedence over the systemic concerns. The offensive drive, without political 
stewardship, halted and Jihad was relegated to a defense-dominant function of the dar 
al-Islam.  
 
                                                
16 Schelling (2008), p.143 
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The restoration of Jihad as a function of policy occurred as part of Mu‘awiya’s 
attempt to revive the ‘Umar Doctrine. A return to domestic political bargaining that 
focused upon the re-distribution of power amongst competing tribal factions in the 
aftermath of the Fitna, and the rebooting of the resettlement programme were the 
foundations of the Da’wa 2.0. demonstrating once again, that domestic political 
stability was the bedrock upon which Jihad and foreign policy, in general, required in 
order to function. Mu‘awiya’s restoration of the tribal shura council and military 
reforms in particular, were designed to promote and maintain domestic political 
stability and fortify his claims to legitimate leadership of the dar al-Islam. 
8.1.3. Sub-Investigative Questions d.  
 
d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the 
early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates 
strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy? 
 
The primary objectives during the maghazi were situated in Arabia rendering a 
practical examination of this question fruitless. The implicit possibility that the 
domination of the tribal structure was intended as a run-up to controlling Arabia for 
the purposes of systemic expansion certainly appears to have been probable. 
However, the plausible intention and design for systemic projection is tied to the 
notion of absolute Jihad and a missionary cause of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, during the 
maghazi period since systemic expansion would have been considered an extension of 
the Prophet’s political objectives to bring Islam and the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a. 
 
Rather it is argued, that the quest for offense dominance began during Abu Bakr’s 
administration. The continuation of the warfighting mentality from the maghazi 
period may well have resulted in an exaggeration of insecurity resulting in bellicose 
conduct, Van Evera states that it is often the case that actors ‘are seldom as insecure 
as they think they are. Moreover, if they are insecure, this insecurity often grows from 
their own efforts to escape imagined insecurity.’17 However, if the mandate of the 
Prophet’s mission was universal; then whether fear of insecurity were valid or not, the 
pacification of the Arabs as a prelude to systemic projection had always been an 
                                                
17 Van Evera (2004), p.264 
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inevitable objective of the Muslim political leadership. The only real way to ascertain 
a strategically viable interpretation to this question is to investigate actual actions 
undertaken following the death of the Prophet until the end of our research period. 
 
The administration of Abu Bakr we have negatively interpreted in relation to policies 
that were designed to serve offensive imperial ambitions. The Caliphate of ‘Umar, that 
is, the period of the Futuh and the official implementation of the Da’wa policy is the real 
investigative beginning point for sub-investigative question d. since the application of 
the Da’wa or the ‘Umar Doctrine remained virtually unchanged throughout the tenure 
of ‘Uthman until the hiatus induced by the Fitna. 
 
During both administrations of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, foreign policy was 
philosophically Islamic given its emancipatory goals, 18 but also reflected the enduring 
characteristics of power politics and the pursuit for primacy amongst nations. Across 
both the administrations, Jihad was instrumentally employed according to the dictates 
of the Da’wa policy, which retained the controlling interest of Jihad, employing 
warfighting to retain the strategic initiative. The Da’wa policy was inextricably linked 
to the Caliph’s conception of political, territorial, and religious integrity, alongside 
security concerns. The ‘Umar Doctrine was created in response to the existing 
strategic setting and environment. It was designed to create domestic stability through 
systemic gains in the form of a series of calculated responses to identified strategic 
problems (sub-investigative question c.). Jihad sublimated potential insurrection into 
harnessed aggression and violence to be deployed at the frontiers, thus galvanising the 
nomads to raid and fight against a common enemy instead of one another. When Jihad 
began to dwindle, insurrection returned. 
 
It was clear from the investigation that the observations investigated under sub-
investigative question c. had a far greater impact and influence upon the development 
of the Da’wa policy. Whilst a politically manipulated rhetoric of righteousness 
certainly infused deployments with zeal to translate absolute Jihad through Jihad fi 
sabil l’Allah, it seems that this was clearly a development, and belief at the individual 
level of analysis (sub-investigative questions a. and b.). 
                                                
18 Donner (1981), p.269 
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At the level of systemic interactions, realist assumptions of the strategic environment, 
such as anarchy and self-help, interpreted the Da’wa policy with greater clarity. In 
fact, it is hard not to see the strategic congruence of design, motivation, and coherence 
for the application of warfighting as a means of policy that were predicated upon the 
distinct assumptions of survival and security from the administrations of Abu Bakr to 
‘Uthman (632 – 656). 
 
The imperial character of the Da’wa 2.0. was politically created and manipulated to 
induce the same effects that the rhetoric of righteousness had - to credit and 
legitimate the ‘Umar Doctrine. In reality, the strategic investigation of the revived 
Da’wa policy during the Caliphate of Mu‘awiya reveals that the policy was directed 
toward the new threat analysis and estimation, in the aftermath of the Fitna. Policy 
and the application of Jihad had, since the Caliphate of ‘Umar, been consistently 
affected by the regional powers and with the end of the Sassanid Empire, the Muslims 
faced only Byzantium for regional dominance. Repetitive strategic interactions 
between the dar al-Islam and Byzantium resulted in shifting and changing dynamics 
with respect to preferences and strategies. General strategic assumptions generated 
under these circumstances were maintained with respect to Jihad as they had been 
with previous administrations. 
 
It is in the context of Mu‘awiya’s politico-military reforms and domestic policies, that 
a comparison can be made with the model upon which he predicted his administration 
upon regarding Jihad as an instrument of offensive imperial ambitions. The following 
explanation also addresses the concern of research question 4. In chapter 5, regarding the 
administration of ‘Umar, it was proposed that the Da’wa policy was a prudent means 
of protecting vital interests under conditions of self-help and an impending belief of 
reprisal attacks from the regional powers. To maintain the offensive strategic 
initiative and accumulate relative gains in an inherently hostile environment is a 
logical and strategically orientated policy with specific end-goals. In other words, as 
the Muslims entered the systemic space for the first time in their young history, as 
new actors in the strategic setting and with no experience of the systemic strategic 




The new Imperial Da’wa policy (2.0.) designed by Mu‘awiya held at its core the same 
assumptions of self-help, existential threat, and anarchy, but enshrined them as 
absolute and thus the belief that the permanent state of war reflected in absolute Jihad 
became an enduring political condition.19 The new Da’wa policy as a mode of 
imperial foreign policy in the seventh-century is still entirely understandable given the 
geo-political environment. The new Da’wa policy as a form of Islamic imperialism 
was not particularly different to the Hellenistic Byzantine or Zoroastrian Sassanid 
Empires who championed their religious ideologies to justify territorial expansionism 
and subjugation of the conquered.20 Accordingly, an accusation of imperial ambitions 
would more than likely not have been recognised prior to Mu‘awiya’s reign since the 
language of the Da’wa had been constructed through a rhetoric of righteousness since 
the days of ‘Umar. Furthermore, charges of ‘aggression’ could not be levied since 
ideals of da’wa as a means of emancipation was a divine right privileged to the 
Muslims by God.  The Da’wa policy carried the metaphysical charge of humanitarian 
intervention sanctioned by God Himself.21 
 
The consequent development of this new imperial policy in relation to strategic 
dynamics was to invest the office of the Caliph as permanently charged with the duty 
of translating the absolute Jihad.22 Thereafter, the early Muslim caliphate, according 
to Khalid Blankinship, more than any polity that had existed before it, was an 
ideological state, a state directed toward a single, unified ideological goal,23 ‘… this 
imperative was the establishment of God’s rule on the earth, for that was the sole 
legitimate sovereignty. God’s rule was to be established by those kinds of efforts that 
He had ordained, which included armed struggle in His path.’24 No longer could Jihad 
be championed to serve a homeland security policy, since Islam was not only the 
norm but obedience to the basic fundamentals had long been established. 
Additionally, the rhetoric of the Da’wa policy as a mechanism for emancipation had 
made such spectacular success already that a community emerging from civil war 
might well have been too conflict-weary to see the value in its continuation, 
preferring to consolidate what had already been achieved.  
                                                
19 See Kamali (2006), pp.223-4; Zuhayli (1965), pp.130, 135; and Khadduri (1966), p.17 
20 Robinson (2005), p.60 
21 See Q, 2:251 
22 Robinson (2003), p.134 
23 Blankinship (1994), p.11 
24 Ibid., p.1 
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This distinction between the new ‘imperial’ policy and the Da’wa policy of the ‘Umar 
Doctrine, is the answer to sub-investigative question d. and is directly connected to the 
sense of providentialism raised by sub-investigative question b.; an aggressive and 
offense-dominant strategic intention required a policy that sought to escalate the 
offensive weapons capability of the dar al-Islam, but also an uncontested level of 
regional or even international superiority. 
 
8.2. Research Questions 2 - 4 
The sub-investigative questions tackled most of the specific issues that are raised 
when approaching the subject matter of Jihad from the perspective of the strategic 
approach. The findings of the following research questions are addressed in the 
context of the sub-investigative conclusions, and the overall pattern of the analysis. 
8.2.1. Research Question 2 
2. Can a consistent link be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that 
the evolving strategic dynamics affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy? 
 
The investigation as a whole has consistently demonstrated direct correlations 
between successive administrations and the application of Jihad as a mechanism for 
policy. The evolving strategic dynamics that accompanied some of the 
administrations is best explained by research question 4, and therefore we shall return 
to this point shortly. Suffice that the general investigative requirement of this research 
question has been clearly acknowledged throughout the investigation, demonstrating 
throughout the sub-investigative questions as well as the research questions, ample 
evidence of continuation. 
8.2.2. Research Question 3 
 
3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-
political circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a 
set of strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious 
worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of 
the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment? 
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Offense-defense theory was used throughout this investigation to examine the validity 
of strategic interpretation to historical events, as they are known. Offense-defense 
analysis consistently revealed the horizontal nature of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah (distinct 
from absolute Jihad) during the maghazi period; and that Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was 
strategically directed and not religiously, or by the dictates of the theological 
imperative. Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was clearly a means of limited warfare not holy war.  
Whilst the initial raids were sanctioned by the Qur‘an, the resulting guerrilla 
campaign was the product of a strictly means-ends calculus. 
 
As the Muslims became increasingly successful in their battle against the Quraysh 
(post-Hudaybiyya), Jihad fi sabil l’Allah, that is, Jihad in reality or as a function of 
warfighting, became an increasingly offensive strategic instrument of political 
bargaining culminating in an overwhelming preponderance of latent violence that was 
used to secure a decisive victory in Mecca. In this sense, the term diplomacy of 
violence is the most befitting description of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah in its final form 
during the maghazi. Consequently, the mission of the Prophet was undoubtedly 
‘religious’ (that is, vertically inclined) yet the means-ends calculus employed by the 
Prophet and his advisors was, more often than not, horizontally explored. 
 
The predictions of offense-defense theory were consistent in explaining why an 
offensive character of diplomacy and bargaining was present throughout the maghazi, 
as well as highlighting the associated behaviours expected with politico-strategic 
decision-making. It was the nature of the tribal political structures and the anarchic 
conditions in Arabia that drove strategic interactions and designs over and above 
religious injunctions as we have elaborated upon during the investigation of sub-
investigative questions a. and b. 
 
The administration of Abu Bakr was a continuation of the politico-strategic designs of 
the Prophet, by other means. Once again, the crisis condition of the strategic setting 
and environment informed strategic action unquestionably, over and above religious 
ideals. Whilst the weight of personal faith or value-systems undeniably forged firm 
commitment (sub-investigative question b.), it is those elements of rational 
calculation and the instrumentalisation of force that were most apparent during this 
administration; as Schelling explains, ‘… what one does today in a crisis affects what 
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one can be expected to do tomorrow.’25 The overall calculi of Abu Bakr and his war 
council determined that the expected utility of violence had supreme efficacy in 
harmonsing ends with military means. 
 
The Pacification of Arabia extended to the northern grasslands bordering the 
Byzantine and Sassanid empires. Extending regional security meant de-escalating the 
military instrument to meet the limited nature of the use of the engagement. The 
recalibration of Jihad to limited warfare simultaneously induced a state of 
brinkmanship between the Muslims and the regional powers. Brinkmanship is a 
function of VUCA, and uncertainty about neighbours always exists, thus by extending 
the regional security Abu Bakr was also raising the manipulation of risks associated to 
limited war as he had done during the Ridda Wars. 
 
Although a risky strategy, it was politically sound. Schelling argues that brinkmanship 
strategies often seek to advance risky behaviours especially with regards to territory 
since ‘[n]ot all the frontiers and thresholds are precisely defined, fully reliable, and 
known to be so beyond the least temptation to test them out, to explore for loopholes, 
or to take a chance that they may be disconnected this time.’26 The offense-defense 
diagnosis supports the strategic interpretation of Abu Bakr’s extended security policy. 
This geostrategic expansion of the military effort was a continuation of strategic 
projection and design that would have the greatest weight upon the strategic dynamics 
of Jihad and the prime directives for its employment through subsequent 
administrations as it began a ‘domino effect’ in the region. Once again, Jihad fi sabil 
l’Allah and not absolute Jihad guided the utility and employment of warfighting 
capabilities as a subordinated instrument of policy. 
 
The majority of variables that influenced the offensive warfighting actions during 
‘Umar’s administration were secondary variables inherited from the previous 
administration or as a direct consequence of the strategic setting and environment both 
domestic and systemic. Undoubtedly, the theological imperatives of the Islamic meta-
narrative and absolute Jihad gave meaning and credibility to the new foreign policy of 
Da’wa, but only after developments had occurred and not before. 
                                                
25 Schelling (2008), p.93 
26 Ibid. 
 296 
In other words, the official policy of Da’wa certainly conveyed the tendency to 
conduct strategic behaviour inclined towards a set of strategic preferences and 
assumptions as the product of a religious worldview but was practiced horizontally as 
a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. 
Absolute Jihad would have demanded the zero-sum concept of victory that was clearly 
not adopted. Instead, ‘Umar adopted a nonzero-sum concept of victory as an 
acceptable political baseline calculation. Political goals were primarily a consequence 
of the domestic strategic setting, and secondarily, a matter of strategic preference 
managed according to a strict means and ends calculus of expected utility. 
 
The offense-defense diagnostics were clear in demonstrating the increasing 
predilection of Jihad as an offensive military instrument serving a political 
programme of security protocols as part of a strategy of conflict. And although a 
teleological consequence of Islam,27 Jihad had been a product of the rise of the dar al-
Islam, and not a cause for it. 28  As the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar 
demonstrated, Jihad as warfighting (qital) - fi sabil l’Allah - was part of ‘a long and 
deliberate process of political consolidation’29 and not a frenzied force of religious 
fervour.  
 
The Caliphate of ‘Uthman, during its first period, was a continuation of the Da’wa 
policy on all fronts with little to no amendments. Although the introduction of a 
standing naval fleet did enrich the Muslim military capabilities and open new avenues 
of exploitation; there were little to no signs or symptoms that religious preferences 
played any role in the determination of policy choices or military action. Instead, 
expected patterns of strategic behaviour anticipated, according to the prime 
predictions of offense-defense theory, were exhibited.30 The emergence of a new 
crisis environment within the domestic strategic setting was the catalyst to deflate the 
escalating offense-dominant approach of the Da’wa policy, as internal insurrections 
crippled the ability of central administrations to focus upon foreign policy. The 
outbreak of civil war saw the return of blind forces dominating the strategic setting, as 
tribal politics overshadowed foreign policy. 
                                                
27 As established by sub-investigative question b. 
28 Donner (1981), pp.295-6, fn.31 
29 Ibid., p.118 
30 Van Evera (2004), p.244 
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The socio-political grievances of tribal factions became the primary cause that halted 
the Jihad on all fronts. This indirectly reinforces the offense-defense diagnostic 
findings of the case investigation since Jihad had been determined as a result and 
consequence of the pressures and nature of both the domestic setting and the broader 
anarchic environment. In other words, religion had not directed Jihad horizontally 
neither did it bring it to a halt. The interim administration of ‘Ali further ratified this 
conclusion, since it was clear that appeals to re-ignite Jihad domestically fell on deaf 
ears since claims to authorise its use had been separate from foreign policy.  
 
It was in our final case study, the administration of Mu‘awiya, that the marriage of the 
variables proposed in research question 3 took place. The outwardly religious 
exhortation of the Da’wa policy 2.0. was, in effect, an exercise in political 
misdirection and a means to increase credibility and personal legitimacy within the 
domestic strategic setting. At the systemic level, the revival of the Da’wa policy was 
wholly a reaction to the pressures of the anarchic environment. Mu‘awiya’s effort to 
champion the absolute Jihad and the Manifest Destiny of the dar al-Islam through a 
new imperial agenda was a strategic development, and not religious. 
 
Damping the blind forces of passion by military recruitment, the accumulation of war 
booty and tax revenues to maintain ongoing military operations, whilst simultaneously 
managing systemic threats, were the primary reasons for the formulation of the imperial 
agenda. The rhetoric of righteousness, and the invitation for God to judge between the 
Muslims and their enemies, were part of Mu‘awiya’s strategic design to advance his 
political objectives. The ‘weaponising’ of absolute Jihad by invoking God’s Providence 
was a skillful political manipulation of the Islamic meta-narrative to serve domestic 
political interests. 
 
Hence across all six administrations of government the signs and symptoms of the 
offense-defense variables were consistently supportive in explaining politico-strategic 
decision-making and their consequences. The escalating drive of the dar al-Islam 
towards offense dominance in the region was clearly predicted according to expected 
strategic behaviours of offense-defense theory, and consistent in validating the strategic 
interpretations advanced during the investigation. 
 
 298 
8.2.3. Research Question 4 
 
4. Can the strategic dynamics of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests of 
Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation 
for the origin and evolution of warfighting? 
 
The investigation, which charted the strategic dynamics of Jihad over a 70-year 
period, has confirmed the prime predictions of offense-defense theory. Jihad was 
employed in a warfighting capacity to consistently advance the interests of the Islamic 
movement or the dar al-Islam when the strategic initiative was attained. When the 
strategic initiative was lacking, as during the Meccan phase of the maghazi, 
warfighting was not employed.31 As the offense grew stronger for the Muslims, they 
increasingly escalated in their resort to the military instrument in the name of Jihad, 
initiating a guerrilla campaign during the maghazi and seeking defensive 
expansionism by means of extended security under conditions of perceived 
vulnerability during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr. The policy of Da’wa promoted the 
notion of emancipatory interventionism but was more clearly identified as being a 
means to maintain and enhance the offensive strategic initiative during the 
administrations of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman. 
 
During the Caliphate of Mu‘awiya, the new policy of Da’wa was an attempt to regain 
the perceived loss, or at least the diminishing, strategic initiative.32 During periods of 
offense dominance, such as during the Futuh, the Muslims never relinquished the 
strategic initiative that reflected a sense of Providence and continued mission to 
promote the supremacy of God’s Will on earth. 33  From these investigative 
conclusions, it is clear that the early employment of Jihad in its warfighting capacity 
was distinctly offense-orientated to achieving an offense-dominant status in relation 
to other actors, and hence sought regional hegemony.  
 
                                                
31 Prediction 1. - War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed easy, less 
common when conquest is difficult or is believed difficult; 
32 Prediction 2. - States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive 
vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states; 
33 Prediction 3. - A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, 
larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities 
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Below (Figure 3.) is an overview of the strategic reconstruction of the dynamics 
involved and those characteristic features that were connected to the application and the 
development of those policies, which regulated its military function and utility. 
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Figure 3. - The Strategic Dynamics of Jihad to Policy 
 
The evolving strategic dynamics of Jihad consistently reflects the state of the strategic 
environment, setting, and the interaction between actors, such that direct and indirect 
outcomes had net consequences for the system as a whole. This meant that each 
administration of the dar al-Islam was never truly acting according to an independent 
will,34 even when dictating the strategic initiative through Jihad. Instead, we see a 
continuum of operations and policies both internal and external, which kept 
administrations always reacting or making decisions in response to events taking 
place or having had occurred; this being true for all actors within the operational 
strategic environment, because anarchy is concomitant with interdependence. 
 
                                                
34 Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14 
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For example, during the Futuh, the predilection of invoking variables to achieve 
offense-dominance in the short-term were extremely high because strategic 
interactions were intended to be unique, thereby avoiding considerations of 
cooperative preferences or strategies for decisive victory. Hence, during the later 
stages of ‘Uthman’s administration and throughout that of Mu‘awiya, the effects of 
continued battle with Byzantium resulted in mid-to-long term strategies, as opposed 
to the high-risk short-term offense dominant strategies of the first two Caliphates. 
Though imperial in its swagger, continued indecisive military campaigns and a series 
of frontier stalemates created the beginnings of hostile-cooperative diplomatic 
contacts between the dar al-Islam and Byzantium. 
 
The outwardly aggressive re-ignition of Jihad to strike at Byzantium on all fronts was 
actually a battle between ‘defense dominant’ orientated opponents. Strategically 
interpreted, Jihad as directed by Da’wa 2.0. was driven to maintain control of the 
tactical initiative as a prelude to the strategic. The outward description of events as 
presented by historians might suggest the opposite, however the logic of strategy 
demands that the overall strategy that directs the tactical efficiency of military 
operations are examined and judged by their ability to achieve political ends.35 The 
tactical operations of Jihad directed by Da’wa 2.0. clearly revealed a strategy that did 
not seek decisive battle, instead force was scattered, rather than concentrated; and 
defense dominant strategies replaced the offense dominant perception for the first 
time in Islamic history. Nonetheless the cult of the offensive remained, as defense was 
sought in the mindset of the offensive. Luttwak’s expression ‘Great-State Autism’ is 
the most illustrative in this context as he explains: 
 
In all great states there is so much internal activity that leaders and 
opinion-makers cannot focus seriously on foreign affairs as well, 
except in particular times of crisis. … decisions on foreign affairs 
are almost always made on the basis of highly simplified, 
schematic representations of unmanageably complex realities, 
                                                
35 Smith (1997), p. 102 
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which are then distorted to fit within internally generated 
categories, expectations, and perspectives.36 
 
The Da’wa 2.0. ‘nationalised’ Jihad and became an essential element of Muslim 
political unity and identity as Mu‘awiya appealed to the glory of the Futuh, and 
invoked absolute Jihad, paradoxically not to conquer, but to create a status quo 
condition and bolster a deterrent capability against Byzantium.37 Simply put, Jihad 
was employed offensively as the best way to defend the vulnerabilities of the dar al-
Islam. 
 
In conclusion, the evolving strategic dynamics distinctly reveals that as a means of 
limited war, Jihad was no different to any other form of warfare (sub-investigative 
question a.), in that, it demonstrated a consistent failure to impose enduring political 
results from decisive military victories. Most of the military victories of the maghazi 
period were politically over-turned once the Prophet died. Abu Bakr’s military 
victories during the Ridda Wars ended in semi-permanent results on account of tribal 
extinction or decimation. The political operation of ‘Umar to absorb the security 
policy into the Da’wa policy was predicated upon projecting limited war to the 
frontiers; an exercise with successful political victories that were short lived. After 
‘Umar died revolts took place both within the dar al-Islam and external to it, 
diminishing the success that had been accrued before it. 
 
These short-term results are perhaps unsurprising since, as Schelling so writes: ‘To 
engage in limited war is to start rocking the boat, to set in motion a process that is not 
altogether in one's control.’ 38  The strategic dynamics of Jihad were largely 
determined by horizontal domestic stability as much as the pressures of systemic 
anarchy, over and before vertical imperatives, which explains the offensive military 
conquests of Islamic history within the remit of policies that were designed with a 
high estimation in the efficacy of warfighting to realise political ends. 
 
 
                                                
36 Luttwak (2012), pp.13-14 
37 On mutual dynamics and deterrence as a means of warding off premeditated war or ‘accidental war’ 
see Schelling (2008), pp.221, 230-1 
38 Schelling (2008), pp.105-6 
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8.3. Research Question 1 
 
1. Is Jihad is a continuation of politik by other means; that is to ask the question 
therefore, what is the link between politik (policy and politics) and the 
application of force in the name of Jihad? 
 
Finally we arrive to the central research question and prime agenda of this thesis. 
Clausewitz wrote ‘If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it 
is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration 
in conducting it.’39 The political purposes of Jihad have been revealed horizontally on 
the plane of war in reality, as the idiom of military action, in other words, as a 
warfighting capability. Proposition one and two of the strategic paradigm states that 
war and warfighting are considered core parts of human social relations, and on the 
basis of strategic observation we have demonstrated that Jihad was a continued 
political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a social unit, whether 
an organised political polity, a tribe, or a prophet. ‘Nations, like people, [and tribes]’ 
Schelling writes, ‘are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of nerve, 
and explorations for understandings and misunderstandings’;40 that is, engaged in the 
bargaining exercise of politics. 
 
This study has investigated six successive administrations of the earliest Islamic 
political administrations as case studies to explore the relationship between the 
function of Jihad and politik. The results have demonstrated that the application of 
Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was consistently in harmony with the propositions of the 
strategic paradigm (and thus strategic theory in general), and strategic interactions 
examined in the context of offense-defense theory; demonstrating congruity with our 
thesis that the origin and evolution of Jihad was the product of rational calculation 
and the strategic instrumentalisation of Jihad fi sabil l’Allah as a warfighting 
capability to serve the interests of the early Islamic movement. As a warfighting 
capability, the purposes for which Jihad fi sabil l’Allah was employed resonated with 
existing practices of war according to the Ayyam al-‘Arab traditions.  
                                                
39 Schelling (2008), p.87 
40 Ibid., p.93 
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Haykal identifies 30 pre-Islamic applications of warfighting for the interests of policy 
from the Ayyam al-‘Arab traditions. Having condensed the list into 20 applications of 
pre-Islamic warfighting and tabulating these against applications of Jihad below 
reveals common patterns of warfighting. The congruence of Arab warfighting 
practices to Jihad exposes the commonality of practice on account of sharing 
objectives in service of limited warfare. 
 














Acquisition of material 
wealth 
✔   ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Differences in Assabiyyah 
or as a missionary means 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Contests for political 
authority 
✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Geo-strategic contests for 
land 
✔   ✔ ✔  ✔ 
The suppression of internal 
insurrection 
✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Interference in the internal 
affairs of other nations 
✔   ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Regional hegemony ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Class warfare ✔ ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Internal Unification ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Wars of liberation ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Wars of succession ✔  ✔   ✔  
Status quo balancing ✔    ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Protecting foreign interests ✔    ✔   
Breaking treaties ✔ ✔   ✔  ✔ 
Coercion to form alliances ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Political entrapment ✔ ✔     ✔ 
Pre-emptive strikes ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ 
Foreign and separatist 
interventions 
✔  ✔  ✔   
Internal rectification ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
War by proxy ✔       
Total Variables 20 9 9 9 16 7 16 
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The generally shared practice of limited warfare41 supports the thesis that Jihad was, 
like war in general, a continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz states, 
‘Policy, then will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature 
will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them’. 42  The warfighting 
orientations of the Muslims differed according to time and place, resulting in Jihad 
being employed across a variety of policies. It is clear that the instrumental nature of 
Jihad, like all forms of strategic violence, ‘always stands in need of guidance and 
justification through the end it pursues. And what needs justification by something 
else cannot be the essence of anything.’43 In this respect, the teleological connection 
between Jihad as a translation of absolute Jihad in service of political ends is most 
meaningful. In other words, absolute Jihad authorised horizontal translation into 
policy. 
 
The common denominator of limited war between Jihad and the Ayyam al-‘Arab 
traditions is rendered separate once the aims of policy are explored. Jihad was 
authorised and subordinated to policy only if policies were themselves congruent and 
in harmony with the Islamic meta-narrative or its ideals and injunctions, i.e. the 
Qur’an, or by precedent of the Prophet, through word or deed.44 From the strategic 
investigation of this study, the following inferences regarding policy can be made 
based upon the six case studies explored: Policies that are the result of referent objects 
of Islam, such as in defence of the jurisdiction of God, territorial integrity, or the 
Muslim body politic at large; are all commensurate threats that can be used to initiate 
Jihad. Policies that are designed to enhance the security of these objects, or to 
promote the supremacy of the Shari‘a, or are in service of emancipatory 
interventionism are also justifiable.45 
 
Politics, that are bargaining exercises for the promotion or security of domestic and 
trinitarian harmony, are also variables that Jihad may be commissioned to service. 
This includes, the pacification of internal rebellion, insurgencies or terrorism.46 Jihad 
                                                
41 The Ridda Wars having been the sole exception, alongside the inferred assumption that unlimited 
war would be waged in the face of an impacting existential threat. 
42 OW, p.87 
43 Arendt (1970), p.51 
44 Research Question 3 
45 Research Question 4 
46 Sub-Investigative Question c. 
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was not commissioned to serve ambitions that fell beyond the concern of the Shari‘a 
or were in contradistinction to it, its aims, ideals, or the general meta-narrative of 
Islam.47 Warfighting was considered the highest function of Jihad fi Sabil l’Allah, 
although it is clear that as a function of politik, the early Muslim movement was 
‘total’ in its worldview. 
 
Hence, Jihad fi Sabil l’Allah was a part of the ‘total war’ of absolute Jihad expounded 
in the Qur’an and the meta-narrative between Truth and Falsehood, in which all 
Muslims had a role to play, warfighting being the highest.48 Jihad therefore was 
teleologically linked to Islam via absolute Jihad,49 but altered in its application given 
the evolving strategic dynamics of the setting and environment and the nature of the 
anarchic systemic environment.50 Jihad was the idiom of military action during the 
first 70 years of Islam, and as such, it was the continuation of politk by other means. 
 
8.4. Final Remarks 
Clausewitz writes that the ‘primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and 
ideas that have become confused and entangled.’51 Concepts and ideas pertaining to 
the matter of Jihad have become, as discussed in Chapter One, as confused and 
entangled as they have become academically stagnant. It is customary today that the 
more benevolent and co-operative expression of diplomacy and conviviality is what 
most Muslims (and some non-Muslims) would like to believe was the norm between 
the dar al-Islam and their neighbours; but it was the quest for offense-dominance and 
the strategic initiative that most accurately reflects the competitive state of political 
affairs during the first 70 years of Islamic history. 
 
The early Muslim community was forged in the crucible of war. The history of early 
Islam is one of Trinitarian successes but more often of consistent failures to balance 
internal rectification and external power management as the cult of the offensive 
increasingly dominated policy. 52  Consequently, from guerrilla warfare, to an 
                                                
47 Sub-Investigative Question d. 
48 Sub-Investigative Question a. 
49 Sub-Investigative Question b. 
50 Research Question 2 
51 OW, p.132 
52 Quigley (2013), pp.731-3 
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instrument of security, and then as an instrument in service of a strategy of systemic 
conflict, Jihad, like a chameleon, reveals itself as a structurally fluid and 
philosophically instrumentalised mechanism of realpolitik. The dynamic application 
of Jihad was a result of the strategic environment, and in response to the behaviour of 
the dar al-Islam’s adversaries. In other words, the policies which directed Jihad, and 
its military expression, found realpolitik behaviour by adapting to the nature of the 
anarchic systemic level of international relations and war. 
 
This investigation has clearly demonstrated the following: the Prophet and successive 
administrations employed Jihad in accordance with their politico-strategic calculus of 
means and ends within their respective strategic environments and settings. Absolute 
Jihad served as a theo-philosophical foundation that legitimated, calibrated, and 
justified policy, but never dictated the horizontal application of force. Jihad was 
subject to the variables of VUCA as any other forms of warfare might be, and 
consistently served as an instrument of policy between 610-680 in an increasingly 
offense-dominant warfighting capability. 
 
8.5. Areas of Continuing Research 
Pre-legal Islam, that is, before the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate (~750), operated 
without any set ‘Islamic’ military doctrine, or any specific formulation of warfighting 
which is identifiably ‘Islamic’. There were however, specific challenges to ‘Muslim’ 
security and strategic interests. Hence, a broadly articulated form of security thinking 
and strategic practice developed that would later direct legal developments in the 
Muslim world. The codification of legal opinions formulated on the conduct of Jihad 
was an attempt by jurists to reconstruct the warfighting practices during the periods 
we have examined primarily, but also broadly up until their own time periods. 
 
Politics and law are deeply connected in Islam; yet it was the political discourse that 
dominated the early strategic development of theory and application of Jihad before 
the legal.53 In this pre-legal paradigm period, Jihad was not constrained or directed by 
law but by politik. Therefore, the most salient and obvious area of research that this 
                                                
53 Cook (2005), pp.11, 19-21 
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study reveals are those areas that relate to the transition between pre-legal, or politico-
strategic Jihad, and the legal paradigm of Jihad that is well-known today. 
 
By pre-dating the development of the legal institution in Islam, areas of further study 
are abundant, and can include but are not restricted to, primarily a systematic study of 
the Prophet’s politico-strategic and military career in the context of revolutionary war; 
military operations, guerrilla warfare theory; and broader themes of missionary 
emancipation, theo-political sovereignty and models of theocratic governance. In 
particular, the politico-strategic response and aggressive military stance of the Ridda 
Wars proved difficult for later Islamic scholarship and jurists to rationalise and 
justify.54 Traditional attempts have never fully satisfied anyone, and modern research 
in the area feeds off the same insufficient works. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the 
Ridda campaigns, including operational and tactical analysis, as a means to exposing 
the first form of non-Prophetic warfighting in Islam that laid the foundations for later 
legal codification and legislation for foreign policy, and military action, such as pre-
emptive warfighting and targeted killing, amongst others, is a potential treasure trove 
of strategic study in the making. 
 
An entire study, or series of studies, can be envisioned to cover the administrative and 
military reforms during the Caliphate of ‘Umar and the socio-political influence of the 
period on early Islamic politico-strategic thought. Identifying distinctive assumptions 
of Jihad embedded in the developing spatial narrative55 (the dar al-harb and dar al-
Islam dichotomy) during the Futuh is an exciting prospect for elaboration; as too 
would be coverage of institutional developments such as the constituents of the 
‘Umar Doctrine, the emergence of Islamic naval power, the establishments of the 
shurta (police) and haras (close and secret services); the judiciary and their growing 
influence as scholasticism grew. 
 
 
Strategic theory has revealed the importance of contextualising an actor’s value 
system into any strategic analysis. Often writers would rather do without the 
                                                
54 Madelung (2001), pp.48-9; and Abou El Fadl (2001) 
55 See Lefebrve (1991); also de Certeau (1984), pp.115-30; and Pred (1990), p.50.  
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consideration of the abstract or supernatural, but to accept their existence as variables 
in the decision-making processes of actors is not to impose beliefs upon oneself, 
which all too often is the reason for their neglect. Strategic theory, being pragmatic 
accepts that if an actor believes something to be true then there is great value in 
accepting this belief in subsequent analysis. Often the temptation is to ignore the 
belief or to wish it away through scientific explanation or interpretation. Hence, 
research specifically investigating the providentialism associated with Jihad is 
especially pertinent given the parallels to the rallying calls of Jihad by non-state actors 
and the associated effects of violence as a result. Indeed, whilst studies have been 
conducted in the areas of intra-Muslim violence, these are almost always working 
within the later legal paradigm and thus are post-facto revisions of selective 
interpretations. 
 
In the midst of sustained interest in areas of Islam and violence (radicalisation, 
extremism, terrorism, etc.) this study stands alone as being the first to have not only 
distinguished Jihad from legal interpretation, but in doing so, made Jihad a 
strategically intelligible concept and an accessible area of research for further study 
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